Max Weber’s Critique of Idealism and the Concept of Rationalization

The weight of German philosophical heritage lies in its ability to encompass and dominate all fields of knowledge and art, including music and sculpture. However, this influence extends beyond this level and determines the paths and landmarks of these fields through the provision of insights and conceptions of history, existence, and humanity.

Weberian sociology has also been subject to this immense philosophical weight. This is evident through the impact of critical idealism on the conditions of Weberian thought regarding rationalization. It gives the value phenomena a logic and a law of development that can only come from it, as it appears each time as the ultimate cause of the overall comprehensive process. Weber states in this regard that “material and ideal interests, rather than ideas, directly govern people’s behavior, yet the ‘worldviews’ created by ideas often determine the equations through which behaviors are influenced by the dynamics of interests.” We are faced with a breath of German idealistic philosophical thought, which manifested itself in the deep connection between the spirit of Protestantism and idealistic philosophy.

This movement, whose origins and roots cannot be confined, found its deepest expression in Germany, particularly in the works of Kant, Fichte, and Hegel. These individuals, with their philosophical background, were able to express the fundamental idea of the Reformation. Ernest Troeltsch described this German spirit that enabled Western rationalization as the “embodiment of a religion of consciousness and personal belief, in harmony with modern individualistic civilization.”

On this basis, understanding Weberian production in general, and the issue of rationalization in particular, requires a precise analytical stance on the nature of the epistemic conditions that contributed to the maturation and crystallization of his conceptions of the concept of rationalization. In other words, we will try to examine the epistemic horizon within which Weber could only think and conceptualize this concept.

Therefore, we will not search for the history of the concept as much as we will try to uncover the hidden connections that enabled him to think about the subject of rationalization. From this perspective, we have formulated the following hypothesis: I- The concept of rationalization could not be thought of without digesting the spirit of Kantian philosophy and neo-Kantianism with its implications, based on the following elements: 1- Unity of consciousness. 2- The self as an intellectual force. 3- The self as a moral force. I- Kantianism and neo-Kantianism [the philosophical background for addressing the concept of rationalization].

The legacy of Kantianism and neo-Kantianism formed a philosophical foundation that framed Weber’s conceptions and ideas, whether in relation to the methodologies associated with history, economics, and sociology, but also represented the essential background for his core subject of rationalization. Understanding Weber’s work is only possible through the broad manifestations of Kantian thought and the implications of neo-Kantian conceptions, which can be expressed in three main points: 1- Unity of consciousness:

Kant believes that intellectual activity is directed through a set of complex and coherent ideas or what is referred to as the systematicity of thought, where “the rational self gathers sensory data through sensory perception to transform it into concepts by inserting categories such as unity, causality, and possibility, which make it thinkable.”

In the same context, Hermann Cohen (1842-1918) believes that there is no object foreign to thought, and no external data, as every fact or event is a product of thought. Cohen utilized Kant’s thesis and went beyond it by claiming the rational “pure thought is the only one that produces pure knowledge, as there is no intuitive data outside of thought or prior to it, as every pure content is a product of reason.” 2- The self as an intellectual force:

Kant’s belief in the intellectual power of the self is evident through two main points:

A- Ideas and their active role as a cause in social and political transformation.

B- Human existence and its ability to form symbolic and interpretive meanings for its world.

These two points led Hermann Cohen, the pioneer of the Marburg School [logical neo-Kantianism], to consider thought alone capable of producing its subjects, whether they are practical [within the realm of art] or moral (within the realm of ethics) or sensory (within the realm of aesthetics). Consciousness takes on a spontaneous automatic tone: it is the pinnacle of expressing the great independence of reason.

• Universality of human experience: There are no limits to thought or external facts. Martin Albrow states, “With these elements, it became possible to talk about a central and fundamental concept, which is the concept of [worldview], which will have a significant impact on Weberian thought. When Weber dealt with the idea of rationalization, we find that he dealt with a changing culture from what Kant introduced as a new vision for German thought.”

Reason became a penetrating force within Weberian thought, as its ability is embodied in gathering all scattered historical knowledge into what he called the “ideal type” for gathering and selecting information and data to facilitate their rationalization. Reason seeks unity within multiplicity as a generalization of a set of laws within a general principle. While the external world knows chaos and dispersion, reason’s task is to attempt to shape and model this world through understanding. There is a “logical relationship towards the world of subjects, which allows for the construction of the subjects of the world, it is a fundamental focus for rationalization and understanding in relation to this construction, as if we were to place something specific, we can, through understanding the rest of the things, find the same thing in Weber, where he presents the concept of rationalization as a central concept within sociology to regulate and understand the mechanisms of development that occurred in human society.”

We are faced with a unity carried out by human reason, or in other words, the self when it unifies and rationalizes the subject or what Kantianism called it.

With reason and moral self:

Kant believes that reason is the essence and support of the moral self, as it requires the validity of the moral act:

A- Determining the free agent.

B- Adopting this act by others.

C- Turning this into a universal law.

These elements formed the logical basis for two contradictory conceptions of the moral act. The direction that sees the validity of the moral act in its results, which is called teleological ethics and its utilitarian implications, on the other hand, we find the theory of deontological ethics adopted by Kant, which sees the criterion of the correctness of the act as dependent on the extent of its conformity to a rule or command. It assumes that the moral agent self possesses a large degree of freedom, as it is an end and not a means, this free management of the self emerges through the following concepts:

A- “The self and its ability to apply rules and adhere to them.

B- The validity of the rules depends on their universality.

C- The presence of the element of consciousness and will in the face of impulse and irrational choice.”

These conceptions and ideas led Wilhelm Windelband (1848-1915) and Heinrich Rickert (1863-1936) to replace the normative consciousness with the thinking self, as Windelband transformed Kantian idealism into moral idealism, making objectivity and truth represent what is dependent on normativity, that is, the degree of conformity and suitability to the standards of thought.

From this perspective, knowledge becomes a judgment with a practical tone, and for this judgment to have epistemic value, the self should not judge itself, but rather let itself be guided and directed through the sense of duty. Rickert states in this regard that “what guides my judgment and my knowledge is the sense that I must judge in this way and not that.” Moral consciousness makes the self a priority within a special world different from the world of existence, it is the world of values, and he expressed this with his famous elements “to know means in depth to evaluate” these values are not only logical but also moral and aesthetic.

The Weberian epistemic project cannot be separated from the nature of the ongoing conflicts at that time between a group of directions, including the parties of neo-Kantianism, the logical Marburg School, the axiological Baden School, and the positivist currents, or between the holistic and psychological tendencies, as it can be said that “this unresolved conflict formed the essence of Weberian philosophy.” Nevertheless, the traces and dimensions of critical idealism emerge within Weberian philosophy, especially in the level of addressing rationalization. It becomes clear when we examine the elements of influence, with regard to the first element represented in:

1. Unity of consciousness:

We find that this element opened horizons for the Weberian conception of the concept of the ideal type. If the rational self gathers elements of sensory perception and intellectual perception within the unity of consciousness in Kant, Weber sees that the ideal type: “an elevation and gathering of a viewpoint or a set of viewpoints and a sequence and connection of a set of given phenomena in isolation, scattered and hidden, thus we draw a coherent picture.”

Weber follows in Kant’s footsteps in terms of assembling the elements and coordinating them, and selecting them, as he relies on the concept of (cultural significance), which are the ideas or values associated with these elements, which do not give them importance in themselves but rather in their relationships with their subjects.

The tones of idealism emerge in the Weberian conception as “the ideal type is merely a picture or a table of ideas. It is not historical reality, nor is it ‘authentic’ reality, but rather it serves as a sketch through which reality is organized and ordered, it is the model or pattern that has no significance other than being a limited ideal conception, through which we measure reality to clarify the selective content of some important elements that we compare it to.” We are faced with sketches and mental templates that are relied upon in assembling and composing the elements of certain events. What is fundamental within this tool is the process of selection and ordering of the important aspects within the world of facts rather than being a picture or a copy of any part or elements of this reality, and the matter becomes clearer and the Kantian picture of the concept of unity of consciousness emerges when we contemplate Weber’s statement expressing the value of conceptions as a means of organizing selective data, “they are not an end in themselves, they are mental means that help reason become master of natural data.” 2- Kant’s belief in the power of reason:

Manifested in the importance of ideas and their role in influence and as a cause in social and political transformations on the one hand, and in relation to human existence and its ability to form symbolic meanings and interpret its world, the impact of the first element in Weber’s work is evident through the priority he gives to intellectual constructions and their role in understanding and interpreting events, and justifying society requires determining the nature of its ideas and the conceptions of its individuals, he states in this regard: “the role of the ideal type in being able to understand the ideas that govern people’s behavior in a certain era. It is a movement that moves undefined people despite their differences, and it is clear in terms of meaning, as well as in terms of form and depth.” It seems that Weber, unlike Marx’s thesis, instead of submitting people’s existence to the determination of their consciousness, ideas, and conceptions, finds himself going to the content of consciousness and ideas to interrogate them as a determining element for everything that is real and selective, this epistemic creativity made Weber establish a quasi-causal relationship between rationalization and conceptions, values, and morals.

The impact of these two elements is evident through the definition that Weber provides for the concept of culture, “it is from the human perspective a straight line of infinite value, thought invests in it in terms of its importance and significance with regard to the infinite world alien to all significance.” We note Weber’s acknowledgment of the belief value of culturally significant meanings and their role in guiding research and recognizing the unique reality, as without beliefs, research or knowledge would have no meaning, the relationship with value, as Weber’s objectivity is dependent on the concept of the relationship with value, and it requires guidance towards cultural events. Culture becomes a value concept, and the experiential reality in this context becomes culture as much as we approach it and attribute it to value ideas, our conception of culture is a conception of value, as selective reality is culture in our eyes, as we link it to value ideas. It merges with the elements of reality, especially when these elements acquire significance for us through the relationship with value, we are faced with a part of reality that we have extracted, taking on a certain color each time according to the value we add to it, which Dilthey expressed with the concept of “from life to life.”

Perhaps this is what led Runiceman to conclude the elements of the idealistic tendency in the Weberian conception through the concept of [relationship with value], where he states: “the concept of the relationship with value stems from an implicit hidden ideal knowledge more than it is positivistic.” And he sees it as a Weberian mistake. One of the drawbacks of this value conception of human action is that it traps the sociologist in a single standard while studying the meaning of a certain behavior, as Wittgenstein expressed when we seek proof of a relationship between cause and effect, the cause turns into a conception, and this is the essence of the problem because it falls into a new monism. While the concept of the relationship with value allows the researcher to understand the phenomenon, this does not prevent the transition to the level of interpretation and searching for the governing laws as is the case in the natural sciences, the sociologist is required to provide appropriate interpretations at the level of meaning and appropriate interpretations from the scientific perspective. To ensure Weber’s conditions for the transition from the level of understanding meaning to the level of causal interpretation, he assumes the rational type of action: where the agent uses the appropriate means in the way that can be known scientifically. As if we were to say, for example, interpreting the action by referring it to a goal that the agent thinks of by employing means corresponding to that goal. However, causality here, in Weber’s view, is not a matter of regulating laws as much as it is a matter of individual objective relationships. An event is not referred to a general law that regulates and interprets it, but rather attributed to certain elements that contributed to its formation and extraction into the ground of reality. Capitalism, for example, is the result of the formation of a set of elements such as the capitalist rationalization triangle that in turn reflected on the emergence of the economic pattern.

Causality, in Weber’s view, is not an end, but rather a means that facilitates the process of causal attribution of a phenomenon in terms of its cultural or symbolic importance. And here, the features of the Weberian idealistic tendency also emerge, instead of referring to the nature of the position and the positivism that the subject occupies, it refers to the construction of qualitative distinctions and connections aimed, according to Weber’s expression, at the transition from the level of apparent meaning to the realm of the subject itself, giving priority to the categories from which the researcher starts in the subject of research, which led Runiceman to conclude once again the presence of the idealistic breath “behind every interpretation of social behavior, there are causal connections between the procedural variables that determine what is hidden and latent.”

There are those who wanted to free Weber from this idealistic picture, as Brayan Turner claimed Weber’s emphasis that any conception that claims capitalism is the essence of the Reformation stage, i.e., Protestant ethics, is a conception closer to stupidity and sectarianism, but rather the concept of causality is more complex than what those with the idealistic claim imagine. Nevertheless, Turner returns to the same standards that Runiceman used to prove the elements of idealistic philosophy behind his methodological conceptions, where he states: “Weber was interested in clarifying and discovering the complex relationships and intersections between professions, complexes, and meaningful behaviors. The task of the sociologist is to understand the motives of social actors to conclude that Weber does not take the positivist or Humean (after David Hume) view of causality but rather tries to interpret behaviors or actions by understanding their intrinsic meanings.”

It seems that the essence of the Weberian thesis is to justify any behavior through the individual motives that form the basis of the formation of conceptions, as behind every action there is a motive, “as the action cannot be proven through the successive understanding of motives as the real reservoir for interpreting the observed behavior,” there is no consistency in referring the action to the motive to interpret it. There may be a logical relationship between motives and actions, according to Runiceman’s expression, but it does not mean that it turns into a causal relationship. And this led Weber not to interpret things from themselves but to unify the goal and the motive, as a necessary condition for interpretation and explanation. We are faced with a picture of Kantian critical idealism, which is present intensely within the Weberian text. This presence is embodied in the balance and correspondence that Weber establishes between value rationalization and goal rationalization, as value rational action is an action that rationalizes and does not conform to it, and the theory of understanding is nothing but actions, positions, and beliefs of individual selves understood as inclusive of the meaning [given by the agent to his behavior] and it is capable of being a real cause of the action, whether it is beliefs, positions, or values, the tool of understanding is a proof of the existence of rationality behind religious rationalization and the value conceptions that the Protestant holds towards the world in his behavior and actions. Weber states: “the beliefs and positions of social selves find their interpretation in strong rational causes, as we find behind these beliefs rational justifications, and this is not only true for scientific beliefs but also for moral and religious beliefs,” the Weberian example presented by Boudon: the magical beliefs of peasants and their inability to predict the outcome of natural phenomena. They refuse to believe that phenomena are subject to a fixed law and system because it means for them reducing the possibility of multifaceted speculation that magical ritual beliefs allow. It is a rationally justified behavior, as its rationality is enabled within the goals that these peasants aspire to. This leads us to the last element of the elements and legacy of German idealism influencing Weberian thought. 3) The self as a moral force:

We previously mentioned the self as a moral force in Kant and the nature of free action and free will and what neo-Kantianism created regarding the transformation of truth from the realm of knowledge to the realm of values. In this context, Kant believes that achieving the perfection of human existence is dependent on following the moral duty, as he questions regarding this moral duty: where does it derive its strength and awe from? What is its support and origin that makes it penetrate into the depths of our souls? And we have all this appreciation and respect for it. Kant responds: “this origin would be nothing less than that which elevates man above himself, as part of the sensible world, it would be nothing other than personality, that is, freedom and independence towards all laws of nature, conceived at the same time as a capacity possessed by a being subject to special laws, that is, to purely practical laws given by his pure reason,” the individual’s freedom is expressed through the independent and rational adherence to duty. And its legitimacy within universal rational rules, which give the self the ability to grasp the following paradox: the freedom of the acting self and its submission to the moral rule at the same time.

Inspired by the Kantian spirit, the concept of the free will of the acting self in Kant influenced Weber in building the rationality of individual methodology through his thesis regarding the close connection between “free will and the concept of rationalization,” this is evident through his view of the individual, which he attributed to the Puritan in his writing of The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, where he states: “the Puritan, like any rational ascetic pattern, tries to qualify a person and make him capable of preserving and acting above his fixed instincts. From this psychological figurative meaning of the word, the urgent task is to break the spontaneous impulsive pleasure, as the important means is to organize behavior.” The Puritan personality is characterized by rational action, which excludes all irrational instincts and actions, but rather rationalization becomes a transcendence of duty, as the personality is built through adherence to duty. We are faced with a human action related to the correct choice of appropriate means for goals instead of being subject to pressures and coercion. And this opens us completely to rational analysis, Weber states in this regard: “as much as the decision is free, not subject to external coercion and the evaluation is specific to the agent, as much as the motive is regulated by the category of goal and means, and at the same time it becomes easy and smooth to analyze it rationally, and even integrate it within the sketch of rational action,” this text is considered a fundamental ground for determining Weber’s view of the logic of social sciences, especially in relation to the Kantian concept of “freedom of will,” which remained an obstacle to the process of human sciences, by violating the logic of causality according to the claims of the positivist direction.

According to Weber, there is a metaphysical belief in human free will, which prevents referring to general conceptions and rules to interpret human behavior, as it does not allow for the possibility of prediction, in other words, there is a direction that links the concept of free will to the concept of rationalization.

How did Weber marry free will with rationalization or conscious rational action? And how can the free action be a rational action? And when does freedom of will conform to the logic of causal interpretation, which is considered one of the characteristics of scientific interpretation?

This leads us to the deep dialogue that Max Weber conducted with one of the great German historians, Edouard Mayer (1855-1930), during his isolation of Western elements from the scientific conception of history, among which we find the concept of “free decision,” as he recognized the concept of chance, which does not mean “the objective absence of cause as much as it means the impossibility or absolute impossibility of knowing the connections between some manifestations of the conditions that determine the result.” Therefore, this concept does not contradict scientific principles, as the sciences themselves believe in this principle. While the concept of will contradicts the concept of historical development, as a process subject to reasonable laws. Freedom of will denies the possibility of subjecting historical action to regulated laws, and therefore there must be laws of nature to ensure the concept of determinism.

This conception of the concept of freedom of will assumes the following equation “rationality of nature versus irrationality of man,” that is, the deeper man delves into nature, the more the rationality and objectivity of human action is realized, and the more this action is freed from nature and dependent on human will, it becomes irrational.

Mayer believes that the causal laws that ensure objectivity are fundamentally related to events and reality more than they are related to individuals, except for familiarity with the conditions surrounding them. Then we can predict and anticipate the results of any decision, starting from “the given conditions related to the rigid natural circle that assumes, first, standing on the given elements that can be calculated, which can be quantitatively represented, second, the conditions contributing to development that can be recognized in a real and tangible way, where they become capable of precision, regulation, and calculation,” these elements capable of quantification are contradictory to everything that refers to the concept of freedom or how, they refer us to the regulated laws in an objective manner at the tangible level, whether in terms of estimation or in terms of anticipating the inevitable results.

Mayer’s concept of freedom as an internal human event leads us to the intimate experience, which in turn leads us to the search for intrinsic motives and individual responsibility, which is a secondary matter in scientific research, because it transcends precision and objectivity, as the realm of freedom of will cannot transcend the world of value judgments. And this is contrary to scientificity because it involves us in the realm of values instead of the realm of laws.

Max Weber responds to this conception with the existence of a close relationship between conscious personal decisions and the concept of causality that Mayer denied, but rather Weber sees the possibility of attributing causality to any personal decision, consciously understood, by the measure that can consider this decision a fundamental factor within the historical process. While the concept of [freedom of will] in Weber’s view, its characteristic and ability to obscure its predictions, as we cannot sometimes recognize the event in advance, Weber sees that the actions that we have complete awareness of their rational application are those accompanied by free selective feelings, as they are actions outside all psychological, material, and conscientious coercion, or obstacles that obscure the judgment that makes the action follow a certain goal, consciously and clearly, starting from [the means] most suitable, according to their knowledge and according to the rules of experience, from this perspective and on this basis, the concept of rationalization becomes synonymous with rational selective action, forming the particularity of Western rationalization and distinguishing it from other societies that have not crossed the threshold of conscientious or traditional actions and have not qualified them to the level of Western rationalization.

• Footnotes

(1) Albrow Marin 1990 Max weber’s Construction of social theory. Mac Millan education LTD London P31.

(2) Hermann Cohen is considered one of the founders of logical neo-Kantianism, known as the Marburg School, see page 26 of Boutot Alain’s book La pensée allemande Moderne PUF.

(3) Boutot Alain: La pensée allemande Moderne PUF 1995 que sais je P27.

(4) Len Hardt Christian: Max Weber and the legacy of critical Idealism in. the barbarism of reason: Max Weber and the twilight of Englightemment. Asher Horowitz and Terry Maey Editors P25. University of Toronto / press 1994 P25.

(5) Boutot Alain: La pensée allemande Moderne P29.

Note: The Marburg School, which re-read Kant starting from the book of pure reason.

(6) Albrow Marin: Max weber’s construction of social theory. Mac Millan education LTD London 1990 P31.

(7) Albrow Marin: Max weber’s construction of social theory. P35.

(Cool Lenhardt Christian: Max Weber and the lagacy of critical Idealism P30.

(9) Lenhardt Christian: Max Weber and the lagacy of critical Idealism P32.

(10) As a reminder, Windelband is considered the founder of the Baden School of neo-Kantianism, which focused on re-reading practical reason, where priority was given to practical reason at the expense of theoretical reason [as truth becomes a value].

(11) Boutot Alain: La pensée allemande Moderne PUF que sais je P37.

(12) Runiciman. W. G.: Acritique of Max Weber’s philosophy of social science cambridge university press 1972. P10.

(13) Weber Max: Essais sur la théorie de la science. Libraire plan 1965. P172.

(14) Weber Max: Essais sur la théorie de la science. Libraire plan P177.

(15) Weber Max: Essais sur la théorie de la science. P193.

(16) Weber Max: (14) Weber Max: Essais la théorie de la science. P179.

(17) Weber Max: P160.

(18) Runiciman W.C.: Acritique of Max Weber’s philosophy of social science cambridge university press P79.

(19) Runiciman W.C.: Acritique of Max Weber’s philosophy of social science cambridge university press P79.

(20) Brayan Turner: Sociology and Islam (A Critical Study of Max Weber’s Thought) translated by Dr. Ahmed Baqadir. Dar Al-Qalam, 2nd edition, 1987, p. 25.

(21) Brayan Turner: p. 26-27.

(22) Runiciman W.C.: Acritique « Max Weber’s philosophy » of social science. P25.

(23) Boudon Raymon: « La rationalité asciologique » une notion essentielle pour l’analyse des phénomènes normatifs: sociologie et société XXXI printemps 1999 n°1 p.104.

(24) Kant Emmanuel: Critique de la raison pratique PUF Parie 1965 P. 91.

(25) Albrow Marin: Max weber’s construction of social theory. Mac Millan education LTD London 1990 P43.

(26) Albrow Marin: Max weber’s construction of social theory. P44.

(27) Weber Max: Essais sur la théorie de la science. P70.

(28) Weber Max: Essais sur la théorie de la science. P75.

(29) Weber Max: Essais sur la théorie de la science. P211.

(30) Weber Max: Essais sur la théorie de la science. P213.

(31) It seems that there is a contradiction between causality as it is in the natural sciences and causality in the social sciences, as in the latter it is nothing more than a matter of attribution and not subjecting the phenomenon as is the case in the natural sciences, if so, knowing social laws does not mean knowing social reality according to Weber.

(32) Weber Max: Essais sur la théorie de la science. P219.

• ) Brayan Turner: Sociology and Islam (A Critical Study of Max Weber’s Thought) translated by Dr. Ahmed Baqadir. Dar Al-Qalam, 2nd edition, 1987, p. 39.

** ) Gunther Roth. Rationalization in Max Webre’s development hitory in: Rationality and Modernity Ed By San Whimster and Scott Lash. Allen And Unwin 1987, p. 21