Is there an American Strategy in Syria?

The United States under President Donald Trump doesn’t seem to have a clear vision for dealing with the new administration in Syria. When the Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) forces were moving from Idlib towards Aleppo, Hama, and Homs, and before reaching Damascus on December 8th, 2020, the then-President-elect Trump had a stance based on non-involvement in Syrian affairs, famously saying “the US has no interest in Syria, and we should not get involved in Syrian events.”

However, after more than three months of the new Syrian administration’s rule, and only two months after Trump’s arrival at the White House, it became clear that Washington was trying to find common ground with Ahmad al-Sharq’s government. This was evident when Natasha Franceschi, the US Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs, met with Syrian Foreign Minister Asad al-Shaibani on March 18th, 2021, in a private meeting on the sidelines of the Syria Donor Conference in Brussels. During this meeting, Washington presented a package of security and political demands, primarily including:

• Preventing foreign fighters from China (Uyghurs), Russia (Chechens), and other Central Asian and Arab countries from holding military positions in the Syrian army.
• Demolishing Syria’s remaining chemical weapons stockpiles.
• Syria providing full information about terrorist groups linked to al-Qaeda and ISIS in Syria.
• Cooperation in counter-terrorism efforts.
• Appointing a liaison officer to work with Washington to secure the return of the American journalist, Austin Tice, who was kidnapped in 2012.
• Ensuring the Syrian political process is inclusive and does not exclude anyone, treating all Syrians equally.

In return, the US offered to extend the sanctions exemptions allowing humanitarian aid to enter Syria for another six months.

While some argue that the US is asking for a lot and offering very little in this deal, the meeting between al-Shaibani and Franceschi marked a significant shift in Washington’s stance. Previous statements had rejected engaging in any dialogue with al-Sharq’s administration. This brings us to the question: how far can this shift in the American position go? Is the Syrian government ready to implement some of the American conditions, like expelling foreign fighters from Central Asia and Arab countries, whose presence alongside al-Sharq has worried the countries they come from? Does all this indicate that Washington now has a new and clear strategy for dealing with Syria?

A Strategy of No Strategy

From the events that unfolded in Syria starting in March 2011 until the end of al-Assad’s rule on December 8th, 2020, the US did not have a fixed or clear vision or strategy regarding Syria. American goals changed throughout those years. Between 2011 and the end of 2016 under Barack Obama, American policy clearly aimed to overthrow the al-Assad regime. Congress allocated millions of dollars to support Syrian fighters battling al-Assad’s government. However, when Donald Trump came to power in his first term from January 20th, 2017, to January 20th, 2021, his primary focus was defeating ISIS after Obama had said that eliminating ISIS in Syria and Iraq would take decades. Indeed, Trump succeeded in his first term in eliminating ISIS’s territorial control. The international coalition led by the US helped defeat ISIS in its last battle in the village of Baghouz, and Trump declared in March 2019 the elimination of the terrorist organization’s last foothold in Syrian territory. But when Democrats returned to the White House under Joe Biden, American priorities changed again. Biden’s focus became containing Iranian influence. After the war in Ukraine began on February 24th, 2022, the US’s most important focus became monitoring the Russian presence in Syria.

Three Options

There are many discussions in Republican policy-making institutions about the best ways to deal with the new Syrian administration. The US’s hesitant steps towards Damascus reflect this divergence, pushing towards three main options:

1. Avoid the Beneficiary:

Some in the US administration advocate for a view that “the best thing the US can do in Syria is to do nothing.” They call for withdrawing all US troops, numbering around 2,000 soldiers, along with a few hundred logistical personnel. The Syrian file can be managed remotely, either through relations with Turkey or with European actors. This group’s calculations are based on the belief that the US has no interests in Syria. This might be what Trump expressed in December 2020 before taking office. They see the new Syrian administration as incapable of shedding its “garment of extremism and terrorism,” incapable of establishing a new phase of peace and stability in Syria, and that American engagement with Damascus would not only strengthen extremism in the Levant but also in the Arab region and all Middle Eastern countries.

2. The Hub of Interactions:

Another group believes that the US can be the hub of Syrian political and security interactions and cannot leave a country with strategic importance in the Middle East to other regional actors who might lead Syria in directions away from American interests. This view is supported by Eric Trager, a Middle East official on the US National Security Council. This group’s proponents argue that the US has a series of interests in Syria:

• Preventing Iranian Influence Revival:

This group argues that the US military and civilian presence in Syria is crucial to prevent “Iranian influence revival.” They link this objective to President Trump’s “maximum pressure” strategy on Iran. They believe that withdrawing US troops from Syria would be a major mistake that would weaken the US not only in Syria but also in Iraq. They believe that US forces in Syria play a significant role in preventing Iranian aid from reaching Lebanon through Syrian territory. All this, they say, could ultimately help push Tehran towards the negotiating table regarding Iran’s nuclear and missile program.

• Protecting Allies:

The Kurds are at the forefront of Washington’s allies in Syria. This group points to Washington’s influence in stopping the Turkish attack supported by the Free Syrian Army against the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) formed by the Kurds. The US army also played a prominent role in signing an agreement between the Syrian Autonomous Administration led by Mazloum Abdi and the new Syrian president, Ahmad al-Sharq, in February 2021. The US military transported Mazloum Abdi from Qamishli to Damascus by helicopter to sign an agreement to integrate the SDF forces into the Syrian army. This view argues that a US military withdrawal would pave the way for the Kurds to be crushed by HTS forces and the Turkish army, leaving a negative impression in the Middle East that the US is abandoning its friends in the region.

• Curbing the Turkish Role:

While Turkey and the US are members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) since Turkey joined the alliance in 1952, there is a difference in their goals in Syria. While Turkey combats Kurdish forces in Syria, the US provides a security and political umbrella for Syrian Kurds. Washington has always sought to make the Kurds a “buffer force” and a “deterrent force” against what it calls Ankara’s incursions in Syrian territory. This is why President Trump criticized Turkish policy in December 2020, saying that what happened in Syria was completely engineered and orchestrated by the Turkish state.

• Protecting Israeli Interests:

Some American and Israeli circles remain skeptical about the intentions of the new Syrian government towards Israel, especially after Israel’s control over vast areas in three Syrian governorates: Quneitra, Suwayda, and Daraa. They see American political and military engagement in Syria as a “guarantee” against Syrian policy deviating against Israel, like the previous al-Assad government, which worked against Israel based on its centrality in the Resistance Axis.

• Preventing ISIS Revival:

There is American consensus that ISIS has all the tools to return to Syria amidst the growth of operations conducted by the terrorist organization in Syria, the presence of about 70,000 ISIS families in Syrian camps, and the talk about “Cubs of the Caliphate,” children of ISIS fighters killed from 2014 onwards in Syria and Iraq. Many countries refuse to take back these children who are now young adults and ready to engage in any terrorist acts carried out by the organization. This group insists that a US withdrawal and the inability of the Kurds to protect these camps housing ISIS families, like al-Hol camp, would contribute to a new wave of terrorism in the region.

• Normalization with Israel:

This group bets on the American presence in the Syrian scene being crucial in the Syrian government’s move towards normalization with Israel. This group’s estimates suggest that Syria could be the first country in the region to normalize relations with Israel if Israel presents a new approach based on disarming southern Syria in exchange for returning those territories to the Syrian government.

3. Step by Step:

This is a current within the US administration that seeks to ensure US influence without engaging or interfering in the details of Syrian issues. They emphasize that the US role can be to control Syrian interactions without military or political engagement by maximizing the role of aid and setting conditions for lifting sanctions, especially those imposed under the “Caesar Act.” They call this strategy “step by step,” meaning the US would not provide any political, economic, or security support to Syria unless the Syrian government takes a corresponding step. The US has provided examples of this cooperation by requesting information about Syrian terrorist groups, but it also provided US intelligence that helped thwart an attack ISIS had planned on the shrine and mosque of Sayyida Zainab in the heart of Damascus.

The Syrian government has not yet responded to the US demands. However, all estimates suggest that the new Syrian government will respond to many of the demands, especially those related to destroying all weapons of mass destruction. However, the fate of about 8,000 foreign fighters remains the real test for the development of US-Syrian relations.