Since the leader of the Turkish Nationalist Movement Party, Devlet Bahçeli, issued his call in October 2024 to disband the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) and disarm it in exchange for the release of its founding leader, Abdullah Öcalan, the momentum has snowballed, with all parties reacting to this appeal with serious consideration, as Bahçeli would not have initiated this endeavor without coordinating with his ally, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, who has vocally and strongly supported him in hopes of making a breakthrough in this issue.
Öcalan’s Call
Following meetings and discussions between representatives of the pro-Kurdish Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP) and Öcalan, who is serving a life sentence under tight security on Imralı Island in the Sea of Marmara, a delegation from the party presented a message from Öcalan at a press conference on February 27, 2025, calling for a conference to agree on disbanding the PKK, disarmament, and engaging in a democratic political process.
The Kurdish public followed the message from their imprisoned leader, who has been in prison since 1999, through large screens in public squares across southeastern Turkey and northern Syria and Iraq, reviving hopes that this initiative could end a conflict that began nearly 40 years ago and has resulted in tens of thousands of deaths and widespread destruction.
Founded in 1978, the PKK began its attacks against the government in 1984, initially aiming to establish a Kurdish state before shifting its demands to autonomy. It is listed as a terrorist organization by Turkey, the United States, and the European Union. The party emerged in response to what it describes as the oppression of the Kurdish population in Turkey, which has been deprived of its language rights. Despite significant reforms undertaken by the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP), the outcomes have remained below the aspirations of the Kurdish citizenry.
Divergent Responses
Öcalan’s call resonated widely, creating contrasting reactions both within Turkey and abroad. Some notable reactions include:
- PKK Reaction: In early March, the PKK announced a cease-fire, but its response was conditional and accompanied by several demands, including the release of its leader to oversee the disarmament process. The party stated success hinges on achieving democracy and a suitable legal framework, declaring: “We announce a cease-fire starting today; as long as there are no attacks against us, none of our forces will carry out armed actions. Öcalan’s call is not the end, but rather a new beginning. The things that must have been done in the past thirty-five years, especially during the last twenty, but were not executed on time, must happen now.” The decision to cease hostilities applies to all forces from March 1, 2025, including leadership in the Qandil Mountains of northern Iraq, with several assemblies close to the party endorsing the initiative.
- Turkish Government Response: Erdoğan’s government handled Öcalan’s invitation with a dual approach; Erdoğan viewed it as an opportunity to move Turkey into a new phase aimed at making it “terror-free.” He praised the initiative on February 28, stating: “We have a chance to take a historic step toward demolishing the wall of terrorism that stands between our brotherhood, which has lasted for a thousand years.” However, the following day, Erdoğan threatened to resume military operations if the PKK halted the disarmament process or failed to fulfill its promises. Meanwhile, the Turkish military continued its assaults on PKK strongholds in the Kurdistan region of Iraq and announced that fighters would respond to these attacks, with the media center reporting over a thousand Turkish attacks in just the first three days of March.
- Political Parties: Reactions within the Turkish political elite varied. Both Ümit Özdağ, leader of the far-right Victory Party, and Meral Akşener, leader of the Good Party, rejected the peace initiative, viewing it as Erdoğan’s maneuver to prolong his rule. They indicated that drafting a new constitution as part of reconciliation arrangements with the Kurds would allow Erdoğan to renew his presidency, which is set to end in 2028. While opposition leader and head of the Republican People’s Party (CHP), Özgür Özel, did not outright reject the peace initiative, he expressed reservations about it. Fatih Erbakan, leader of the New Welfare Party, also had hesitations regarding the initiative’s details. Conversely, Ali Babacan’s Democracy and Progress Party, Ahmet Davutoğlu’s Future Party, and Zakaria Yapıcıoğlu’s Huda Par welcomed Öcalan’s call.
The AKP stands to gain significantly from the initiative, potentially boosting its local support, as does the HDP, the third-largest party in Parliament and the political face of the Kurdish movement, likely to expand in role and influence due to this initiative.
- Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF): The Turks view the SDF as the Syrian branch of the PKK despite its attempts to deny this connection. The AKP’s spokesman, Ömer Çelik, stated: “Kurdish militants in Turkey, Iraq, and Syria, including the SDF, must lay down their arms… There is no bargaining or negotiation with terrorists.” Meanwhile, SDF leader Mazloum Abdi praised Öcalan’s call but stated that his forces are not concerned with it, understanding it inversely as: “If peace is achieved in Turkey, there will be no justification for continuing attacks on us in Syria.” As a result, Turkish military operations and attacks by affiliated factions on SDF forces persisted, and both sides exchanged artillery fire in northeastern Syria.
Challenges to Success
Öcalan’s call comes amidst intertwined local and regional developments. Although it has garnered praise from various parties, it may face obstacles capable of undermining it at its inception and foiling positive efforts. The main challenges include:
- Power Centers within the PKK: In recent years, all peace efforts fell into a deadlock between the government and the leaders controlling the PKK’s pivotal roles. These leaders risk losing their influence and power if the party dissolves and disarms. Just two days after Bahçeli’s initiative announcement, the PKK carried out a suicide attack on October 24 against the Turkish Aerospace Industries (TAI) in Ankara, killing five and injuring others. PKK commander Cemil Bayık released a video asserting that he makes the decisions, not Öcalan or the HDP, stating: “We decide.” Within the AKP, there is a view that the upper Alevi group controlling the PKK is behind the foiling of Öcalan’s attempts to resolve the conflict, noting that major leaders like Bayık, Mustafa Karasu, Duran Kalkan, Rıza Altun, and Ali Haydar Kaytan are Alawite, unlike Öcalan and most party supporters.
- Criticism from Turkish Nationalists: In a previous reconciliation attempt in 2015, the AKP faced backlash from its nationalist base, leading them to vote for other parties. Erdoğan has faced fierce criticism recently from far-right Turkish nationalists. Thus, the initiative was initially announced by the Nationalist Movement Party’s leader to shield the AKP from nationalist challenges on this issue. However, the MHP faced competition from far-right politician Ümit Özdağ, who was arrested and charged with multiple offenses; Akşener subsequently went to court to express support for him and his rejection of the peace initiative.
- SDF Rejection: The SDF rejected the peace initiative since it is considered the Syrian branch of the PKK, maintaining its denial of organizational ties. Ankara insists the initiative must include the resolution of the SDF and disarmament, threatening a wide-scale military operation for this purpose. A member of the Kurdistan Communities Union (KCK) Executive Council, Zübeyir Aydın, dismissed reports from pro-government media that Öcalan’s call includes the SDF, clarifying that Öcalan had previously demanded a suitable status for Kurds in Syria, without reverting to the situation that prevailed under Assad. The SDF enjoys U.S. military support, which Ankara seeks to counter by persuading President Trump to withdraw U.S. forces from northeastern Syria.
- Iranian Influence: Tehran fears the expansion of Turkish influence in the region and a potential Kurdish alliance with Ankara that would negatively affect its own power. The PKK in Iraq has allied with Iranians, with some of its forces included in the Popular Mobilization Forces linked to Iran’s Revolutionary Guard, particularly in Sinjar, Iraq. Tehran seeks to maintain its influence in the Kurdistan region of Iraq, and the current peace process could enhance cooperation between the region and Ankara across various fields, including a gas export project through Turkish territory, providing an alternative to Iranian gas, which has previously been used as leverage against Turkey.
- Israeli Considerations: Israel aims to leverage Kurdish affairs to its advantage, viewing the PKK as a means to weaken Syria and curb Turkish influence, which has supplanted Iranian influence. Tel Aviv is particularly concerned about Turkish attempts to persuade Trump to withdraw U.S. troops from Syria and is trying to convince the White House to maintain American forces. Israeli Foreign Minister Gideon Sa’ar has openly stated that Israel’s natural alliances are with minorities such as “the Kurds in Syria, Iraq, Iran, and Turkey,” indicating an explicit Israeli desire to support and prolong the Kurdish rebellion.
Possible Scenarios
As Öcalan’s initiative unfolds and its influence spreads, several potential paths or scenarios could emerge regarding the success of these efforts and their impact on the region:
- Return to Square One: This scenario draws on negative historical experience, given the lack of trust between the Turkish and Kurdish parties. Previous attempts have ended in failure, with Öcalan’s earlier calls being ignored. Pessimistic voices within the PKK note that their party has unilaterally declared a cease-fire seven times since 1993 to seek a political solution, but the Turkish government has responded with increased military aggression. Some initiatives nearly succeeded but lacked sufficient support; shortly after his imprisonment, Öcalan requested in 2000 that his party dissolve, but five years later, the party accused the government of non-responsiveness. In March 2013, the PKK officially announced a ceasefire with Turkey until June 2015, which gained significant momentum but ultimately bore no fruit.
This scenario also aligns with the ongoing military confrontations following Öcalan’s current call, particularly in northern Iraq. Continuing and escalating confrontations could thwart peace efforts, similar to a single suicide attack in Istanbul causing many casualties, which could place Erdoğan’s government in an extremely difficult position and bolster support for a confrontational stance.
Furthermore, there are concerns that PKK leaders may attempt to sidestep the initiative by retaining their forces through associated organizations in Syria and Iraq under different banners. This warning was issued by Bülent Arınç, a former speaker of the Turkish parliament, indicating that the organization is no longer strong within Turkey, with significantly reduced membership, but has concentrated its power on rebuilding itself outside Turkey. Current military confrontations in northern Iraq increase the likelihood of sabotaging the initiative, paralleling previous unsuccessful attempts due to the lack of trust between parties and the inability to arrive at satisfactory agreements that fulfill minimum consensus.
- Success of the Initiative: There remains a reasonable chance that this attempt could achieve the desired success, due to many changed circumstances. Öcalan noted this at the beginning of his message, stating that the PKK was formed “in the twentieth century, the most violent century in history, born from the repression of freedoms, especially the freedom of expression and the denial of Kurdish reality.” His current call is justified by the expanding margin of freedoms and the altered environments that have fostered this conflict.
Moreover, Bahçeli is mobilizing efforts to gather support for the initiative, having conducted a series of communications with prominent Kurdish leaders, including Selahattin Demirtaş, the former leader of the HDP. There are serious behind-the-scenes efforts underway to draft a detailed roadmap for implementing this initiative. Turkish writer Nurai Babacan revealed that according to the arrangements in preparation, the PKK leader would be released but would not be able to travel abroad or enjoy the right to vote or run for elections, with his primary residence being Imralı and his movement within Turkey being dependent on permission from the authorities. If the plan unfolds as conceived by the state, the processes for the dissolution of the organization, surrendering arms, clearing camps, and deporting leadership to other countries could take at least a year. Only then would discussions about amnesty for Öcalan begin, possibly requiring two years to complete all necessary procedures.
Moreover, the co-chair of the HDP, Tülay Hatimoğulları, stated that Öcalan is preparing a comprehensive vision that includes realistic solutions through legal frameworks to address the issues in Syria, Turkey, Iraq, and the region as a whole.
However, this optimistic scenario is accompanied by fears that if the PKK issue is resolved solely through security measures without addressing the grievances of the Kurdish population, more radical groups may emerge to fill the vacuum left by the dismantling of the party and expand within the same supportive environment.
- Disintegration of the PKK: Given the massive transformation the PKK faces today, significant structural divisions and rifts could arise due to multiple leadership factions and external interventions. Currently, there are three leaders of the party in the Qandil Mountains: Cemil Bayık, Mustafa Karasu, and Murat Karayılan, all of whom are connected to Iran, which fears a Turkish-Kurdish alliance.
Moreover, there might be schisms within the PKK along sectarian lines, since many party leaders are from the Alevi sect while the vast majority of Kurds are Sunni. There are discussions about the possibility of some leaders or factions that oppose the party’s new steps splitting off, whether in northern Iraq or Europe. In recent days, Kurdish voices have emerged accusing Öcalan of betraying the cause and shamefully conceding the rights of his people by not advocating for their rights in his message. Many splits have occurred during previous reconciliation attempts, but these have not diminished the party’s strength.
Despite Öcalan’s significant standing, his imprisonment for a quarter of a century has affected his decision-making ability within the PKK. A generation has emerged that has only seen him as an icon and historical symbol, as if belonging to a bygone era. Numerous influential leaders have appeared in Turkey, Iraq, Syria, and Europe, which may lead to disagreements among the various wings as often happens during such historical turning points.
In conclusion, Öcalan’s initiative could represent a pivotal turning point in the history of the region, not just Turkey; should it receive genuine support and sincere cooperation from both PKK leaders and the Turkish government, combined with political steps alongside cultural, social, and economic efforts to heal past wounds. However, expecting an immediate and swift resolution to issues that have deepened over decades is overly optimistic; a fundamental resolution to such issues requires sufficient time to bear fruit, and rushing it could harm all and benefit none.
It is crucial to note the fragility of trust between the two parties based on their negative historical experiences and the high probability of retreating from the recent progress should current military confrontations continue and intensify, allowing the clamor of battles to overshadow calls for peace and reconciliation. Herein lies the utmost importance of establishing trust-building measures and frameworks that ensure everyone benefits; only in this way can the initiative succeed and overcome those who seek to obstruct it.
