Opportunities and Challenges for the Success of Ocalan’s Initiative to End the Turkish-Kurdish Conflict

Since Turkish Nationalist Movement Party leader Devlet Bahceli launched his call in October 2024 for the disbandment and disarmament of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) in exchange for the release of its founding leader, Abdullah Ocalan, the reaction from all parties has snowballed. This is largely due to the understanding that Bahceli would not begin this effort without coordinating with his ally, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, who publicly and strongly supported the initiative, hoping to make a breakthrough in this issue.

Ocalan’s Call:

Following meetings between representatives of the Peoples’ Equality and Democracy Party (DEVA) and Ocalan, who is serving a life sentence in solitary confinement on Imrali Island in the Sea of Marmara, the party’s delegation presented Ocalan’s message at a press conference on February 27, 2025. In the message, Ocalan called for a conference to agree on the PKK’s disbandment and disarmament and to engage in a democratic political process.

Kurdish crowds followed the message of their leader, imprisoned since 1999, through giant screens in public squares in southeastern Turkey and northern Syria and Iraq. Hopes surged that this initiative could end a conflict that has lasted for nearly 40 years, resulting in tens of thousands of deaths and widespread destruction.

The PKK was established in 1978 and began its attacks against the government in 1984. Its initial goal was to establish a Kurdish state, which later shifted to demands for autonomy. It is listed as a terrorist organization by Turkey, the United States, and the European Union. The party arose in the context of what it describes as the persecution of the Kurdish population in Turkey and the denial of their rights to use their language. Although the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) has implemented several reforms in this regard, they have fallen short of Kurdish citizens’ aspirations.

Mixed Reactions:

Ocalan’s initiative elicited significant and varied reactions both within and outside Turkey. Notable responses include:

1. The PKK: In early March 2025, the PKK announced a ceasefire, but its acceptance of the initiative came with conditions and demands, calling for the release of its leader to lead the disarmament process and preside over the conference himself. The PKK stated in a message that success is contingent upon achieving democracy and a suitable legal framework. It declared: “We announce a ceasefire starting today; as long as there is no attack against us, none of our forces will carry out armed actions… Ocalan’s call is certainly not the end, but rather a new beginning. The things that should have been done over the last thirty-five years, especially in the last twenty years, but were not done in a timely manner, must now occur.” The PKK emphasized that the ceasefire applies to all its forces starting from March 1, 2025, including the party’s leadership in the Qandil Mountains of northern Iraq. Several PKK-affiliated gatherings expressed their support for the initiative.
2. The Turkish Government: Erdogan’s government reacted to Ocalan’s call with a mixed approach. Erdogan embraced the initiative, considering Turkey to have entered a new phase aimed at making the country “free of terrorism,” praising the venture on February 28, saying: “We have an opportunity to take a historic step toward breaking down the wall of terrorism that has been built between our brotherhood, which has a history of a thousand years.” However, the next day, during a breakfast event in Istanbul, he threatened to resume military operations if the PKK halted its disarmament process or failed to meet commitments.

Meanwhile, the Turkish army continued its attacks on PKK strongholds in northern Iraq, with fighters pledging to respond to these assaults. Throughout the following days, air and ground attacks on PKK hideouts persisted, with its media center reporting over a thousand Turkish attacks during the first three days of March alone.

3. Turkish Political Parties: As expected, reactions from the Turkish political elite were mixed. Umit Ozdag, head of the far-right Victory Party, and Masarat Durmuş, head of the Good Party, rejected the peace initiative, viewing it as a maneuver by Erdogan to extend his rule, implying that the drafting of a new constitution as part of reconciliation arrangements with the Kurds would provide Erdogan with an opportunity to renew his presidency, which is supposed to end in 2028. While the leader of the main opposition Republican People’s Party (CHP), Ozgur Ozel, did not outright reject the peace initiative, he expressed apprehension. Fatih Erbakan, head of the New Welfare Party, expressed reservations about the initiative’s details. Conversely, the Democracy and Progress Party led by Ali Babacan, the Future Party led by Ahmet Davutoğlu, and the Huda Par Islamic party led by Zekeriya Yapıcıoğlu welcomed Ocalan’s call.

The AKP is expected to be one of the main beneficiaries of the initiative, likely to enhance its popularity locally, along with the Peoples’ Equality and Democracy Party, the third-largest party in parliament, which serves as the political front for the Kurdish movement and has initiated Ocalan’s call. It is likely to expand its role and influence in the future against the backdrop of this initiative.

4. Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF): Turks consider the SDF to be the Syrian branch of the PKK, despite the latter’s attempts to deny this relationship. The spokesperson for the ruling AKP, Omar Celik, stated: “The Kurdish fighters in Turkey, Iraq, and Syria, including the SDF, must lay down their arms… There is no compromise or negotiation with terrorists.” SDF commander Mazloum Abdi praised Ocalan’s call but stated that his forces are not concerned with it, interpreting the situation inversely: “If peace is achieved in Turkey, then there is no justification for continuing the attacks against us in Syria.” As a result, Turkish forces and allied factions continued their attacks on SDF forces, with both sides exchanging artillery fire in northeastern Syria.

Challenges to Success:

Ocalan’s call comes amid complex local and regional developments. Despite the welcoming and praises from various parties, it may face obstacles capable of thwarting its initial momentum and undermining positive efforts. The primary challenges include:

1. Power Centers within the PKK: Over the past years, all peace efforts have hit dead ends between the government and the leaders controlling the PKK. This can be understood considering that these leaders would lose their influence and power if the party were dissolved and disarmed. Just two days after Bahceli’s initiative was announced, the PKK carried out a suicide attack on October 24 that targeted the Turkish Aerospace Industries (TAI) in Ankara, resulting in five deaths and several injuries. PKK commander Cemil Bayik released a video stating that he is the one making decisions, not Ocalan or the Peoples’ Equality and Democracy Party, asserting: “We decide.” There is a perspective within the AKP that sees the ruling Alevi group in the PKK as those behind the failure of Ocalan’s attempts to resolve the conflict, given that top PKK leaders like Cemil Bayik, Mustafa Karasu, Duran Kalkan, Reza Altun, and Ali Haydar Kaytan are Alawites, unlike Ocalan and most of the party’s supporters.
2. Criticism from Turkish Nationalists: One of the reasons for the failure of the previous reconciliation initiative in 2015 was the AKP’s pressure from its nationalist base, who leaned toward voting for other parties. Recently, Erdogan faced severe criticism from far-right Turkish nationalists; thus, the announcement of the initiative was presented by the head of the Nationalist Movement Party to protect the AKP from nationalist competition on this matter. However, the Nationalist Movement Party faced competition from far-right politician Umit Ozdag, who was subsequently arrested and charged with several offenses. Maisar Al-Durmus, the head of the Good Party, went to court to show his support for him and his opposition to the peace initiative.
3. Rejection of the SDF: The SDF rejected involvement in the peace initiative, considering itself the Syrian branch of the PKK, while denying any organizational connections to it. Ankara insists that the initiative must include the resolution of the SDF and its disarmament and threatens to launch a large military operation for this purpose. Zubir Aydar, a member of the Executive Council of the KCK (Kurdistan Communities Union), rejected Turkish government-affiliated media reports that claimed Ocalan’s call included the SDF, clarifying that Ocalan had previously requested suitable status for Kurds in Syria and that things should not return to what they were under Assad. He stated that the Turkish press presents varying interpretations as part of a “psychological war.” The SDF relies on U.S. military support, which Ankara tries to counter by convincing President Trump to withdraw U.S. forces from northeastern Syria.
4. Iranian Influence: Tehran fears the expansion of Turkish influence in the region and a Kurdish alliance with Ankara, which would negatively impact Iranian influence. The PKK in Iraq is allied with Iranians, and part of its forces is integrated into the Popular Mobilization Forces loyal to the Iranian Revolutionary Guard, as seen in Sinjar in western Iraq. Tehran aims to maintain its influence in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq. The current peace process could enhance cooperation between the region and Ankara across various fields, including the exportation of regional gas through Turkish territory, providing an alternative to Iranian gas, which has been used previously as leverage against Turkey.
5. Israeli Calculations: Israel seeks to leverage the Kurdish issue to its advantage, seeing the PKK as an effective means to undermine Syria and curb Turkish influence that has replaced Iranian dominance. Tel Aviv is extremely concerned about Turkish attempts to persuade Trump to withdraw U.S. forces from Syria and is lobbying the White House against such a move. Israeli Foreign Minister Gideon Sa’ar explicitly stated that his country’s natural alliances are with minorities like “the Kurds in Syria, Iraq, Iran, and Turkey,” indicating an open Israeli desire to support the Kurdish rebellion and its continuation.

Possible Scenarios:

In light of the engagement with Ocalan’s initiative and the expanding influence it may have, several paths or potential scenarios regarding the success of these efforts and their implications for the region can be considered:

1. Return to Square One: This scenario draws on historical negative experience. Due to the lack of trust between the Turkish and Kurdish parties, all previous attempts have failed, and Ocalan’s previous calls have fallen flat. Pessimistic voices within the PKK cite that their party has declared a unilateral ceasefire seven times since 1993 to seek a political solution, but the Turkish government has responded with escalated attacks. Some of these initiatives almost achieved success but lacked adequate support. Shortly after his imprisonment, Ocalan called in 2000 for his party to disband, but five years later, the party resumed its path, accusing the government of lack of responsiveness. In March 2013, the PKK officially announced a ceasefire with Turkey until June 2015, and this initiative garnered significant momentum without any eventual success.

This scenario is also based on the interactions following Ocalan’s current call; military confrontations between the two sides have continued, especially in northern Iraq. Continued or intensified confrontations could potentially derail peace endeavors, and a single suicide attack by the party in Istanbul, for example, leading to a high number of casualties could place the Erdogan government in a very awkward position and strengthen the hardline faction’s stance.

Moreover, there are fears that PKK leaders may attempt to circumvent the initiative by maintaining their forces through affiliated organizations in Syria and Iraq under other banners, a caution raised by former Turkish parliament speaker Bulent Arinc. The organization is no longer strong within Turkish territory, and its membership has significantly decreased, but it has concentrated its efforts on rebuilding itself outside Turkey. Ongoing military confrontations between the two sides in northern Iraq increase the likelihood that the initiative will fail, mirroring previous unsuccessful attempts due to a lack of trust between the two parties and the failure to reach satisfactory frameworks that meet the minimum level of agreement.

2. Success of the Initiative: It is fairly possible this time that the initiative could achieve the desired success due to many changing circumstances, as Ocalan pointed out at the beginning of his message, noting that the PKK emerged “in the twentieth century, the most violent century in history, on a foundation that stemmed from the prohibition of freedoms, especially the freedom of expression and the denial of the Kurdish reality.” He justified his current call with the expanding margin of freedoms and the changing environment that has produced this conflict.

Additionally, Bahceli leads a movement aimed at gathering support to ensure the initiative’s success; he has conducted a series of communications with prominent Kurdish leaders, including Selahattin Demirtas, the former leader of the Democratic Peoples’ Party. Serious behind-the-scenes efforts are underway to craft a detailed roadmap for implementing this initiative. Turkish writer Nuray Babacan revealed that according to the arrangements being prepared, the PKK leader will be released but will not be able to travel abroad or enjoy the right to vote or run for election, and his primary residence will be in Imrali, traveling within Turkey only with authorization from the authorities. If the plan unfolds as the state envisions, the process of organizational dissolution, disarmament, and relocation of leaders to other countries will take at least a year, after which discussions about Ocalan’s amnesty could begin, a process that could take two years to finalize.

Meanwhile, the co-chair of the Peoples’ Equality and Democracy Party, Tulay Hatimoglu, stated that Ocalan is in the process of developing a comprehensive vision that includes realistic solutions through legal frameworks to resolve the issue across Syria, Turkey, Iraq, and the entire region.

However, this optimistic scenario is shadowed by fears that if a security resolution to the PKK issue succeeds fully without addressing the grievances of the Kurdish population, more radical groups might emerge to fill the void left by the dismantling of the party and thrive in the same supportive environment.

3. Dismantling of the PKK: Given the significant transformation the PKK faces today, it may suffer from significant structural divisions and splits due to competing leadership and external interventions. There are three prominent leaders of the party in the Qandil Mountains: Cemil Bayik, Mustafa Karasu, and Murad Karayilan, all of whom maintain ties with Iran, which fears Turkey’s alliance with the Kurds.

There may also be sectarian divisions within the PKK, considering that many of its leaders are from the Alawite sect while the vast majority of Kurds are Sunni. There are discussions about the potential separation of some leaders or groups rejecting the new steps of the party, whether in northern Iraq or Europe. Recently, Kurdish voices have emerged accusing Ocalan of betraying the cause by conceding the rights of his people in a degrading manner because he did not advocate for their rights in his message. While many splits occurred during previous reconciliation attempts, they did not eradicate the party’s strength.

Despite Ocalan’s significant stature, his quarter-century incarceration has affected his decision-making power within the PKK, as a generation has grown that views him only as a historical icon, belonging to a bygone era. Many influential leaders in Turkey, Iraq, Syria, and Europe have emerged, and disputes among the various factions are likely to arise, as is common during such historical inflections.

In conclusion, Ocalan’s initiative could represent a critical turning point in the history of the region, not just Turkey; however, for it to receive genuine support and sincere cooperation from both PKK leaders and the Turkish government, steps must be taken to accompany political moves with cultural, social, and economic measures to heal past wounds. Nevertheless, anticipating an immediate and swift resolution to the problems that have deepened over decades is overly optimistic; a fundamental resolution to such issues requires sufficient time to bear fruit, and hastiness may harm everyone without benefiting any party.

It is worth noting the fragility of trust between both parties based on their historical negative experiences, and the significant possibility of regression from this recent progress, as has occurred previously, especially if ongoing military confrontations continue to escalate, allowing the sound of battle to overshadow calls for peace and reconciliation. Herein lies the utmost importance of confidence-building measures and frameworks that ensure mutual benefits; only in this way can the initiative succeed and overcome those attempting to obstruct it.