The Cold War was a long-standing political, ideological, and economic struggle between the United States and the Soviet Union following World War II. This conflict, spanning from the late 1940s to the early 1990s, included an arms race, proxy wars, and global competition for influence, without escalating into direct military confrontation between the two superpowers. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, it was widely believed that the Western bloc had triumphed and that the global ideological struggle had ended. However, recent decades have revealed profound shifts and new intellectual and political conflicts within the international community, reflecting a fundamental divergence in states’ visions of the world and the nature of the international system.
In this context, Paul Robinson’s book Russia’s World Order examines Russia’s perspective on the world and the escalating conflict between Russia and the West. Unlike common analyses that interpret the conflict in political or ideological terms—such as the clash between democracy and authoritarianism—the book argues that its essence is far deeper, stemming from fundamentally different conceptions of the world and the course of history. While the West promotes a historical vision that drives all countries toward a single socio-political and economic model (modern Western liberalism), Russia defends the right of all civilizations to pursue their own independent developmental paths.
The State-Civilization Perspective
Russia defines itself as a “state-civilization.” The author notes that this is an interesting designation, contrasting it, for example, with India, which is considered a civilizational state but not a “state-civilization” like Russia. A “civilizational state” is a state based on a civilization, while a “state-civilization” is a civilization embodied in the state itself. In Russia’s case, the state represents the supreme value that unites sovereignty and a distinct identity, encompassing multiple ethnicities, cultures, languages, and religious denominations.
In other words, not all states are civilizations, and not all civilizations are states. It is difficult to imagine that civilizational relations could replace sovereignty and the nation-state as the foundation of international relations. Ivan Timofeev, director of the Russian International Affairs Council, argues that the Russian civilizational concept is a work in progress, requiring significant conceptual and practical development before it can become a fully-fledged alternative global vision for politics and society.
The book highlights President Vladimir Putin’s vision of Russia as a state-civilization coexisting with other global civilizations, which together constitute the core of a world community of sovereign states. Putin’s adoption of the concept of “civilization” was gradual, motivated by pragmatism as much as philosophy.
According to the book, Putin consistently emphasizes Russia’s unique civilization and its right to choose its own developmental path in the face of Western claims of universal liberal values. He states: “The emerging multipolar world has replaced the supremacy and exceptionalism that prevailed during Western global dominance after the Cold War.”
In October 2022, speaking at the Moscow-based Valdai Discussion Club, Putin said: “I am convinced that true democracy in a multipolar world lies, first and foremost, in the ability of each state, society, or civilization to follow its own path and organize its social and political system in its own way.” In 2023, Russia’s revised Foreign Policy Concept reaffirmed that “over a thousand years of an independent state define Russia’s special place as a unique state-civilization,” emphasizing its pursuit of an international order that ensures reliable security, preserves cultural and civilizational identity, and provides equal opportunities for the development of all states.
In his October 2024 Valdai speech, Putin praised this concept, asserting that “humanity is not moving toward a soulless globalization, but toward the synergy of state-civilizations.” Contrary to Samuel Huntington’s “clash of civilizations” thesis, Putin maintains that the current confrontation between Russia and the West is not a civilizational clash but a political and ideological conflict reflecting differing visions of the global order and its future.
Historical and Philosophical Roots
The book argues that the historical and philosophical roots of Russian civilization contradict the assumption that Russia is destined to follow the same path of progress as Western Europe. In the mid-19th century, the Slavs rejected this notion, insisting that Russia is fundamentally different from the West, with spiritual and communal traditions enabling it to chart its own historical path and destiny independently of Western development models. This intellectual tradition was continued by numerous disciples and thinkers, whose diverse ideas are explored in detail by the author.
Some Western thinkers, including Johann Gottfried Herder, Oswald Spengler, and Arnold J. Toynbee, aligned with this perspective and rejected the unilinear model of history embraced by Francis Fukuyama in 1989, who famously proclaimed that the triumph of liberal democracy represented the “end of history.”
The Russian civilizational theory is grounded in two foundational works: Nikolay Danilevsky’s Russia and Europe (1869) and Konstantin Leontiev’s Byzantium and Slavs (1876). Danilevsky argued that Russia constitutes one of several distinct civilizations, while Leontiev traced the Byzantine roots of the Russian Orthodox Church as the source of its civilizational uniqueness. Although their ideas were marginalized during their lifetimes, they reemerged in post-Soviet Russia, with Danilevsky notably cited by Putin himself in acknowledgment of the principle of civilizational diversity.
The book identifies two main currents within Russian civilizational thought: the Eurasianist current and the isolationist current. The isolationist current, associated initially with Vadim Tsymburskiy and later with Boris Mezhuev and others, posits that Russia’s central problem is its persistent desire to be part of the West and to gain Western recognition—an acknowledgment they argue will never be granted. This approach advocates for complete separation between Russia and the West, recognizing them as entirely distinct civilizations. The author notes, however, that this philosophy is fundamentally flawed because the West, embracing a universalist worldview, would never accept such a division.
The Eurasianist current encompasses diverse tendencies, some more confrontational than others, with Aleksandr Dugin as a prominent contemporary representative. Dugin views the West—specifically the Anglo-Saxons—as fundamentally malevolent and argues that Russia must lead a multicultural and civilizational struggle against Western dominance, which he characterizes as inherently racist for asserting the superiority of its values and seeking to impose them globally. Dugin contends that resistance is the only means to preserve Russian civilizational identity in the face of the West.
The author highlights the role of two unexpected figures in promoting Russian civilizational thought: Gennady Zyuganov, leader of the Russian Communist Party, and Vladimir Zhirinovsky, founder of the nationalist-populist Liberal Democratic Party. Zyuganov viewed Russia as “a unique world and integrated social universe” defined by historical, geopolitical, philosophical, national, and economic characteristics. Zhirinovsky founded an institute of world civilizations and published numerous works emphasizing that Russia is a unique civilization grounded in collectivism. The author notes that their ideas gradually permeated President Putin’s rhetoric and the official discourse of the ruling United Russia Party. The Russian state has also promoted these visions through “cultural science” programs aimed at educating youth about global civilizations and their interactions.
Internal Critique of Civilizationalism
In general, civilizationalism reinforces the notion of Russian exceptionalism, strengthening national spirit and supporting the state. It also provides a tool for justifying Russia’s political conflict with the West and persuading developing countries not to align with the West against Russia.
However, Russian civilizational theory faces internal critiques. Ivan Timofeev notes that 19th-century Slavs drew on existing cultural and value systems reflecting the majority population’s traditions. Over a century and a half of modernization and political transformations, however, Russian society has changed radically, and contemporary Russians differ greatly from their ancestors.
Timofeev argues that while civilizationalists emphasize Russia’s uniqueness, they lack clarity in defining what that uniqueness entails. He also criticizes the notion that identities are natural and organic, rooted in fixed cultural origins, noting that civilizational distinctiveness is often a constructed political concept. Moreover, while some Russian civilizationalists advocate isolating Russia from the West, other civilizations do not adopt the same approach; many integrate elements of Western spiritual, political, and material culture into their societies.
Conclusion
During the Cold War, Soviet ideology posited that the socialist system represented the final stage of human development. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia initially adopted a new historical determinism, assuming it would ultimately join the global path toward liberal democracy and free-market capitalism. However, Robinson notes that by the late 1990s, following disappointment with the Western model, Russian thinkers increasingly viewed the world as composed of distinct civilizations, each with its own characteristics and developmental trajectory.
The book traces the roots of Russian civilizational theory to both 20th-century Western and Russian philosophers and offers interpretations from contemporary Russian ideologues. Politically, following Moscow’s war in Ukraine, its separation from the West, and turn toward the non-Western world, Putin has clearly adopted civilizational rhetoric as official policy, embedding it into presidential speeches and even Russian textbooks.
Source:
Paul Robinson, Russia’s World Order: How Civilizationism Explains the Conflict with the West, Cornell University Press, 2025.
