Amidst the rapidly shifting geopolitical landscape, marked by wars, conflicts, and natural disasters, migration management—in its various forms—has taken a central role in the foreign policies of nations. Countries now utilize all available diplomatic tools and resources to manage migration in ways that enhance their strength and achieve objectives that may or may not be directly related to migration.
Similar to traditional diplomacy, migration diplomacy is shaped by various factors, the most important being a country’s position in migration flows—whether as a country of origin, transit, or destination—along with the power dynamics between nations and their varying, often shifting, national interests.
Patterns of Utilization:
Given the natural migration dynamics, a destination country (with high resources) may employ all its diplomatic tools and resources to protect its borders and prevent migration flows, especially in times of crises and wars. In contrast, a transit country (developing or less developed) might open its borders to these flows in exchange for financial gains and economic benefits, to achieve political and security goals, and to boost its international legitimacy. Similarly, a country of origin might use its expatriate community in a destination country to ensure their rights and as a tool for political and economic leverage.
Furthermore, some countries initiate or encourage specific migration flows to use them as a tool for diplomatic, geopolitical, and security pressure on neighboring states, in what is known as “coercive diplomacy.” Below is an overview and analysis of these patterns of migration diplomacy in light of both natural and artificial migration dynamics.
1. Natural Migration Dynamics:
Most migration flows occur naturally, as migrants, driven by economic, social, political, security, environmental, or demographic factors, decide to move from one place to another in search of settling in their intended destination country. Within these natural dynamics, countries’ objectives and patterns in utilizing migration diplomacy vary based on their position in the map of migration flows, as well as their intertwined and shifting national interests.
a. Destination Countries:
Destination countries with high resources, particularly in the North, employ all their diplomatic tools and resources to create incentives for developing and less developed countries of origin and transit to accept unwanted migration flows (such as irregular migration and displacement). More importantly, they tighten border security measures to prevent these flows from reaching destination countries. These incentives include access to trade markets, visa facilitation, investments, direct budget support, development financing, and direct funding for migration management activities (e.g., capacity-building initiatives).
A notable example of this type of migration diplomacy is the 2016 agreement between the European Union and Turkey, under which Turkey agreed to take measures to prevent migrants and refugees (especially from Syria and Iraq) from crossing illegally into Greece and other EU countries. In return, the EU provided billions of euros to support Turkey’s efforts to integrate refugees within its borders, alongside other incentives like visa liberalization for Turkish citizens traveling to Europe and opening talks on EU membership (which later stalled).
A more recent example of this pattern in EU migration diplomacy is the strategic partnership it formed with Egypt in the first quarter of 2024, valued at €7.4 billion over three years, aimed at preventing irregular migration to Europe via the Mediterranean in exchange for supporting Egypt’s economy. The package included €5 billion in soft loans for economic reforms, €1.8 billion to support private sector investments, and €600 million in grants, including €200 million for migration management. Similarly, the EU struck a similar deal with Tunisia in 2023, valued at £150 million, to curb irregular migration to Europe from Tunisia.
It is important to note that the support provided by destination countries to protect their borders by aiding development and integration efforts for migrants and asylum seekers in origin and transit countries does not necessarily benefit those countries. Beyond the risks of corruption and the diversion of funds for unintended purposes, there are significant human rights violations against migrants and asylum seekers in the implementation of some of these deals. A prominent example that has sparked significant criticism is Australia’s creation of detention centers for irregular migrants and refugees in poor countries like Nauru and Manus Island in Papua New Guinea, in exchange for financial and developmental aid. Under this system, asylum seekers intercepted at sea are forcibly transferred to detention centers in Nauru or Manus Island, where they remain while their asylum applications are processed. They are denied the opportunity to permanently settle in Australia, even if found deserving of protection, with resettlement in a third country or remaining in Nauru or Papua New Guinea being the only options.
b. Transit Countries:
Developing and less developed transit countries exploit the threat felt by most high-resource destination countries (in the North) from migrants and asylum seekers. Contrary to the rhetoric of destination countries, which calls for border protection, transit countries have realized that welcoming migrants and asylum seekers, especially during crises, can become a channel for financial flows, economic gains, and a means to improve their international legitimacy as a country that shares the burden of irregular migration or combats organized crime networks that profit from it. It can also be used as a tool for geopolitical and security pressure.
Libya under Muammar Gaddafi, for example, served as a refuge for the EU, particularly Italy, to prevent asylum seekers and migrants from crossing the Mediterranean into Europe. In return, the EU provided millions of euros to Libya and turned a blind eye to human rights abuses. More recently, the EU’s harsh criticisms of Poland’s judicial and media independence turned to praise after Poland became a transit country for Ukrainian refugees fleeing the Russian war on Ukraine.
c. Origin States:
Although it is common for transit and destination countries to benefit from their position in migration flows for geopolitical gains, origin states (those sending migrants) also engage in “migration diplomacy.” In this case, their diplomatic efforts often form part of policy-making aimed at enhancing the rights of their diaspora abroad or creating opportunities and pathways for their citizens to migrate.
An example is the recent migration agreement between Australia and the Polynesian island nation of Tuvalu, under which Australia pledges to support Tuvalu in facing climate change, including granting 280 permanent visas annually to Tuvalu citizens affected by climate change (a significant number in a country with a population of 11,000). In return, Australia gains veto power over Tuvalu’s entry into security or defense agreements with other countries (primarily China), within the context of fierce competition for geopolitical influence in the Pacific. While this agreement might seem unrelated to migration, it illustrates how migration pathways can be used to foster cooperation in non-migration-related issues and derive benefits for/from migrants.
2. Artificial Migration Dynamics:
In addition to exploiting existing natural migration dynamics, a country may create or support new dynamics as a tool for exerting diplomatic, geopolitical, and security pressure on neighboring states, in what is known as “coercive diplomacy.”
A clear example is Belarusian President Lukashenko’s 2021 attempt to export a “new migration crisis” to Europe by directing thousands of migrants towards the borders with Lithuania, Latvia, and Poland in response to EU sanctions and criticism. Similarly, Turkish President Erdogan threatened in 2019 to open Turkey’s borders to allow migrants to freely move toward Europe to secure more support for establishing a safe zone to return Syrian refugees.
In conclusion, it can be said that, given the current forms of migration diplomacy, high-resource destination countries will remain vulnerable to geopolitical and security pressure from transit and origin countries due to their security-oriented approach to migrants and asylum seekers, as well as their urgent need for migrant labor, especially amid a worsening demographic crisis in many destination countries.