Priority of Security: Turkish-Iraqi Approach Based on Security Understandings
In a sign of a political breakthrough in Turkish-Iraqi relations, moving towards an acceptable level of mutual understanding, the defense ministers of both countries, Yaşar Güler and Thabet al-Abbasi respectively, signed a memorandum of understanding on Thursday, August 15, 2024. This agreement, the first of its kind, addresses military and security cooperation and counter-terrorism efforts. The signing occurred on the sidelines of the inaugural meeting of the Turkish-Iraqi Joint Planning Group, chaired by the foreign ministers of both countries. The memorandum includes transferring the Turkish base in Bashiqa to Iraq, where a joint military training base will be established, as well as creating a joint security coordination center in Baghdad. This center will focus on combating terrorism and transnational organized crime, such as human trafficking and drug smuggling. Additionally, the agreement allows Iraqis under 15 and over 50 years old to enter Turkey without a visa. The memorandum reflects a mutual commitment to move beyond a period of disputes and find a cooperative framework based on “security for development.” This document discusses the motivations behind the new agreement and the challenges associated with its implementation.
Calculations of the Parties
The issue of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) has been a problematic topic in Turkish-Iraqi relations since the 1980s, affecting the rise and fall of bilateral relations and impacting progress on political, economic, trade, water, and oil issues. Thus, finding a solution to this problem pushes both countries toward a positive path to repair bilateral relations after a phase of tensions. In this context, the calculations of both the Turkish and Iraqi sides regarding the signing of the security memorandum can be outlined as follows:
1. The Turkish Side:
Addressing the external dimensions of an internal security dilemma represented by the Kurdish issue with a separatist nature, which has yet to address its root causes and prefers to tackle its side effects. This explains the security-driven nature of Turkish-Iraqi relations, where northern Iraq is considered a southern belt in Turkey’s national security strategy, as interactions within it directly affect Turkish domestic security. Therefore, Ankara aims to resolve the battle against the PKK and curb destabilizing activities, such as cross-border infiltration, attacks inside Turkey, and targeting Turkish forces and bases within Iraq. Turkey believes that establishing security cooperation entities, such as security coordination centers, could make their efforts more effective by facilitating regular meetings and agreements on joint security arrangements like border patrols, aerial surveillance systems, or focused military operations against the PKK, in addition to easing intelligence sharing.
In general, Turkey’s intensive diplomatic efforts have led Baghdad to take significant steps against the PKK, including designating it as a banned organization by the Iraqi National Security Council and dissolving three related political parties: the Yazidi Freedom and Democracy Party, the Yazidi Struggle Front Party, and the Freedom Party of Kurdistan. These parties are active in Sinjar and areas of western Nineveh bordering Hassakeh, Syria. Additionally, the civil registry office in Sinjar has been relocated to Ba’aj, away from PKK influence within the city.
Choking and surrounding the self-administration areas and its military wing, the Syrian Democratic Forces, by cutting land communication lines between the PKK and Kurdish units across the Syrian-Iraqi border. The PKK’s presence in Iraq, especially in Sinjar, serves as a logistical rear supply point for the Kurdish areas due to its rugged geographical nature, making it difficult to access, expose, and destroy. The PKK has built tunnels in and around Sinjar used for smuggling weapons into Syria through the border, including sniper rifles, rocket shells, automatic guns, explosives, and night-vision equipment, in addition to moving fighters between Sinjar and Hassakeh. These tunnels also serve as military bases and storage areas. Moreover, the PKK has agreements with local leaders and tribes on the Syrian side of the border, such as the Shammar tribe and its armed wing, the Sanadid. Therefore, pursuing the PKK and dismantling its bases in Iraq while keeping it away from the Turkish and Syrian borders is a way to cut off the lifeline supporting Syrian Kurdish areas and a crucial factor in surrounding and strangling them.
In this context, focusing on the Iraqi side is crucial given the ongoing complex situation in northern Syria, the slowdown, and sometimes the stalling of the Turkish-Syrian normalization process, as well as the need for deals with the United States, the international ally of the Syrian Kurds, especially since it retains military forces east of the Euphrates. At the same time, Ankara enjoys greater freedom on the Iraqi front with a degree of American satisfaction to balance Iranian influence.
Figure 1 – Map of border crossings between the PKK deployment areas in Iraq and the Autonomous Administration in Syria
Weakening the Sulaymaniyah factor in the security and political equation in northern Iraq, where Ankara seeks to create a consensus between the governments of Baghdad and Erbil (led by the Kurdistan Democratic Party) and the Popular Mobilization Forces. This is evident from the presence of the head of the Popular Mobilization Forces and the Minister of Interior of the Kurdistan Region in the Turkish visiting delegation, regarding any security agreements in northern Iraq related to undermining the PKK, aiming to neutralize the role of its ally, the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan in Sulaymaniyah, which provides logistical support and safe havens and hosts PKK offices and activities. The differing wills between Baghdad and the Popular Mobilization Forces on one side and Erbil on the other side favor strengthening Sulaymaniyah’s position. Creating compatible positions between Baghdad and Erbil benefits the advancement of Turkish-Iraqi relations and facilitates reaching agreements between the two sides, unlike a conflicting situation that hinders the implementation of joint arrangements and makes them a point of dispute.
Balancing Iranian influence in Iraq, as Iraq is a key node in Iran’s hegemony strategy in the Middle East. The PKK has been a part of this strategy through its alliance with the Popular Mobilization Forces in northwestern Iraq, especially Sinjar, which has served as a bridge allowing Tehran to support the Syrian government and Hezbollah by transferring weapons and fighters. Additionally, the route to Syria through Sinjar provides an alternative to the Al-Qaim crossing in Anbar province, which has been subjected to numerous American attacks, while Sinjar’s geographic and demographic characteristics make it a more secure military transit route. The Sinjar mountain range also holds strategic importance in the Iranian regional strategy against Israel, as it could be used to attack Israeli territories with missiles, similar to what Saddam Hussein did in 1991. Moreover, the PKK represents an Iranian tool to weaken Kurdish opposition parties active in northern Iraq, such as the Iranian Kurdistan Democratic Party and the Komala Movement. Thus, containing the PKK removes one of Tehran’s tools for influence in Iraq and gives Ankara a degree of balance against Iranian hegemony, especially since Tehran uses it as leverage against Turkey whenever necessary.
Figure 2 – Logistics supply lines between Iran and its proxies via Iraq, Syria and Lebanon
Legalizing the Turkish military presence in northern Iraq by providing it with legal and political cover, establishing a framework to regulate its deployment and activities, and distancing it from criticism by political components or regional and international parties hostile to Turkish influence. This ensures that military interventions do not undermine Turkey’s long-term strategic objectives in Iraq in terms of security, economic, and political goals or disrupt its relationship with its ally, the Kurdistan Democratic Party ruling in Erbil. Continued uncoordinated military operations might undermine the party’s legitimacy among Kurdish populations. Additionally, it guarantees the continued presence of military bases in Iraq in the foreseeable future, regardless of the PKK’s field position, based on Ankara’s belief that even if the PKK militants withdraw 30 to 40 kilometers from the border, it does not mean their complete eradication, especially given the unpreparedness of the Peshmerga and Iraqi border guards to fill the gap left by Turkish forces due to sensitivities around increasing Iraqi military presence in the Kurdistan Region.
Figure 3 – Turkish military deployment areas in northern Iraq
The participation of representatives from the Kurdistan Region in political and security meetings underscores the region’s central role in Turkish policy towards Iraq. Erbil and the Kurdistan Democratic Party are strategically important to Turkey as their relations have allowed Turkey to enhance its influence within Iraq and serve as a channel through which Ankara has been able to affect Baghdad’s policy. Turkey has relied on the regional government as a geopolitical buffer against Iranian influence and to combat the PKK in Syria.
Turkish security and political moves regarding Iraq are also linked to regional developments related to the Gaza war and the international and regional actors’ perceptions of the post-conflict scenario, which will inevitably lead to new variables that major regional countries seek to preempt by addressing their security issues and clearing tension points to ensure that any regional settlement does not harm their supreme interests. This may explain why Ankara chose the current timing to finalize the mentioned security understandings, as it understands that Iran will refrain from overt opposition to send a twofold message to the United States: first, emphasizing the priority of dialogue and the possibility of understanding on Iran’s regional role that does not conflict with American and Israeli desires, even if it involves short-term understandings to allow Iran to navigate the current escalation moment; and second, signaling regional de-escalation while the American military presence in the Middle East has reached unprecedented levels in preparation to contain any Iranian response to the planned assassination of Ismail Haniyeh. Hence, the representation of the Popular Mobilization Forces in recent official consultations between the two countries and the presence of its head, Falih al-Fayyad, at the signing of the memorandum of understanding.
The Iraqi Side:
The agreement aims to alleviate political and public pressure on the Iraqi government resulting from Turkey’s military incursions under the pretext of pursuing members of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) in northern areas as part of Operation “Claw-Lock,” conducted without prior warning, coordination, or notification to Baghdad. The Baghdad government has faced criticism from political factions accusing it of neglecting Iraqi sovereignty. It has frequently had to summon the Turkish ambassador to protest these incursions to relieve itself of the criticism. However, the memorandum of understanding provides Turkey with a legal basis for military presence within Iraqi territory by placing the Bashiqah base under Iraqi sovereignty. This arrangement allows both countries to establish a security framework for their shared border and possibly coordinate joint operations against the PKK.
The agreement also seeks to address the issue of groups operating outside the central government’s authority. While the PKK poses a security threat to Turkey, it represents a national sovereignty and political stability issue for Iraq due to its connections with other armed militias, its tactical alliance with the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) since 2016, and their use of the geographical and mountainous terrain of Sinjar for local and cross-border activities beyond state control. Consequently, Baghdad aims to end the activities of non-governmental actors within the state and extend its control over all national territory with the help of regional partners, as it lacks the full capacity to confront armed groups on its own.
A related issue is the Iraqi government’s efforts to resolve the Sinjar problem. Both Turkey and Iraq share a desire to expel PKK members from Sinjar, which forms the core of the 2020 political and security agreement between the Baghdad and Erbil governments, titled “Agreement on the Stabilization and Normalization of the Situation in Sinjar.” This agreement stipulates the removal of PKK fighters and their associated groups and the return of displaced residents to the city as a first step towards implementing Article 140 of the Constitution. Both countries hope that security coordination between Ankara and key Iraqi political and security players, including the Erbil government and the PMF—who were represented in recent formal consultations between the two countries—will lead to a political understanding among the three parties (Baghdad, Erbil, and the PMF) to reactivate the Sinjar Agreement. One of the agreement’s shortcomings, which may have hindered its implementation, was the exclusion of local allies of the PKK and the PMF from its discussions. The PMF, being the most powerful military actor in Sinjar, exerts significant security influence through its brigades in the surrounding areas and local armed and political factions, and it has alliances with leaders of Sunni Arab and Yazidi communities. It has also played a role in obstructing the Sinjar Agreement by mediating a truce between Iraqi security forces and PKK-aligned groups and using its influence within the government to prevent the appointment of a new mayor for Sinjar.
The agreement addresses a security challenge faced by the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), as the PKK’s movement southward due to Turkish strikes has become a security issue for the KDP. The ruling party in Erbil views this movement as an infringement on its territory. Moreover, as the PKK moves south, so do Turkish military operations and bases, shifting the conflict from low-population mountainous areas in the north to more densely populated regions, causing civilian harm and placing the Erbil government in a difficult position as it struggles to meet security demands. This situation forces Erbil to condemn Turkish attacks to avoid stirring Kurdish nationalism and Peshmerga forces, despite the alliance between Ankara and Erbil.
The agreement also seeks to resolve some economic and commercial issues tangled in Turkey’s “linkage policy” towards Iraq, which conditions progress on bilateral issues on meeting Turkey’s security demands. The PKK issue is not the only strategic dimension of the bilateral relationship; other topics include increasing water flow to Iraq, restarting the oil pipelines transporting oil from Mosul and Kirkuk to the Ceyhan-Yumurtalık terminal in Adana, resuming the export of oil from the Kurdistan region, making tangible progress on the Development Road project, and boosting Turkish trade and investments in Iraq. Baghdad aims to advance these issues as they enhance Iraq’s geostrategic and economic significance, though they remain stalled pending a security settlement.
Ongoing Challenges
Despite the positive steps in Turkish-Iraqi relations and progress in security agreements, it is still early to assess their sustainability and effectiveness. Previous similar security arrangements did not come to fruition, which can be attributed to several challenges:
The possibility of Iran exerting pressure on the Iraqi government, either directly or through its influential allies within Baghdad’s decision-making circles, to undermine the security arrangements. Turkey’s presence in Iraq concerns Tehran as it diminishes its influence and threatens the balance with regional competitors. Tehran seeks to maintain its primary control over Iraq’s political landscape. Iranian pressure has historically led to tough Iraqi stances against Turkey, and Tehran may view the Turkish-Iraqi security agreements with suspicion, seeing them as detrimental to its strategic interests and aiming to undermine them to keep the Iraqi stage clear of its rivals.
Discrepancies among Iraqi political factions and their sometimes external decision-making dependencies, which is a deep-rooted issue in the Iraqi political system and has historically obstructed the internal political process and hindered the building of balanced and sustainable positive relationships with regional and international actors. The Turkish-Iraqi agreements are not immune to these political differences, especially as they lack internal consensus due to the presence of PKK allies in Baghdad and the Kurdistan National Union Party’s reluctance to engage in efforts against the PKK.
The American control over Turkish operations in Iraq. While the signing of the security memorandum was welcomed by Washington as part of its efforts to counter Iranian influence in Iraq, the differing American and Turkish perspectives on regional security threats, U.S. support for the Kurds, and the U.S. military presence in the Kurdistan region limit Turkish freedom of movement in Iraq. This situation makes Turkish operations contingent on alignment with Washington, possibly leading to exchanges between the two countries, including deals on other issues such as Syria.
It is worth noting that the memorandum of understanding was signed in draft form, meaning it is subject to amendments, additions, or deletions before its final ratification. The preliminary signature by the representatives of the countries indicates that the memorandum or agreement could be reviewed by the signatory parties within the period leading up to the final signing. This observation is significant given the approaching end of the current Iraqi government’s term, with Prime Minister Mohammed Shia’ al-Sudani having only about a year remaining in office. If the consultation period before the ratification of the memorandum is prolonged, it may fall victim to differing wills.
In conclusion, Turkish-Iraqi relations have entered a positive phase, with both countries showing greater willingness for consultation and dialogue and accepting their differing interests and views on security threats. This development is linked to regional and international context shifts, as well as possibly local factors. However, political realities must not be overlooked. Building trust after periods of tension takes time, and the strategic interests of the two countries remain conflicting. Their views on resolving certain bilateral issues remain divergent; for instance, while Iraq sees the distribution of the Tigris and Euphrates waters as unfair due to Turkish water policies, Ankara considers the problem as misuse of resources, focusing on potential Turkish investments to develop water infrastructure. Similarly, the Development Road project still faces logistical and political obstacles related to the geographical nature of the route and some internal parties’ positions, not to mention issues of corruption and security tensions.
