Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky began a European tour in Paris on Thursday, which will also take him to London, Rome, and Berlin. These bilateral talks come as Russian pressure steadily but surely intensifies in eastern Ukraine, while rhetoric among supporters of the country appears to be shifting. In addition to Germany freezing economic aid, the upcoming U.S. presidential election raises fears in Kyiv of a Donald Trump victory, signaling a potential decrease in Western support. Can the recent territorial gains by the Ukrainian army in the Kursk Oblast reverse the tide? Does this change in the situation make negotiations with Russia more likely? What do the affected populations think?
Since the Ukrainian offensive in Kursk on August 6, 2024, and following a new episode of tensions in Crimea, how have the military positions of Ukraine and Russia evolved?
Russian pressure is increasing. The Russian army has recently been bolstered to 2.4 million personnel, including 1.5 million combatants by the end of the year. The Russian government has not needed to conduct a second mobilization following that of autumn 2022; it has simply increased bonuses for contract soldiers and raised the maximum conscription age from 27 to 30. Russian superiority in personnel, shells, tanks, aircraft, and missiles is felt on the ground, despite the resumption and acceleration of Western aid to Ukraine.
However, as of now, the Russians have not managed to dislodge the Ukrainians from the pocket they captured in the Kursk Oblast last August nor to seize the logistical hub of Pokrovsk. The slow encroachment on villages around Pokrovsk continues, despite the heroic defense by Ukrainians and heavy Russian losses. Vuhledar, a key point, was taken in early October, tightening the vise. Pressure is widespread in the Luhansk and Donetsk Oblasts, while Zaporizhzhia is regularly bombarded. Only the southwest sector (Kherson) remains relatively untouched for the moment. Clearly, the Russian priority is to conquer the entirety of the four oblasts formally annexed to Russia in September 2022, despite the Russian army not fully controlling the territory at that time (Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhzhia, Kherson, along with Crimea annexed in 2014).
As we approach the thousandth day of open war between Russia and Ukraine, what is the public opinion position in both countries regarding the conflict?
There is, of course, a noticeable fatigue, and the difficulties in recruitment in Ukraine—and to a lesser extent, in Russia—reflect this. However, Russians still resonate with the theme of Russia being besieged by a “collective West,” promoted by the Kremlin, and support for Putin remains above 70% (according to the Levada Institute). On the Ukrainian side, there is a slight decline in the popularity of Volodymyr Zelensky (55% favorable opinion at the end of August 2024, despite a surge during the Ukrainian offensive in Kursk early in the month), and notably, supporters of negotiation have surged from 33% a year ago to 57%, according to the International Sociology Institute of Kyiv.
The Russian government presents a united front following the “triumphant” (but contested) election of President Putin in March (with 88% of the vote) and the ousting of the previous Minister of Defense, Sergei Shoigu, in May, along with nearly all his teams.
On the Ukrainian side, which is much more transparent, a significant reshuffle occurred in September, with the resignations of Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba and ministers of Justice, Environment, and Strategic Industries, as well as some associates of President Zelensky. The president himself could not be “re-legitimized” by the polls due to the impossibility of organizing presidential elections in a partially occupied country. The newcomers are seen as more open to negotiation. It is highly likely that a very tough debate is taking place within Ukrainian leadership about war conduct and the appropriateness of negotiations involving territorial compromises.
What about Western engagement in this conflict in light of recent announcements by French President Emmanuel Macron and the upcoming U.S. presidential election? What could be the impact of the election results on the continuation of the war and potential negotiations?
Western financial commitment is likely to weaken. The European Union has just decided to grant an additional 35 billion euros, backed by the interest on frozen Russian assets, but the implementation of this decision appears to be facing some legal and technical challenges. Germany has announced it will reduce its aid by half in 2025.
Financial aid to Ukraine is also contested by American Republicans, particularly vice-presidential candidate J.D. Vance. Joe Biden is seeking to solidify support before the elections (with an additional 8 billion dollars in military aid announced at the end of September), but he is discreetly pressuring Zelensky to consider negotiations. He has expressed reluctance regarding Ukraine’s immediate NATO membership, shelved the “Victory Plan” presented by the Ukrainian president at the UN General Assembly, and finally, refused to allow Kyiv to strike deep into Russia.
The Western aid coordination meeting scheduled for October 10 at Ramstein during Biden’s visit to Germany, intended to revitalize aid to Ukraine, has been postponed due to the American president’s cancellation of his visit because of Hurricane Milton. France, which had declared in May that it did not rule out sending troops on the ground and had maintained some ambiguity about deep strikes, is becoming more discreet, with Emmanuel Macron once again discussing Russia’s place in post-war Europe.
Zelensky’s visit to Paris on October 10 is likely to reaffirm French aid (including the delivery of Mirage aircraft) but also to initiate discussions on the opening of negotiations. Ideas are circulating: Polish Foreign Minister Radosław Sikorsky considers a UN mandate for Crimea; Annalena Baerbock, her German counterpart, stated at the UN General Assembly that “we need peace” to avoid the destruction of Ukraine. According to media reports, Ukrainian and Western experts are discussing various formulas (de facto control of occupied territories formally recognized as belonging to Russia in exchange for Ukraine joining NATO). German Chancellor Olaf Scholz, weakened by high peace supporter ratings in eastern Länder, has indicated he is considering a phone conversation with Putin. The Financial Times discusses a “German scenario” involving a division between East and West similar to West Germany and East Germany. The Sino-Brazilian plan, based on a preliminary ceasefire that would freeze the situation to the benefit of the Russians, is firmly rejected by Ukraine, with Zelensky labeling it as “destructive” at the UN podium.
Nonetheless, the “great maneuvers” aimed at opening negotiations have begun. But it remains to be seen if Russia, which holds the military advantage and is counting on the “fatigue” of the West, will engage in the process.
