The new conditions in Syria raise numerous questions that everyone seeks answers to, whether they are officials wanting to understand how to engage with Syria in the future, or ordinary citizens yearning to grasp the rapid and dramatic developments that have led to changes which could be a new “political and security lever” marking a beginning with broad implications that everyone agrees will extend beyond Syria to the entire Middle East. What transpires in the coming phase may closely relate to greater regional equations.
Among the most pressing questions awaiting answers is how armed factions will behave in the future. Are the members and leaders of these factions still living in the “shadow of terrorist organizations” they have worked with and for over many years, such as ISIS and al-Qaeda? Or are we witnessing a transformation and maturation in the thinking and behavior of this new group in Syria’s governance?
Amid fears for Syria’s unity, a significant question arises regarding the commitment of Ahmad al-Shara “Abu Muhammad al-Jolani” and his companions in “Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham” to the project of a Syrian national state and its institutions, particularly the Syrian army. To what extent do these factions possess the political will and determination to maintain the territorial integrity of Syria, as they fought for years to topple Bashar al-Assad’s regime? And does Israel’s control over approximately 270 kilometers of southern Syria, coupled with the expanding areas governed by the Kurds and the presence of other actors such as Russian and American forces, signal that Syria may never revert to its known borders?
Positive Indicators:
There are some positive signs following the armed factions’ assumption of power in Syria, including:
Unitary Discourse and Moderate Behavior: After the overthrow of Bashar al-Assad’s regime, the discourse of “Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham” and its leader Ahmad al-Shara took on a moderate, unitary tone, speaking positively about the Alawites, Christians, and Druze as partners in the homeland who cannot be expelled or killed as previously attempted by Jabhat al-Nusra. This suggests a political discourse that respects minorities and distances itself from revengeful sentiments.
Willingness to Succeed in the New Experiment: Recent days have shown that many may be ready to support the new governance experiment positively, providing a real opportunity for success. An example is the pledge from the residents, sheikhs, and dignitaries of Qardaha (Bashar al-Assad’s hometown) to assist “Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham” and the “Free Syrian Army” in the forthcoming period, expressing that they have paid a heavy price for the ongoing war in Syria since March 2011 and look forward to a new era that avoids further deaths of local youth in battles between the previous regime and new rulers.
Smooth Transition of Power: The image of Ahmad al-Shara meeting with Muhammad al-Jalali, the last Prime Minister under Bashar al-Assad, and Muhammad al-Bashir, chosen to lead the transitional government, confirms the view that the Syrian people are not inclined towards further wars and disputes. The positive spirit that characterized this meeting sent a message to all in Syria and beyond that consensus and problem-solving through dialogue may be the overarching theme of the upcoming phase.
Regional and International Support: Indicators suggest that the new rulers in Syria will receive both regional and international backing. In addition to full Turkish support, Russia has discussed dialogue pathways with the armed factions to ensure the security of Russian interests in Syria, especially the Russian military bases in Tartus and Hmeimim. The permanence of those bases is tied to the commitment of the armed factions to an agreement signed by Bashar al-Assad in 2015 regarding these bases, valid for 50 years and subject to renewal for another 25 years.
Moreover, there are numerous signs from the United States indicating readiness to remove al-Shara and his companions from U.S. and international terrorism lists after Washington previously designated a $10 million bounty for al-Jolani’s apprehension; this U.S. position might play a significant role in changing many hesitant stances towards the government of the armed Syrian factions.
- Reduction in Lawlessness: Despite numerous theft incidents and vandalism of some entities, there has not been a general phenomenon of lawlessness since the armed factions took control of Aleppo. They left the city for the police and moved on to the next area, while in Damascus, police have begun gradual operations, and businesses resumed activities by the third day following Bashar al-Assad’s departure from power. This is largely attributable to al-Shara’s prohibition of any actions against institutions or public and private properties since entering Aleppo and Hama.
Challenges and Concerns:
Despite all the positive indicators mentioned, real fears remain about Syria becoming a new hotspot of instability in the region for several reasons, including:
History of Armed Factions: There is consensus among advocates for a civil state that those aligned with extremist ideological groups, such as ISIS and al-Qaeda, do not exit them and remain prisoners to their ideas and orientations, regardless of how their outward appearances may change or if they revert to their original names. Some behaviors from the leadership of “Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham,” which has recently eliminated competitors in Idlib, affirm the difficulty in changing the mindset or ideology of Syrian armed groups. It asserts that someone like al-Shara, who fought alongside Abu Musab al-Zarqawi and Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, is unlikely to be different now that he holds significant power. According to this view, the armed factions are using “political taqiya” to gain support from national and foreign powers before potentially reverting to their known behaviors of killing and revenge.
Cross-Border Connections: Elements and leaders of Syrian armed factions continue to receive external support, which explains their access to weapons, ammunition, drones, and anti-tank missiles used to breach the defenses of the Syrian army. The most concerning issue for supporters of a national state in Syria is al-Qaeda congratulating al-Shara, despite his assurances of separation and disagreement with al-Qaeda. Additionally, extremist groups and their popular bases have been the most delighted and welcoming of the armed factions’ ascendancy to power in Syria.
Dominance of “Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham” in Governance: The National Coalition for Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces has complained that the selection of Muhammad al-Bashir as head of the interim government and steps taken to form the current government were not discussed with the armed factions and the coalition, potentially signaling a “negative precedent,” given the coalition’s historical context appearing since the early days of protests against Assad in 2011, seen as the largest gathering of civil and military Syrian forces opposed to Assad and engaged in numerous rounds of negotiations in Geneva, Astana, and Sochi. By ignoring the National Coalition, “Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham” sends a preliminary signal of its intention to monopolize governance despite the presence of numerous civil and secular forces within the coalition. Consequently, Abdul Majid Barakat, vice president of the coalition, stated that it seeks a genuine constitution and fair elections, asserting that the Syrian voter should choose the president and head of the government. Some criticized the choice of al-Bashir as interim prime minister, given his ties to the Muslim Brotherhood and closeness to al-Shara, suggesting that the selection was based on personal reasons rather than consensus and acceptance by all.
Seizure of Syrian Territories: This seizure has commenced with Kurdish groups taking more land in northern and eastern Syria, especially in Deir ez-Zor and Qamishli, up to the Syrian-Iraqi border and the al-Bukamal crossing. Israel has quickly acted to annex new areas of the Golan Heights, occupied since June 5, 1967. Following Israel’s control over a 75-kilometer buffer zone from Mount Sheikh to the Jordanian border, it has further deepened its presence by around 20 kilometers into southern Syria, bringing it alarmingly close to the capital, Damascus. Although the armed factions have not declared a stance on the Israeli incursion, this could serve as a source of instability in southern Syria during the upcoming phase.
Destruction of the Syrian Army: By December 10, various Israeli and Syrian estimates indicate that Israel has conducted around 300 attacks on military targets in Syria. Undoubtedly, Israel’s systematic destruction of the Syrian army’s land, naval, and air capabilities raises serious concerns about Syria’s future. The absence of a strong, professional army may exacerbate instability and foster secessionist sentiments, creating an environment for conflict among the armed factions themselves in the absence of a “ruling military force” to mediate and prevent disputes among the various military components.
Risk of Targeting the Kurds: Turkey perceives the Syrian Democratic Forces “SDF” and various Kurdish factions and groups in Syria as a threat to its national security, particularly from the Kurdistan Workers’ Party. Simultaneously, as armed factions move towards Damascus, there have also been parallel moves against the Kurds in the cities of Manbij and Tal Rifaat, raising fears that the armed factions in Syria could turn into “mercenary forces” utilized against the Kurds, further complicating the transitional phase in the country.
Foreign Troops Remaining: There are principled stances indicating that Syria will continue housing Russian and American forces after Washington announced that it would maintain about 950 U.S. soldiers in Eastern Euphrates. Also, Moscow has stated it is communicating through intermediaries with the armed factions to ascertain the future presence of its forces in Tartus and Hmeimim. The continued presence of competing foreign forces on Syrian soil is a potential factor for tension and instability that could have ramifications for the internal Syrian situation.
Possible Scenarios:
Amid positive indicators and concerns, several potential scenarios for the future of Syria can be outlined as follows:
- The Golden Scenario: This is what everyone hopes for, based on the establishment of a modern democratic state that treats all equitably, where majorities stand on equal footing with minorities. This scenario begins by outlining a roadmap based on clear steps to draft a new constitution, elect a president and parliament, and establish the nature of relationships with Arab, regional, and international countries. This scenario is likely the only one that could preserve the unity and integrity of Syria, and it might be the hardest to achieve.
- Federal State: This scenario involves granting substantial rights that exceed autonomy to the main Syrian components such as Sunnis, Alawites, Christians, and Druze, forming a federal country comprising all these groups. This model aligns closely with American and European thinking, and Israel might support it.
- Anti-Shiite State: This is a vision that Israel has pursued since the outbreak of events in Syria in 2011, believing that the existence of a “Shiite-hostile” Syrian state could eliminate any Iranian influence in the region entirely since it would sever communication lines between Shiites in Iraq, Syria, and Hezbollah in Lebanon. This is Israel’s preferred scenario.
- The Afghan Taliban Experience: This scenario aligns perfectly with the ideas and visions of armed groups claiming to seek the establishment of a Syrian Islamic Republic that respects minority rights while not infringing upon those of other sects, based on what they claim is a rightful interpretation of religion. This discourse bears a striking resemblance to the Taliban in Afghanistan. Following this scenario, “Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham” and the Salafist current would be the core proponents of this project.
- Division into Small States: This scenario assumes the division of Syria into small states according to “blood borders” and the “re-engineering of maps in the Arab East,” as articulated by British Bernard Lewis and American Ralph Peters. Given the regional and international aspirations in Syria, this scenario is entirely plausible.
