The move by some fighters of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) to burn their weapons in the mountains of the Kurdistan Region of Iraq is a symbolic but significant gesture signaling the group’s renunciation of its five-decade-long armed struggle against the Turkish state. The PKK, which is designated as a terrorist organization by Ankara, the EU, and Washington, took this step as part of the Turkish-Kurdish peace process, which began after the leader of the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP)—a partner in the ruling coalition with the Justice and Development Party (AKP)—Devlet Bahçeli, called on PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan (imprisoned since 1999) in October 2024 to urge his group to lay down arms and enter a peace process with Ankara.
The PKK responded to its historical leader’s call by announcing its dissolution and disarmament in May 2025. Öcalan renewed his call on July 9, 2025, leading a faction of the party to burn their rifles and weapons two days later.
Supporting Opportunities:
Several promising factors could pave the way for the completion of the Turkish-Kurdish peace process. The most notable include:
- Domestic Support:
Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan described the PKK’s disarmament as a “new chapter” in the country’s history. There also appears to be a general political consensus across Turkish parties to support the peace process with the PKK. In this context, a delegation from the pro-Kurdish Peoples’ Equality and Democracy Party (DEM), after meeting with Öcalan, held high-level talks with political leaders. The delegation met with Devlet Bahçeli in his parliamentary office on July 15, 2025, and also visited the leader of the main opposition Republican People’s Party (CHP), Özgür Özel. The Kurdish gesture received broad government support. Turkish Vice President Cevdet Yılmaz described it as a new phase in “Turkey’s path to being free of terrorism.” The DEM delegation also met with Justice Minister Yılmaz Tunç in Ankara. These parties welcomed the peace process and pledged their support. - Mutual Benefits:
The peace process offers all parties a chance for mutual gain. For Turkey, disarmament could help resolve its most complex domestic issue. Internally, it would support Erdoğan’s vision for a “terror-free Turkey” and strengthen domestic unity. Externally, it would undermine foreign actors who have used the PKK to pressure Ankara. For the Kurds, peace could bring enhanced rights and freedoms, possible constitutional amendments, expanded local authority, and recognition of PKK members as Turkish citizens with rights and responsibilities. - Parliamentary Committee:
Following the weapon-burning event, a parliamentary committee of 35 members—comprising representatives from all political parties—was established to raise public awareness about the peace process and advise the government on steps to facilitate it. On July 19, 2025, the Turkish parliament took initial steps to form this committee, tasked with monitoring the PKK’s dissolution, disarmament, and the creation of a legal framework to support the peace process. - Electoral Incentive:
Erdoğan needs the support of the 57 Kurdish MPs in parliament if he wants to amend the constitution to remove presidential term limits or call early elections ahead of a potential 2028 presidential bid. Constitutional amendments require 360 votes, while Erdoğan’s coalition currently holds only 319 seats. - Economic Gains:
Peace with the Kurds could deliver economic benefits. Erdoğan and Finance Minister Mehmet Şimşek estimate that the PKK conflict has cost Turkey nearly $1.8 trillion since 1984. Amid an ongoing economic crisis, Turkey’s budget deficit reached $24.3 billion in the first half of 2025—significantly higher than the same period last year. - Favorable Regional and International Conditions:
The United States supports peace between Turkey and the Kurds. U.S. Ambassador to Turkey and special envoy to Syria, Thomas Barrack, announced that Washington is ready to help resolve Turkey and Syria’s disputes with Kurdish groups and would assist in relocating Kurdish fighters—referring to PKK combatants. Additionally, regime change in Syria and shifting regional dynamics in Iran post-October 7, 2023, also create momentum for peace between Ankara and the PKK.
Ongoing Challenges:
Despite the momentum, several obstacles could hinder the Turkish-Kurdish peace process:
- Mutual Distrust:
Suspicion could derail the peace process. Some political factions doubt the PKK’s sincerity in dissolving all its factions in Iraq, Syria, and Iran, surrendering weapons, and integrating into the Turkish military. The weapon-burning event only involved 30 fighters and was purely symbolic; it did not signify full disarmament, as most PKK forces remain in their positions. At the same time, many PKK leaders and fighters are still skeptical of the Turkish government’s willingness to meet their demands, such as constitutional amendments, a general amnesty, the release of thousands of prisoners including Öcalan, and full legal and social reintegration of Kurdish fighters into Turkish society while preserving Kurdish identity. - Lack of a Framework:
The absence of an official framework for the peace process means progress hinges on Turkish government goodwill and reciprocal trust. There is no clear vision for what follows. Key issues—such as the fate of disarmed fighters, timelines, handover locations, and designated authorities for weapon collection—remain vague. Though Bahçeli had previously stated in March 2025 that weapons should be handed over to the government, no detailed plan has been publicly announced. - Resistance from Hardliners:
Internal resistance is likely from PKK hardliners who oppose the peace process—either due to dissatisfaction with Turkish concessions or continued aspirations for Kurdish autonomy. Resistance could also come from nationalist or conservative factions within the Turkish government. On July 2, 2025, the PKK stated that some Turkish officials were actively sabotaging the disarmament process aimed at ending decades of conflict.
Potential Implications:
The peace process could bring about several long-term outcomes:
- Constitutional Reform:
Although both the AKP and DEM deny any link between the peace process and constitutional reform, if Erdoğan secures DEM support, he will have a better chance at pushing constitutional changes. Moreover, the peace process itself may require constitutional adjustments to integrate Kurds into Turkey’s national fabric. Kurds widely believe that reconciliation efforts are tied to Erdoğan’s ambitions to amend the constitution and potentially run again in 2028. - Regional Peace Support:
Turkish and Iraqi officials attended the PKK weapon-burning ceremony, suggesting the possibility of a cooperative approach to disarmament and conflict resolution across borders. This could foster peace and security not only in Turkey, but also in neighboring countries like Syria and Iraq. - Rebalancing Regional Dynamics:
The Turkish-Kurdish peace process may reshape dynamics across Turkey, Syria, Iraq, and Iran. It may inspire similar models in the region. Although Turkey’s bases in northern Iraq have become part of its regional deterrence strategy rather than just anti-PKK outposts, Ankara could consider closing them once disarmament is complete. A Kurdish-Turkish peace agreement would offer renewed hope for Iraq’s Kurdistan Region. Meanwhile, the U.S.—which welcomed the Turkish-Kurdish peace process—might fully withdraw from Syria. The American condition is that Ankara ends its conflict with the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). Under a proposed peace and U.S. plan, a new Syrian army (aligned with Damascus and incorporating the SDF alongside the Turkish army) would take over the fight against ISIS, replacing U.S. forces.
Future Scenarios:
The Turkish-Kurdish peace process could unfold in one of several possible directions:
- Successful Peace Process:
This scenario envisions a breakthrough in the peace process, especially given the Turkish parliament’s efforts to form a committee to oversee the PKK’s disbandment. This time, the PKK did not just bury its weapons—it burned them, symbolizing irreversible action. Weapons were not handed to the state, a committee, or the UN, but destroyed outright, prompting some to call it a historic turning point. - Lengthy Process:
This more likely scenario sees the peace process as long and gradual. A senior Turkish official predicted full PKK disarmament by the end of 2025, while an Iraqi security source suggested it may conclude in 2026. A new Kurdish political party may emerge in Turkey. Maintaining peace will require broad, cross-ideological commitment. - Collapse of the Process:
This scenario assumes the peace process will fail, as the Kurdish gesture was largely symbolic—a goodwill initiative meant to test Turkish sincerity. The initiative faces opposition on both sides. Some say Erdoğan is risking voter backlash by pursuing peace with the Kurds. DEM co-chair Tülay Hatimoğulları has already declared an alliance with the AKP and MHP to be impossible.
Conclusion:
Given current conditions, the Turkish-Kurdish peace process appears more serious than previous attempts—like those between 2013 and 2015. However, the process is likely to be long and complex due to deep-seated mistrust, the absence of a clear roadmap, and internal division within the PKK. Additionally, opposition from affiliated factions in neighboring countries may ultimately prevent a final and complete resolution between the two sides.
