Messages and Reflections on Russia Lifting the Taliban from the Terrorist List

On April 17, 2025, the Supreme Court of Russia announced its approval to remove the Taliban from the list of terrorist organizations, a move that reflects the flexibility of Russia’s concept of terrorism and Moscow’s pragmatism in handling the Afghan file. This decision is also a significant step for the Taliban towards gaining international recognition and integration into the international system.

This decision, which took effect immediately and was described by Taliban Foreign Minister Amir Khan Muttaqi as “an important development in the relations between the two countries,” crowns the growing closeness between Moscow and Kabul, and is expected to enhance mutual interests and achieve the strategic objectives of Russian diplomacy.

A Critical Discourse of Engagement:

Since the Taliban’s takeover of Kabul in August 2021, Russia has adopted a pragmatic approach to the Afghan issue, despite the group being on its terrorist list since 2003. Russia began to show the contours of its approach to the Taliban following its victory over the U.S.-backed government, with its Kabul embassy remarking on then-Afghan President Ashraf Ghani’s escape, alongside “four cars and a helicopter loaded with money,” implying allegations of misappropriating state funds. This sentiment was reiterated by its special representative in Afghanistan, Zamir Kabulov, who expressed hope that “the new authorities would secure funds to establish a budget foundation.” In contrast, Russia announced it would maintain a diplomatic presence in Kabul and develop its relations with the Taliban while affirming its cautious stance regarding official recognition. Just two days after the Taliban seized power, Russian Ambassador Dmitry Zhirnov became the first foreign diplomat to meet publicly with the Taliban, offering necessary support for establishing governance and stability.

On October 20, 2021, Russia hosted a Taliban delegation for the “Moscow Format” meeting, led by Abdul Salam Hanafi, the deputy prime minister. The Russian Foreign Ministry issued a statement following the meeting, reflecting the group’s stance toward the Taliban, emphasizing respect for Afghanistan’s sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity, and the necessity for cooperation based on the “new reality” of the Taliban’s rise to power, regardless of international recognition, while expressing concern about terrorism and drug trafficking, urging the Taliban to form an inclusive government.

In late December 2021, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Oleg Syromolotov praised the Taliban’s ability to prevent a severe security collapse and its efforts to ensure security and stability. In March 2022, Russia appointed its first diplomat designated by the Taliban, a rare initiative reflecting its desire to normalize relations, despite recurring reiterations by Russian officials of the conditions for recognizing the Taliban government. These conditions were articulated by Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov in early June 2023, addressing the need for inclusive government representation, ethnic rights, and counter-terrorism measures.

Thus, Moscow has coupled its rapprochement with the Taliban with a critical discourse on its policies. In September 2023, Russia hosted Afghan opposition leader Ahmad Massoud, head of the “National Resistance Front,” who met with Sergei Mironov, head of the “Justice” Party and deputy speaker of the Russian parliament, a decision implying Kremlin approval, especially as Mironov referenced a speech by Massoud to Russian officials in a parliamentary session regarding Afghanistan. In November 2023, the head of the Counter-Terrorism Center of the Commonwealth of Independent States, Yevgeny Sisev, deemed the Taliban leader’s statement on “exporting Sharia” a threat to Central Asian countries, arguing that the Taliban continues to pose a concern and is incapable of managing the ISIS-Khorasan organization. This critical stance reflects a Russian maneuver toward the Taliban to urge them to make the utmost concessions.

In September 2023, Russia invited the Taliban Foreign Minister to participate in “Moscow Format” consultations on Afghanistan in Kazan. In December 2023, the Russian Foreign Ministry considered Kazakhstan’s decision to lift the Taliban from its list of terrorist organizations as contributing to drawing Afghanistan out of its isolation, presenting new opportunities to support the Afghan people, and aiding reconciliation and stability in the country. Thus, Moscow affirmed its conviction that rapprochement with the Taliban meets the conditions for recognition rather than the opposite, despite maintaining its critical discourse, which was echoed by Zamir Kabulov, who commented on the Kazakh decision: “The Taliban has not changed, and Russia is not negotiating to remove it from the list of banned groups,” before Kabulov eventually announced himself, in early October 2024, the removal of the Taliban from Russia’s list of terrorist organizations, stating that “the final decision will be announced in the future.”

Mutual Interests:

Russia has recognized the importance of normalizing its relations with the Taliban to enhance their mutual interests, acting as an effective economic and security partner in combating terrorism, as follows:

1. Economic Benefits: The unification of Afghanistan and its relative stability under Taliban authority has sparked international competition regarding its emerging market and untapped resources. The World Bank predicted a 2.7% growth in its economy for 2024. Its total trade last year, according to Afghan official sources, reached about 12.5 billion,including over 12.5 billion,including over 800 million in exports, compared to less than $850 million recorded annually before the Taliban’s return.

Thus, Russia has set a program to increase its trade with Afghanistan to $3 billion by 2025, aiming to reach $10 billion by 2030, according to Rustam Habibullin, head of the Russian Business Center in Afghanistan. Trade exchange in 2022 was estimated at just $170 million. Russia has also sought Taliban participation in the St. Petersburg Economic Forum in 2022 and 2024, as well as the ‘Russia and the Islamic World’ International Economic Forum in 2024, with plans for further participation next month. This participation aims to finalize agreements concerning the transit of Russian gas through Afghanistan, with potential for increased Russian investments, particularly in the energy and mining sectors, and for expanding the market for Afghan agricultural products.

2. Security Benefits: Russia has come to believe in the Taliban’s firm grip on Afghanistan, enjoying a degree of popularity and trust from neighboring countries regarding its ability to secure its borders. This has established a new security dynamic in the region, encouraging countries fearful of terrorist threats to view the Taliban in terms of security returns. Among these countries is Russia, which hosted a Taliban-designated military attaché in March 2024, documenting collaboration against terrorism, especially concerning the ISIS-Khorasan branch responsible for the attack on a concert hall at the Crocus complex near Moscow in March 2024, which resulted in about 145 fatalities and 200 injuries.

Shortly after this attack, in early April 2024, Kabulov praised the Taliban government’s cooperation in counter-terrorism efforts. Meanwhile, Russian President Vladimir Putin, in July 2024, referred to the Taliban as “an ally in the fight against terrorism.” Thus, it is possible that Russia, amid its rapprochement with the Taliban, may assist it in conducting quality retaliatory operations against ISIS to restore its reputation, tarnished by the Crocus attack, while attempting to cover its vulnerabilities by blaming Western powers for involvement in the operation.

Strategic Objectives:

Without a doubt, Moscow’s rapprochement with the Taliban allows it to exploit Afghanistan’s strategic location to generate diplomatic dynamics that realize its strategic objectives on both regional and international levels, as evidenced in the following:

1. Regional Level: Russia’s rapprochement with the Taliban aims to bolster its regional policy, strengthening its position against the West; hence, it has made sure to integrate the Afghan issue into the work agendas of regional organizations that support its policies, such as the “Collective Security Treaty Organization” and the “Shanghai Cooperation Organization,” particularly the “Moscow Format” it established in 2017 to discuss the Afghan situation. Russia initiated this framework following the Taliban’s takeover of Kabul by inviting it to convene in October 2021, attended by a high-level delegation representing the interim Taliban government.

Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov considered the dialogue with the Taliban, as the dominant political force in Afghanistan, to align with the interests of security and economic development in the region. Russia’s “Foreign Policy Concept,” adopted in March 2023, underscored the importance of Afghanistan in the regional dimension of its strategy. Despite reiterating a critical narrative regarding solving the Afghan situation and aiding in forming a political regime that meets the interests of all ethnic groups, it called for the establishment of a major integrative Eurasian partnership open to states interested in the matter, discussing “the prospects of integrating Afghanistan into the Eurasian cooperative space.”

Thus, Russia’s rapprochement with the Taliban meets its desire to benefit from Afghanistan’s integration with neighboring countries engaged in joint projects that involve Afghan territory, such as the transportation project between Belarus and Pakistan via Russia, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Afghanistan, currently underway. This reflects Russia’s ambition to lead this region at the expense of China and to resolve issues among its countries by unifying their vital interests.

2. International Level: The Russian decision aims to keep pace with Afghanistan’s transformation into a new battleground following Ukraine and the West, thus competing with projects that threaten Russian interests: a. Ukraine preempted the Russian decision by sending a delegation to Kabul in November 2024 to explore the possibility of involving Ukrainian experts in maintaining hydroelectric facilities and water transport from Panjshir to Kabul, among other sectors that are typically Russia’s exclusive purview, requiring a “memorandum of understanding” reflecting Ukrainian rapprochement with the Taliban. A report by Russian writer Andrei Sirenko published in the Russian newspaper “Nezavisimaya” on November 18 suggested that the visit might be a “cover operation” to disguise Ukrainian plans aimed at enhancing its presence in Afghanistan and the region to reduce Russian influence, indicating possible involvement from specific countries, including the United States, in arranging the visit and funding the costs for Ukrainian experts “via international financial institutions.” b. The European Union has escalated its competition with Russia in Central Asia, which is deemed exclusively within Russia’s sphere of influence. On April 4, a “EU-Central Asia Summit” was held in Samarkand, involving Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan, culminating in an agreement to elevate their relationships to a “strategic partnership” and to allocate a European investment package worth 12 billion euros. They also expressed shared concerns regarding the Afghan situation and a commitment to work together to ensure regional stability, reflecting European interest in shifting the balance of power in Central Asia at Russia’s expense and indicating that economic cooperation could serve as a gateway to broader security collaboration involving Afghanistan.

In conclusion, Russia’s decision to lift the Taliban from its terrorist organization list contributes to expanding international openness towards its government and mitigating sanctions against it, paving the way for recognition of its legitimacy; a significant victory for Taliban diplomacy. The growing Russian interests in Afghanistan and the ineffectiveness of the conditions set for recognizing the Taliban may prompt Western capitals, including Washington, to rethink their policies towards the Taliban, which has shown flexibility towards the Trump administration, leading U.S. envoy Adam Bowler to issue positive remarks regarding progress in prisoner issues, drug control, security situations, and the importance of looking to the future in relations with the Taliban.