On January 9, 2025, the presidential vacuum in Lebanon, which lasted more than two years, ended with the election of Army Chief Joseph Aoun as President of the Republic, in a electoral process that sparked extensive constitutional controversy. Aoun received 99 votes out of 128 deputies in the second round of voting, after gaining only 71 votes in the first round; this reflected a decisive shift in the positions of some parliamentary blocs in a short time. This constitutional controversy stemmed from Article 49 of the Lebanese Constitution, which prohibits the election of high-ranking state officials during their term of office or within less than two years of the end of their service; thus requiring an implicit amendment to the constitution to overcome this obstacle.
This constitutional confusion was resolved through political consensus accepting the constitutionality of Joseph Aoun’s victory if his votes exceeded a two-thirds majority (86 votes); as at that point it would be impossible to gather the required number of deputies, set at a third, to challenge the election results before the Constitutional Council. This political solution highlights the role played by both internal and external forces to ensure the passage of this presidential election without obstacles, with the aim of ending the presidential vacuum and enhancing the stability of the country amid its multiple crises.
Political Consensus
The election of President Joseph Aoun resulted from several internal, regional, and international factors that converged to end the third presidential vacuum since 2007:
Arab and International Pressure to End the Presidential Vacuum: Regional and international powers played a crucial role in achieving consensus on Joseph Aoun’s name for the presidency. After a presidential vacuum lasting over two years, the United States, France, and Saudi Arabia intervened directly to pressure Lebanese parties to reach a solution to end the political crisis. These countries sent special envoys, such as U.S. envoy Amos Hochstein, French envoy Jean-Yves Le Drian, and Saudi envoy Prince Yazeed bin Farhan. These envoys conducted a series of meetings with Lebanese political leaders, carrying clear messages indicating that the international community would not support Lebanon economically and politically unless a new president was agreed upon, hinting that international and regional aid, particularly in reconstruction after the war with Israel, would be conditional on electing a president capable of leading reforms. This intense diplomatic pressure made Lebanese political forces realize that the continuation of the presidential vacuum was no longer an acceptable option.
Weakening of Some Traditional Forces in Lebanon: Amid rapid regional changes, some traditional political forces in Lebanon witnessed a decline in their influence, especially following losses suffered by Hezbollah in the recent war with Israel. This weakening diminished the party’s ability to impose its presidential candidate or effectively object to other candidates. The international and regional community exploited this weakness to enhance Joseph Aoun’s chances, viewing him as a consensus figure who could restore balance to the Lebanese political scene without excluding any party. It can be said that the diminishing influence of Hezbollah and its allies opened the door for other parties to support Aoun without fear of disrupting the electoral process, while the urgent need for reconstruction and international confidence spurred political forces to transcend their differences and seize the opportunity at hand.
Aoun’s Ability to Forge Temporary Consensus Among Rivals: Joseph Aoun managed to achieve a convergence of interests among traditionally opposing political forces, such as the Lebanese Forces led by Samir Geagea, the Amal Movement led by Nabih Berri, and even Hezbollah. This temporary consensus was not the result of strategic alliances as much as it was a response to the urgent need to fill the presidential vacuum and avoid further collapse in the country. Aoun demonstrated skill in communicating with different parties, providing guarantees and reassurances to each regarding their concerns and worries; for the Lebanese Forces, Joseph Aoun’s accession represented an opportunity to enhance state sovereignty and restore the role of institutions, while his promises to maintain security stability and refrain from making decisions that provoke any party reassured Hezbollah and the Amal Movement (known as the Shiite duo). This pragmatic approach helped build temporary trust among rivals, facilitating his election with relative smoothness, as everyone recognized that cooperation was the only way out of the crisis.
Neutralizing the Influence of Opposing Christian Forces: Although the Free Patriotic Movement led by Gebran Bassil strongly opposed Joseph Aoun’s candidacy, this objection did not significantly impact the electoral process; the strong international and regional pressures, coupled with the consensus of most Christian forces—namely the Lebanese Forces led by Samir Geagea, the Phalange Party led by Samy Gemayel, and the Marada Movement led by Sleiman Frangieh—to support Aoun, helped neutralize the opposing influences of the Free Patriotic Movement. Moreover, the Christian public opinion leaned toward ending the presidential vacuum and achieving stability. Bassil’s opposition to Joseph Aoun’s presidency was seen as a personal feud, stemming from Aoun’s refusal to deal harshly with the October 17 protesters and not yielding to the demands of the Minister of Defense allied with Bassil. Consequently, the Free Patriotic Movement could not gather sufficient popular and political support to obstruct the election.
Regional Changes Accelerating the Election of a New President: The agreement on electing Joseph Aoun came at a very sensitive time internally and regionally; following the ceasefire agreement with Israel in November 2024, there was a leadership vacuum in addressing the ramifications of the war and reconstruction, while the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime in Syria brought about fundamental changes in regional balances; this affected internal alliances in Lebanon. For instance, some independent deputies who previously aligned with the March 8 forces, like Faisal Karami, Hassan Murad, Taha Nagy, and Adnan Trabulsi, along with some defectors from the Free Patriotic Movement, such as Alain Aoun and Simon Abi Ramia, declared their support for Joseph Aoun. Additionally, Hezbollah’s primary presidential candidate, former Minister Sleiman Frangieh, withdrew from the competition, announcing his support for Joseph Aoun. Political forces recognized that delaying the election of a president would make Lebanon vulnerable to further external interventions and potentially complete economic collapse.
Aoun’s Success in Allaying Hezbollah and Its Allies’ Fears: Direct meetings between Joseph Aoun and leaders from Hezbollah and the Amal Movement played a crucial role in securing their support for his election, especially between the two voting rounds; during these, Aoun met with MP Ali Hassan Khalil from the Amal Movement and the head of the Loyalty to the Resistance Bloc, MP Mohammad Raad. During these negotiations, Aoun reportedly provided guarantees regarding enhancing the state’s role and its institutions without targeting any party. These commitments helped assuage Hezbollah and its allies’ fears that his election would be a move against them, as the negotiations also addressed issues of reconstruction for areas affected during the recent Israeli war on Lebanon, and cooperation in addressing economic and social crises.
This internal negotiation showcased Joseph Aoun’s ability to build bridges of communication and understanding with various parties; this enhanced his chances of garnering broad support and securing the required constitutional quorum for his election, as his votes increased by 28 in the second round; noting that the Shiite duo comprises 30 deputies, who had voted blank in the first round.
Potential Challenges
The commencement of the new term and Joseph Aoun’s presidency will face major challenges; which will put the ability to reform to a difficult test:
Continued Internal Division: The persistence of internal political divisions represents one of the most prominent challenges that President Joseph Aoun will face at the beginning of his term. The Lebanese political scene suffers from sharp divisions among political and sectarian forces; as competitions and conflicts among parties and movements continue without a unified vision for managing the affairs of the country. This division makes cooperation among different parties difficult, especially on sensitive issues such as economic reforms and reconstruction.
Aoun may find it challenging to muster the parliamentary support necessary to pass the required laws and initiatives to extract Lebanon from its crises, and the opposition, which includes Christian forces like the Free Patriotic Movement, may later join with Hezbollah (after the grace period ends) to obstruct any reform initiatives they believe do not serve their political or sectarian interests. This divided environment threatens to turn any reform steps into long-term political battles, thereby hindering necessary progress.
Limited Powers of the Lebanese President: In his oath of office speech on January 9, 2025, President Joseph Aoun indicated his intent to work on enhancing judicial independence and launching economic and political reforms. However, the powers granted to the Lebanese president by the constitution require close cooperation with the Prime Minister and the Parliament for the implementation of these reforms. The greatest challenge lies in forming an effective government capable of interacting with the president’s vision and fulfilling his promises. Aoun focused on respecting the constitution and the separation of powers in his oath of office speech, highlighting his awareness of this challenge, and his intention to address it within the powers available to him. Within this framework, he urgently scheduled parliamentary consultations for January 13, 2025, to name a new prime minister.
Facing External Pressures: Managing external pressures is another major challenge that Joseph Aoun will face at the beginning of his presidency. Lebanon has recently suffered from interventions by regional powers, such as Iran, which has weakened its political decision-making independence. It is expected that Iranian influence, embodied by Hezbollah, will continue to exert internal pressures with external dimensions to push Lebanon to adopt political positions that serve Iranian interests at the expense of national interest; placing the new president in a continuous challenge to achieve a delicate balance between these pressures and maintaining the country’s sovereignty.
On the other hand, Aoun’s oath of office included an acknowledgement of the importance of strengthening relations with Arab countries as part of a strategy to rebuild trust with the regional environment. Joseph Aoun emphasized Lebanon’s commitment to establishing the best relations with Arab nations and working to export the best it has to them. This advocacy underscores his awareness of the pivotal role of Arab countries in providing economic and political support to Lebanon, which indicates the importance of regional integration in overcoming current crises.
Reconstruction of the Southern Suburb, the South, and the Beqaa Valley: Joseph Aoun’s presidential term will face a tremendous challenge regarding the reconstruction of areas affected by the war with Israel, such as the South, the Beqaa, and the southern suburbs. These areas require substantial financial support to rebuild the infrastructure and essential services destroyed by the war. Amid the current economic crisis that Lebanon is experiencing, Aoun will need to secure external support for these efforts. However, obtaining this support may be conditioned on political and economic reforms that may face opposition from internal forces, especially if they involve attempts to reduce Hezbollah’s influence in southern Lebanon.
Dealing with Hezbollah: Aoun reaffirmed, in his oath of office, the necessity of strengthening state sovereignty and the exclusivity of arms in its hands; which places him directly in challenge with Hezbollah, a major political and military force in Lebanon. Joseph Aoun also called for a comprehensive defense policy “that grants the Lebanese state alone the role of removing the Israeli occupation and repelling its aggression from all Lebanese territories.” Moreover, implementing UN Security Council Resolution 1701, which stipulates a ceasefire and disarmament in the area south of the Litani River, will be a fundamental challenge in dealing with Hezbollah.
Aoun pledged, in his oath of office, Lebanon’s commitment to the truce agreement with Israel, emphasizing the role of the Lebanese army, with its defensive combat doctrine, in deployment in border areas to maintain stability and prevent any breaches of the ceasefire. While these measures aim to reinforce state authority, they will face significant complications due to Hezbollah’s influence in the south; making the execution of Resolution 1701 a real test of Aoun’s ability to achieve a balance between Lebanon’s international commitments and internal stability.
In conclusion, the consensus that led to Joseph Aoun’s election as President of the Lebanese Republic raises questions about the extent to which it reflects a genuine internal agreement; despite ending a presidential vacuum that lasted more than two years, the election was driven more by intense international and regional pressures than a pure Lebanese will. The Shiite duo’s alignment with this consensus in its later stages reflects a conditional commitment to achieve gains and ensure their role in the internal equation. The coming phase remains a test of Lebanese parties’ ability to transform this temporary consensus into either genuine national agreement and partnership that propels Lebanon toward overcoming its current crisis or a squandered opportunity that joins a series of previous disappointments.
