The election victory of President Donald Trump signals a new phase of uncertainty and political fluctuations in Washington’s relations with African capitals. While both Democrats and Republicans recognize Africa’s growing strategic importance in the global geopolitical landscape, their differing approaches significantly impact perceptions of the continent.
As President Trump’s new administration begins to fulfill its domestic campaign promises while reasserting American leadership abroad, the U.S. can no longer afford to overlook Africa. Numerous indicators suggest that it will seek to advance American interests on the continent through a new approach, especially as its global role continues to expand, whether as a target for foreign interests in the context of great power competition with nations like China and Russia, or as a significant voting bloc in the United Nations.
The upcoming phase hints at the onset of a new chapter in U.S.-Africa relations, fraught with uncertainties and fears, but also bearing signs of opportunities for Africans.
This paper discusses a central question regarding the likelihood that President Donald Trump will indeed initiate a new era in U.S.-Africa relations and break from his predecessor’s policies toward the continent.
Divergent Trends in Interest Toward Africa
Historically, U.S. foreign policy towards Africa has been characterized by a general indifference toward the continent, dating back to the pre-World War II era. Afterward, U.S. policy included engagement or disengagement with African nations, largely viewed through the lens of countering Soviet attempts to gain influence in the region.
A significant and sustained engagement between the U.S. and Africa began during the Clinton administration, which was further deepened with substantial bipartisan support. The Clinton, Bush, and Obama administrations exhibited remarkable continuity in both Congress and the White House regarding Washington’s agenda in Africa.
Over the past two decades, Africa’s share of annual U.S. foreign aid has increased. While U.S. developmental and security assistance to Africa has grown, part of this increase was dedicated to President Bush’s AIDS relief plan initiated in 2003. During President Obama’s tenure, U.S. aid to Africa fluctuated between 7and7and8 billion annually. However, Trump’s election indicated a radical departure from this consensus; his approach marked a regression.
From 2017 to 2021, the relationship between Washington and African capitals was generally characterized by mistrust, hostility, and neglect. The president’s more isolationist worldview placed Africa completely off the radar of U.S. foreign policy priorities. This was not a novel situation at that time, as the continent had never emerged as a strategic priority for Washington under previous Democratic or Republican administrations. However, it can be argued that relations with the continent reached alarmingly low levels during Trump’s first term due to three main issues.
First, the U.S. administration displayed contempt for international organizations, evidenced by cuts to its contributions to peacekeeping missions; this undermined confidence in U.S. commitment to global security and governance, particularly in Africa.
Second, Trump’s foreign policy towards Africa was characterized by glaring neglect, with a lack of diplomats and waning initiatives leading to reduced bilateral trade and perceptions of a lack of partnership.
Third, Trump’s derogatory statements and travel bans affecting citizens of certain countries reinforced negative images of Africa as a place of insecurity and danger, damaging relations with Washington and demonstrating that Trump held little respect for Africans.
Conversely, since 2021, the Biden administration has aimed to rectify relations with Africa by rebuilding trust and goodwill, demonstrating its commitment to prioritizing African concerns on the global stage.
This has been achieved through a clearer vision outlined in the 2022 “U.S. Strategy Toward Sub-Saharan Africa.” This strategy identifies four key goals to guide Washington’s bilateral relations with African capitals: the need to strengthen open societies, achieve democratic and security gains, enhance economic opportunities, and support climate adaptation. It officially recognized the increasing geopolitical weight of African countries on the global stage and the need for greater U.S. investment to build and strengthen strategic ties with the continent across a wide range of areas, including democracy, trade development, human rights, women’s empowerment, individual freedoms, and countering extremism.
While Biden has made only one trip to Africa during his presidency, his efforts toward the continent have been bolstered by several other high-level working visits and his invitation for the African Union to join the G20—gaining membership in 2023—and for greater African representation on the UN Security Council, alongside hosting a U.S.-Africa Leaders Summit in December 2022.
In the commercial realm, American companies finalized over 500 deals in Africa during his tenure, valued at more than 14billion.Anotableachievementofthepresidentwasthe14billion.Anotableachievementofthepresidentwasthe250 million financing package offered by Washington to develop the Lobito Atlantic Railway, connecting the mineral-rich regions of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Zambia to the Lobito Port in Angola.
However, even with the recent growth in relations, the foreign policy establishment in Washington continues to regard Africa as a strategically low-priority area; U.S. embassies in the region still suffer from staffing shortages and lack of resources. Further cuts, as proposed by Trump’s transition team, would severely deplete an already handicapped Africa team within the State Department and other agencies.
Trump’s second administration inherits these divergent trends in interest. Some indicators suggest it will seek to advance U.S. interests in Africa through a new strategy.
Will Trump Make a Radical Shift in His Africa Relations?
Based on the 2025 Project report prepared by several major right-wing think tanks and lobby groups under the leadership of the “Heritage Foundation,” alongside statements from senior Republican foreign policy makers and media reports, Trump’s anticipated foreign policy agenda toward Africa calls for radical changes. Among its main orientations are:
First, enhancing military and security cooperation by focusing on providing greater security and military assistance to allied African nations, such as military training to combat terrorist groups like Boko Haram that may threaten American interests on the continent and globally. Additionally, relying on France in North Africa to counter terrorist threats and address increasing Russian influence.
Second, reducing traditional developmental aid, converting it into loans aimed at encouraging U.S. private sector engagement.
Furthermore, the administration would consider cancelling or decreasing humanitarian and developmental support programs in favor of promoting economic growth through private investments.
Third, countering Chinese and Russian influence by supporting U.S. companies to compete with Chinese presence in strategic sectors within Africa and focusing on containing Russian military and political activities by strengthening U.S. presence in strategic regions.
Fourth, concentrating U.S. efforts and resources on countries with close ties to the U.S., rather than distributing support across all African nations. This includes recognizing the self-declared “Somaliland” and leveraging this recognition to enhance U.S. geopolitical influence in the Horn of Africa.
Fifth, refraining from imposing controversial cultural agendas and avoiding pressing African governments to adopt policies such as LGBTQ rights and abortion, focusing instead on prioritizing economic and security issues.
Thus, Trump’s expected policies towards Africa center on enhancing military and security roles, reducing developmental aid while shifting it to investment loans, and confronting Chinese and Russian influences, with a focus on countries of strategic importance to the U.S. and clear economic and geopolitical interests.
These orientations raise doubts and fears among Africans even before their implementation, posing questions about the fate of previously established initiatives, agreements, and decisions, and whether they will receive the necessary political and financial backing for their full execution, or if the new administration will present its new vision that entirely breaks from its predecessor?
A Second Term Amplifying African Fears
While it is anticipated that Donald Trump will instigate radical changes in foreign policy, significant doubts remain about whether he will break from his previous administration’s approach regarding African relations.
The uncertainty surrounding Trump’s potential policies and decisions regarding Africa, alongside a scenario of continuity that remains strongly plausible, creates real concerns for Africans on various issues, notably:
America First Policy
This implies that interests and commitments toward other countries and international affairs are secondary, based solely on their benefits to the United States. Hence, Washington’s interests and commitments would be tied to strategic security and economic requirements.
This presents a challenge to African nations, which hold limited strategic importance to Washington. For example, during Trump’s first term (2017-2021), the U.S. demonstrated a preference for bilateral trade deals over the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), introduced by the Clinton administration in 2000, which allows tariff-free access to the U.S. market for certain products from eligible African nations.
If this diverts benefits from countries benefiting from this law, it may also favor those who managed to secure bilateral deals with Trump’s administration. However, it could also lead to fragmented trade relations between Washington and the larger African continent, negatively affecting smaller economies with lesser negotiating power.
Aid
The United States provided approximately $3.7 billion in aid to Africa in 2024, but Trump’s first administration repeatedly suggested suspending or reducing foreign aid globally. Concerns abound that such suspensions may be enacted in the coming period, especially with Republicans gaining a majority in Congress.
Regarding security, military budgets are unlikely to be reduced, though Trump might terminate missions and withdraw more U.S. troops from the continent, supporting only effective operations, similar to his first term when he ended the mission in Darfur and ordered the withdrawal of 700 U.S. troops from Somalia.
Democracy and Human Rights
There is uncertainty about how Trump will approach democracy and the promotion of human rights in Africa. He has shown affection for authoritarianism and praised dictators. This trend endangers struggling democracies and the human rights trajectory on the continent. While some leaders may welcome reduced external intervention, it could encourage authoritarian regimes, weaken political accountability, and impact political stability.
Trade and Investment
The Biden administration has worked hard to convey the impression that Africa is an important partner, yet Biden has struggled to translate this enthusiasm into significant agreements and partnerships, though this does not imply his Africa strategy has failed.
For instance, in 2023, the U.S. announced that it had invested over $22 billion since Biden took office. However, some fear that Trump, with his protectionist and isolationist vision, may reverse such investments and exchanges in accordance with his “America First” mantra. The AGOA, extended by Obama in 2015 for ten years, and set to expire in September 2025, poses a significant concern.
Trump could simply choose not to renew it, as he expressed during his previous administration, in order to enforce his plan on program members to impose comprehensive tariffs ranging from 10% to 25% on imports from abroad, as promised in his 2024 campaign.
Alternatively, he might decide to maintain this program and utilize it as a leverage tool.
On the other hand, while Trump does not significantly support the AGOA, he has acknowledged that if the U.S. aims to counter China’s increasing economic influence in Africa, it must sustain a certain level of partnership.
In 2018, the Trump administration unveiled the “Prosper Africa” initiative—a scheme designed to assist U.S. companies looking to invest in Africa—and the “Development Finance Corporation,” which funds development projects in Africa and around the world. Biden has kept both entities operational, with the corporation stating it has invested over $10 billion in Africa.
Considering China remains a major power in Africa, and given Trump himself presented these policies as alternatives to Chinese financial offerings on the continent, he is likely to think twice before dismantling them.
Trump’s transactional approach could present an opportunity for some African nations that view his return to the presidency positively, particularly in a few sectors that represent priorities for Trump’s administration: oil and strategic minerals, which could incentivize him to pay greater attention to these countries.
However, concerns remain that this limited view of Africa will significantly harm the principle of mutual profit and equal partnership with the continent’s nations.
This could mean favorable ties only with select strategic African partners, with little attention paid to Africa collectively. Evidence of this is that Trump did not organize a U.S.-Africa Leaders Summit during his first presidency, unlike both Obama and Biden.
Migration
Another area causing considerable concern is Trump’s proposed stringent immigration policy, which would tighten borders and deport undocumented migrants, making legitimate African migration to the U.S. difficult. While Africa contributes minimally to the unauthorized immigrant population in America, Trump’s policy will adversely affect diaspora relations between the U.S. and Africa, potentially subjecting hundreds of thousands of Africans to deportation, impacting their remittances, which totaled $13 billion in 2023.
Climate Change
Trump believes climate change is a hoax, which motivated his withdrawal from the Paris Agreement.
His return would imply an expansion of fossil fuel reliance, a retreat from environmental policies, and reduced funding for climate adaptation projects and clean energy investments in Africa. Given the continent’s heavy reliance on agriculture, such stances could exacerbate climate vulnerabilities in Africa.
Expanding African Membership on the Security Council
U.S. support for two permanent African seats on the UN Security Council, proposed by the Biden administration, has become uncertain under Trump.
Washington’s Challenges Amid Global Strategic Competition
With various Republican hawks joining Trump’s government, including Secretary of State Marco Rubio, his administration is likely to continue viewing foreign policy through the zero-sum lens of great power competition in Africa; where both Beijing and Moscow remain highly active.
This positions it before three major challenges that will shape Washington’s African policy amidst global strategic competition:
- Geoeconomic Competition with China: Here, Washington faces the reality of its inability to compete with China in areas of interest to Africans, as China maintains high-level relations grounded in solidarity with the global south, with its trade and infrastructure investments bolstering regional economic growth over the past twenty years. The U.S. significantly lags in both sectors. While trade between the U.S. and African countries remains just over one-sixth of the volume of trade between China and those nations, Washington’s use of sanctions could further exacerbate this trade imbalance.
Trump vocally criticized China during his campaign, pledging to impose higher tariffs on its exports. Experts differ on what a second Trump term would mean for Beijing’s ambitions on the continent; some suggest it could be a boon for China if Washington follows a more isolationist agenda that neglects the region. However, it is evident that Trump is aware of China’s strength and the threat it poses on the continent. Consequently, it is unlikely that a Republican administration will overlook Africa more than before, as it perceives China as a threat to U.S. interests globally, which would allow China greater maneuverability to expand its influence in various ways.
However, it is likely that only a few countries will attract attention during the second term—those whose resources or positions align with U.S. national security interests.
For example, critical minerals such as cobalt and lithium are essential for both green technologies and microchips powering everything from cars to mobile phones. Although President Trump is averse to green energy, he will need to compete in this sector to prevent the U.S. from falling farther behind China in accessing these materials, which may reflect Trump’s broader policies of competition with China and could provide a crucial resource in the event of a trade war with it.
- Enhancing U.S. Geopolitical Influence: While both parties are committed to promoting U.S. geopolitical interests on the continent, their views on competition with China and Russia may differ. The Biden administration has continued Trump’s approach toward China but has not evolved into a clear and comprehensive strategy, whereas Trump publicly framed U.S. engagement in Africa as competition with China, avoiding direct competition in that context.
Furthermore, while Trump was not president, Russia expanded its presence in Africa, particularly through arms sales and the deployment of African Legion forces—previously the Wagner Group—while the Russian-Ukrainian war has already spread to Africa. Questions arise regarding the extent of support Trump would provide to African states in an effort to push back against Russia. Although the U.S. national security architecture views Russia as a threat, Trump has not acted as if he perceives Russia in that light, especially given his closer relationship with President Vladimir Putin.
- Protecting U.S. Interests in the Sahel and Horn of Africa: The instability in the Sahel, marked by escalating rebel violence and recurrent coups, has exposed a lack of strategic clarity in Washington’s policy due to the presence of other powers with conflicting visions and the increasing selectivity of African leaders in choosing partners.
Amid this context, if Trump’s administration decides to engage robustly in strategic competition with Beijing and Moscow, it may find itself more involved in conflicts and choosing between parties based on the benefits they provide in confronting its adversaries and competitors.
Moreover, its involvement in crises in the Horn of Africa—including the civil war in Sudan, the conflict in Ethiopia, and instability in Somalia, among others—will be shaped by its broader interests in the Middle East, dominated by a desire to establish normalization agreements with Israel.
Conclusion
Undoubtedly, the incoming Trump administration brings a much greater degree of uncertainty and unpredictability to African nations’ relationships with Washington. Yet, challenges and opportunities are equally abundant. It is up to policymakers in Washington and African capitals to maneuver strategically to ensure new arrangements for mutual benefit, without allowing Trump’s prior administration’s legacy to unduly influence future developments; as Trump’s return to the presidency may offer some opportunities, such as:
First, despite his derogatory remarks about African nations and threats to deport migrants, Trump’s ideology finds a positive resonance in Africa. With Trump’s return, Washington will cease to promote and pressure African governments to respect human rights, LGBTQ rights, and political, civil, and democratic rights, which are often rejected by governments as an interference in their internal affairs and a violation of their sovereignty, and instead focus on basic security, trade, investment, and economic partnership.
Second, the increasingly competitive nature of international relations and Africa’s growing ties with China, Russia, and other competitors is unlikely to be ignored. In a multipolar world characterized by multiple powers challenging U.S. dominance, African nations have the opportunity to seek diverse alliances, intelligently balancing between American, Chinese, and Russian influences in ways that benefit Africans.
Third, Trump prioritized investment over traditional aid models during his first term, arguing for prosperity through partnership. Continuing along the same lines could lead to cuts or suspensions of humanitarian and developmental aid provided to Africa, affecting health, education, and infrastructure projects reliant on assistance. However, this could spur Africans to look inward and help themselves, providing them opportunities for self-development. This might be precisely what the continent needs to stop its dependency on others and leverage its immense human and natural resources for its growth, taking initiatives like the African Continental Free Trade Area seriously.
References
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(2) Amandine Gnanguenon, “US Interests and African Agendas: Africa Policy After the 2024 Elections“, German Marchall Fund, September 27, 2024, (accessed January. 23, 2025). https://tinyurl.com/yj5skunr
(3) Ibid.
(4) Daniel Volman, “Africa Policy in Trump’s Second Term,” Foreign Policy In Focus, January. 13, 2024. (accessed January. 23, 2025). https://tinyurl.com/4cr84s2t
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(8) “Commerce, aide, sécurité : Que signifie la victoire de Trump pour l’Afrique ?”, Ibid.
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(10) “Commerce, aide, sécurité: Que signifie la victoire de Trump pour l’Afrique ?” , Ibid.
(11) “Donald Trump will put America first: what does that mean for Africa?” , Ibid.
(12) Ibid.
(13) Ken Opalo, “A Trumpian Policy for Africa,” Foreign Affairs, December. 04, 2024. (accessed January. 23, 2025) https://tinyurl.com/r7k9fynd
(14) R. Parens and C. P. Clarke, “How might Trump 2.0 approach Sub-Saharan Africa policy?,” Defense One, November. 26, 2024. (accessed January. 23, 2025) https://tinyurl.com/bdh6ktnm
(15) “US Interests and African Agendas: Africa Policy After the 2024 Elections“, Ibid.
(16) “Commerce, aide, sécurité: Que signifie la victoire de Trump pour l’Afrique ?”, Ibid.
(17) “US Interests and African Agendas: Africa Policy After the 2024 Elections“, Ibid.
(18) “How might Trump 2.0 approach Sub-Saharan Africa policy?”, Ibid.
