New Realism Theory for Analyzing Political Phenomena

We begin this article with the third major facet of realism in the 20th century, namely the new realist Kenneth Waltz, who worked on formulating a nomological-deductive theory of international politics based on his conviction that the nature of the international system determines how the political units it comprises act. In his book Man, the State, and War, Waltz attributes the state of war to the anarchic structure of the international system more than attributing it to human nature or the actions of states in isolation, stating that “wars break out because there is nothing to prevent them.”

Waltz’s theory of international politics derives from his book of the same name, published in 1979, and serves as a reaction to critiques faced by the realist perspective from behavioralists and alternatives that do not rely on state centrality during the second and third debates. They collectively criticized the lack of independence of international relations from social sciences while behavioralists accused them of unscientific propositions, as Marxists pointed to the role of non-state actors.

Waltz borrowed from the field of economics, applying the market model to international politics. He criticized what he called reductionist theories, which explain international politics from the first analytical level (human nature and the personality of rulers) or the second level (the state, its geographical location, and the nature of its internal political system). He argued that it is essential to consider both levels when analyzing the foreign policies of states, but they should not be abstracted from time and space factors. Thus, Waltz relies on the third analytical level— the international system, which he divides into three main principles: the principle of organization, the principle of differentiation, and the principle of distribution.

1. The Principle of Organization:

This principle pertains to the overall condition of the system. Like Aron, he argues for a radical difference between the internal political system, characterized by a central authority that possesses and dominates legitimate means of coercion, and the international political system, where such authority is absent. In his book Theory of International Politics, he posits that international systems are decentralized and anarchic, whereas internal systems are centralized and vertical, hence organizational principles of both structures differ and oppose each other.

This point is the only one where he aligns with Aron regarding the second principle.

2. The Principle of Differentiation:

Waltz gives no regard for the internal structure of states in international politics, arguing that the anarchic structure of the international system compels all its units, i.e., states, to act similarly. The chaos characterizing the international system drives each state to seek its security and maintain its survival before pursuing any other goals established in its foreign policy, such as power or economic prosperity. Waltz posits that every state must self-help to achieve its security, stating that “to realize its objectives and maintain its security, no state should rely on others; this is the practical principle in an anarchic system.” This means each state is required to balance its power against all others. The system incentivizes actors who fail to cooperate, impeding their prosperity and security—hence, this compels states to unite and collaborate to achieve a balance of power.

In contrast, while Aron sees anarchy leading to multiple goals for states due to the differences in their internal systems and values, Waltz presents the concept of the international system abstractly, independent of internal systems. He believes this leads to the formation of an international structure that organizes states’ external behaviors. This view of the international structure, imposed by international anarchy, can be credited to Jean-Jacques Rousseau, who asserts that primitive human beings prioritize their self-interest over collective interest, not because of human nature as posited by Hobbes, but due to a natural condition that enforces such behavior. This is because they cannot be certain of others’ intentions due to the absence of a supreme authority to penalize violations of agreements.

A question arises: can we say there is only one type of international system since all states behave similarly? The answer is “no,” as evidenced by the third principle.

3. The Principle of Distribution:

This refers to the distribution of material values among states, which leads to changing any international system. Waltz argues that the structure of the system changes based on how values are distributed among the units of the system.

In other words, while all states behave similarly within an anarchic system by striving for their security through a balance of power, they differ in their capacity to achieve this task (i.e., security).

Thus, the structure of the international system is limited to a number of major powers that constitute it. In this context, theorists and researchers in international relations, much like political practitioners, distinguish between different international systems based on the number of major powers composing them. Consequently, Waltz focused solely on studying these major powers that govern and manage the system in a way that reduces uncertainty typical of an anarchic system.

The fewer the major states, the more stable the international system. However, Morgenthau argues that the best system is a multipolar one, while Aron believes that a homogeneous multipolarity is preferable. Waltz, on the other hand, favored a bipolar system, considering it essential for a balanced and orderly system.

The end of the Cold War vindicated Waltz at Aron’s expense; the ideological war discussed by Aron was avoided, as the conflict between the two giants ended without firing a shot, due to the collapse of the Soviet Union. However, Waltz did not predict this collapse; rather, he insisted in 1979 that any club to which the Soviet Union and the U.S. belonged was essentially closed off, as no country could meet the conditions for joining it, thus it would remain closed for a long time.

The fall of the Berlin Wall contradicted this prediction, leading to criticisms of new realism regarding its inability to predict the peaceful end of the Cold War. Indeed, there is one area where Waltz did foresee future events when he questioned the true capabilities of the Soviet Union, arguing that this state possessed many advantages in comparison to the U.S.; however, with a gross national product (G.N.P) representing half of that of the U.S., it would soon face daunting problems in this race.

The practical question that arises is not whether two or three states can appear alongside the superpowers, but whether the Soviet Union can maintain its position. These specific inquiries formed a turning point for new realism. Two years after Waltz’s theory of international relations, Robert Gilpin published his valuable book War and Change in World Politics, attempting to address criticisms from Marxists and globalists, particularly the lack of focus on the economic factor. Gilpin introduced the economic dimension into the general theory of realism, unlike classical realists like Morgenthau and Aron, who considered the economic side from a narrow perspective limited to the extent to which economic resources support military power. Waltz did not incorporate the economic aspect but included a method of thought or the economic approach, specifically microeconomics.

Thus, Gilpin was the first to introduce this aspect, seeing it as an essential condition for the distribution of values and power among states—topics that Waltz did not address, merely asserting that “the structure of any international system changes according to how values and powers are distributed among the fundamental units of the system.”

This led to a dynamic conception of realism by abandoning the notion of continuity and consistency in foreign policy, as well as the recurrent events and phenomena criticized by post-positivists such as Ruggie, Ashley, Cox, and especially Keohane in “New Realism and Its Critiques.”

Therefore, change, or rather some changes, are possible in international relations. However, Gilpin, like all realists, denies any possibility of creating a peaceful system among states. He argues, “The fundamental nature of international relations has not changed for centuries. International relations remain a struggle for prosperity and power among independent units in a state of chaos.” A simple glance at classical history such as that of Thucydides illustrates this idea, despite it dating back to the 5th century B.C.

Yet he believes in the potential for change, which can occur through: 1) changes in the system due to changing natures of the units that constitute it; in the anarchic system, these units are conflict groups. Gilpin borrowed this idea from Aristotle and sociologist Dagendorf, mentioned in his book No One Loves Realpolitik.

In this context, Gilpin states that the state, as the primary actor in international politics today, may not maintain this status indefinitely; changes in its nature may occur, and possibly the nation-state model itself could change, ceasing to be the highest form of political organization in societies. A review of history shows that political organizations have changed over time—from familial groups, tribes, states, cities, empires, etc.—indicating the likelihood of numerous changes in the principal actors in international relations, which will undeniably impact the international system.

The second image involves changes at the level of adjustments within the system, wherein the renewal brought by Gilpin appears.

Unlike Morgenthau and Aron, who embraced the concept of multipolar balance, and Waltz, who defended a bipolar balance, Gilpin relates balance and peace on an international level to the presence of a unipolar balance, meaning the dominance of a single authoritative power. His historical proof lies in the stability that prevailed during the era of British peace and earlier Roman peace. Thus, the Pax Americana that emerged since 1945 is seen as the solution for stability.

Gilpin’s idea of dominant power is not anchored in military power distribution or technological or economic changes; he posits that military capabilities of a power depend on the constructive power whose controlling metrics are established and adjusted by the dominant state for its benefit and for the benefit of its allies. Therefore, Gilpin’s concept of hegemony rests not only on material bases but also stands midway between the realist perception of hegemony defended by Mearsheimer—who sees it as control via material (especially military) force—and the Gramscian view found in Wallerstein and especially R. Cox, which perceives it as a quiet dominance unnoticed by those subjected to it.

However, the characteristic of constructive powers is that they grow unevenly; over a time period, economic growth flourishes before the situation changes. The maintenance of the dominant state’s position requires massive expenditure to defend its positions, which takes a toll on economic growth. This means that the law of unequal growth rates will ultimately favor the secondary powers, which, if one of them recognizes that this system does not benefit them and that the expected advantages of changing the status quo are better, would not hesitate to compete against the dominant power. This results in what is known as hegemonic wars—a term drawn from Raymond Aron in his works on industrial society and war, which Gilpin later adopted, defining it as: “A war that does not only revolve around trying to achieve direct objectives, but also its extensions and implications, affecting all international units that form the system.”

Thus, this hegemonic war is a total conflict aimed at establishing the foundations of a new international system, a “struggle for dominance” resulting from the growing imbalance between what the dominant state possesses in capabilities and what is required to maintain the system, ultimately leading to the birth of a new international system.

At the forefront of this system stands the state that challenges the defeated dominant power or one of its allies, benefiting from the decline of its ally’s power to seize the mantle of hegemony. This transpired after the two World Wars, as the U.S. rose at Britain’s expense, which Germany contested on two occasions. In either case, this new system remains temporary. “The endpoint of a hegemonic war signifies the starting point of the previous cycle: growth, expansion, then collapse,” wherein the rule of uneven growth divides the powers, thereby dismantling the established situation achieved by the latest war, and instability replaces stability, steering the world towards another hegemonic war.

Accordingly, the emergence and collapse of powers—this subject was addressed by Paul Kennedy in his famous book Naissance et déclin des grandes puissances—and the calculations of price/benefit/hegemony have been studied by the theory of international system changes through the mechanisms of hegemonic conflicts arising between powers in a growth phase and powers in a decline phase, which originally trace back to Montesquieu and Gibbon as well as to the methods of microeconomics gleaned from the rational choice models, complemented by some neo-Marxist ideas. Gilpin’s work is notably influenced by neo-Marxism, particularly in his second major work, The Political Economy of International Relations, and the theory of hegemonic balance by Kindlberger, as well as the power cycle theory of Modelski-Thompson or the power transition theory of Organski-Kugler. In this context, Gilpin posits that realism as a school of thought represents a rationality and philosophy rather than a scientific theory subject to empirical testing, thus undermining Waltz’s hopes of establishing realism as a scientific theory of international politics capable of explaining and interpreting states’ behaviors regardless of time and space factors.

For Waltz, as he confirmed in his book Theory of International Politics, if there exists any theory of international politics, it is the theory of the balance of power, where the anarchic system based on the concept of self-help compels states to engage in this kind of behavior and to avoid other actions. Consequently, he excludes strategies of alignment or bandwagoning vis-à-vis the dominant power.

However, Gilpin, like Waltz, is considered one of the neo-realists but does not share Waltz’s analysis that sees the most effective form of stability as being a unipolar balance that suspends all rivalries between states to balance their powers according to a single leading power. In other words, certain secondary powers relinquish the idea of self-help in favor of the benevolent dominant power. Here we summarize the discrepancy between two significant perspectives belonging to the same school. Gilpin argues that to enhance its power, states are compelled to adopt bandwagoning policies. This creates a balance taking the form of the emergence of a global dominant power.

This very idea has been subjected to numerous criticisms as it is unreasonable to assume that all states desire to enhance their power; some cannot even maintain their current status. In general, states aim to preserve their positions.

Nevertheless, the policy of bandwagoning can be understood and explained in case of a threat emanating from a power that is not the dominant one. In this case, a new realist concept comes into play, introduced by Stephen Walt, who presented the idea of “threat balance.” This concept deals with balancing the offensive material capabilities and intentions of any power considered a threat, especially if it is geographically close. This concept applies to the policies of France, Britain, and Germany, which allied with the U.S. during the Cold War to confront the communist threat, thus elucidating the bandwagoning strategy.

Whether we analyze this strategy as the behavior of a satisfied state convinced that the rules of the game put forth by the dominant power serve its interests or as the actions of a secondary power fearful of a major power that threatens those interests, there is no doubt that what drives them to adopt such behavior is not merely the material distribution of power among the nations forming the international system, as Waltz perceives it, which he derives from Wright, an expert in war studies in 1942.

Waltz applied this concept in his theory of the balance of power, referring to the behavior of a state or secondary power that aligns with the dominant power team, whereas Walt uses it in his threat balance theory to describe the actions of secondary powers aligning against the most threatening power.

If we attempt to align both theories, we arrive at an important conclusion that following a balancing policy against the dominant power, as Walt states, entails adhering to alignment against the more threatening power, a position Waltz rejects. This disparity explains why the two theories do not correlate.

This fragmentation led to an internal assault on Waltz’s theory of international politics, resulting in a schism within the realist theory and the emergence of numerous trends within the same school. Several new theories appeared in recent years beyond “balance of power” and “balance of threat.” Talia Ferrow proposed the “soft balancing” notion in 2004, while the journal International Security introduced the idea of “soft balancing”.

This fragmentation persisted until the emergence of one of the most prominent thinkers of the realist school, John Mearsheimer, with his famous book The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, which represents a logical culmination of two previous works titled “How to Stop Future Instability in Post-Cold War Europe” and “The False Promise of International Institutions.” Mearsheimer attempted to unify the realist house by merging Waltz’s structural new realism with Morgenthau’s classical realism, which produced a new theory encapsulated as offensive realism.

However, unintentionally, he contributed to the emergence of a new division between the static balance theory—be it bipolar or multipolar—and the dynamic theory of unipolar balance. Mearsheimer borrows from Waltz the hypothesis stating that the behavior of states is determined by the nature of the anarchic international system, not by the malicious human nature or L’animus dominandi or its instincts.

He asserts that the absence of a central authority exclusively possessing material means of coercion signifies the lack of any authority superior to that of the state, which is a rational political unit seeking above all to ensure its survival as a territorial unit and maintain internal political order. This state exists in an environment of sovereign and independent states equipped with offensive military capabilities, whose intentions it cannot accurately discern. Nonetheless, Mearsheimer does not conclude from this hypothesis that states aim to balance their capabilities against all other states to ensure their survival. On the contrary, he adopts Morgenthau’s classical realism notion that states strive to increase their power beyond that of others rather than attempting to maintain their strength while hoping to dominate others.

Mearsheimer states, “Like defensive realism, the offensive realism I propose argues that great powers seek to provide the means necessary to ensure their survival in an environment devoid of authority or order.” Consequently, these states soon realize that power is the key to survival.

Yet offensive realism distinguishes itself from defensive realism when it comes to the quantity of power that a state seeks to achieve. For defensive realists, the structure of the international system prompts states to maintain existing power balances, i.e., preserving the status quo through balancing power rather than attempting to maximize it—which is regarded as a tool and objective by offensive realism. Experience, practice, and historical analysis show that we rarely find states content with the status quo in international politics. This drives great powers to multiply their strength, linking it to their national security, which explains offensive or aggressive behaviors such as military strikes and preemptive wars. These actions cannot be interpreted as representing great powers’ desire for hegemony but as states searching for the greatest amount of power to provide optimal conditions for their survival. However, it cannot be asserted that Mearsheimer strictly adheres to Waltz and Morgenthau since Waltz, for example, places more emphasis on states’ capabilities than on their intentions, while Morgenthau believes most states follow a status quo policy rather than a revolutionary one against the existing system.

Mearsheimer posits that the goal of states’ existence is to seek to become or remain the dominant power in the system, thus he also defines hegemony through material concepts, primarily military power. Only the state that dominates others aspires to live securely. Although Gilpin’s ideas align into the same stream—seeing the control of one of the powers over the system as a condition for achieving temporary security—he only mentioned Gilpin in passing in the Tragedy of Great Power Politics. It raises the question of whether Mearsheimer’s aim in this book is to resolve the existing dispute between Morgenthau’s classical offensive theory and Waltz’s defensive theory, and at the same time reconcile the static theory of power balance with the dynamic theory of power cycle.

This assertion rests on his conclusion that the dominant power, even if a regional one, will adopt an offshore balancing policy, deduced by integrating the dynamic theory of the power cycle with the static theory of the balance of power.

Despite these overlapping ideas, Mearsheimer differs from Gilpin for two reasons:

1. Water-Restraining Power: By placing particular emphasis on maritime matters, Mearsheimer becomes the only realist to introduce geopolitical influences, emphasizing the fundamental role that land-based power units play during any military operation and the extent to which seas and oceans hinder these operations. Drawing much from geopolitical theorists like Alfred Mahan and Nicholas Spykman, he contends that the water-restraining power complicates the task of invading and managing territories on the other side of the world or in another continent regardless of its strength, thus the sole dominant power that could emerge is a regional, not a global or comprehensive one as Gilpin sees it.
2. This regional power is driven by its strength to expand further offshore; hence, it does not settle for the status quo, differing from the dominant power Gilpin describes as one with benevolent intentions that benefits itself and all its allies from the advantages of the system it established, before it transforms into a predatory power in response to relative decline, aiming to safeguard its security and eliminate any anticipated or future competitors through not only relying on an offshore balancing policy, which depends on an active diplomacy to maintain balance with any out-of-continent state that could pose a threat or competition but also through remedial policies. Mearsheimer has drawn upon Schviller’s ideas when positing that every state, while competing with the threatening state, seeks opportunities to weaken the latter, therefore increasing its strength and vice versa. This idea has faced strong criticism: It seems unreasonable for a regional dominant power to perceive its interests threatened by another regional dominant power as long as we assert that the water-restraining power would impede any mutual attack.

In summary, for defensive realists such as Waltz and Gilpin, the possibility of an organized international anarchy arises through the actions pursued by states aiming to preserve the status quo and whom Waltz has termed “duopolists” or “the states satisfied with the established hegemonic system.” In contrast, offensive realists led by Mearsheimer argue that great powers rely on an offensive strength—hence an offensive policy—and that the innate selfishness shown not only targets adversaries but also manifests in the strategic approaches taken in dealing with allies. When threatened by a risk of armed conflict, they propose a collective response to confront this powerful threat, known as the “buck-passing” strategy or responsibility-shifting game. More than that, should this power enter wars, it would not hesitate to prioritize its interests over collective allies’ interests and would also not shy away from exiting once this war has undermined the strength of its allies, termed the “blood-letting” strategy.

Thus, from all of the aforementioned, Mearsheimer saw international politics as a largely tragic, never-ending affair, setting a grim table for international relations from the Napoleonic Wars until the end of the Cold War. The logical question to pose is whether this analysis reflects the empirical reality of contemporary circumstances or is driven by fears that the U.S.—the only regional power, according to his perspective, known throughout history—is soon poised to face the awakening giant, China, which undoubtedly shares the characteristics of power and hegemony.

The Security Dilemma: Kenneth Waltz wrote in his book Theory of International Politics that security is the primary and fundamental goal of states, with the anarchic structure of the international system encouraging states to achieve this goal in order to maintain their survival. The root cause of what is known as the security dilemma arises from the condition that each state feels it is exposed to military action from other states.

In other words, international relations occur, as Raymond Aron stated, “under the shadow of wars,” and all states must rely solely on themselves to ensure their security. This embodies the principle of self-help.

Thus, every state becomes compelled to enhance its military capabilities to confront any potential attacks from other states. However, these military preparations often raise concerns among other states, fearing they are the targets of such preparations. In an anarchic environment, it is impossible to discern states’ true intentions—whether defensive, aimed at ensuring survival in a hostile environment, or aggressive, aimed at altering the status quo.

From the womb of these strategic interactions emerges the notion described by H. Butterfield as Hobbesian fear. The term “security dilemma” was first coined by theorist John Herz, who stated, “Wherever there is an anarchic society, there exists what can be called a security dilemma, where individuals and groups place the utmost importance on securing their safety out of fear of potential attacks from other individuals or groups.” Consequently, they strive to mitigate this threat by seeking greater power to counter the perceived risk.

Yet, these preparations, despite being defensive in nature, have repercussions on others, prompting them to brace for the worst—total war. It is impossible for any party in a world of competing units to feel secure in their circumstances. This gives rise to a closed loop (Security => Power -> Security). This is why it is termed a “security dilemma” rather than just a simple security problem:

A state B, facing state A’s military capability increase, faces two options: it can interpret this process as defensive and thus not respond by increasing its military capabilities, or it can interpret this increase as offensive and respond by enhancing its military capabilities. It is assured that regardless of the path taken, state B’s security will be compromised; in the first scenario, if it does not adopt defensive measures, its security is at a direct threat due to state A’s capabilities exceeding its own. In the second scenario, if it reacts defensively by building up its military capacity, its security is at an indirect risk because such an increase may encourage state A to enhance its own readiness further. Thus, we encounter a true dilemma.

In this frame, it is essential to highlight that realism builds its analyses based on the second scenario, believing that every state interprets its actions as defensive in pursuit of achieving security and perceives the actions of others as offensive endangering its own safety.

Thus, what can be articulated in this regard is what Kenneth Waltz echoed in his book titled New Realism and the Causes of Wars, wherein he states, “The source of reassurance for one party in an anarchic environment becomes a source of concern for the other party. Consequently, a state seeking to acquire military means to defend itself will inevitably provoke responses from other states since their recognition of this increase compels them to act to restore balance. In this way, states oscillate between action and reaction, leading to what is known as the security dilemma.”

• Kenneth Waltz published his book Man, the State, and War in 1959, marking it as one of his most significant scientific contributions.
• Chapter three of Waltz’s renowned work Theory of International Politics, titled “Theories and Structural Systems,” includes the following: “I defined domestic political structures first by the principle according to which they are organized or ordered, second by the differentiation of units and the specification of their functions, and third by the distribution of capacities across the units…”
• In discussing the theory of balance of power, Waltz emphasized how this theory provides an acceptable explanation of what occurs on the international scene and acknowledged the roles played by Ernest Haas, Martin Wight (1953-1966), and Hans Morgenthau (1973) in developing this theory.

References

• “The New Realism”: Perspectives on Multilateralism and World Order” edited by Robert W. Cox.
• “Realism in Political Theory” edited by Rahul Sagar and Matt Sleat.
• “The Edinburgh Companion to Political Realism” edited by Robert Schuett and Miles Hollingworth.
• “Neoclassical Realist Theory of International Politics” by Norrin M. Ripsman, Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, and Steven E. Lobell
• “Value, Conflict, and Order: Berlin, Hampshire, Williams, and the Realist Revival in Political Theory” by Edward Hall.
• “Politics Recovered: Essays on Realist Political Thought” edited by Matt Sleat.
• “The Atlantic Realists: Empire and International Political Thought Between Germany and the United States” by Matthew G. Specter.
• “What Moves Man: The Realist Theory of International Relations and Its Judgment of Human Nature” by Annette Freyberg-Inan.