Recently, there has been significant debate about the nature of the current relationship between the Russian Federation and North Korea, especially following Kim Jong-un’s extended visit to Russia and his meeting with President Vladimir Putin and Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu on September 13, 2023. This visit led to increased speculation regarding the possibility of North Korea supplying Russia with ammunition needed in its ongoing war with Ukraine, particularly since the United States has hinted at this several times, warning of the consequences. These warnings intensified with Kim’s visit to Russia.
Indicators of Russian-North Korean Cooperation
Stepping away from the historical context of the Soviet Union, during which relations between Moscow and Pyongyang reached their peak, recent history—particularly following President Putin’s rise to power—has seen the countries’ relations move past the relative chill experienced under President Boris Yeltsin. Despite overcoming that period of indifference and holding high-level visits, Russia found itself compelled to agree to UN Security Council resolutions imposing sanctions on North Korea due to its ongoing nuclear and missile tests.
However, as US-Russian relations have soured in recent years, Moscow and Beijing have not continued to follow Washington’s lead in imposing additional sanctions on North Korea through new Security Council resolutions. Instead, they have begun to call for easing these sanctions, especially with the thaw in relations not only between Pyongyang and Seoul but also between the North and Washington, evident through high-level summits. Even after tensions resurfaced when Trump-Kim meetings yielded little, Moscow and Beijing insisted on preventing new resolutions against Pyongyang, which has ramped up its missile launches at unprecedented rates. One argument justifying this stance is that the counterparty bears significant responsibility for the tension on the Korean Peninsula through its provocative actions, notably the expanding military exercises between the US and South Korea, alongside constant reminders of an essential aspect of international decisions, which is encouraging negotiations alongside punitive measures like sanctions.
The war in Ukraine has further tightened the bond between Moscow and Pyongyang, as the latter has wholly adopted the Russian narrative that it has aligned itself with Moscow’s actions, including the war declaration and the recognition of the Donetsk and Luhansk republics, followed by their annexation with the Kherson and Zaporizhzhia regions. Naturally, North Korea stands out as one of the few nations opposing all international resolutions condemning Russia and rejecting its actions in Ukraine. The words used by the North Korean leader during his meeting with President Putin encapsulated this sentiment, declaring that Russia is waging a “sacred” war against forces of “evil” and affirming North Korea’s support for Russia in its fight against “imperialism,” expressing confidence in achieving victory, and endorsing all Russian decisions concerning this issue.
Given North Korea’s stance, it is reasonable to expect continued exchange of messages between the leaderships of both nations. The recent visit of the Russian Minister of Defense to Pyongyang served as a sign of Russia’s appreciation for North Korea’s position. Both parties have been speaking increasingly about elevating their relationship to new heights. At the recent summit, it was confirmed that all issues were discussed, with Russia hinting at undisclosed matters.
Will Pyongyang Supply Moscow with Weapons?
This issue has been raised multiple times, especially by the United States, to which Pyongyang has explicitly denied any such plans. However, following the Russian defense minister’s visit, North Korea has not reiterated its previous rejection, nor has it confirmed any arms supply. Prior to Kim’s visit to Russia, American warnings intensified, accompanied by threats of sanctions should North Korea indeed supply ammunition that Washington believes Russia needs for its war in Ukraine. This time, it was noted that warnings included claims of evidence suggesting that Pyongyang had supplied the Wagner Group with some ammunition.
Statements from Russia regarding discussions on various forms of cooperation, as well as the types of places visited by Kim Jong-un, and the composition of his delegation, along with joint meetings, aside from the encounter with the Russian president, carry numerous implications. For example, in a symbolic gesture, Putin gifted Kim a modern Russian rifle, while Kim reciprocated with a North Korean rifle. Beyond meetings with President Putin, Kim also met with Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu, who showed him Russian aircraft manufacturing facilities and naval assets. High-ranking North Korean military officials also met their Russian counterparts. Although there were no announcements of specific agreements or signed contracts, President Putin’s clear remarks about assisting Pyongyang with its space program indicate potential agreements or deals. North Korea has attempted to launch a spy satellite twice, in May 2023 and August 2023, but failed both times, showing determination to try again. Such Russian technical assistance or facilitation is likely to encompass areas beyond military aspects, including various civilian fields. Additionally, the locations visited by Kim—starting with Russia’s newest space center, which hosted their joint summit, followed by military and civilian aircraft factories, and the Pacific Fleet—offer deep significance.
Notably, Pyongyang is not the only nation receiving warnings and accusations from the US regarding potential arms supplies to Russia; China is also included. Despite their prior denials, both countries have pointed to US actions that incite conflict, arguing that Washington’s policies have disregarded Russian security concerns. Hence, the US has supplied Ukraine with unprecedented quantities and types of weapons.
Specifically regarding Pyongyang, it has previously asserted that it has not exported arms and ammunition to Russia and has no future plans in this regard, considering US claims to be unfounded rumors and part of a broader American conspiracy against it, amidst Washington’s hostile policy which seeks to defame its international reputation. Furthermore, Pyongyang has emphasized that any laws cited by Washington to justify sanctions against potential transactions between itself and Moscow are illegal.
The string of decisions issued by the Security Council has included severe sanctions not only on arms exports but has broadly curtailed North Korea’s ability to acquire financial resources to fund its unconventional arms programs. Therefore, the US not only relies on Security Council sanctions but actively tracks entities and individuals it accuses of circumventing these decisions. Furthermore, sanctions extend beyond exports to encompass extensive restrictions on imports. Hence, the US warns that any arms and ammunition exports would constitute a violation of Security Council resolutions not only by Pyongyang but by Moscow as well.
Russia can potentially acquire weapons and ammunition from North Korea without it being publicly acknowledged. Logistically, this is a feasible proposition, especially given the shared border between the two countries. However, the pressing questions remain: Does Russia genuinely need weapons and ammunition from North Korea? Can the latter meet Russia’s demands? What conditions might govern such transactions?
The only known source of imported weapons for Russia engaged in the current conflict is drones. Beyond this, there is uncertainty regarding whether Russia imports arms or ammunition from other nations. Suppose we presume that Moscow, noted for its extensive arms production and as one of the largest arms suppliers globally, is indeed in need of specific types of weapons and ammunition amidst rigorous battle deployments. In that case, will North Korea be its primary option?
One could query: what are the countries that might precede North Korea as suppliers to Russia? In this case, the first choice might be Belarus, given the unity format between the two countries, their aligned perspectives, and the Collective Security Treaty Organization involving other Central Asian and Caucasian nations. Additionally, Russia has publicly announced plans to transfer tactical nuclear weapons to Belarus while retaining control over them. Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko played a significant role in quelling the rebellion led by Wagner Group leader Yevgeny Prigozhin before he was killed in a plane crash. Among what was agreed to end this rebellion was for Wagner leaders and their forces to relocate to camps in Belarus. Moreover, Belarus’s proximity to the battlefield is noteworthy, given their shared border with Ukraine. It may be argued that Belarus’s capabilities for arms manufacturing are limited, and even if it supplied Moscow, Russia would still require ammunition. Consequently, Russia’s options would be narrowed down to China and Pyongyang, with Tehran as a possibility, as it supplies Moscow with drones, reportedly containing Chinese components.
If Russia were to request arms and ammunition from Beijing, it would have to consider numerous factors, unlike with North Korea, which would likely hastily fulfill such a request as it first does not acknowledge Security Council resolutions against it and views them as a form of war against it. Second, it has little to lose by meeting Russia’s requests. At the same time, it comprehends that Washington cannot do much more to it than it already does. Third, North Korea now finds itself in a position to threaten and intimidate before Washington and its allies, even issuing threats of nuclear war. Recent exercises before Kim’s trip to Russia included drills for launching tactical nuclear strikes, along with announcing the launch of a submarine carrying nuclear missiles. Importantly, high-ranking Russian officials have reiterated threats of nuclear war numerous times amid the ongoing conflict in Ukraine. Lastly, North Korea’s responsiveness to Russian requests is likely to foster further understanding regarding trading facilities, including not only commercial exchanges but potentially the influx of North Korean labor which Russia might be more eager for now than ever. There could also be the exchange of military experts and perhaps even collaborative military drills. Recent intelligence leaks have suggested proposals for trilateral naval maneuvers including China, North Korea, and Russia, amid the intensifying Chinese-Russian naval exercises in recent years.
What Lies Ahead After the Putin-Kim Summit?
Talk of a meeting between Vladimir Putin and Kim Jong-un intensified about two weeks before Kim’s visit, fueled by speculations based on various indicators, including the arrival of a large North Korean delegation to Russia at the end of August. It is noteworthy that this visit encompassed not just the summit meeting but various locations throughout Russia, enriching the significance of the visit which was lengthy by diplomatic standards. Some may argue that the extended duration was influenced by travel logistics, either from North Korea to Russia or within Russia itself, given the distances involved. However, that alone does not account for the length of the visit, as Kim could have traversed Russia by air but chose not to. If this was indeed a North Korean insistence, it was well-received by Russia, implying a desire for Kim and his entourage to remain in Russia for as long as possible.
This visit occurred against a backdrop of escalating ties between Russia and North Korea amid the deterioration of relations with Washington for both Moscow and Pyongyang. Furthermore, there is no existing Security Council resolution preventing such meetings. Kim has met with former US President Donald Trump and previously with President Putin nearly four years ago, as well as with Chinese President Xi Jinping several times. Consequently, given that North Korea and Russia find themselves in the same corner, it is only natural for the leaders of both countries to meet. Should both sides agree to a meeting, they would not heed the protests from Washington and its allies, considering their current relationships with the US. This is precisely what transpired, and even President Putin announced he had accepted Kim’s invitation to visit Pyongyang.
If Washington reproached former Pakistani Prime Minister Imran Khan after his visit to Moscow following the outbreak of the Ukraine war and allegedly sought to topple him, it has been unable to prevent African leaders from visiting Moscow for talks with Putin. Furthermore, it could not dare to caution the Chinese President against repeated meetings with Putin, although it might strongly criticize the Putin-Kim meeting without possessing the means to halt such engagements. The US does not have any significant punitive measures it can impose against Moscow or Pyongyang. For North Korea specifically, it appears that the US policy has reached a dead end; neither have the sanctions yielded any results nor has North Korea heeded the constant US calls for unconditional dialogue. Rather, it has openly stated that it is no longer interested in this dialogue against the backdrop of US aggression. What do they have to negotiate, given its firm stance that it will not relinquish its nuclear arsenal and will instead actively work to strengthen and expand it to enhance its overall strength necessary to protect its sovereignty and dignity, deterring any aggression against it.
In this context, North Korea has not hidden its pursuit of acquiring nuclear-powered submarines, raising speculation about possible Russian assistance in this endeavor. Specifically, this issue is the most complex due to North Korea already possessing nuclear weapons, albeit outside the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, which recognizes only the five nuclear powers, all of which hold veto rights in the Security Council. Hence, North Korea’s possession of such weapons is a violation of the international non-proliferation regime. Furthermore, these five nuclear powers are supposed to refrain from supplying nuclear weapons to other countries or enabling them to acquire such capabilities. However, the discussion of this topic evokes the agreement reached between the United States, the UK, and Australia for Washington and London to furnish Canberra with conventionally-armed nuclear-powered submarines, an arrangement met with fierce opposition from Beijing, Moscow, and Pyongyang, who argue it upsets the balance of power in the region and triggers an arms race, not to mention its violation of the international non-proliferation regime. With North Korea’s announcement to pursue this path, it would not be lacking in justifications, including the Australian model. However, what about Moscow? Can it technically assist Pyongyang in achieving this objective?
So far, no indications suggest such a direction from Russia, especially as the North Korean announcement is relatively recent. Moreover, Pyongyang might not require the same kind of assistance Canberra will receive to acquire these submarines, given that Australia does not possess nuclear weapons like North Korea. Additionally, Canberra and its partners state that their cooperation aligns with adherence to the international non-proliferation regime and that they remain in contact with the International Atomic Energy Agency regarding details of their collaboration in this regard. Remarkably, Rafael Grossi, Director-General of the IAEA, has ruled out the likelihood of Russia engaging in non-proliferation treaty-violating deals with Pyongyang.
Not only is Washington cautioning against military cooperation, whether narrowly regarding the war in Ukraine or broadly encompassing various fields, but South Korea’s voice is increasingly raised. Its President, Yoon Suk-yeol, has argued that such collaboration is illegal and violates UN Security Council resolutions.
The issue of potential joint maneuvers among Moscow, Pyongyang, and Beijing remains. Should this occur, it would mark a qualitative shift. Yet, as of now, there are no specifics about this matter. One cannot conclusively determine whether Beijing would participate in such drills, despite frequent joint exercises with Moscow, especially in recent years. Could the exercises be bilateral between Moscow and Pyongyang? All possibilities remain open, especially since the analysis goes beyond just logistics or timing of the exercises. It includes numerous factors not solely related to Russian-North Korean relations, but rather intertwined with the ongoing, primarily conflictual dynamics between Moscow and Washington and its Western allies, alongside certain allies in Asia. Conversely, it is also connected to the interactions occurring between Washington and Beijing across several issues, including Taiwan. It is noteworthy that Pyongyang stands firmly alongside both Russia and China, responding strongly to everything Washington and its allies propose. Will the continuing Western pressure solidify the Moscow-Pyongyang-Beijing front? What levels of consolidation might this achieve?