With the decline of manufacturing and the expansion of the service economy in light of the neoliberal policies adopted by countries, particularly in Europe, the “petty bourgeoisie” has risen to become a significant force within the middle class in contemporary politics. This group even played a role in supporting Brexit. This new force has altered scientific approaches to class analysis in modern societies, especially since it comprises individuals who tend towards individualism rather than collectivism.
Social class is defined as a group of individuals who share similar economic and social conditions. Typically, class is determined based on individuals’ relationships to the means of production, but other criteria such as education, status, skills, and recognition by others can also form the basis for class formation. Social classes are often categorized into three groups: the upper class or bourgeoisie (the wealthy and employers), the working class or proletariat (those without property who are compelled to work for the bourgeoisie for survival), and the middle class (a large, diverse class situated between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie).
Contrary to expectations of the middle class, including the petty bourgeoisie, disappearing alongside the rise of monopoly capitalism (considered by Karl Marx as a “transitional” group between the two main classes), structural changes in the global economy under neoliberalism have led to the growth of the petty bourgeoisie and the widespread adoption of individualistic values associated with it, such as the personal “ambition” to ascend to a higher class and expand homeownership and entrepreneurship.
Drawing on the contributions of leftist thinkers such as Karl Marx and Nikos Poulantzas, author Dan Evans explores in his book “A Nation of Shopkeepers: The Unstoppable Rise of the Petty Bourgeoisie” the contemporary class structure in Britain, highlighting the growth of the petty bourgeoisie, particularly since the rise of neoliberalism in the 1980s, pointing to this class’s dominance over contemporary British leftist movements, including both left-wing activists and new union members, despite their reproduction of ambitious and consumerist values that work against socialist organization.
What is the “Petty Bourgeoisie”?
The petty bourgeoisie is not synonymous with the entire middle class; it is considered part of the intermediate (large) classes in the modern class structure. Evans posits that there are two types of petty bourgeoisie: one “traditional” and the other “new.” Both are socially, culturally, and ideologically distinct from the proletariat and the bourgeoisie. The “traditional” petty bourgeoisie refers to a class of small artisans and farmers, occupying a “middle” status between the working class and the bourgeoisie, characterized by independence, social isolation, and individualism. While Marx predicted the dissolution of this class, it has evolved and taken various forms across different eras due to its adaptability; for instance, a small farmer or artisan may become a shop owner.
The second type is the “new” petty bourgeoisie, encompassing culturally developed and politically aware individuals concentrated in urban areas. While culturally distinct from the old petty bourgeoisie, they are also economically close to the proletariat due to their lack of ownership of productive means; however, they are socially and ideologically positioned within the petty bourgeoisie due to their shared individualism and desire for distinction, akin to the old petty bourgeoisie.
There is a persistent growth in the number of individuals working alone in isolated, non-unionized, and non-collective environments, such as driving for services like Uber or working from home. These social experiences have entrenched an individualistic ethos that is antagonistic to collectivism, marking an important development for the left specifically and society at large.
Both the “traditional” and “new” petty bourgeoisie share an inherently unstable nature, being products of a capitalist system characterized by competition among the middle classes, which accompanies the potential for changes in rank alongside ongoing social mobility. At the same time, both traditional and new petty bourgeoisie refuse to join the working class’s lifestyle, constantly striving to climb the social ladder, whether through accumulating economic capital (the traditional petty bourgeoisie) or acquiring academic qualifications and accumulating cultural capital (the new petty bourgeoisie).
Class Analysis Crisis:
The author argues that there is a crisis in understanding social class among cultural and social circles, including leftist thinkers. Class is often viewed through a formal lens, such as similarities in dialect or profession. As a result, “middle class” has become a useless term to describe a collection of vague behaviors and rising consumer practices. The author adds that the petty bourgeoisie is a complex and heterogeneous class, particularly the new petty bourgeoisie, which does not possess its means of production (like the proletariat). The growth of this new class is part of the decline of manufacturing and the dominance of the service economy in neoliberal economies.
In the early 20th century, “white-collar” workers (such as clerks and officials) joined the petty bourgeoisie to manage capitalism and operate within state bureaucracy. During the neoliberal era, this class significantly expanded and was modernized with the inclusion of supervisory workers who are socially, politically, and ideologically distinct from blue-collar workers, even though they are not in a better financial situation.
Based on the foregoing, traditional class analysis, which focuses solely on economic aspects (i.e., ownership of the means of production), must be transcended when analyzing and understanding the specifics of the new petty bourgeoisie. In this context, the author refers to Eric Olin Wright’s contributions regarding “contradictory class locations” to help comprehend middle classes in modern societies. Wright argued that class boundaries are not fixed or definitive; there are gray areas along the borders between classes that contain elements of interests (and ideologies) from both the upper and lower classes.
The current lack of security has contributed to the fading boundaries between the petty bourgeoisie and the working class. Due to these permeable (or fluid) boundaries between classes, the culture and characteristics of the petty bourgeoisie are likely to become blurred within the class, making it difficult to talk about a distinct habitat for the petty bourgeoisie. Furthermore, the upper and lower segments of the class may increasingly be influenced by the culture and habits of the working class or the professional managerial class.
Effects of Neoliberalism:
Neoliberalism has transformed the social class structure from a relatively simple one (consisting of a large working class, a small ruling class, and a small middle class) into a more complex configuration after the swelling of the middle class and the heterogeneity of the ruling class. Regarding the middle class, it can be divided into two sections: the “upper,” which includes professionals and administrators, and the lower section (the larger one), which is the new petty bourgeoisie. The author notes that the majority of contemporary leftist youth are rooted in the new petty bourgeoisie.
It is worth mentioning that the new petty bourgeoisie is a far-reaching class encompassing countless professions and experiences. It is characterized by constant mobility, contributing to its precariousness, which differentiates it from the working class, along with other standards such as job, culture, and ideology that define the membership of this class. However, it remains unclear whether the new petty bourgeoisie possesses its own institutions or culture like the old petty bourgeoisie, the working class, or professional managerial classes. The author proposes several determinants for the new petty bourgeoisie, notably:
Formal Education: This holds significant importance for the new petty bourgeoisie compared to the bourgeoisie and the working class, given that education provides them the opportunity to avoid descending into the working class and increases the likelihood of ascending the social hierarchy. Furthermore, educational strategies in the UK have contributed to the development of the middle classes. Examples of these strategies include the expansion of higher education, separating the new petty bourgeoisie from the working class in schools, and instilling principles such as progress and individual ambition among class members. Nevertheless, there appear to be no opportunities on the horizon for this class to reach the bourgeoisie or professional managerial classes, particularly with increasing unemployment rates and rising debt levels. Consequently, educational capital has been rendered incapable of providing the hoped-for upward social mobility.
Homeownership: Housing privatization is a fundamental pillar of neoliberalism. The right to purchase a home has blurred the lines between aspiring individuals within the working class and the petty bourgeoisie. Homeownership is no longer exclusive to the petty bourgeoisie. Notably, housing policies advocating for “homeownership” form part of the ruling classes’ strategy (successive right-wing governments) to support capital while marginalizing the left. As a result, working-class neighborhoods, which were built adjacent to industrial areas, have disappeared and been replaced by housing in post-industrial areas around hospitals or near highways. These modern buildings have granted their owners a degree of security by avoiding downward social mobility.
The author concludes that the petty bourgeoisie has now become a major political force in contemporary politics. For instance, this class supported Brexit and former British Prime Minister Boris Johnson, as well as British opposition leader Jeremy Corbyn. Thus, it is essential to understand the new petty bourgeoisie as a distinct class with its unique experiences, values, and ideologies, rather than merging it with other classes.
In a climate of instability and declining security, the author argues that leftists need to build class coalitions between the petty bourgeoisie and the working class based on common interests to reshape economic structures and end precarity. The author believes that the acceptance of descending social mobility among elements of the new petty bourgeoisie, if they cannot climb the occupational ladder, could lead to a gradual erosion of class boundaries and facilitate the formation of broad political coalitions within nations and communities.
Source:
Dan Evans. A Nation of Shopkeepers: The Unstoppable Rise of the Petty Bourgeoisie. London: Repeater Books, 2023.
