Is Lebanon Heading Towards Stability?

With the election of Joseph Aoun as President of the Lebanese Republic on January 9, 2025, Lebanon ended nearly two years and two months of presidential vacancy following the term of President Michel Aoun. With this vacancy filled, the features of the new political landscape began to solidify—features that had started to take shape since the detonations of automated call devices, followed by the assassination of Hezbollah leaders and the targeting of its military capabilities. It can be said that these successive developments led to the relatively smooth election of the new president. The bigger surprise, however, came with the appointment of prominent Lebanese international judge Nawaf Salam to form the government. The controversy surrounding Salam’s appointment was even greater than that which accompanied Joseph Aoun’s election, as it was said that the Shiite duo (Hezbollah and Amal) were deceived. They had agreed to Aoun’s election in return for keeping Najib Mikati as Prime Minister, only to be surprised later by the appointment of Nawaf Salam.

All this points to a political scene that differs greatly from what it was just a few months ago. This article highlights the most prominent features of this shift and attempts to assess its implications for Lebanon’s future.

Suppressed Tensions

Despite the wave of solidarity with Hezbollah members and supporters who were primarily targeted by the detonations of automated call devices, Israeli shelling of the southern suburbs and towns of southern Lebanon led to a new problem: the displacement of people to Beirut and other cities not affected by the bombings. At the same time, issues began to emerge concerning the reception of Shiites in predominantly Christian areas. Signs of tension took on new and clear dimensions with the start of the presidential election and the appointment of a prime minister. Hezbollah viewed these developments as a deliberate attempt to exclude the Shiite community from the Lebanese political scene—treating efforts to correct the political imbalance caused by three decades of dominance by the Shiite duo as an attempt to eliminate any political role for Lebanese Shiites altogether.

This sentiment was echoed both in Hezbollah’s media rhetoric and in protest chants such as “Shia… Shia,” commonly heard in demonstrations by party supporters. These protests were also accompanied by acts of unrest and the blocking of major roads to assert Shiite presence in Lebanese streets.

This conflation of the party and movement with the broader Shiite population enables large-scale mobilization by making the average Shiite citizen feel personally targeted—that it’s not just political disagreement with a specific Shiite party, but sectarian persecution of the entire Shiite community. This, of course, is a major distortion.

Hezbollah’s political rhetoric exploited the intense media campaigns by Christian satellite channels against its leaders—especially its former Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah—to advance the narrative that it was Nasrallah’s absence that allowed such criticism of Lebanese Shiites, rather than just of the party. Meanwhile, the issue of rebuilding southern Lebanese towns and Beirut’s southern suburb was raised—a genuine issue that President Joseph Aoun addressed in his inaugural speech. However, addressing it requires funding, which is no easy task, especially given the sensitive issue of Hezbollah’s weapons. While UN Resolution 1701, which the party has committed to, includes this topic, its implementation remains extremely difficult and lacks the national mechanisms necessary for enforcement.

The Return of Saad Hariri

The assassination of former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri on February 14, 2005, created a leadership vacuum in the Sunni political arena. Hariri had not only been a seasoned politician with a charismatic presence, but also a wealthy businessman who had rebuilt downtown Beirut after the Lebanese Civil War. He also possessed a wide network of regional and international relations that brought Lebanon into one of its most prosperous modern eras, particularly during the 1990s up until his assassination.

His son, Saad Hariri, struggled to fill that vacuum despite cross-sectarian popular support. Among the obstacles were political differences within the Future Movement. Now, with Saad Hariri’s return on the 20th anniversary of his father’s assassination, and his announcement that the Future Movement will re-engage in political life—participating in this year’s municipal elections and next year’s parliamentary elections—questions arise about whether he can unify the Sunni community under his leadership. It’s worth noting that, following the Future Movement’s boycott of the 2022 parliamentary elections, Sunni parliamentary seats were distributed among several largely independent figures.

In addressing this question, it is important to highlight two key messages in Saad Hariri’s speech marking the 20th anniversary of his father’s death. First, he called on Hezbollah supporters to join the state project rather than be part of foreign axes—an implicit reference to the Iran-led resistance axis. Second, he emphasized the exclusive right of the state to bear arms, which sends a clear message.

It is also significant that Hariri’s return coincides with recent developments in neighboring Syria, including the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime—whom Saad blames for his father’s assassination—and the weakening of Hezbollah, whose members were convicted for the assassination.

In theory, then, the Lebanese environment seems conducive for Saad Hariri to play a major role in leading the Sunni community. But practically speaking, can he perform better than he did during his three previous terms as Prime Minister?

As for the leadership of the Future Movement—which initially served as a broad umbrella for several key Lebanese political forces—indications suggest that Bahia Hariri, Rafik Hariri’s sister, is well-positioned to assume leadership. She has several qualities that qualify her for this role and has previously navigated some of Lebanon’s most critical political crises post her brother’s assassination. But there is a difference between leading the party and preparing it for the upcoming elections—a likely scenario—and actually repositioning the Sunni community as a key player in Lebanese politics, which remains uncertain. Of course, parliamentary representation is one of the tools of political influence, but who can guarantee that the party will secure a majority of Sunni seats in the next parliament?

Increasing U.S. Presence

The United States has long had a strong presence in Lebanon, manifested in various ways—from the military landing in the 1950s and participation in multinational forces in the 1980s, to mediating the Lebanon-Israel maritime border demarcation and brokering ceasefire agreements in 2022 and 2024. The U.S. is also Lebanon’s primary source of weapons and economic aid. Thus, this is not a new phenomenon.

However, the decline of Iranian influence in the Middle East, including in Lebanon, has allowed the U.S. to further increase its clout there. This shift is exemplified by remarks from Morgan Ortagus, Deputy U.S. Envoy to the Middle East, who—from inside the presidential palace in Baabda—welcomed Hezbollah’s defeat by Israel and urged that the party not be included in Nawaf Salam’s cabinet.

These statements caused considerable embarrassment to the Lebanese president, prompting Aoun to clarify that Ortagus’s remarks reflected her personal views and not those of the presidency. Compare this to five years ago, when Hezbollah held sway over Lebanese politics: remarks made by then-U.S. Ambassador Dorothy Shea—criticizing government corruption and accusing Hezbollah of destabilizing Lebanon—led a local judge in Tyre to bar her from making public statements and banned Lebanese media from covering her. In Ortagus’s case, the only response was the president’s mild statement, and in practice, Hezbollah members were excluded from the new cabinet. This contrast highlights the shift in Lebanon’s political context between 2020 and 2025.

Other developments suggest that the U.S. is preparing for a broader role in Lebanon. For instance, the new U.S. embassy complex under construction in Akkar is the second-largest American embassy in the world, with approximately 5,000 employees—a huge number, especially considering Lebanon’s size (10,500 km²) and population (around 5 million). Notably, the largest U.S. embassy is in Iraq, another key battleground for Iranian influence, much like Lebanon.

Drivers of Instability

All the above elements can be described as ticking time bombs threatening Lebanon’s political stability. On one hand, we have a community—the Shiites—feeling deeply wronged, fearing a return to their pre-Musa al-Sadr days before he launched the Movement of the Deprived in southern Lebanon in the late 1970s. Such feelings of injustice often ignite unrest, regardless of whether they are grounded in reality.

It is also fair to say that some Christian political factions are trying to capitalize on Hezbollah’s military setbacks, particularly to diminish its political power, which further escalates tensions.

On the other hand, the Sunni bloc still lacks a strong political leadership capable of increasing the number of players on Lebanon’s political chessboard. This concentration of political actors exacerbates polarization. Add to that the growing U.S. and Israeli influence, which fuels internal friction and puts additional pressure on the Lebanese state to assert its sovereignty—especially if it wants to challenge Hezbollah’s armament.

And this is without even mentioning the uncertainty surrounding Lebanese-Syrian relations, in light of recent border skirmishes and mutual provocations. The latest incident involved accusations that Hezbollah kidnapped and killed Syrian security officers in mid-March—an allegation the party denied.

Lebanon has always managed to walk a tightrope, and we hope it retains this remarkable skill—even as the entire Middle East faces growing challenges, not just Lebanon.