The official position of Iran regarding the nuclear file and the feasibility of negotiations with Washington has sparked a debate within the country. While Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei rejected statements made by US President Donald Trump on March 8, 2025, in which he announced sending a message to Iran calling for negotiations on a new agreement, the Iranian mission to the United Nations affirmed the following day, through a tweet on its account on the “X” platform, that Iran does not rule out negotiations, especially if the goal is to address concerns about the existence of a military aspect to the Iranian nuclear program.
This was supported by statements made by Iranian President Masoud Bazeshkian on March 12, 2025, in response to Trump’s message, where he refused to negotiate under threat, saying to him, “Do whatever you want.” On the same day, Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi confirmed that Tehran had received Trump’s message, and the spokesperson for the Iranian Foreign Ministry, Ismail Baqaei, indicated the following day that the message was being studied and would be responded to after evaluating its aspects.
This may reflect an authentic aspect of Iranian foreign policy related to the multiplicity of positions within different institutions regarding the same issue, which allows decision-makers to test the intentions of the other party and keep the door open for adopting more than one option.
Internal factors:
The most prominent internal reaction parameters to official stances on the nuclear file crisis were evident in several aspects:
1- Frustration with inconsistent statements: The contradiction in the statements of Iranian officials regarding the nuclear file has caused discontent among supporters and opponents within Iran. While the regime believes that this situation highlights the lack of internal consensus on negotiations, which may limit the concessions Tehran can offer in any new agreement by citing opposition from certain sectors within the country, several political trends have emphasized that it may result in American skepticism about internal cohesion regarding negotiations, and thus intensify pressure on Iran through imposing more sanctions, citing the subsequent economic penalties imposed by Washington on Tehran.
2- Calls for a change in strategy: Building on the previous point, some activists and analysts have called for the necessity of reevaluating the Iranian strategy followed in managing the process of returning to negotiations with Washington. The Iranian political analyst Abbas Akhoundi expressed this in a statement to the “IRNA” news agency, emphasizing that what matters today is changing the strategy, not negotiations, saying, “We must acknowledge that over the past forty-six years, we have pursued policies in the country that have failed to achieve our goals.”
Akhoundi pointed out that regarding foreign policy developments, there are two important issues that need to be thoroughly studied: Trump’s personality and negotiations with the United States, considering that Trump is a politician with unpredictable behavior, which has cast a shadow over developments. He also emphasized that negotiations are an important issue for Iranian foreign policy, noting that regardless of Trump’s personality, Iranians must reach a common understanding of the new global direction that goes beyond the Trump phenomenon.
3- Calls to continue talks with Europe: Others have emphasized that regardless of what happens in the process of returning to negotiations with Washington, diplomatic channels must remain open with the European Troika countries through rounds of talks. In this context, Abbas Golroo, a member of the National Security and Foreign Policy Committee in the Iranian Parliament, stated in an interview with the “ILNA” news agency on March 2, 2025, that rejecting negotiations has never been on Tehran’s agenda, and that dialogue with European countries shows that doors are open.
Golroo stressed that rounds of talks between Iran and European countries could be one of the few indications of Tehran’s continued commitment to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), signed in 2015, despite Trump’s withdrawal from it after three years. This could limit the desire of the European Troika countries (Britain, France, and Germany) to implement the “snapback” mechanism – which means the automatic return of international sanctions that were imposed on Iran before the 2015 agreement was signed – especially with the approaching deadline in October 2025.
It is worth noting that Iranian officials have held more than one round of talks with officials from the European Troika in Geneva and Vienna in recent times, the latest of which was in mid-January 2025, to discuss the contentious files between the parties, primarily the nuclear file crisis, and that round was described as “good” by those parties.
4- Doubts about excessive reliance on Russia: Some analysts and activists have pointed out that Iran’s negotiation confusion may result in more Russian intervention in managing the relationship between Washington and Tehran regarding returning to the JCPOA or reaching a new agreement, which raises concerns in Tehran that the Russian-American agreement on the Ukrainian crisis may come at the expense of Tehran’s interests, especially after Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov announced that the Iranian nuclear program was one of the negotiation files with Washington in coordination with the Europeans.
This was confirmed by Heshmatollah Fallahpisheh, the former head of the National Security and Foreign Policy Committee in the Iranian Parliament, in a statement to the “Didban Iran” website on March 6, 2025, stating that the nuclear agreement was sacrificed for the war in Ukraine, and there are concerns that Iran may be sacrificed for peace in Ukraine, according to this perspective.
The moderate newspaper “Jomhouri Eslami” noted in its report on February 19, 2025, that Iranian diplomatic officials must be cautious of Putin making a deal with Trump at Iran’s expense, and the report called on Iranian officials to monitor Russia’s actions in how it interacts with the United States, emphasizing that the consequences of such vital interactions are not insignificant for Iran; therefore, the latter must seek solutions to avoid these repercussions before it is too late.
5- Calls for normalizing relations with Washington: Some analysts have emphasized that the apparent discrepancy in official stances on the nuclear file can be addressed by examining the root causes of the problems, including the necessity of normalizing relations with the United States. Mahmoud Sariolghalam, a professor of international relations at Shahid Beheshti University, stated in an interview with the “Jamaran” website, that no country can progress without normal relations with the United States, China, and Russia.
In this context, Sariolghalam emphasized that the new American administration is a golden opportunity to enhance Iran’s economic strength, saying, “Even if we reach a daily production of one million barrels of oil, we can only survive. To achieve development, we must produce no less than 4 to 5 million barrels of oil in the medium term. In the long term, Iran should avoid selling raw materials and become a major power in the field of artificial intelligence, which can be achieved through American and European investments.”
6- Calls to make the nuclear agreement the basis for negotiations: Some have suggested that to end the debate over the feasibility of returning to the JCPOA or accepting a new agreement, the former should be the main starting point for negotiations. In this context, Abbas Salimi Namini, a principled political activist, stated in an interview with the “Etemad” newspaper on March 13, 2025, that it is better for Iran to stick to the current nuclear agreement, as it has not abandoned it since Trump’s withdrawal in 2018, and has not received any compensation for the sanctions imposed on it since then, despite receiving European promises to do so.
Namini confirmed that if there are any issues regarding Iranian nuclear activities, they should be addressed within the framework of the JCPOA and provide the necessary guarantees for its implementation. This is supported by a statement from Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov that his country proposed during the talks between Moscow and Washington in Riyadh to work on the nuclear agreement that the Americans withdrew from during Trump’s first term, indicating that there are concerning indicators revealing that they want an agreement on the Iranian nuclear program under political conditions, including linking the new agreement to Iran’s commitment not to support armed groups loyal to it in the Middle East, noting that this option will not succeed.
Multiple implications:
The official stances on the nuclear file crisis reveal a set of implications that become evident in the following:
- Escalation of disagreement over the feasibility of negotiations: The discrepancy in statements by Iranian officials regarding negotiations with Washington about the nuclear program reflects the extent of polarization on the political scene in Iran between the principlists and reformists. While the principlists currently reject negotiations with Washington due to a lack of sufficient leverage, the reformist-leaning government of Bazeshkian aims to reach an agreement with Washington urgently, under which the economic sanctions imposed on Tehran would be lifted, supporting the improvement of the Iranian economy and giving the president more legitimacy to defend his government members against principlist efforts led by the “Paydari” front, or “Stability and Steadfastness,” to impeach them through the Parliament.
In this context, the principlist newspaper “Javan” emphasized in its report on March 6, 2025, that the reformists want to force the regime to negotiate with Washington because their narrative of the meeting between the American and Ukrainian presidents is incorrect. It noted that while politicians and almost all Western media outlets consider Trump’s behavior towards Zelensky as anti-negotiation, humiliating, and degrading, some political activists and media figures in the reformist camp claim, with a favorable narrative and a 180-degree reversal of this humiliating scene, that Zelensky is negotiating.
On the other hand, Iranian Vice President for Social Affairs Ali Rabiei emphasized in his article in the “Etemad” newspaper titled “Who Should Be Prosecuted?” the need to hold accountable those who insist on keeping the sanctions. Rabiei pointed out that over the past four years, social and economic classes have changed significantly, and many citizens have fallen into poverty, and the social situation is not better than the economic situation, given that all indicators suggest that hope for a better tomorrow has greatly diminished.
- The desire to offer the minimum concessions: The ambiguity surrounding Iran’s stance on negotiations with Washington comes in the context of the regime’s adherence to a “strategic patience” strategy and exporting internal disagreement and using it as an excuse to get out of the tight maneuvering margin and limited options to offer the least possible concessions.
On the other hand, this reflects Tehran’s understanding of Trump’s pragmatic mindset, which puts forward maximum demands not with the aim of insisting on achieving them, but to force the other party to accept Washington’s appropriate limits.
- Principlist efforts to weaken the Bazeshkian government: Iran’s stance confusion regarding negotiations with Washington coincides with the impeachment of Economy Minister Abdolnaser Hemmati and the resignation of Iranian Vice President for Strategic Affairs Mohammad Javad Zarif, reflecting the extent of pressure imposed on the Bazeshkian government by the hardline faction, which is not unrelated to its efforts regarding nuclear file negotiations.
In the same context, the Iranian president faced fierce criticism from reformists due to his statement, in which he opposed negotiations with Washington in support of the Supreme Leader’s stance, and they pointed out that it came after principlist pressure on Bazeshkian, but it may widen the gap that has become evident between the government and the people, given the president’s inability to fulfill any of the promises he made during his election campaign.
- The emergence of the problem of distrust in allies: Despite the official Iranian stance welcoming the mediation carried out by Russia between Washington and Tehran in the nuclear file, it seems that what is happening behind the scenes is very different from reality, as many warnings have been issued at the popular level emphasizing the necessity of not trusting Russia in this context. These circles also say that Russia has always exploited international files related to Iran to achieve its national interests, which comes at the expense of Tehran’s interests, as the latter realizes that it is not in Moscow’s interest to reach a nuclear agreement that would normalize Iran’s relations with the West, limiting its dependence on Russia.
This can be explained in the context of the negative stances Iran has faced in the past, the most prominent of which was evident when negotiations to revive the nuclear agreement were about to conclude at the end of the second term of former President Hassan Rouhani, Russia sent an official request to the United States, asking it not to include the sanctions resulting from the Ukrainian war in the trade and economic relations between Iran and Russia, which immediately faced opposition from Washington, which considered it an abuse of the negotiations by Russia, and ultimately prevented the return to the agreement, harming Tehran’s interests, according to this perspective.
- Fears of a military strike: The discrepancy regarding negotiations reflects the extent of internal fears of being subjected to an American-Israeli military strike if negotiations on the nuclear file are not expedited in response to Trump’s call, especially after the latter announced during an interview with the American channel “Fox News” on March 9, 2025, that there are two options for dealing with Iran, either a military solution or reaching an agreement.
It is worth noting that these pressures put Iran in a real dilemma, either agreeing to reach an agreement in which it offers many concessions related to American demands to dismantle the nuclear program and abandon support for proxies, or facing military attacks that would have direct repercussions on the regime’s legitimacy.
- The impact of sanctions on the economy and society: The inconsistency in Iran’s stance on the nuclear file comes within the framework of a general imbalance in society, amid the worsening economic crisis, and in parallel, the sanctions imposed on Iran for several decades have caused a type of disruption in the relationship between the state and society, as they have contributed to a decline in the economic sectors on which Iran’s national income depends, such as oil and petrochemicals. In the medium and long term, this has not only led to an increase in the poverty rate, which is estimated at 30% according to some official statistics, but also the spread of some social harms such as increased migration rates, especially of brains, violence, and theft, in addition to a decline in population growth below the global average due to reluctance to marry.
In conclusion, it can be said that the prevailing discrepancy in Iran’s stance on negotiations with the United States may seem deliberate on the part of the regime to a large extent, as it comes within the framework of the “strategic patience” strategy and procrastination that aims to influence the calculations of the opponent on the one hand, and give Tehran the opportunity to study the dimensions of the available options, allowing it to avoid offering many concessions and achieve a reasonable amount of gains on the other hand.
