Europeans are closely watching the results of the upcoming U.S. presidential election scheduled for November 5, 2024, due to its implications for Europe and the transatlantic partnership. This partnership is critical, especially given the differing approaches to it by the presidential candidates—Kamala Harris and Donald Trump—both in their previous governance experience and their campaign promises. The importance of the relationship with the United States for Europe is evident in Europe’s reliance on American security guarantees through NATO, as well as the multifaceted economic interests involved. The United States is Europe’s largest trading and investment partner, and both share a commitment to the principles of Western liberal values.
Historically, U.S.-European relations have faced tensions, including the European divide over the U.S. intervention in Iraq in 2003 and during Trump’s administration (2017-2020), which was marked by his skepticism towards NATO’s effectiveness. There is a significant concern among Europeans that Trump’s potential return to the White House could have negative consequences for Europe.
Shared Issues
The U.S. presidential elections raise several questions regarding key foreign policy issues that are crucial for Europe and the potential consequences of one candidate winning over the other. Some of these issues include:
European Security and the Future of the Transatlantic Alliance:
The future of American security guarantees is of utmost concern for Europe in the current presidential election, particularly in light of the Russian-Ukrainian war. European leaders fear that a return of Trump to the White House could jeopardize Washington’s commitment to NATO and support for Kyiv. Some European decision-makers have expressed that Trump’s return would mean “Europe is on its own.” During his first presidency and currently in his campaign, Trump has adopted an anti-NATO stance, questioning its utility and describing it as “dead.” He has repeatedly criticized NATO member states for not meeting their defense spending commitments of 2% of their GDP, labeling them as “free riders” who benefit from NATO’s security umbrella without contributing their fair share. Regarding American support for Ukraine, Trump has stated that continued support cannot be guaranteed, emphasizing the need to end the ongoing war. Although Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky recently stated in an interview with Fox News on September 28, 2024, that he received “very direct information” from Trump indicating that he would support Ukraine in its war against Russia if reelected, there are lingering Western concerns that a Trump victory could lead to reduced American support for Kyiv and potential pressure on Ukraine to negotiate a settlement with Moscow that may involve significant concessions.
In contrast, if Harris wins, it is expected to alleviate European concerns, given her supportive stance towards NATO, Ukraine, and strengthening key American alliances. However, regardless of the election’s outcome, there are ongoing trends in U.S. policy that will affect Europe. Since the administration of former President Barack Obama, Washington has demanded fairer burden-sharing among NATO members and increased defense spending by European countries, following years of austerity policies stemming from the eurozone crisis. Should Harris win, although she supports Ukraine, she is likely to demand that European countries shoulder more of the burden, especially since this aligns with Washington’s goal of shifting its focus from Europe and the Middle East (especially before the Ukraine and Gaza wars) towards Asia and the Indo-Pacific, in an effort to contain China, which is seen as the stage for the future of the global order. This is evidenced by the Biden administration’s signing of a new defense agreement with Papua New Guinea in May 2023 and the establishment of the Quad alliance, which includes the U.S., Australia, India, and Japan. The American focus on China puts pressure on the European Union to enhance its defensive capabilities, which face several challenges, a situation that will become more urgent if Trump wins the election.
Multilateralism vs. Unilateralism and the Future of the Liberal Global Order:
The global role of the United States and the importance of multilateral institutions are among the clear points of divergence between Trump and Harris. This comes at a time when the liberal global order, led by the U.S. and the West, faces significant challenges and a transitional period. Amidst intensifying competition with China, the Russian-Ukrainian war, and the diffusion of power among state and non-state actors, pressures are mounting on the effectiveness of multilateral cooperation frameworks. Some within the U.S. and Europe fear a growing hostility towards these institutions that undermine Western interests. For Trump, adopting unilateralism and disregarding multilateral arrangements when they conflict with American interests is a hallmark of his “America First” doctrine. He sees little need to invest time and effort into maintaining influence within these institutions.
During his presidency, the U.S. withdrew from several multilateral agreements and organizations, including the World Health Organization amid the COVID-19 pandemic, UNESCO, the U.N. Human Rights Council, the Paris Climate Agreement, and several international security arrangements such as the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty with Russia. More withdrawals are expected if Trump wins. In contrast, Harris has a different vision, which became evident during the Biden administration, as the U.S. rejoined many international institutions and agreements from which it had previously withdrawn during Trump’s tenure. These contrasting positions have implications for Europe; if Trump wins, the U.S. is likely to abandon multilateral cooperation in several areas, such as climate change and renewable energy. This could exert greater political pressure on Europe to slow down its transition towards a green economy and renewable energy sources.
Relations with China:
There is a bipartisan consensus that China poses the greatest challenge to the United States, as reflected in the national security strategies of 2018 and 2022, though they differ on how to address this threat. However, it is expected that Washington will adopt a tough stance towards Beijing, regardless of who wins the presidential election. This consensus is particularly evident in economic matters, as Washington aims to succeed in technological competition with China. During his presidency, Trump imposed tariffs on certain Chinese imports and restricted advanced technology exports to China, actions some labeled as a “trade war.”
The Biden administration has continued this approach, imposing additional tariffs on a wide range of Chinese imports, including electric vehicles and semiconductors, while implementing more restrictions on American technology exports to China, particularly regarding advanced chip manufacturing. If Harris wins, she is likely to maintain the same policy, as her statements reflect her discontent with China flooding the American market with substandard products, stealing intellectual property, and distorting the global economy with subsidized goods. Harris also emphasizes the importance of the U.S. winning in technological competition. This tough U.S. approach, alongside intensifying competition between the United States and China, will increase pressure on allies, including Europe, to take firmer and clearer stances towards Beijing.
Consequently, Europe may find it challenging to distance itself from being caught in the middle of the U.S.-China conflict, placing it in a more vulnerable position due to its significant economic exposure to China. Should Trump win, he could take unilateral actions and potentially penalize European allies if they do not adopt decisive positions. Moreover, Europe may find itself inundated with Chinese products seeking alternative markets to avoid U.S. tariffs, among other possible ramifications. Currently, it does not appear that Washington and Europe agree on viewing China as the primary threat or on how to engage with it. This divide extends within the European Union itself, where the collective European stance considers China both a partner and a strategic competitor, necessitating reduced economic reliance and protection of the single market. However, there is clear disagreement among some EU member states on how to implement this.
Move Towards “Trade Protectionism”:
During his presidency, Trump leaned towards “trade protectionism,” imposing tariffs on some Chinese imports and on nearly all countries’ steel and aluminum imports, including those from Europe, while criticizing the World Trade Organization and threatening to withdraw from it. In his current campaign, Trump has pledged to impose tariffs ranging from 10% to 20% on most imported goods, which could rise to 100% on countries attempting to trade outside the existing U.S. dollar-based financial system. Harris, during her first debate with Trump on September 10, 2024, criticized his plan to impose blanket tariffs, describing it as a “sales tax” burdening American citizens. However, paradoxically, the Biden-Harris administration has continued to adopt protective measures.
For instance, voluntary export quotas and restrictions were replaced by tariffs on aluminum and steel imports from the European Union. Numerous legislative measures underscore this protective trend, the most notable being the Inflation Reduction Act, which includes financial incentives and tax breaks for areas such as electric vehicles, batteries, and renewable energy projects. In response to international competition and amid declining manufacturing and challenges facing the working class, there is a bipartisan agreement on the necessity of implementing some protective measures—albeit with differing opinions on their nature—to ensure American economic security. The goal is to enhance and protect working-class jobs by restoring the United States’ manufacturing capabilities, encouraging domestic manufacturing, and supporting its competitiveness, while considering certain industries and technologies as strategic and essential to localize within the country rather than outsourcing them.
This shift towards protectionism has led to tensions in U.S.-European relations. Following the Inflation Reduction Act, which, for example, offers tax breaks for electric vehicles manufactured in North America with domestically produced batteries—thus excluding vehicles manufactured in the European Union—Europe accused Washington of practicing protectionism contrary to global trade rules and of taking discriminatory actions by providing exceptional support to domestic producers to the detriment of European companies. The President of the European Commission called for what she termed a “structural response” to the new U.S. industrial policy. These disagreements are likely to escalate further should Trump win.
European Concerns:
The potential repercussions of the current U.S. presidential elections, particularly if Trump were to win, could significantly impact the European Union and the internal political landscape of several European nations.
One primary concern is the possibility of providing a boost and legitimacy to far-right populist parties. Europe stands on the brink of a second wave of far-right populism, characterized by a rhetoric that is critical of established institutions, skeptical of the European Union, and opposed to immigration and multiculturalism. These parties have successfully increased their electoral shares, participated in governing coalitions, and even assumed leadership in several governments, notably in Italy. This trend was evident in the European Parliament elections held in June 2024, where far-right parties achieved significant successes in countries such as France, Germany, Spain, Italy, and Austria.
Conversely, some central European countries have managed to resist this far-right surge through seemingly fragile arrangements. For instance, the ruling coalition in Germany, led by current Chancellor Olaf Scholz and his Social Democratic Party, alongside the Greens and the Free Democratic Party, has faced recurring internal disputes and is navigating a difficult situation following the historic victory of the far-right Alternative for Germany party in local elections in Thuringia in early September 2024, just ahead of next year’s federal elections. In France, both the left and right parties managed to prevent the far right from gaining power in the early legislative elections held on June 30 and July 7. However, the country now appears to be on the brink of a political crisis due to the absence of an absolute majority in parliament. In the European Parliament, despite the clear gains made by far-right parties, the center-right was able to maintain its status as the largest bloc.
In this precarious context, where the European Parliament and some key nations have resisted the far-right tide, there is growing concern that Trump’s potential return to the White House might provide a boost and further legitimacy to far-right populist parties. This would increase the pressure on mainstream centrist movements in Europe, both left and right, compelling them to adopt more stringent rhetoric and policies on several issues, particularly regarding immigration and European integration. Far-right parties are seen as natural allies of Trump, a sentiment he himself expressed during his first debate with Harris, where he praised Viktor Orbán, the right-wing Prime Minister of Hungary, who is skeptical of the European Union and opposes its policies in various areas. This apprehension is supported by studies on electoral behavior, indicating that the success of ideologically similar parties abroad can play a role in the success of similar parties domestically, and vice versa.
Moreover, there is European concern over the damage Trump’s potential return could inflict on democratic values in the United States and globally. These values are integral to European identity, and Trump’s success could amplify non-liberal trends in Europe, especially in Central and Eastern Europe, posing an existential threat to the European Union.
Another risk lies in the potential to deepen divisions within the European Union. Most experts and decision-makers in various European capitals believe that the solution to addressing the widening transatlantic rift, which is likely to increase should Trump return to power, lies in crafting a unified European response. Some argue that failing to achieve this could lead to further fragmentation within Europe, especially from Central and Eastern European countries that heavily rely on American security and may seek to forge bilateral arrangements with Trump, alongside Atlantic-oriented countries that have differing views on the strategic independence of Europe.
The disagreement over how to engage with the United States has a greater potential to divide the EU than disagreements over how to engage with China or even Russia, due to the depth and significance of transatlantic relations. The European division that emerged during the U.S. war on Iraq in 2003 serves as a prime example.
In conclusion, it is noteworthy that despite the differences between Harris and Trump regarding the transatlantic alliance, climate change, and other issues, there is a notable shift in American grand strategy. The divergence in priorities, visions, and interests between the United States and Europe is widening. Consequently, many in European policymaking and think tanks are raising questions about how to address this amid internal divisions and the lack of European leadership.
