By Yan St-Pierre ( Revue Défense Nationale 2024/8 No. 873)
Translated by Mohamed SAKHRI
Since 2020, attention to the activities of the Wagner Group has highlighted the role of Private Military Companies (PMCs) in foreign policy. While the use of PMCs as substitutes for military presence has been a common practice for centuries, the system employed by Russian PMCs represents a shift, as security mandates are secondary to their economic and political functions. PMCs no longer aim to ensure their autonomy but rather to create and manage economic and political infrastructures for the countries to which they are linked, thus becoming political agents beyond mere security assets.
The “Wagner system” has been a success for Russia’s foreign policy, creating a more competitive market for these systems as other countries seek to replicate this success, disrupting foreign policy strategies, particularly in Europe. This article offers an analysis of the “Wagner effect” and the impact of competing PMC systems on Western foreign policy, especially concerning security.
The Impact of PMCs on Conflict Dynamics
Although commonly associated with mercenaries, the prevailing discourse framing PMCs presents them as contributors to improving a country’s security. This narrative has been fueled by anti-terrorism policies justifying several military interventions since 2001. Thus, PMCs are no longer portrayed merely as mercenaries, but as actors fighting for a just cause. In the Sahel, Russian PMCs effectively leverage this narrative, presenting themselves as more effective than France and other international missions combating terrorism in the region. In Mali, Russia’s anti-terrorist discourse also extends to tensions between northern independence movements and the government, as evidenced by the staging of its own “conquest” of Kidal when Malian troops entered there in November 2023. The message was clear: Wagner and Russia can defeat insurgents and restore peace and stability in the region.
This image contrasts sharply with Wagner’s actual security record. Defeated in Mozambique, suffering significant losses in Mali, and achieving limited operational success in the Central African Republic (CAR), Libya, Syria, and Ukraine, Wagner’s security record is poor. In fact, Wagner may contribute to insecurity in a region where organizations linked to Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State in the Sahel are likely more powerful than ever, and human rights violations have worsened over the past four years.
The same inefficiency could be cited for other private military companies. Eric Prince’s many PMCs, such as Blackwater, Academi, or Frontier Services Group, are known more for their scandals and human rights violations than for their operational effectiveness; South African PMCs like Dyck Advisory Group (DAG) are known for the violence of their operations, with their effectiveness being questioned following DAG’s failure in Mozambique; and Chinese PMCs are described as incompetent and ineffective. Data and operational analyses thus do not suggest a value added by using PMCs in security operations. Nevertheless, their use is increasing, as is the scope of their missions.
The Role and Models of PMC Use in Foreign Policy
Historically, the costs associated with PMCs need to be minimal, both financially and politically. Financially, PMCs need to be self-sufficient. Politically, PMCs allow states to intervene or operate outside certain restrictions while providing a potential for denial if a mandate becomes problematic.
Currently, the role of PMCs is that of a system developer. The “Wagner system” is innovative in its scope and success, as well as in its business model as a private/public entity designed to generate and maintain networks and infrastructures that enhance a state’s influence and resources. Its scope is vast, both geographically and in its fields of activity, and it is long-term with organic development. It is also opportunistic, exploiting the weaknesses of its adversaries. Most importantly, the system inverts Western security foreign policy: while it typically employs a donor/beneficiary framework wherein support is contingent on reforms—system change—the “Wagner system” is transactional, aiming to consolidate a structure.
Russian PMC systems primarily offer “security assistance/cooperation” before moving to broader economic agreements. For instance, in Burkina Faso and Niger, the partnership also extends to the nuclear energy sector, while in CAR, Chad, and Togo, it proposes to develop critical infrastructures such as airports and 5G networks. Politically, the system utilizes disinformation tactics fueled by state-run “psyops” units such as the GRU (Russian military intelligence) and a significant network of influencers and media platforms. It also employs cultural representations, history, and religion to bolster its positive image. This allows the provider to present itself as an actor that understands and respects local political dynamics while providing “non-coercive” solutions to security issues.
Russia’s success has prompted its adversaries to reconsider their own use of PMCs in foreign policy. The United States aims to integrate PMCs into its strategy of containing Russia; China seeks to enhance its PMC capabilities for deployments, while Turkish and Gulf PMCs are becoming more active in Africa and Asia. All share a common goal: acquiring and consolidating political and economic assets rather than prioritizing security operations.
For the U.S., the goal would be to use PMCs to contain Russian influence by incorporating political and economic objectives into PMC contracts. For example, in CAR, the U.S. is testing this new approach through the PMC Bancroft Global Development. The contract’s aim is to provide additional security to President Faustin-Archange Touadéra while supporting anti-insurgency operations and providing extra security in the capital, Bangui. Bancroft is also tasked with protecting certain mining sites reportedly owned by President Touadéra’s family, all without officially interfering with Russian operations in the country. Even though the contract’s implementation is exceptionally challenging, the Russian response suffices to qualify the American attempt as a success. By proposing an alternative, the U.S. has forced Russia to react, notably by offering a new agreement to the government.
China also wants to develop its PMC market. Partially motivated by the theft of Chinese assets in Africa—including mining sites—by entities linked to Russia, China has deployed PMCs to protect its interests in the region, quintupling its presence between 2020 and 2023. Additionally, Beijing is now utilizing its own PMCs, employing nearly exclusively Chinese personnel, and aligning PMC use with its foreign policy. This strategic shift is notably visible in Central Asia, where China is progressively positioning itself as a security guarantor, a role which Chinese PMCs would play a key part in.
Turkey also offers a PMC system primarily embodied by the company Sadat. Many Turkish PMCs align with the foreign policy needs of the Turkish government, and the system is likewise a private/public hybrid reminiscent of the Russian structure: legally independent, but supported and framed by governmental objectives. The discourse around the system is also more candid about prioritizing political objectives rather than security ones. Despite these similarities, the Turkish system has its own structure and identity: it is more discreet but also less active militarily, placing particular value on religious and cultural factors for its marketing. Sadat, for instance, seeks to enhance cooperation in the defense industry between Muslim countries, including African nations. Drawing on this philosophy and leveraging the growing demand in Africa, Turkish PMCs have expanded their operations to the continent, including the Sahel, where they compete with other PMC systems.
The Impact of PMC Systems on Foreign Policy Dynamics
The increase in supply in the security market allows clients to choose security partners aligned with their needs and interests rather than being forced to tolerate conditions dictated by providers. The most significant impact of this development is how it has shifted the balance of power from provider to client. The situation in CAR serves as a good example at both national and international levels. In this sense, CAR could be considered a “laboratory” for how PMC systems can be used for foreign policy, and the outcome may change how other countries utilize PMCs.
At the national level, PMC systems affect the power dynamics between pro-Russian and pro-Touadéra factions by protecting or threatening key actors, assets, and economic interests. Internationally, they enable CAR to impose its conditions, as Americans have observed when they had to accept those of Faustin-Archange Touadéra to finalize the Bancroft agreement. The Central African President has enough weight to pressure the U.S., while also having sufficient leverage to compel Russia to renegotiate its agreement with CAR on more favorable terms, confirming the shift in the balance of power in favor of his country. This also demonstrates that the primary function of the Russian PMC system is to protect Russian interests, as engaging in a bidding war is only justified if the asset’s value exceeds the additional costs.
The competition among PMC systems is also observable elsewhere. Chad is “shopping for systems” and uses its closer ties with Russia to pressure France, while in Togo, Russia’s increased presence in the country since August 2023 for counter-terrorism purposes has opened new discussions about the presence of American and British PMCs in Togo. Benin, Senegal, and other countries are also utilizing this type of strategic leverage, suggesting that PMC systems have a geostrategic impact even before the signing of a deal.
Nevertheless, these systems are not the instigators of change but rather catalysts. The conditions leading to coups in Mali, Niger, Burkina Faso, and elsewhere preceded Russia’s involvement, and other issues, such as the war in Ukraine, have created new opportunities for actors like Turkey and China. This competition alters the balance of power, and as France and others have recognized in West Africa, more states are willing to leverage this new weight.
PMC Systems: A Tool for Foreign Policy in Europe?
The increasing loss of influence and competitiveness of European countries on the international stage is affecting their foreign policy strategies, particularly towards the “Global South,” a region deemed critical for Europe’s security and in response to Russia and China. Despite the significant role given to security, this is a sector where Europeans are less competitive, partly due to a low utilization of private sector resources in this field, limiting their strategic and tactical flexibility as well as their access to additional resources. As competition intensifies, this gap becomes a major strategic disadvantage.
Europe possesses the necessary resources to develop and offer a competitive PMC system. France, with its private security market, is likely the best positioned to do so, while other offerings could come from Eastern Europe. However, mandates, foreign policy objectives, and strategies need to be clear and move away from the donor/beneficiary model, while respecting the moral and legal framework of the EU. Europeans must also be willing to pay the price: conditions can no longer be dictated, and in a context where European political influence is weak, paying a premium will likely be necessary to secure a contract.
As allies and adversaries of Europe benefit from the demand for PMC systems, European countries must consider the use of PMCs in their foreign policy, lest they risk exclusion. Given that Europe’s overall security is a priority, better utilization of private sector resources, including PMCs, would allow Europe to better defend its security interests internationally and achieve its political objectives.
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