Georgia is entering another chapter of instability and new “color revolutions,” with the West inciting opposition parties against the election results in which the ruling party, “Georgian Dream,” secured about 54% of the voters’ voices in the elections held on October 26. The party won 89 seats out of a total of 150 in parliament, while opposition coalitions, including “United for a Georgia Rescue,” “Alliance for Change,” and “Strong Georgia,” managed to obtain approximately 39% of the seats.
Before all the votes were counted in this election, conducted for the first time using “electronic voting,” Georgian opposition leaders claimed that the elections were “stolen” by the ruling party. They asserted that their polls indicated the ruling party would only garner 42%, while the opposition should receive 52% of the votes.
The opposition leaders did not stop there; calls for protests began, reminiscent of the 2003 scenario known as the “Rose Revolution.” Despite this, all indicators refute the claims of the pro-West opposition. Notably, the turnout for the elections was significant, with about 59% of registered voters participating— the highest turnout since 2012, as acknowledged by the opposition. For the first time in Georgia’s history, voting and counting were conducted electronically, making electoral fraud more difficult, as these electronic voting machines can be audited at any time. Clearly, the victory of the “Georgian Dream” party can be attributed to two main factors: first, the party’s good performance over the past 12 years, convincing the majority of the Georgian people that it is not in Georgia’s interest to be hostile to Russia or enter into a second war against the Kremlin; and second, the ruling party’s adoption of a national agenda focused on the need for “self-distancing” from the Russian-Ukrainian war while concentrating on a Georgian agenda that maintains peace and the social and political fabric of the country. Thus, the electoral programs of the “Georgian Dream” party portrayed the elections as a choice between peace and war, contrasting sharply with the opposition’s view, which many Georgians fear could drag them into the fires of the Russian-Ukrainian war. The electoral platforms of all opposition coalitions presented the elections as a singular choice between the West and Russia.
Prior to the recent elections, the United States and the European Union imposed sanctions on several officials of the ruling party, which refuses to engage in antagonism with Russia, especially after the Georgian government passed a law requiring human rights groups that receive over 20% of their funding from abroad to disclose the sources of these funds. This development sparked outrage in the West, particularly in the EU and the United States, which penalized the Georgian delegation participating in UN meetings in the third week of September by banning them from attending the group meeting of delegation heads with President Joe Biden. So, what are the prospects of the conflict between the opposition and the Georgian government? What cards could be manipulated to push Georgia into a scenario similar to the “Ukrainian scenario”? And what gains do Washington and its European allies seek from building a “wall of hostility” between Russia and Georgia?
The Prelude to Colorful Chaos
The United States leaves no opportunity to draw Georgia away from its regional and cultural context as a former Soviet state, where its people have special ties with the Russian people and state. Russia and Georgia share a border of about 1,000 km. Thus, Georgia was one of the first countries to experience “color revolutions,” notably when the so-called “Rose Revolution” erupted there in 2003. When these color revolutions failed, Washington pushed Tbilisi to clash with its neighbor Moscow, leading to the Georgian-Russian War in 2008. Georgia’s stated aim in that war was to reclaim the breakaway republics of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, which declared independence in 1991.
This year, the US administration, along with EU countries, is attempting to push Georgia once more toward the “Ukrainian scenario.” This is being done by inciting disputes regarding the relations between Russia and Georgia and questioning the results of the elections won by the government, while simultaneously supporting protests by the Georgian opposition against the currently ruling “Georgian Dream” party. The month of May witnessed unprecedented US and European support for protests against the “foreign influence law” or “agents law.” As a result, the “European Union” has stalled Georgia’s accession file to Brussels, and Washington imposed sanctions on dozens of Georgian officials for allegedly using violence against protesters. Washington and Brussels’ actions are based on a provision in the Georgian constitution, which they claim institutionalizes the request for membership in the EU and NATO.
The Ukrainian Scenario
Some believe that the US aims to ultimately replicate the “Ukrainian scenario” in Georgia, especially since Georgia was the epicenter of color revolutions in Eastern Europe when protests erupted in 2003 under the name “Rose Revolution” against the government of Edward Shevardnadze, who was the last Soviet Foreign Minister and later became the President of Georgia following the Soviet Union’s collapse on December 25, 1991. This was just two years before the “Orange Revolution” in Ukraine in 2005. Additionally, Georgia preceded Ukraine in its war with Russia when Tbilisi engaged in hostilities against Moscow under former President Dmitry Medvedev in 2008, suffering a decisive defeat that nearly led to the occupation of the Georgian capital, Tbilisi, within a few hours.
Today, there are calls to sever the relationship between Russia and Georgia, similar to the current conflict between Moscow and Kyiv, not just to alleviate pressure on Ukrainian forces but also to reclaim what is said to be “Georgian territories” in Abkhazia and South Ossetia.
Cycles of Discord
The United States has not halted its ambitions following the disintegration of the former Soviet Union; rather, it has an ambitious goal of creating a circle of hostility and conflict around Russia, as is currently evident in Ukraine. Attempts to drag Georgia and Russia into war have persisted throughout the last three decades and have taken several forms:
First: Abkhazia and South Ossetia
Western plans have never ceased to sow discord and disputes between Russia and its neighboring countries, beginning with the news of the fall of the Berlin Wall and the disintegration of the Soviet Union, which led to the outbreak of war between Georgia and South Ossetia in 1991 and 1992. Another war occurred between Georgia and Abkhazia in 1992 and 1993, resulting in the separation of both Abkhazia and South Ossetia from Georgia. Russia sent peacekeeping forces there to protect the lives of Russian-speaking individuals in these republics. In April 2008, then Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili—a pro-Western leader—sought to regain the breakaway regions of South Ossetia, which is 3,900 km² and home to around 100,000 inhabitants, and Abkhazia, which overlooks the Black Sea and comprises about 12% of Georgia’s total territory. However, the Russian response was strict when the Russian army crossed the Georgian-Russian border, leading to Mikheil Saakashvili’s five-day war failing miserably.
Second: Opening a Second Front against Russia
Georgia and Moldova are seen as key fronts on which the West bets against Russia. There is a desire to open a “second front” against Russia in tandem with Ukraine’s push for permission from the West to target Russian territory, as dubbed “Victory Plan” by Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky. This second front may force Moscow to yield to Western demands, not only in Ukraine but in Georgia as well.
Third: Capitalizing on the New Military Environment
The Georgian opposition’s plan is based on the notion that the world did not heed Georgia’s plight in 2003 and 2008. However, following the Russian-Ukrainian war, there are now 50 countries providing military support to Ukraine. At that time, US President George W. Bush was unable to impose sanctions on Russia due to this conflict, but presently appears to be a favorable moment for Georgia amidst Western mobilization against Russia. Should Georgia make any attempt to reclaim Abkhazia and South Ossetia now, its chances would be better—not only due to the damage inflicted on the Russian army from the Russian-Ukrainian war but also because the Western world would approach any war between Georgia and Russia with “full and unconditional support” for Georgia, in contrast to the American and international indifference during the 2008 war. Hence, now appears to be the right time, from their perspective, for Georgia to reclaim both the republics.
Fourth: Accumulated Military Experience
Since the first day of the Russian-Ukrainian war, Georgians opposed to Moscow have formed what is known as the “Georgian Legion,” within the foreign legion fighting alongside the Ukrainian army against Russia. It is said that this legion is prepared to transfer its military experiences and tactics gained from Ukraine to be applied in any war that breaks out in South Ossetia and Abkhazia against Russia.
Fifth: NATO and EU Promises
The West does not acknowledge the devastation wrought upon Ukraine as a result of challenging Russia and its military. Washington and Brussels continue to reiterate the same narrative, affirming to Georgia—just as they assured Ukraine—that the promise of Georgia’s entry into NATO in 2008 still stands, especially as some see NATO as now stronger than ever.
Sixth: Undermining Russian-Caucasian Relations
US and Western assessments suggest that any new war erupting between Russia and Georgia would benefit the West, as it would create a “significant rift” not only between Georgians and Russia but also among all Caucasian peoples and Moscow.
Russian Leverage
One of the strongest Russian assets is the inclination of the Georgian people, reflected in electoral outcomes, towards maintaining relations with Russia, rejecting any new political or military adventures against Moscow. Moreover, Russia has capitalized on building the military capabilities of South Ossetia and Abkhazia over more than three decades, resulting in highly trained and professional forces in these republics. The presence of Russian peacekeepers in Abkhazia and South Ossetia has also contributed to a precise situational assessment of operational conditions in the region, where Russia possesses military capabilities and multiple supply lines.
