When considering the 2024 U.S. presidential elections in relation to the world and areas of American interest, two paradoxes emerge. The first is a general one, found in every presidential election, concerning the relationship between internal and external factors in the candidates’ programs and campaigns, as well as in voters’ interest in these issues. Generally speaking, internal factors related to the economy, job opportunities, employment and unemployment rates, among others, are the primary elements in determining voter trends and the success chances of each candidate.
Consequently, the topics focused on by the two main competing candidates for the presidency, Donald Trump (the former president and Republican nominee) and Kamala Harris (the vice president and Democratic nominee), were decidedly domestic. This was evident in their media interviews and television appearances, in their acceptance speeches for their candidacies, and in the debate held between them on September 10, 2024, which concentrated on issues such as the decline in economic growth, immigration, and abortion.
The second paradox relates to the 2024 elections: despite the increasing significance of Asia — primarily China — from the perspective of U.S. national security and the maintenance of America’s leadership role in the world, the echoes of airstrikes, missiles, and artillery from the Russian-Ukrainian war and Israel’s conflicts in Palestine and Lebanon overshadowed it.
In this context, this article aims to analyze the importance of the Asian continent from the perspective of American strategy, then highlights the experiences of Trump and Harris concerning Asia and their stances on key Asian issues as they emerged during the campaign.
First: Asia in American Strategic Thought
Undoubtedly, Asia holds a special place in American strategic thinking due to the significant economic rise of several countries, most notably China. This led the U.S. administration under former President Barack Obama to announce the “Pivot to Asia” policy in 2011. American researchers and experts have focused on the geopolitical implications of China’s rise in the global economy and its launch of the Belt and Road Initiative in 2013, an ascent that many scholars predicted would be the most significant event of the 21st century. Alongside China, the continent also includes North Korea and Iran, countries that follow policies deemed hostile by Washington and have faced various economic sanctions.
In Asia, American soldiers have fought on multiple battlefronts and in several countries. Following Japan’s surprise attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941, U.S. forces engaged in combat against Japan on multiple fronts, with General Douglas MacArthur taking command of U.S. ground forces in the Pacific and Southeast Asia. Subsequently, Washington used nuclear weapons for the first time in Hiroshima on August 6 and Nagasaki on August 9, 1945, compelling Japan to surrender unconditionally, which occurred on September 2, 1945. American forces occupied Japan, and MacArthur served as military governor between 1945 and 1951.
Americans also fought in the Korean Peninsula under the United Nations flag, supporting the pro-Western southern faction against the communist northern faction between 1950 and 1953. The war concluded with the signing of a ceasefire agreement on July 27, 1953, establishing a demilitarized zone between North and South Korea. Despite over seventy years since combat ceased, no legal treaty has been signed to formally end the war and lay the groundwork for diplomatic relations between Washington and Pyongyang.
Additionally, they participated in the conflict between the pro-Western South Vietnam and the Eastern-aligned North Vietnam from 1955 to 1975. Initially, this involvement included supplying South Vietnam’s army with weapons, munitions, and military advisors, evolving into actual combat participation. Gradually, the number of U.S. troops increased from fewer than 1,000 in 1959 to over 180,000 in the latter half of the 1960s, including ground and naval forces. However, this massive military support did not achieve its objectives, leading to a complete withdrawal of American forces from Vietnam in August 1973, marking the beginning of the end for South Vietnam, which fell to North Vietnam’s army and the National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam (Viet Cong) in April 1975.
In 2001, Americans fought in Afghanistan in response to the September 11 attacks, under the pretext of combatting terrorism and punishing the Taliban for its role in these events. Over the twenty years of war, thousands of American military personnel and civilians lost their lives, and the U.S. treasury bore significant expenditures; the Afghanistan war ranks as the third most expensive in American history, following World War II and the Iraq War. The American military presence in Afghanistan provided strategic advantages; the country occupies a vital geopolitical location, sharing borders with six countries, allowing it to influence communication lines between Central, South, and West Asia.
Due to the military advances of the Taliban, considered antagonistic to American presence, the Trump administration engaged in negotiations with them, resulting in a withdrawal agreement in 2019. The Biden administration later decided to withdraw, implemented in July 2021, after the Taliban had taken control of most provinces and began entering the capital, Kabul.
India also holds significant importance in American strategy; it is a nuclear state and an emerging economic power aiming to rank fifth among the world’s economies. Its significance increased in 2023 after Washington announced an agreement to establish a new transportation corridor connecting India to the Middle East and, subsequently, to Europe and other countries.
Returning to my initial point, China is at the center of American policy towards Asia. U.S. national security documents identify China as the only country globally possessing comprehensive power elements—economic, diplomatic, military, and technological—that allow it to challenge the global role of America. The U.S. National Security Strategy document released in October 2022 during President Biden’s tenure affirmed this stance, identifying China as a primary strategic threat.
Consequently, Washington has adopted military policies to encircle China and contest with it in the South China Sea, most notably through the AUKUS alliance established in September 2021, which includes the United States, the United Kingdom, and Australia. The U.S. has also pursued trade policies imposing restrictions and hurdles hindering China’s growth rate and limiting the entry of Chinese exports into American markets, while tightening China’s access to certain strategic materials.
Moreover, Washington has formed alliances with Asian countries having border disputes with China and warned nations worldwide against engaging with China in advanced telecommunications technology, specifically 5G technology (Huawei), claiming that China uses it for espionage and information gathering.
The relationship between America and China is complex, involving shared interests and deep concerns, causing American strategic thinking to oscillate between competition, cooperation, and conflict. In some areas, opportunities for cooperation increase, such as in combating climate change and environmental preservation. Economically, elements of competition and conflict intertwine. The arena of military and security, particularly concerning freedom of navigation in the South China Sea and the future of Taiwan, is marked by heightened tension and conflict. Many researchers refer to this complex relationship as a new Cold War.
Second: Candidates’ Experience with Asian Issues
It is apparent that Trump and Harris possess different backgrounds in foreign policy management, particularly concerning China, and what can be expected from either should they be elected President of the United States. On one hand, Trump has practical experience in managing his country’s foreign policy during his four-year presidency, during which his attitudes toward Asian countries emerged.
On the other hand, Harris does not have such experience; she has held various local positions, culminating in her role as Attorney General of California and subsequently being elected to the Senate until 2020. Throughout her career, Harris focused on domestic issues, particularly reforming the criminal justice system and immigration. However, it should be noted that she participated as a senator in endorsing several bills aimed at defending human rights in China’s Xinjiang province, Hong Kong, and Myanmar. She criticized former President Trump’s decision to impose additional tariffs on Chinese imports, believing that the trade war against China was ineffective, and also rebuked him for not making sufficient efforts to curb North Korea’s nuclear threats.
When President Biden announced his withdrawal from the race in July 2024 and nominated Harris in his place, questions arose in Washington and major world capitals regarding her foreign policy experience and the priorities and ideas she espoused. The prevailing assessment was that she would represent an extension of Biden’s policies, with no evidence suggesting that, during her tenure as vice president, she held significantly different positions from Biden. Some noted that she was a member of Biden’s foreign policy team and that during her time as vice president, she reviewed hundreds of analyses and assessments regarding the evolution of international issues and their implications for American security. She traveled to several Asian countries to emphasize American support for them in the face of China’s geostrategic ascent in the Indo-Pacific region. In 2021, she visited Singapore and Vietnam, in 2022 the Philippines, Thailand, South Korea, and Japan, and in 2023 Indonesia to participate in an ASEAN summit.
Her statements during these visits revealed the U.S. position toward China and America’s role in maintaining security in the region. During her visit to Singapore in 2021, she stated, “We know that Beijing continues to coerce, intimidate, and claim the vast majority of the South China Sea,” and that its actions undermine the rules-based international order and threaten the sovereignty of nations, affirming her country’s steadfast commitment to supporting its allies. In her 2022 visit to Japan for the funeral of Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, she met with American troops at a naval base and mentioned in her speech that “Beijing is engaging in concerning behavior in both the East and South China Seas, and provoking actions in the Taiwan Strait,” asserting Washington’s rejection of any Chinese attempt to take over Taiwan. During her visit to the Philippines the same year, she criticized China’s ongoing harassment of Philippine vessels in the South China Sea.
It appears that China is also interested in learning more about Harris, as indicated by the visit of Jake Sullivan, the U.S. National Security Advisor, to China in August 2024, where he met with Chinese President Xi Jinping, Foreign Minister Wang Yi, and General Zhang Yuxia, Deputy Chairman of China’s Central Military Commission.
Sullivan sought to reassure “Chinese leaders about the stability of relations between the two countries if Harris were to win the election.” At the press conference following this visit, he noted that Ms. Harris was a key member of President Biden’s foreign policy team and had, as vice president, met with both President Xi and Prime Minister Li Qiang, and that she was known to the highest leadership in China. Sullivan confirmed that she would continue Biden’s policy of managing competition with China without resorting to conflict, emphasizing the importance of maintaining open high-level lines of communication between the two countries.
Harris’s relationship with India is a strong point, given her Indian heritage, which influenced her character, as she mentioned during her meeting with Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi in Washington in June 2023. While politicians typically do not evaluate the national interest of their countries based on considerations of origin, it facilitates their communication with others, particularly within the United States, akin to Obama’s relationship with Africa and Biden’s with Ireland. India is a central country in the Global South, and the Biden administration has developed its relations with India, viewing it as a counterbalance to China and a strategic partner in American policy toward the Indo-Pacific region.
Third: Key Trends of the Candidates
Typically, each politician or statesman possesses a guiding framework that influences their attitudes and positions on various issues. One can characterize Trump’s framework as characterized by excessive realism, which leads him to use sharp and sometimes “demeaning” language toward others, with an overabundance of self-confidence regarding his transactional abilities, coupled with a perception of power that influences the behavior of others. Thus, he accuses Biden of weakness, asserting that having a strong president prevents war. For instance, a campaign spokesperson stated on September 24, 2024, that “Iran loves Kamala Harris’s weakness in foreign policy.” In contrast, Harris is more aligned with the political framework of the Democratic Party, which emphasizes diplomatic solutions, alliances with other nations, and the defense of democratic principles, contending that maintaining U.S. interests requires leadership in defining the rules of the road.
In this context, analyzing the candidates’ statements during the electoral campaign indicates that interest in Asia—albeit limited—focused on three topics: how to handle the Chinese challenge, lessons and experiences from the withdrawal from Afghanistan, and addressing the threat posed by North Korea.
Regarding China, while Trump’s initial presidency years were marked by direct confrontation, open hostility, and heightened military tensions in the Taiwan Strait, alongside adopting trade war tactics aimed at disrupting China’s economic growth, Harris’s statements were characterized by a more moderate tone that combined competition management with “responsible escalation.”
Trump’s commitment to a hardline stance continued during his 2024 election campaign. In an interview with Bloomberg on July 16, 2024, he promised new tariffs on Chinese imports ranging between 60% to 100%, imposing strict restrictions on any ownership of major Chinese companies in America. Notably, after years of calling for the prohibition of TikTok, owned by a Chinese company, on American soil, he mentioned in this interview that he no longer considers this issue.
In an interview with Elon Musk, the owner of platform X, on August 13, 2024, Trump warned that China would catch up to or surpass the U.S. in terms of its nuclear arsenal—a sentiment that was commented on by the Chinese Foreign Ministry, indicating that China does not engage in an arms race with anyone.
Trump consciously referenced the threat posed by China to America, illustrating this by noting that he mentioned China 14 times in his acceptance speech for the Republican nomination on July 18, 2024, boasting that he succeeded in keeping Beijing at bay during his presidency. In the same speech, he expressed regret over the Biden administration’s evacuation of Bagram Air Base in Afghanistan, which, according to him, was just one hour away from China’s nuclear facilities.
Trump reiterated his stance toward China during the candidates’ debate, again boasting that he was the only American president whose tariffs “brought billions of dollars from the pockets of the Chinese.” Although the debate moderator did not direct any questions to either candidate about China, they engaged in a heated discussion on the economic policies that should be pursued toward it.
Harris criticized Trump’s proposal to impose high tariffs on goods coming from China, asserting that this would lead to rising inflation in America and create an economic recession. She supported her view by citing the opinions of sixteen Nobel Prize-winning economists. Trump retorted that the Biden administration kept the tariffs on imports from China in place, indicating their beneficial impact on the American economy. Harris responded by criticizing economic policies during Trump’s tenure, claiming they resulted in the highest trade deficit in American history, stating that his policies allowed for the transfer of American chip manufacturing technology to China, enhancing the capabilities and strength of the Chinese military. Trump quickly replied, asserting that China acquired the technology from Taiwan, not from America.
Harris seemed to play all her cards against Trump, even criticizing his relationship with President Xi of China due to a tweet he posted on platform X, praising Xi’s handling of the COVID-19 pandemic. The viewpoints expressed by Harris during the 2024 debate were not new; she had previously articulated them during the 2020 vice presidential debate against Mike Pence, Trump’s vice president, noting at that time that America lost the trade war with China and that Trump’s approach adversely impacted the American economy, contributing to the recession it was experiencing. She asserted that the governing framework for U.S.-China relations should focus on risk mitigation rather than separation, stressing the importance of keeping open lines of communication to manage competition responsibly between our nations.
Indeed, during the Biden/Harris administration, America sought to ease trade disputes between the two countries, encouraging increased American exports to China while continuing to impose restrictions to hinder China’s economic growth and advanced technological capabilities, particularly in semiconductor and electric vehicle manufacturing. They also urged other countries to adopt similar policies through their international alliances.
In this context, one should not exaggerate the differences between Trump and Harris regarding China, as they agreed during the 2024 debate on the importance of using tariffs as an economic tool, despite differing on the fields of application and the countries targeted. There is a wide area of agreement between the two; alongside tariffs, they concur on policies regulating the export controls of American technology to China, collaborating with other nations to contain it, and enhancing military deterrence.
The goals to which Harris committed in her acceptance speech for the Democratic nomination were to “do everything in her power to ensure that the U.S. leads the world in the future of space research and artificial intelligence, and that America, not China, will win the competition of the 21st century.” This was the only instance in which she referred to China. In addition to this, both Trump and Harris pledged to defend Taiwan against the military threat posed by China; Harris assured continued American commitment to defending Taiwan in 2022.
Trump, too, affirmed continued American support for Taiwan, though he criticized its stance, stating in his interview with Bloomberg that it should “pay for its defense because it offers nothing in return to the U.S.” Trump likened the U.S. to an insurance company, noting that insurance firms do not provide services free of charge, and accused Taiwan of stealing chip technology from America.
The debate between Trump and Harris occurred on the third anniversary of the chaotic American withdrawal from Afghanistan in August 2021 after a twenty-year war. A day earlier, Republican members of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs issued a statement blaming the “Biden-Harris” administration for this withdrawal. The statement particularly focused on criticizing Harris’s role related to it, intending to weaken her position in the elections and the debate. Harris was asked whether, as the vice president, she felt any responsibility for what transpired; she avoided answering directly, reiterating her support for President Biden’s withdrawal decision, pointing out that four former presidents pledged to make that decision but did nothing while Biden did.
Harris criticized Trump for initiating negotiations with the Taliban in February 2020 regarding the withdrawal, accusing him of doing this behind the back and without the knowledge of the U.S.-backed Afghan government. In turn, Trump defended his position by justifying it as a desire to protect American soldiers’ lives and claimed that this chaotic withdrawal resulted in $85 billion worth of American weapons and equipment falling into Taliban hands.
Regarding the Korean Peninsula, successive U.S. administrations have followed a policy of alliance with South Korea while openly opposing North Korea. Exceptions included Trump, who sought cautious engagement with North Korean leader Kim Jong-un, holding a summit with him in Singapore on June 12, 2018, meeting in Hanoi on February 27, 2019, and a third meeting on June 30, 2019, in the demilitarized zone between the two Koreas; yet, the prevailing U.S. behavior remained antagonistic.
Trump continued this direction in the 2024 elections, stating in his acceptance speech that he felt understanding and harmony with the North Korean leader, asserting that “we agreed, and he may want to see me again, I think he misses me.” In response, the North Korean Foreign Ministry issued a statement indicating that the U.S. administration must choose the appropriate option for managing relations with Pyongyang regardless of who wins the upcoming elections, adding that political confusion and divisions between the Republican and Democratic parties would hinder any such decision.
Although the Democratic Party’s platform omitted the phrase present in prior platforms regarding “the complete and verifiable denuclearization of North Korea,” in her acceptance speech for the Democratic nomination, Harris committed to a firm and unwavering policy against North Korea, asserting that she would not improve relations with the tyrants and dictators who support Trump because they know he can easily be manipulated by flattery and favoritism.
Fourth: Asia and the U.S. Presidential Elections
It has been noted that American presidential elections primarily revolve around domestic issues facing American citizens, and that public interest during this period has focused on monitoring developments in the fighting in Ukraine and the Middle East amid a backdrop of division and a prevailing state of political and social polarization between the supporters of the two major parties. Due to Trump’s personality and his tendency to simplify matters and make exaggerated or untrue statements, there has been little opportunity for deep and serious discussions regarding U.S. foreign policies in Asia.
Asian capitals are closely monitoring the American electoral scene, given Washington’s leadership role in the world and the mutual interests and relations with countries in the region and the possible developments should either Trump or Harris win. They are keen not to take any position indicating a preference for either candidate, although according to Brad Smith, president of Microsoft, testifying before the Senate Intelligence Committee in September 2024, China is interfering electronically to undermine American elections without supporting either candidate, while Russia intervenes in favor of Trump and Iran in favor of Harris.
In any case, significant Asian issues await the next American president, where the economic relationships between the world’s largest economy and the second-largest economy it pursues remain the main issue confronting the incoming president—specifically, how to manage the competition between the two nations, including establishing rules for managing conflicts between them. This is occurring in the context of increasing closeness between China and Russia, exemplified by the joint naval maneuvers held between them in the Sea of Japan and the Sea of Okhotsk from September 10 to 16, 2024, marking the largest naval exercises by Russia since the Soviet Union’s dissolution in 1991.
Regarding India, partnerships with the United States have evolved under the Obama, Trump, and Biden administrations, respecting the differing interests between the two nations on specific issues. Some believe India would be more comfortable with Trump’s success given the special chemistry of relations between him and Prime Minister Narendra Modi, while others argue that Kamala Harris’s Indian heritage makes her closer to New Delhi.
North Korea will likely represent a crucial topic on the agenda of the next American president due to its increasing nuclear and missile capabilities, heightening concerns among allies in Seoul and Tokyo regarding this development, and the signing of a strategic cooperation agreement between Russia and North Korea in June 2024, which laid the groundwork for mutual defense against external aggression and the emergence of North Korean weaponry in the Ukrainian war. This leads to reinforcing cooperative and allied relations between America, Japan, South Korea, and other like-minded countries in the region.
It appears that Asia is the rising force in the 21st century, with China as the first frontline against the United States. There are ongoing competitions and conflicts between the two nations to gain the trust and friendship of Asian countries. Research findings indicate that China is systematically accumulating wealth and influence, increasing its investments in continental countries through the Belt and Road Initiative, thus expanding its influence as reflected in public opinion polls in these countries. These developments unfold amidst a shift from a world dominated by a single superpower to a multipolar one, presenting the greatest challenge facing the new American president in managing relations with Asia.
Footnotes
- In every American presidential election, there are also independent candidates, but none of them have a chance of winning.
- The six countries are China, Iran, Pakistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan.
- Ali Aziz Bidar, “Afghanistan in the American Strategic Perspective,” Tikrit University Political Science Journal, Issue 30, December 2022, p. 174.
- Ismail Al-Razawi and Mursi Abdel Karim Abdel Razeq, “The American Response to the Rising Chinese Influence in East Asia: Tools and Scenarios,” Al-Mustaqbal Al-Arabi Journal, Volume 47, Issue 546, August 2024, p. 106.
- National Security Strategy, The White House, Washington, October 2022, p. 23. https://tinyurl.com/mrfcfvxu.
- Osama Farouk Makhaimer, “The New Cold War Between the United States and China: A Study of the Causes and Issues,” Scientific Journal of the Faculty of Economics and Political Science, Cairo University, Volume 24, Issue 4, October 2023, pp. 148-115.
- Remarks by Vice President Harris on the Indo-Pacific Region, The White House, Washington, August 24, 2021.
- Remarks by Vice President Harris Aboard the USS Howard Naval Ship, The White House, Washington, September 28, 2022.
- Remarks by Vice President Harris Aboard the Philippine Coast Guard Ship Teresa Magbanua, The White House, Washington, November 22, 2022.
- Remarks by APNSA Jake Sullivan at the Press Conference | Beijing, People’s Republic of China, The White House, Washington, August 29, 2024.
