The debate over the role Mauritania might play in the escalating crisis in northern Mali has intensified. The actions of international powers involved in the situation, particularly Russia and France, have raised numerous questions regarding this potential role for Nouakchott, especially after Algeria’s influence in the Sahel region has waned due to rising tensions in its relations with France, Russia, and other Sahel countries.
This comes in the context of various initiatives undertaken by Mauritania in multiple directions. On November 21, 2024, Mauritania’s Defense Minister “Hanen Ould Sidi” held talks with the Russian ambassador in Mauritania, “Boris Zilko,” to enhance cooperation between Nouakchott and Moscow. This followed the Mauritanian government’s denial of any cooling in relations with Moscow, coinciding with Ukraine opening an embassy in Mauritania and denying any presence of Ukrainian forces on its territory as part of a “proxy war” strategy, the signs of which have reportedly begun to appear in Mali amid the communication channels being established by Russia and Ukraine with conflict parties there.
In this context, it seems that Mauritania is increasingly concerned about the escalating conflict in Mali, placing it under pressure from competing factions, which may lead it to seek an avenue to exit the cycle of conflict, similar to mediating a resolution to the crisis in northern Mali. Doing so could alleviate the pressure it faces from the ongoing crisis.
Supporting Factors
There are several factors that qualify Mauritania to act as a mediator in the Mali crisis, the most important of which are:
Failure of the Military Operations in Northern Mali: Observers point to the failure of the current approach by the Malian government, which relies on aerial strikes and support from the Wagner Group, to achieve a decisive victory. In late July 2024, armed groups killed up to 47 Malian soldiers and 84 Wagner mercenaries near the Algerian border, sparking a new round of fighting. After months of conflict, neither side has achieved a clear victory, and both the Malian armed forces and the Wagner Group have exhausted significant amounts of ammunition during their offensive operations, leading to the displacement and death of northern civilians, while failing to reduce the capabilities of the armed groups, which have retreated to more remote areas of the Sahara to preserve their scarce resources.
Mali’s Rejection of Algerian Mediation in the Crisis: Despite Algeria’s role as a mediator between the Malian government and the Tuareg in northern Mali in past years, it is no longer considered a welcome intermediary, especially after Bamako accused it of interfering in its affairs by organizing meetings with rebel leaders.
Nouakchott’s Maintained Balanced Role in the Sahel: Neighboring countries of Mali, particularly Burkina Faso and Niger, have been heavily occupied with internal security challenges, limiting their capacity to act as mediators. In contrast, Mauritania appears better equipped to engage in peace-building efforts, as it is relatively stable. Its historical neutrality in regional conflicts has positively affected its relations with regional and international powers, and it has the ability to open communication channels with all parties in the Mali conflict (armed groups, terrorist organizations, and government-allied forces), providing it with various opportunities to play this role.
Nouakchott’s Relations with Northern Mali Tribes: Mauritania’s balanced policy allows it to initiate contacts with parties in the northern Mali crisis, given the historical ties between its Bidhan (white Mauritanian) population and the Tuareg in Mali. Both ethnic groups have historically shared similar migration patterns, and their personal, religious, and commercial ties remain strong, with Mauritanian citizens maintaining relations with Northern Mali populations through traditional migration routes.
Expected International Support for Mauritania’s Mediation: Mauritania’s President “Mohamed Ould Ghazouani” enjoys substantial international backing, which could enable him to leverage Mauritania’s presidency of the African Union to form a contact group for northern Mali. Such a group could help coordinate, finance, and implement programs to support outcomes resulting from potential multilateral talks held at a later stage.
Potential Challenges
Despite the favorable conditions for Mauritania’s mediation, there are several potential challenges it may face, primarily including:
The Sharp Divergence of Interests among Mali’s Crisis Parties: The two main parties in the conflict (the Support Group for Islam and Muslims, and the Malian transitional government) have conflicting objectives. The Support Group aims to overthrow the government, while Bamako seeks to combat terrorism and assert control over its territory. Simultaneously, a coalition of non-terrorist armed groups opposing the government fights for greater regional autonomy and economic opportunities, which imposes limited maneuverability for any role Nouakchott may play in the near future.
Uncertainty of the Malian Government’s Stance on Nouakchott’s Mediation: None of the key parties have yet agreed to Mauritania’s mediation, leaving their position regarding Nouakchott’s mediation unclear. Bamako has gradually succeeded in expelling French, EU, and UN forces over the past few years, revealing its antagonism toward international stabilization efforts. The transitional government in Mali is likely to reject any overtures to engage with leaders of both terrorist and non-terrorist armed groups, making it difficult to convince the Malian transitional government to engage in multilateral talks that may not align with any movements Mauritania seeks to undertake.
Nouakchott’s Hesitation Regarding Intervention in the Malian Conflict: The relationship between Mauritania and the Malian government has been unstable, especially after the recent tensions following incursions by Malian forces and the Wagner Group into Mauritania’s borders. Mauritania is concerned that its mediation in Mali could escalate tensions in its relations with the Malian government, and Mali may view Mauritania’s relationships with Western countries with suspicion, considering it one of Russia’s key allies in the region.
Conditional Success
Overall, Mauritania’s success in acting as a mediator in the Mali crisis will primarily depend on Mali’s stance towards this mediation, as well as the actions taken by various international powers concerned with the developments in the region, such as Russia, not to mention Algeria’s position, which does not seem comfortable with the potential ramifications that Mauritania’s role may impose in the upcoming phase.
