On December 11, 2024, the Turkish capital Ankara hosted a meeting between Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, and Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed to announce that Somalia and Ethiopia had reached an agreement, sponsored by Turkey, to end the intense disputes between the two countries, which had escalated throughout the current year.
In this context, it is essential to assess the opportunities and challenges for the success of this agreement within a highly complex regional and international environment, as well as to consider its future implications for both parties and for the broader Horn of Africa.
Context of the Agreement:
At the beginning of 2024, the Ethiopian federal government announced it had signed a memorandum of understanding with the Somaliland government, allowing Ethiopia access to the coasts of Somaliland for the establishment of commercial ports and naval bases, in exchange for Ethiopia beginning the recognition of Somaliland’s independence. This recognition was agreed to start with the elevation of diplomatic relations between the two sides to the ambassadorial level. Since its issuance in January, the memorandum has caused significant tensions between Mogadishu and Addis Ababa, manifested in various forms throughout the current year, culminating in a threat to the regional security arrangements established since 2007. The Somali government has taken advantage of the end of the African Union mission’s mandate to prepare for a new mission while officially rejecting the presence of any Ethiopian forces and considering any Ethiopian military presence in Somalia as foreign occupation beginning in early 2025.
The announcement of the agreement between Somalia and Ethiopia resulted from Turkish diplomatic efforts, led by Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan since July, to mediate between the two countries, both of which maintain close ties with Ankara. Notably, this agreement did not address the contentious issues between Somalia and Ethiopia; these will be left to a technical negotiating process to be launched by February 2025, lasting four months before reaching a final agreement addressing the various outstanding issues.
Thus, it is clear that the agreement announced in Ankara between Somalia and Ethiopia is limited to the two countries exchanging understandings regarding the principles governing their bilateral relationship, as expressed in the official statement from the Turkish side, which confirmed Ethiopia’s commitment to the unity and sovereignty of Somalia in exchange for Somalia’s recognition of Ethiopia’s right to access Somali coasts for economic benefits, acknowledging also the sacrifices made by Ethiopian soldiers during their military involvement in Somalia.
Motivations for Success:
Despite the agreement sponsored by Turkey between Somalia and Ethiopia avoiding engagement with specific contentious issues, it still possesses real opportunities for success due to several motivating factors:
The Need for Somalia and Ethiopia to Alleviate Tensions to Address Internal Issues: Currently, Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud faces growing opposition due to his plan to end reliance on clan-based power-sharing. This involves abolishing indirect elections and shifting to direct voting, granting a voice to every citizen. Additionally, there have been disputes between the President and several state leaders regarding the federal government’s sovereignty amid traditionally expanded powers of the state governments. Conversely, Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed faces significant challenges, including armed conflicts primarily in the Amhara and Oromia regions, along with renewed tensions in the northern Tigray region. His political project to reshape Ethiopian politics beyond the ethnic federalism system has faced numerous difficulties, reflecting the challenges of rebuilding the fragmented parties supporting the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front under the Prosperity Party since late 2019.
Implications of Political Change in Somaliland: Ethiopia’s plan was primarily based on the position of former Somaliland President Muse Bihi Abdi, who signed the memorandum in January 2024 and was one of its main advocates. However, the elections held in November 2024 resulted in the rise of Abdullahi Mohamed Abdillahi, who expressed intentions to reevaluate all agreements signed with external parties to ensure they serve Somaliland’s long-term interests. This trend was confirmed by statements from the ruling party’s spokesperson, indicating the new government was studying the memorandum with Ethiopia to decide whether to proceed or suspend it shortly after the Somali-Ethiopian agreement in Ankara. Thus, the change in leadership in Somaliland may prompt Ethiopia to realign its priorities with Mogadishu towards achieving more comprehensive and sustainable settlements that provoke less regional tension.
Shared Turkish Interests in Somalia and Ethiopia: This interest has been the primary motivation for Turkish mediation. Turkey has maintained a strong presence in Somalia since 2011, expanding from humanitarian efforts to economic and military involvement, particularly in training Somali armed forces. Similarly, Turkey is a major trading partner and investor in the Ethiopian economy, reinforced by extensive political ties between Ankara and Addis Ababa. These Turkish interests motivate Ankara to continue facilitating negotiations between Somalia and Ethiopia, ultimately leading to a comprehensive agreement to address different contentions, thereby enhancing Turkey’s military, security, and economic presence in the Horn of Africa.
Resilience Challenges:
Despite the various motivating factors for the success of the agreement sponsored by Turkey, several challenges may threaten its sustainability, including:
Security Challenges that May Impede Compliance by Somalia and Ethiopia: Securing a lengthy land route from the Somali coasts to the Ethiopian interior, reaching the economic center in Addis Ababa, presents substantial difficulties, even with Turkish military and security support driven by potential economic benefits for Ankara. The most significant challenges include the presence of terrorist organizations; for instance, Al-Shabaab poses severe threats if relying on central and southern Somali ports like Mogadishu, Marka, and Kismayo, and the expanding activities of ISIS if depending on northern Puntland ports like Bosaso. Additionally, the negative experiences from the Tigray conflict, which sparked side conflicts between Somali and Afar communities in Ethiopia, led to the severing of the railway line connecting Djibouti’s port to the Ethiopian capital in 2021, especially with the rise in clashes between Somali and Oromo communities in central and southern regions recently.
Continuing Impacts of Middle Eastern Turmoil: The Horn of Africa is linked to the Middle East via the Bab el Mandeb Strait, rendering the region susceptible to direct influences from changing conditions driven by increasing pressure to limit Iranian expansion in countries like Yemen, which is geographically closest to the Horn of Africa. In this regard, developments in the Middle East could transform the coastal areas of the Horn into strategic points or arenas of confrontation, potentially inviting more active foreign military presence, which could reshape regional balances and diminish the effectiveness of the recent Somali-Ethiopian agreement.
Growing Global Polarization in the Horn of Africa: This creates a susceptibility to rising competition, which may disrupt the fragile stability currently in place, as the African coastal regions adjacent to the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden are viewed as the western limit of the Indian and Pacific Oceans, where intense competition among several major and medium international powers, including the United States, China, Russia, India, and France, is already occurring. This situation may continuously affect the interrelations among Horn of Africa countries, influenced by the shifting balance of international interests in the region, which often leans towards polarization, especially considering the significant variable of Donald Trump’s return to the U.S. presidency starting January 2025.
Three Future Directions:
In light of the motivations and challenges facing the Ethiopian-Somali agreement announced under Turkish sponsorship, three future trends can be anticipated regarding its implications for the Horn of Africa:
- Temporary De-escalation of Tensions between Somalia and Ethiopia: This will have been a source of regional tensions for nearly a year. The Turkish approach, which is cautious in addressing detailed contentious issues, may prolong the period of de-escalation until mid-2025, during which various parties involved in the Horn may await clarity on the new U.S. policy in the region.
- Gradual Entrenchment of External Solutions to Horn of Africa Problems: This comes as regional and African mechanisms sharply decline in effectiveness, amidst a continual decrease in the role of IGAD and the African Union in addressing Horn crises, a trend supported by numerous indicators over the past decade.
- The Partial Nature of the Somali-Ethiopian Agreement: While it addresses one aspect of Ethiopia’s push toward the coast, it leaves two key countries involved in this issue, Djibouti and Eritrea, without suitable resolutions, potentially opening the door to new sources of regional tensions.
