Persistence of War: Resurgence of Military Power

• By Tsiporah Fried, Jean-Michel Jacques, Philippe Pottier, and Paul Césari ( Revue Défense Nationale 2023/HS12 Special Issue)
• Translated by Mohamed SAKHRI

Paul Césari

The chosen theme of “persistence of war” may, at first glance, seem surprising, even paradoxical, within a conference dedicated to its resurgence. The speakers in this roundtable will likely illuminate this apparent contradiction.

In this geopolitically altered environment, marked by the tragic peak of an open, brutal, and intensely prolonged war in Europe, they will shed light on what pertains to permanence, persistence, return, and resurgence; what pertains to the transformation and reformulation of war, its foundations, evolutions, and consequences for defense, armed forces, and the nation.

I would like to briefly introduce our three speakers in the order of their presentations.

Ms. Tsiporah Fried is a Strategy and Innovation Advisor to the Chief of the Army Staff and the General Staff of the Armed Forces. A former student of the National School of Administration (ENA), she has centered her career on strategic questions, working closely with the highest military authorities, both before decision-making processes and in managing international cooperation, digital transformation, and emerging technologies.

Brigadier General Philippe Pottier has been the director of the War School (École de Guerre) since August 1. His career combines operational experiences within the Airborne Marine Troops, in the Balkans, Kapisa, and more recently in Mali, alongside a multidisciplinary intellectual training from institutions including the École Polytechnique, the Institute of Advanced National Defense Studies (IHEDN), HEC, and Marine Corps University.

Mr. Jean-Michel Jacques, a member of the Defense Commission and the Armed Forces, has been a deputy for Morbihan since 2017. His understanding of defense and military issues comes not only from his role as a representative of the nation but also from his 23 years of experience as a military nurse, 17 of which were spent within the Marine Commandos. Therefore, his approach to strategic questions is fed by this dual background.

Our three speakers will present both practitioner and thinker perspectives on strategic issues, first as strategists responsible for preparing and training future military leaders, and finally as politicians representing the nation. I now give them the floor.

Tsiporah Fried

The war in Ukraine marks the end of the illusion of a world without war, at least for Europe, which has up to now enjoyed the dividends of peace, and for France, whose military engagements have been previously chosen. The new international dynamics, articulated around competition, contestation, and confrontation, redraws the relationships between powers, paving the way for an extension of conflict with potentially major engagements.

Disruption of the World

Every white paper or strategic review mentions upheaval, a major mutation, and a world that is complex, uncertain, dangerous, and violent… How does our current period particularly fit this description? Were not the Cuban crisis (1962) and the Euromissile crisis (1980s) reflections of a dangerous world on the brink of a nuclear conflict?

Until recently, the continuum of crisis-peace-war encompassed conflict; however, this paradigm no longer corresponds to today’s context, where a major conflict in Europe, one not seen for a long time, clashes with an energy crisis, a climate crisis, not to mention the political crises of social democracies. This is indeed a disruption of our world and our references, signaling the end of a European way of life that was thought not only to be perpetual but also particularly attractive to the outside. Within this complexity, we can attempt to outline three trends, which are necessary simplifications, albeit insufficient, to begin understanding this world and the perspectives available to us: the de-Westernization of the world; power games and realignments of alliances; the weakening of multilateralism.

De-Westernization of the World

In 2016, Nicolas Baverez wrote an article on the de-Westernization of the world following Donald Trump’s election. He highlighted the challenge—voluntary or otherwise—to American leadership in international relations and the weakening of the American dream in light of a suffering society. The reality is likely more nuanced. The pivot to Asia under President Obama marked the recognition of a shift in the epicenter of global affairs toward the Indo-Pacific region and a certain disinterest in European affairs, but not a total disengagement from world matters.

More recently, Mr. Hubert Védrine, when asked about the necessity of bringing Vladimir Putin to the International Criminal Court (ICC) for war crimes, responded: “The Westerners are no longer the masters of the world.”

Indeed, it is possible to observe an internal weakening of the Western paradigm, illustrated by the general decline of the democratic model under two major pressures:

1. The health crisis has called into question the effectiveness of our political models and their ability to ensure a degree of resilience. This ongoing debate questions the effectiveness of our states and their capacity to execute reforms, enact laws that will be applied, and act in a rapidly transforming and interdependent world. The function of government is to protect its citizens and prepare for their future. Any regime that proves ineffective and disappoints expectations eventually loses its legitimacy. In terms of effectiveness, the recent example of China, embroiled in its zero-COVID policy, tends to relativize the management of this crisis by democracies. Authoritarian regimes and dictatorships do not demonstrate better management, quite the opposite. However, this tends to be curiously inaudible to certain populations, including in the West.
2. The polarization of civil society, the collapse of culture under the triple effect of social media, the radicalization of movements rooted in “Woke” ideologies that challenge the very universality of our values, as populist and identity movements gain ground not only in certain “illiberal democracies” but also in our own country and among our European partners.

Moreover, our models are being challenged externally. Since the end of the 16th century, and likely until around 2010, the West has controlled the history of the world through the invention of the modern state, capitalism, democracy, and the establishment of international institutions… By the dawn of the 20th century, Europe dominated nearly 70% of known territories and their populations; it was its ideas that permeated the world, and its values that defined national and international ambitions.

Today, however, our model is no longer perceived as attractive—never have there been so few liberal democracies since 1995. Various explanations coexist, but what is certain is that the Western perspective, which places the individual above all else, is not understood, particularly by those from Asian traditions where individual and collective values are weighed against each other. Our societal model, which seems to marginalize the family structure as the basis of social organization, does not appear able to meet the significant challenges ahead. Furthermore, human and women’s rights are being relativized in ethnocultural approaches, which allege that their universality aims to establish Western dominance—these movements unfortunately find ideological resonance in our own societies. Lastly, we are also paying for the failure of our attempts to export our model and our capacity to deliver lectures that are no longer accepted today.

The formula of democracy + market economy = peace + prosperity is today weakened, questioned, or even denied.

Power Games and Realignments of Alliances

Is the post-Cold War model, described as the victory of democracies, to use Francis Fukuyama’s vision, or a world organized around multilateralism, alliances, and international organizations that transcend national logics, definitively behind us?

A logic of strategic competition now dominates international relations: the international system rests on a nesting of sovereignties and jurisdictions. The actors in this system are competitors, powers that seek to control the critical nodes of the system—communication routes, access to resources, technological developments…

Authoritarian and revisionist actors constantly challenge us through multiple means: ideological, political, economic, technological, and military. They modernize and rapidly expand their armies, investing in more sophisticated conventional, missile, and nuclear capabilities, with an increasingly tangible ability to threaten our forces, territories, and populations.

Beyond this competitive dynamic, clearer lines of confrontation are emerging.

We may question the emergence of an anti-Western front. The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) sees itself as the modern reaffirmation of the non-aligned movement. Nevertheless, the unity of this front remains relative, and the anti-Western claim is counterbalanced by a more or less pronounced neutrality.

India is caught in the middle. The greatest danger for India is China. New Delhi therefore has a vested interest in drawing closer to countries worried about China’s emergence.

China has aligned itself with Russia but never fully commits to its support. No member of the SCO wishes to see Iran become a nuclear power.

Excluding Russia, mired in the conflict it initiated, the dynamics of power and empire today primarily revolve around the competitive-confrontational relationship between China and the United States, particularly evident in the race for technological supremacy. Meanwhile, Europe struggles to define itself as a power capable of competing on equal terms with its great rivals.

Moreover, the war in Ukraine has revitalized NATO by reintroducing its historic enemy and attracting nations like Finland, which had previously asserted their neutrality, as well as Sweden. NATO remains the most credible vehicle for military coordination, defense, and nuclear deterrence today, despite its vulnerabilities. On the European side, the European Union (EU) has managed to overcome deep-rooted divergences to agree on eight packages of sanctions against Russia and substantial support for Ukraine via the peace facility. It has reinvested in its armaments industry and strengthened its ties with NATO. Germany, for its part, is committing to an unprecedented rearmament in nearly seventy years and seeks to assert itself as Europe’s leading conventional military power. However, the EU remains divided on energy issues and relations with China; it still struggles to define itself as an international actor in its own right and as a political power. The Russian aggression led the EU to grant candidate status to Ukraine and Moldova in June 2022, thus demonstrating its awareness that the new geopolitical situation demands swift and determined action. However, it remains uncertain whether the Union can merely address these risks by adding new members.

French President Emmanuel Macron and German Chancellor Olaf Scholz recently discussed the geopolitical urgency of redefining the EU’s relationship with its neighborhood. This project for a European Political Community (EPC), whose first summit took place on October 6, 2022, envisions more or less integrated circles around a core that facilitates relations with third countries, particularly those aspiring to integration.

Weak Multilateralism and Consequences

We can observe a weakened multilateral system: it has been denounced by Donald Trump and challenged by other powers that call its foundations and Western dominance into question. The COVID-19 pandemic, a factor of global crisis, has likely accelerated or further highlighted the crisis of multilateralism—the World Health Organization (WHO), under fire for its slow crisis management and complacency toward China, serves as a glaring example.

Furthermore, we now face the denunciation of all disarmament treaties signed at the end of the Cold War, including the INF Treaty on deployed nuclear forces in Europe. The entire architecture of European security is thus undermined.

The future of the multilateral system, particularly the UN and its role in a multipolar and increasingly competitive world, remains at stake.

This leads to two consequences:

1. The weakness of multilateralism fosters a disinhibition in the use of force in the absence of recognized and accepted regulatory institutions. Competition restricts the diplomatic space for cooperation and limits incentives to encourage it, especially in cases of dispute. This is referred to as the so-called “salami” method: a process of territorialization and then militarization of spaces, especially for contested islets in the South China Sea. This is a fait accompli strategy that surprises the defender of the status quo and shifts the responsibility for escalation onto them, bringing to light a strategic ambiguity. On the periphery of Europe, conflicts multiply and the number of states at war gradually and inexorably increases: Georgia, Crimea, Donbass, Nagorno-Karabakh.
2. Multilateralism has become increasingly a space where influence relations are played out and a battleground, contrary to what Europeans believe, who see multilateralism as a solution to all problems. It is precisely in this regard that we must consider the war being waged over international norms and standards: the perversion of law and the emergence of lawfare.

Thus, we can pose several questions: What should be the place of multilateralism in a world where competition is central to the concerns of powers? What nature will future multilateralism take, with actors proposing different—if not divergent—visions regarding the role of law, non-state actors, the debate between universality and relativism, or the balance between sovereignty and international responsibilities?

The Return of War or the Persistence of War?

Three Periods of Conflict

War is a permanent element of—both in and amidst—our international relations. Certainly, Europe has benefited from what we call the dividends of peace, but war has persisted in many other territories involving European states, particularly France and the United Kingdom. According to Philippe Delmas, order was never peace, but rather a definition of the reasons for waging war. He warns against the illusion of a world without war, which does not exist.

Historically, and simplifying, we can identify three major periods since the Second World War:

1. Diverted Conflicts (Korea, Vietnam) and frozen confrontations rooted in the fear of nuclear war and the logic of assured destruction.
2. Peacekeeping Operations and Expeditionary Wars, civil wars culminating in the Gulf War and the war on terror.
3. Power Strategies that multiply hostile positions below the threshold of war: adoption of denial-of-access postures, hybrid strategies, grey zone actions… with a focus on influence struggles undermining the efforts of Western armies in theaters of operation where they are engaged.

We must now add a fourth period, as it represents a significant strategic turning point: the return of war in Europe. Not forgetting that it began further east, in Nagorno-Karabakh, this strategic sequence is characterized by a major change of scale: the extension of conflict across all environments and fields, and combinations of hybrid strategies complicating our engagements and diminishing our reactive capacities.

The Hypothesis of Major Engagement and High Intensity: A Change in Strategic Grammar

The term “major war” does not oppose wars that could be deemed “minor,” which are challenging to define. It more serves to oppose it to “irregular” or “asymmetrical” war—implying that major wars are understood as regular or symmetrical, anchored in the frontal clash of two similarly powerful armies.

Furthermore, there would be no domains in which we are assured of maintaining superiority (air, naval…).

The outcome of war and our engagement in these conflicts will depend on our capacity to accept a high level of human losses: this is what the Warfighting exercise prepares us for.

Until now, we had the choice of our interventions. That will no longer be the case moving forward.

The Future of War or War’s Future

As Clausewitz famously stated: “War is a chameleon, and each war is unique.” It is difficult to predict what the next war will look like—this is the delicate exercise of strategic anticipation and forward-thinking that we engage in within the General Staff and the Strategic Command.

What, then, have we learned from the war in Ukraine? It is certain that the lessons learned (retour d’expérience) are already beginning to feed prospective reflections on war. This is indeed a high-intensity war, a frontal clash between two nations, one of which fights for its survival. It is a conventional conflict but continuously underpinned by an alert regarding the nuclear threat. This acts as a signal to other non-belligerent nations that support Ukraine. Military actions are brutal and evoke another era: war crimes against civilian populations, hostage-taking, etc. Furthermore, this is a war that intertwines technologies from the 20th and 21st centuries.

Ukraine and Russia are engaged in a war of attrition. To endure, one must have resources in everything: ammunition, artillery, energy, and food resources. To cope with this, there is mobilization of the Defense Industrial and Technological Base (BITD), increased operational readiness, and the establishment of legal norms that allow for rapid mobilization of resources.

Finally, Russia implements a comprehensive strategy of energy warfare, engaging across all realms beyond the classical fields, highlighting the importance of perceptions. The energy crisis or food resource struggles serve as leverage and power dynamics in a context of information warfare.

In light of this observation, China and the United States have entered the race for rare metals, particularly in Africa. The Belt and Road Initiative and China’s economic strategy are more significant than the Chinese White Paper on Defense. Control of ports and undersea cables has become crucial, as has energy independence and the transportation of gas. This war confirms the extension of conflict across all environments and fields: deep sea, cyber, space, electromagnetic spectrum, and information warfare. One of the major challenges emerging from this is the construction of an inter-service Command and Control (C2) system that combines actions across all fields and domains, and coordination as close as possible to operational realities. For example, cyberspace is an almost permanent field of engagement, rife with sabotage, espionage, and subversion… Beyond the specific Ukrainian example, what will the major trends and uses of disruptive weapons of the future be? We talk about killer robot armies, armed combat drones, laser and electromagnetic weapons, brain manipulation. The easier access to disruptive technologies presents new threats, but it also offers opportunities. These could, in the long run, give an advantage to countries that master these technologies.

Regardless of the form of future warfare, we can advance two certainties in conclusion:

Firstly, after more than seventy years of relative peace in Europe (excluding Yugoslavia), we must get used to living in strategic uncertainty.

Secondly, the next war will require the mobilization of the entire nation (war economy, resilience). Without speaking of total war, the actors in this conflict will no longer be solely military but also include populations, who may very well become targets, and whose moral strength will be decisive in achieving victory. We must prepare for this now.

Philippe Pottier

I will begin by mentioning Francis Fukuyama. In a famous 1989 article, later published as a book in 1992, the author claimed that the end of the Cold War marked the ideological victory of democracy and liberalism over other political ideologies. He announced “the end of history” and the absolute supremacy of the liberal democratic ideal. Today, we see that with de-Westernization, Fukuyama’s prediction has not materialized. From a historical perspective, this seems to validate the thesis of Samuel Huntington. What we are witnessing, primarily, is the emergence of alternative models to the Western model. Fukuyama’s “end of history,” which envisioned the continuation of war but with an absolute supremacy of the West, now confronts the resurgence of war at our doorsteps, with alternative models ready to combat Western ideology by any means necessary. I particularly liked the quote highlighted in today’s program, taken from “Unrestricted Warfare,” published in 1999. In this excerpt, Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui state that “there is no longer any domain that cannot serve war, there is almost no domain that does not present the offensive aspect of war.” This will be the foundation of my discussion.

Carl von Clausewitz defines war as a duel. He explains that it is an act of violence, aimed at compelling the opponent to submit to our will. We see a power strategy that consists of constraining the opponent while avoiding open war. While open war has, or rather until recently, left our immediate environment, power strategies have never ceased. Acting across various fields constitutes a war before the war.

My argument will revolve around this pre-war war, to which we are in fact always subjected, which has never stopped; and around the wars that have never ceased but were outside our probable environment.

Firstly, the assertion of power by states touches every domain. This assertion naturally leads to conflicts between states, which are not necessarily armed conflicts. The state is power: both internally (public power) and externally. Competition among nations is the normal mode of expression of power and occurs across all domains: diplomatic, informational, military, economic, legal, technological, industrial, and cultural. In asserting its power, the state naturally comes into conflict with other states. This conflict can range from simple competition, the natural form of interstate relations. However, this does not exclude the possibility that the conflict can escalate into violent forms, even outside the context of armed confrontation. I will provide three illustrations in this regard.

The Norm: Lawfare

The norm is traditionally one of the preferred modes of expression of sovereignty. Today, it is often determined by private actors, as a relay of national strategy. The one who defines the norm sets the rules of the game and is, de facto, the most powerful. This is especially true in France: currency, an essential regal power, along with weights and measures, delineates one of the oldest applications of standardization. To illustrate the power of norms, I will recount a rather amusing anecdote, showing the power inherent in standards, both in military and civilian realms. Let us go back to Antiquity: among the elements contributing to the greatness of Rome, its road system may not immediately spring to mind. However, it was crucial to the functioning of the Empire and allowed for extraordinary development of economic exchanges, contributing to its prosperity. This primary role also facilitated the movement of troops to the Empire’s borders. To this end, the width of Roman roads was determined based on the width of battle chariots, pulled by two horses, which needed to be able to pass one another. This dimension was officially standardized as early as 451 BC, in the compilation of the Twelve Tables (Lex Duodecim Tabularum). It specifies that Roman roads had to be eight Roman feet wide in winding areas and sixteen feet wide in flat areas. Afterwards, the spacing of the axles of civilian carts adopted that of battle chariots so they could traverse these roads without breaking due to ruts. This axle spacing traversed throughout the Middle Ages and reached modern times. When the first trams and trains were constructed, they were built by industrialists already producing carts. Thus, they carried over the axle spacing of carts for the design of the first trains and trams. This occurred in Europe, naturally. Nevertheless, the British engineers who participated in the construction of the first trains and trams in the United States chose a rail gauge similar to that of European rails, with the idea of being able to export locomotives to the United States. Consequently, the rail gauge is the same in both the US and the UK. An unexpected consequence: years later, the United States contracted with Thiokol to build two boosters for the American shuttle. This company, based in Utah, had to transport them by rail to Cape Canaveral. The dimensions of the booster components had to pass through a tunnel, sized according to the rail gauge. It is the Lex Duodecim Tabularum of 451 BC that determined the size of the American space shuttle boosters! This anecdote merely illustrates the power of the norm.

Whoever defines the rule is very powerful. Today, failing to master the norm concerning software, interfaces, communication systems, or data formats means becoming dependent on those who define them. The one who imposes norms does so according to their chosen orientations and the technological advantage they have gained. Thus, the GSM standard for mobile telephony provided a real advantage to Europeans. By standardizing, it is also possible to penalize or even block the development of alternative projects. Thus, it is possible to close a national market to undesirable products. This is the case with European regulations on pesticides or genetically modified organisms (GMOs). Being able to resist external norms is a military and economic necessity, two dimensions intimately linked in this regard as in many others. Norms are a genuine weapon for states, and a power like China strives to increase its influence within organizations such as the International Organization for Standardization (ISO). Additionally, societal criteria are emerging today, which are not norms per se. These generally refer to environmental, social, and governance (ESG) criteria, which can have a significant impact on a company’s image. For instance, some banks have refused to finance oil exploration projects in the North or to lend money to arms industries. Norms are extremely powerful and can be implemented as a strategy, below the threshold of conflict while constraining actors. I recall General Beaufre’s thought: he stated that strategy is the dialectic of wills, employing force to resolve conflicts. The aim is to create and exploit a situation that induces sufficient moral disintegration of the adversary to compel them to accept the conditions we wish to impose. Norms contribute to this.

Economic War

A second point of the pre-war war is the economic war, a term often overused. In fact, violent war as such, armed conflict, is not the economic war. Nevertheless, there is indeed confrontation in this domain. I will only take one example regarding the United States. However, it is essential to remember that all economic powers engage in struggle in this domain. At the conclusion of the Second World War, the United States emerged as the world’s leading economic power. This enabled them to implement an organization of the international monetary system, with the dollar as its pivot. Originally, it was tied to gold. Today, the dollar remains a reference currency, accounting for 59% of the reserves of central banks worldwide. The euro follows in second place with 20%. Beyond the exorbitant privilege that the dominant position of the dollar bestows upon the United States, it has also allowed them to develop a legal corpus concerning the extraterritoriality of American law. Indeed, the mere use of the dollar allows them to pursue individuals or entities that may have violated certain American laws. One of the most well-known examples in France is the $8.9 billion fine that BNP Paribas had to pay in 2014. Other French firms have also faced significant fines, albeit much lower, such as Alstom, Total, Siemens, or Crédit Agricole. These judicial proceedings aim to compel foreign companies to adhere to the policy determined by the United States. They also weaken certain French industrial beacons competing against American firms.

Space Conquest

Finally, when discussing power competition, how can we not mention space conquest? Initially, the Soviet Union was in the lead, notably with Sputnik and Yuri Gagarin’s first flight on April 12, 1961. On May 25, John Fitzgerald Kennedy, then President of the United States, announced before Congress a program to send men to the moon before the end of the decade. Let’s look at the dates: Gagarin flies on April 12, and what happens between April 12 and May 25? The Bay of Pigs invasion, a famous fiasco. In fact, Kennedy’s speech concerns not only space conquest and a technological and human adventure, but also the resumption of leadership at the expense of the USSR. Today, we are witnessing a resurgence of space conquest and competition in that arena. China aims to present itself as a power on par with the United States, deploying objects on both the Moon and Mars. Currently, there are only two types of rovers on Mars: one is Chinese, and the other is American. The United States is rekindling the race with the Artemis program, which aims to land a crew on the lunar surface by 2025 and then prepare a manned mission to Mars. The Artemis mission also aims to promote Western values; for example, it has been clearly stated that Artemis intends to land the first woman on the Moon. Thus, the objective surpasses scientific conquest in this domain. This indicates that while open war may not necessarily involve the West, the fact remains that powers assert themselves and utilize every possible lever to achieve this.

War has not disappeared; it has merely vacated our daily lives. High-intensity wars have not ceased. However, they have occurred without Western engagement. Remember the Iran-Iraq war from 1980 to 1988, during which approximately 500,000 soldiers and another 500,000 civilians were killed. This constitutes a high-intensity war. One may also think of the war in the former Yugoslavia, which caused roughly 150,000 deaths. While this could be called a civil war, there is also Kosovo, where NATO powers were involved. Of course, there are various conflicts in which Russia is engaged—I particularly think of Georgia. Let us not forget the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh between Armenia and Azerbaijan not so long ago. Ultimately, there certainly exists a type of high-intensity conflict in which the West is not involved as a protagonist.

When the West is engaged in conflicts, it is in asymmetric or irregular conflicts. Kosovo (1999) is an example of asymmetric conflict, just as the two Gulf Wars (1990-1991 and 2003) and Libya (2011). An asymmetric war corresponds to a situation where the West faces armies equipped with significant capabilities, but where the disparity is enormous. This is reflected in the casualties: in Libya, we are talking about 5,000 to 10,000 casualties against zero for the coalition. In the first Gulf War, there were 292 coalition deaths, against 25,000 to 100,000 killed on the other side. Asymmetric wars also match the disparity between Western power and that of its competitors. Of course, the choice of competitors is to avoid direct confrontation. This leads to asymmetric conflicts, such as those in Afghanistan or the Sahel. These conflicts, which the West, particularly France, is engaged in, are chosen conflicts. France chose to participate in the first Gulf War and opted not to partake in the second. France opted to go into Afghanistan and chose to withdraw, according to the decision made by President Nicolas Sarkozy in 2011, which led to a definitive withdrawal in 2014. These wars were choices made at times when we wanted to participate and where we wanted to do so. Ukraine reminds us that while it takes two to make peace, one is sufficient to make war. Today, we rediscover that war can impose itself upon us in Europe.

I will conclude with this realization, returning to the Wales summit in 2014. At that time, NATO countries, under the urging of the United States, decided to increase their defense spending to reach 2% of GDP. In 2014, only three NATO countries had crossed that 2% threshold. By 2021, according to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), ten countries had reached it. The budgetary effort in France has been colossal: our defense spending was around 32 billion euros in 2016, compared to 40.91 billion euros in 2022. Thus, there has been a growing awareness and rearmament in the world over recent years. For the first time in human history, according to SIPRI, global military spending has surpassed 2 trillion dollars.

Jean-Michel Jacques

In the current geostrategic context faced with the upheavals in our world, it is vital to mobilize the nation. This should not be a short-lived phenomenon of a few weeks but rather a long-term mobilization. The example of the war in Ukraine demonstrates this well. Very quickly, Ukrainian flags bloomed in every French municipality, and small ribbons in the colors of Ukraine were worn. However, several months later, as winter approaches, many citizens do not make the connection between this conflict and the rise in energy prices or the necessity, at times, to implement everyday savings. It is clear that the public’s perception of war does not necessarily align with that of the defense community. When considering the entirety of the French population, a large portion does not draw a direct link between what is happening today and the war in Ukraine. This is related to the phenomenon of hybrid warfare, and at times, perception of the conflict—which does not necessarily take the shape of armed forces but other forms—is skewed, poorly perceived. However, this perception is essential in a war. Indeed, to take the example of the war in Ukraine, it is evident that while we do not doubt the patriotism of the Russian population if Russia were attacked, within the framework of a war projected, initially portrayed by the Kremlin as a “special military operation,” the Russian nation does not follow the Kremlin’s narrative in its entirety.

In light of the multiplication and diversification of threats to our national defense, several major levers are necessary to mobilize, if not remobilize, the nation concerning these issues.

From a human standpoint, it is crucial to better communicate about geopolitical and defense issues so that the population understands them. At this level, all actors must play their part. This requires responsible communication from political decision-makers: we witness too many statements that are not necessarily aligned with the truth but resemble a political strategy instead. These remarks often distort reality, ultimately influencing or altering the nation’s perceptions. This is true for political leaders but also for all actors with influence. The media is part of this. While we have quality print media in France, at both local and national levels, not everyone reads them. Today, most of our fellow citizens get their information via social media or television. Their perception of the war is shaped by these channels, and for this reason, we must collectively strive to restore greater truth—remaining humble about the notion of truth, as there is always a degree of knowledge or ignorance involved. To this end, we have deployed resources to regulate all communication platforms. I also have great faith in the deployment of means to mobilize our youth and citizens, notably through the Universal National Service (SNU), which raises awareness among young people regarding geopolitical issues, what the army represents, the importance of assistance to others, and civil security. These concerns must be presented and conveyed to our youth as well as all our citizens. In line with this vision, in the upcoming 2024-2030 Military Programming Law (LPM) and in accordance with the ambitions set forth by the president during the July 13, 2022 ceremony at the Hôtel de Brienne, the number of reservists will be increased. I believe that this operational engagement is a good way for older citizens to serve the Nation.

From a budgetary standpoint, we need to continue advancing along the trajectory established since 2017. Indeed, since that date, and with the 2019-2025 LPM, we have significantly increased the defense budget to make up for what had been neglected, if not deteriorated, due to past budgetary restrictions. We must sustain this effort and will maintain an annual increase of 3 billion euros for the defense budget starting in 2023, aiming for an annual expenditure of 50 billion euros by 2025. The 2019-2025 LPM has set a trajectory, and I am convinced that it will be preserved. Of course, the budget allocated to defense must also have the consent of the population and help them understand why this investment is as essential as that in national education, for example. Furthermore, we could also address the issue of taxonomy, as it is evident that investment in our defense-related companies is crucial to spark technological innovation and meet the capacity needs of our armed forces. Here as well, significant work remains to be done regarding perceptions.

In terms of innovation and technology, it is essential to strengthen the territorial framework we already have in France to capture innovations developed by businesses in our territories. We should not merely leave this responsibility to the Directorate General of Armament (DGA) and the Defense Innovation Agency (AID), but we need to find relays, sensors, and branches in the territories. This includes business leaders, elected officials, and economic organizations in regions or around urban areas. Once again, everyone must internalize the defense issues. This is crucial for not only capturing innovations but also protecting our innovative companies because, without direct understanding in the territories, our competitors—or even our enemies—could appropriate these innovations and, who knows, potentially resell them to us later when they were first French!

From an industrial perspective, the President and the Minister of the Armed Forces have reiterated the need to configure our industries to establish a “war economy.” This means we must reindustrialize our country in certain fields: it is a question of sovereignty, as well as a reflection of understanding the complex world we live in. To give a concrete example, a Renault foundry is located in my constituency (the 6th of Morbihan) and manufactures cast iron parts for vehicles. Instead of keeping this industrial facility on national soil, Renault chose to invest in Turkey to reduce payroll costs. However, with the changes in energy prices and the increase in denial of access to the sea—both present and future—this may not be the most profitable choice. Therefore, on the subject of industrial sovereignty, we must carry the nation along with us, as well as our industrialists.

In terms of normative action, there are also steps to be taken, as this field is particularly important. If today, within the population, the principle of precaution has become established, whereby we limit our risks and commitments, we must still change our habits if we wish to change anything else. This implies changing mindsets through improved communication and pedagogy toward the public to help them understand that not everything can be protected, that there is always a degree of risk, and that nations reluctant to take risks will eventually face loss or be subject to the will of others.

Finally, from a moral standpoint, I consider it essential to preserve the uniqueness of the French military, putting this at the heart of the matter. Going into combat on the other side of the world and, at times, laying down one’s life requires a strong commitment, which exists precisely because a soldier transcends himself, acts for the Nation, and holds a contract with it, deep down. This contract, he respects and honors, and the Nation recognizes this commitment in return.

In conclusion, I believe we must today develop and enhance the spirit of defense across all fields. This is the responsibility of each one of us.

Sources

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