Puntland: The War Against the Islamic State and Future Scenarios

The Somali state of Puntland is witnessing an escalation of security challenges with an increase in military confrontations against the Islamic State organization, which entered its second phase in early February 2024.

This report focuses on analyzing the military strategy employed by Puntland to confront the organization, shedding light on the driving factors behind the rise of ISIS, including the security vacuum, the fragile economic situation, and the unique geostrategic characteristics of the Almiskad highlands, which provide a natural refuge for the militants.

The report also highlights the clear contrast between Puntland’s campaign against ISIS and the operations of the Somali Federal Government against Al-Shabaab in the south and center, particularly under the leadership of President Hassan Sheikh Mahmoud, as the nature of the objectives, methodologies, and challenges differ between the two campaigns.

On the other hand, the report examines the escalating humanitarian impact due to the mass displacement of families from the villages in the Almiskad highlands, with warnings of a potential relief crisis amidst limited international response.

Finally, the report addresses future scenarios of the conflict, including the risks of the spread of fleeing fighters to neighboring areas or their joining other armed groups, which threatens the sustainability of regional stability.

The report concludes with recommendations calling for enhanced coordination between Puntland and the Federal Government, as well as integrating security approaches with political and developmental solutions to address the root causes of extremism.

Background on the Establishment of the Islamic State Organization in Somalia

Abdulqadir Mumin, from the Majerten clan in Puntland, is a central figure in the emergence of the Islamic State organization in Somalia. Mumin gained widespread fame as an eloquent preacher, and media reports suggest that he has connections with prominent figures in the organization abroad, which suggests his influence by global jihadist ideology.

After returning to Somalia in 2010, he joined Al-Shabaab and rose through its ranks until he assumed its leadership in 2014. However, his ambitions exceeded the local objectives of the movement. In 2015, he declared his defection and pledged allegiance to the Islamic State organization, moving with his group to the Almiskad highlands.

Abdulqadir Mumin’s defection from Al-Shabaab represents a pivotal event that affected the jihadist landscape in the Horn of Africa, and the motivations behind this split can be summarized as follows:

The Appeal of the Global “Islamic State” Vision

The vision of the Islamic State organization (ISIS), which involves geographical expansion and building a model of a transnational Islamic state, was particularly appealing to Abdulqadir Mumin and his supporters, especially in 2015. They saw in the organization’s global ideology, its attraction of Muslim youth from communities in Europe and other regions, and its violent approach; a more ambitious step compared to Al-Shabaab’s local approach, which historically was linked to Al-Qaeda with its less expansionist strategy and different ideology and practice than ISIS.

Additionally, the decline of Al-Qaeda’s influence on the “jihadist” map and the killing of its leaders starting with Osama bin Laden on May 2, 2011, followed by Abu Musab Abdul Wadud Droudkal, leader of Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb on June 3, 2020, Abu Muhammad al-Masri on August 7, 2020, and Ayman al-Zawahiri on July 31, 2022, all of this and more pushed Mumin to adopt the “Islamic State” vision as an alternative to Al-Qaeda, considered more vibrant and capable of mobilizing followers of various nationalities.

Personal Ambitions and Enhancing Leadership Status

In addition to the ideological aspect, Abdulqadir Mumin’s personal ambitions played a central role in the decision to defect. He saw in the Islamic State organization an opportunity to enhance his leadership status, especially after facing challenges within Al-Shabaab, which likely limited his aspirations due to its organizational structure and internal power struggles. Joining an international organization like “ISIS” provided him with new legitimacy and a strategic position in the regional conflict.

It appears that the choice of mountainous regions, particularly in Bari province, was a target for these organizations to protect themselves with rugged terrain, as these are remote areas, far from development and the eyes of the state government and the local framework of Al-Shabaab.

In reality, Mumin’s defection cannot be separated from the political and military complexities in Somalia, as the conflict between the central government and rebel militias intersects with the competition among jihadist groups for dominance. In this context, Mumin’s joining the Islamic State organization represented an attempt to create a new balance of power based on shock, taking advantage of the accustomed dynamics of the movement in the face of weak security challenges, in addition to sources of income through the imposition of what is known as zakat, which are taxes and tributes that have become a common practice and tradition for ISIS in its Somali version.

Declaration of War Against the Islamic State in Somalia

Puntland declared war on the Islamic State organization in Somalia in October 2024, and spent nearly two months convincing tribal leaders of the necessity of supporting the government in this war aimed at liberating them from the exorbitant tributes that burdened them and forced some to close their businesses.

On December 26, the first phase of the battle began from the village of Darjali, in the Almiskad region, led by what was called Puntland Defense Forces, composed of: the Darawish, Coast Guard, police, and presidential guard. Puntland’s security forces achieved important field victories, represented by the recapture of several hideouts and fortifications belonging to the organization.

However, the organization showed great flexibility in adapting, as it resorted to using regular drones for military purposes by booby-trapping them and dropping them on government forces, causing human casualties and hindering the progress of the battles. The organization also planted mines on the rugged mountain roads, further complicating military operations.

This phase culminated in notable international intervention, as on February 1, 2025, US President Donald Trump ordered the US command in East Africa (AFRICOM) to bomb the organization’s dens.

The airstrikes resulted in the destruction of large areas and the killing of 30 foreign fighters, which surprised the Somali people who believed that local fighters formed the majority in the organization’s ranks. However, victory was not easy, as Puntland forces lost several members due to landmines, while others were seriously injured.

After liberating the Tormasaleh plateau, Puntland State President Said Abdullahi Deni announced on February 4, 2025, the start of the second phase of the battle near the Driel area, a remote area lacking communication services.

This phase was characterized by intensive air support, with some parties providing support to Puntland due to the widespread presence of mines on the roads leading to the Islamic State’s caves. This phase continued until the 26th of the same month, and all villages and towns of Day Tog Jecil were liberated. According to government reports, 48 villages and towns belonging to three main cities, Qandala, Eyl, and Baledweyne, were liberated from the organization’s control.

On February 27, President Deni announced the launch of the third phase of military operations, focusing on pursuing fleeing fighters who may attempt to return to the liberated areas or hide in their caves. He also granted a 7-day amnesty to members of the organization who did not directly participate in the fighting, such as traders and tribal elders, to surrender themselves.

The Nature of the Almiskad Highlands as a Strategic Stronghold for the Islamic State Organization

The Islamic State organization moved from the Galgala mountains, near the main roads and densely populated urban areas, to the Almiskad region to be its main stronghold in Puntland. This region is characterized by its rugged terrain, consisting of semi-natural caves, deep valleys, and rugged ravines, making it extremely difficult to monitor the organization’s fighters, let alone target them with airstrikes. This region extends over a vast area estimated at about 427 square kilometers, lacking paved roads, which hinders vehicle movement.

As a result, Puntland Defense Forces had to march on foot, carrying their equipment and weapons on their backs, and in some cases, used fishing boats to reach the closest point possible to the targeted area. In contrast, the organization’s fighters, most of whom were foreigners, relied on donkeys for their movements, while local residents used camels to transport goods.

The organization did not economically provoke local residents as it does in major cities of Bari province like Bosaso, which allowed it to coexist with them without arousing their resentment for about 10 years. It is noted that the organization built multi-purpose fortifications, including:

Building an underground network of tunnels and hideouts, providing additional protection from air and ground attacks. Developing the capability to monitor the movements of government and civilian forces on a large scale. Providing natural ports on the ocean and near the Gulf of Aden for smuggling weapons and fighters. Establishing workshops for preparing explosives, and others for manufacturing weapons such as medium-range missiles. Creating trenches for storing fuel. Al-Shabaab and the Islamic State in Somalia… Divergence of Strategies

The main difference between Al-Shabaab and the Islamic State lies in several aspects, including their origins, spread, and ability to infiltrate society. Al-Shabaab started as a local movement, then pledged allegiance to Al-Qaeda, and was declared during a period that witnessed widespread popular anger due to the entry of Ethiopian forces into Mogadishu. That entry, which marked the Ethiopian army’s violation of Somali sovereignty, was a reason that pushed many young people, especially high school and university students, to join its ranks. Most of its founders and leaders were those known as “Afghan mujahideen.” In contrast, the Islamic State organization emerged in Puntland, which enjoys relative security, making the process of recruiting local youth difficult, so the organization relied heavily on foreign fighters.

Another difference lies in their ability to infiltrate Somali society, as Al-Shabaab succeeded in penetrating various segments of society, including tribal elders, teachers, public sector employees, and even army and police officers, which facilitated its ability to bypass checkpoints and carry out bombings in the streets of major cities.

In contrast, both the movement and the Islamic State in Puntland failed to achieve the same success, due to the depth of tribal ties among the people of Puntland State. These strong tribal ties formed a barrier against the spread of terrorist organizations, unlike the situation in central and southern Somalia where tribal ties and family interests are weakened, allowing for severe internal divisions, sometimes reaching the point of a brother killing his brother on orders from leaders who accuse him of apostasy due to his work in the government sector.

In addition to these differences between Al-Shabaab and the Islamic State in Somalia, the strategy to confront them by the Federal Government or the Puntland government was also different. While the government chose to rely on arming tribal militias and risking the outbreak of tribal conflicts to combat Al-Shabaab, Puntland relied on its regular forces, recruiting youth and involving them in military training to prepare them, without allowing the arming of tribal militias and preventing the outbreak of conflicts that would distract the regular forces from their goal of eliminating the Islamic State, and ensuring the continuity of battles when transitioning from one phase to another.

The government also favored popular mobilization towards political issues that were agreed upon, rather than focusing on disarming Al-Shabaab, in contrast to the Puntland government, which mobilized the people towards combating anti-state Islamic forces, an agreed-upon matter that facilitates their defeat if the government’s interest aligns with the public good.

Proposed Strategies to Confront the Islamic State

Eliminating the threat of the Islamic State organization in Puntland requires a comprehensive and integrated strategy that goes beyond the military aspect, and includes:

Enhancing international cooperation: It is necessary to activate international cooperation with the Puntland government, through the provision of military, training, and logistical support, in addition to humanitarian aid, and not being satisfied with bombing and air cover, especially with increasing claims that the leader of the Islamic State organization, Abdulqadir Mumin, is the organization’s international successor, and the readiness to make the state’s highlands a headquarters for terrorist organizations, as Al-Shabaab is settled on the other side of the Golis mountain range in northwestern Golis, located in Sanaag province and known as Almadow. Combating extremist ideology: Targeting the extremist ideology on which the organization relies through awareness programs, supporting education, and providing job opportunities for youth.

It is also necessary to address the root causes that push youth to join extremist groups. Addressing the root causes of extremism: Confronting the roots of extremism by addressing issues of poverty, unemployment, and social injustice, and promoting good governance and sustainable development in affected areas. Strengthening border control: Enhancing border control measures to prevent the influx of foreign fighters and weapons into the organization, which includes forming effective border guard forces and equipping them with the necessary equipment. The necessity of implementing this strategy is reinforced by the deterioration of the humanitarian situation due to military operations and conflicts in Puntland, represented by:

Widespread displacement: Military confrontations and other tribal conflicts in areas like Sanaag have led to the displacement of thousands of civilians from their villages and towns. The displaced, naturally, lack shelter, food, and medicine, necessitating an urgent humanitarian response. Responsibility of the Federal Government: The humanitarian crisis requires effective intervention from the Federal Government, through providing financial and logistical support to Puntland State to provide humanitarian aid and protection for affected civilians. However, its focus is on preparing for disputed elections, in addition to the chronic dispute between it and the state government, and the politicization of all developments. The Future of the Conflict Between the Puntland Government and the Islamic State

We cannot rule out that the future of the conflict will largely depend on several factors, the most prominent of which is the ability of Puntland’s security forces to develop effective strategies to combat the organization. This ability is governed by the extent of support that Puntland will receive from the Somali Federal Government and the international community.

The success of efforts to address the root causes of extremism, such as poverty, unemployment, and social injustice, will remain a priority for any party seeking to truly eliminate the Islamic State in Somalia, especially since the organization’s ability to adapt to increasing pressures and attract new elements has become notable. This context requires maintaining support and trust between the state government and the people.

In this context, there are possible scenarios that could occur, including:

Extension of battles to cities: The organization may be able to strengthen its positions in the Almiskad highlands and increase the pace of its attacks against security forces and civilians. This may include carrying out quality operations, such as suicide bombings, explosions, and assassinations, and destabilizing stability in other areas of Puntland. This scenario seems realistic only if the defense forces stop advancing as happens in the war against Al-Shabaab. Containing the organization and undermining its capabilities: In this scenario, Puntland’s security forces, with support from the Federal Government and the international community, may succeed in containing the organization and undermining its capabilities. This can be achieved through enhancing military and intelligence cooperation, tightening border control, and addressing the root causes of extremism, such as poverty and unemployment. This means a long and ongoing war, and long-term awareness campaigns. Transformation of the organization into sleeper cells: In this scenario, the organization may face significant military pressure, which may force it to reduce its visible activity and transform into sleeper cells. These cells may retain their ability to carry out limited attacks, or may seek to regroup in the future, or even join Al-Shabaab, which is entrenched in Almadow on the western side of the Golis mountain range.

Conclusion

The war against the Islamic State organization in Puntland represents a complex and multifaceted conflict. Despite the progress made by security forces, the organization still poses a continuous threat, especially given its entrenchment in the rugged Almiskad highlands and the ongoing influx of foreign fighters. Eliminating this threat requires continuous efforts and a comprehensive strategy that includes military, ideological, social, and economic aspects. Puntland State cannot bear the responsibility of this battle alone, but it is a regional and international issue that requires a collective effort and cooperation to eliminate this threat.

References

1)– The Islamic State in East Africa, September 2018, European institute of Peace, page 12, access date: Feb 24, 2025, Report_IS-in-East-Africa_October-2018-3.pdf

2)- Puntland oo soo bandhigtay cudud ciidan oo ka dhan ah argagixisada, Horseed Media, December 26, access date: Feb 25, 2025, https://horseedmedia.net/puntland-oo-soo-bandhigtay-cudud-ciidan-oo-ka-…

3)- Ciidamada difaaca Puntland oo soo riday ilaa lix dronesa oo Daacish isku dayday in ay adeegsato, Puntland Post, Jan 24, 2025, access date: Feb 26, 2025, https://puntlandpost.net/2025/01/24/ciidamada-difaaca-puntland-oo-soo-r…

4)- U.S. Forces Conduct Strike Targeting ISIS-Somalia, Africom, Feb 1, 2025, access date: Feb 26, 2025, https://www.africom.mil/pressrelease/35701/us-forces-conduct-strike-tar…

5)- New airstrikes in Somalia’s Puntland kill more than 30 Daesh fighters, anadolu agency, Feb 12, 2025, access date: Feb 26, 2025, https://www.aa.com.tr/en/africa/new-airstrikes-in-somalia-s-puntland-ki…

6)- Puntland oo billowday wajiga 2-aad ee dagaalka Daacish, Voice of America, Feb 4, 2025, access date: Feb 27, 2025, https://www.voasomali.com/a/7962372.html

7)- UAE Airstrikes Hit ISIS in Somalia’s Puntland Killing Dozens of Militants, Garowe online, Feb 16, 2025, access date: Feb 27,2025, https://www.garoweonline.com/en/news/puntland/uae-airstrikes-hit-isis-i…

8)- Puntland forces seize boat carrying illegal weapons, the East African, Feb 5, 2025, access date: Feb 25, 2025, https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/news/east-africa/puntland-forces-s…

9)- Families lose livelihoods due to displacement by war on Islamic State in Puntland, relief Web, Feb 21, 2025, access date: Feb 28. 2025, https://reliefweb.int/report/somalia/families-lose-livelihoods-due-disp…