The study of international relations is often dominated by Western paradigms and theories, which tend to focus on the evolution of the modern state system and the Westphalian order. However, the rich historical context of international relations within the Islamic world remains underexplored despite its profound impact on political thought and practice. Examining the evolution of diplomatic practices, alliances, and conflicts during the Islamic Golden Age, the Crusades, and subsequent Islamic empires reveals a nuanced perspective on how religious, cultural, and political factors intertwined to shape global interactions.

Islamic history is characterized by the emergence of powerful empires and caliphates that not only engaged in territorial expansion but also fostered diplomatic relations, trade networks, and ideological alliances. From the Rashidun Caliphate to the Ottoman Empire, Islamic political entities developed sophisticated methods of governance and international engagement that reflected both religious principles and pragmatic strategies.

This analysis aims to delve into how Islamic history can inform modern political analysis by highlighting the dynamics of power, diplomacy, and conflict resolution. By drawing on classical Islamic political philosophy, historical case studies, and the role of religious identity in statecraft, this work seeks to bridge the gap between Islamic historical perspectives and contemporary international relations theories.

Understanding these aspects not only enriches our comprehension of past conflicts and alliances but also offers valuable insights into modern political contexts where religion continues to play a pivotal role in shaping international dynamics. Through this lens, the legacy of Islamic international relations emerges as a critical component in the broader discourse of global political analysis.

Firstly: Islamic History and the Structure of the International System

The structure of the international system refers to the distribution of capabilities within this system and the arrangement of its constituent units relative to one another, allowing some of these powers to control the directions of other actors. A review of Islamic history shows that the Islamic side played a central role in the international system during the Umayyad and Abbasid eras, particularly during the early Abbasid period, the first and second centuries of the Mamluk state, and the Ottoman state. While Islamic history has witnessed the Islamic entity taking a central role at certain historical periods, it has also experienced the sidelining of this entity, particularly during the second and third Abbasid periods and the last century of Mamluk rule, as well as the 19th century of the Ottoman Empire, and the 20th century following the collapse of the Ottoman Caliphate.

Islamic entities have behaved as both center and periphery within the bipolarity defined by the Umayyad and Byzantine states, while they played a marginal role in the bipolar system that characterized the world following World War II until the Cold War’s end. These entities exhibited both central and marginal behaviors at different times within the multipolar system that emerged in the world from the Abbasid period until World War II. The focal point in this section of the concluding chapter is to analyze the distinctive patterns of the Islamic entity’s role as one of the centers of the international system within the framework of bipolarity and multipolarity.

It’s worth noting that it is difficult to say, given the information in the previous chapters, that the polarization system involving the Umayyad state and the multipolar system that the Abbasid, Mamluk, and Ottoman states experienced corresponds to the models proposed by Kaplan in his analysis of the structure of the international system.

A review of Islamic history clarifies that the nature of the Umayyad era and its dynamics is not identical to the flexible or rigid bipolarity model presented by this researcher, as it is challenging to assert the existence of two main blocs such as NATO and the Warsaw Pact, and the period lacked global actors like the United Nations. However, some principles established by Kaplan to describe bipolarity in its flexible and rigid forms apply to the central behavior of the international system under the Umayyad state.

Each side sought to eliminate its competing counterpart while striving to increase its capabilities against the other party. Yet, one must note the differences in the causes of enmity and the nature of movement during these two phases which possess religious ideological dimensions in the first and material ideological dimensions in the latter. It is challenging to assert that the multipolar system in which Islamic entities participated corresponds to Kaplan’s power balance system. Kaplan noted that, within regions of balance, there are five actors. However, a review of the multipolar system dominated by Islamic entities during the Abbasid era contained four actors, four under the Mamluks, and six during the Ottoman period. Some principles set out by Kaplan as typological behaviors of central units don’t apply to the behaviors of Islamic centers in the balancing system; the centers did not adhere to the principle of halting combat if it would lead to the demise of a major actor.

The principle of imposing restrictions or limits on entities advocating transnational organizations did not appear impactful in the periods when the Islamic entities were at the center of global leadership. However, certain rules proposed by Kaplan can hold significance in understanding interactions within the multipolar system involving Islamic entities, notably the principle that actors will oppose any alliance or actor threatening to achieve a hegemonic position in the international system. This will become apparent through our review of the patterns characterizing Islamic international interactions with non-Islamic entities during the period under study.

Regardless of how Kaplan’s models correspond to the Islamic experience, our focus here is to illustrate the implications of the Islamic experience under the differing structure of the international system concerning two tools emphasized in international relations literature as primary tools used by major powers in the international system to manage interactions with other principal powers: war and alliances.

The question now arises: what is the significance of the Islamic experience regarding the role of these tools in directing international interactions during various stages of the evolution of the Islamic central entity’s status and role in the international system, whether as a center of a bipolar system or a center of a multipolar system? Undoubtedly, this utilization of tools is one of the most debated and controversial areas regarding the degree of fundamentalism of Islamic practice in times of peace and war, and what the sharia rules for peace are compared to those for war.

The Islamic state as a center of the bipolar system — war and alliances as tools of power

The diplomatic dealings of the Umayyad state largely align with one of the standard behavioral rules illustrated by Kaplan in his presentation of polarization, specifically the pursuit by each pole to dominate the other in the system. Though the driving forces behind conflicts differed, the Umayyad state believed in the necessity of conveying the message of Islam throughout the world, signifying its effort to instigate a change in the structure of the international system, aiming for the dominance of a single pole represented by Islam. In this context, we should pose the following question: How did the Umayyad state utilize tools of war and alliances to achieve this goal, and what is the significance of such utilization?

The Umayyad experience indicates that the state’s use of combat as a jihad tool was inherently tied to the experiences of its founders. For instance, Muawiyah ibn Abi Sufyan’s experience, prominently in conflict with the Romans, significantly affected the strategy employed against them. Thus, the Umayyad state concluded that the best approach to external threats was offensive rather than defensive; its security, according to the state’s ethos, was defined through continuous expansion. Thus, reliance on fortifying borders to secure the state internally was not on the agenda of the Umayyads, but rather their approach to securing borders was through a continuous campaign of incorporating new territories, focusing on a policy of continuous conquests on land and sea.

The Umayyad expansion did not limit itself to the Byzantine front but expanded into additional fronts, penetrating deeply into Byzantine territory right up to the Bosporus and gradually reaching Western Europe, including the heart of France and the banks of the Loire. Their Islamic state stretched from the East in China to the West in Al-Andalus and South France, thus achieving borders that the Islamic state has not surpassed thereafter as a unified entity.

An examination of the Umayyad state’s patterns in employing alliances as a tool to guide its international interactions within the polarization system clarifies that the Umayyad state did not enter into alliances with adversarial states. This fact reflects the rules governing interactions within a polarization system, which does not permit alliances between the two poles, although they may conclude peace treaties. The alliances entered into by the Umayyad state were aimed at weakening the Byzantine state or facilitating Umayyad expansion in other regions.

The questions we pose at the end of outlining the general traits of Umayyad behavior as one pole of the system during this period regarding the implications of Umayyad conduct on the nature of this system and its interactions remains: Despite the Umayyad state’s failure to topple the Byzantine Empire, its major conquests led to incorporating substantial parts of that empire into its territory, significantly impacting the status of international actors in later periods. The Byzantine-Umayyad conflict transformed the Mediterranean from a trade artery into a battleground, halting trade and significantly influencing the power dynamics of both Islamic and non-Islamic forces. The Islamic state overcame the obstacles to trade from the East through the Arabian Gulf thanks to its successful control over the shores of the Gulf and all of West Asia, except Anatolia, thus avoiding economic repercussions from the Mediterranean’s role decline. In contrast, Europe experienced declining external trade interactions, contributing to a descent into feudalism and the dark ages.

The Islamic state as a center of the multipolar system: differences in utilizing war and peaceful relations

The Islamic state emerged as a central player in the multipolar system across three phases. The first Abbasid period observed a multipolar system where the main poles included the Abbasid state and the Byzantine state in the West. The establishment and assumption of power by the Mamluk state coincided with other centers: the kingdoms of Aragon, Castile, and subsequently Spain and Portugal, with the Ottoman state also taking a central role within a multipolar framework alongside Spain, Portugal, France, England, and the Netherlands, with later stages seeing Russia playing an important role in guiding international interactions. This section of the conclusion focuses on clarifying the general traits of Islamic states as centers of the multipolar system, especially concerning their utilization of war tools and alliances in interaction with other central powers.

If we review the general characteristics of employing the instrument of war to direct international interactions across these three periods, we will notice differences between the patterns of the Abbasid state in the first Abbasid era and that of the Mamluks, contrasted with the Umayyad state in Al-Andalus and the Ottoman Empire during its zenith in using this tool. In the former cases, reliance on this tool was a reaction to the movements of non-Islamic entities while simultaneously developing peaceful relations to bolster Islamic power; in contrast, it was primarily employed as a tool for conquest in the latter instances.

The first Abbasid era observed a shift from utilizing military expansion and open conquests as the basis for dealings with non-Islamic entities. The Abbasid state took steps that signified a retreat from combat as an expansion tool, reducing its priority as a means of managing external interactions. The state did not consider the elimination of major non-Islamic entities, notably the Byzantine state, as one of its primary objectives. It thereby adopted a policy of peaceful coexistence with these actors, and in the absence of conquests, combat was only utilized as an external engagement tool in cases of necessity represented by aggression, punishment, or deterrence.

The Abbasid disengagement from the offensive ideology as the best defense is evident in their focus on borders, where they regarded them as ends and divides separating the Islamic state from non-Islamic forces.

The Mamluks’ employment of war, however, primarily focused on countering expansion by non-Islamic powers. Their policy at the nascent stage of their state was characterized by tolerance towards the Crusaders in Syria in order to concentrate on facing the Mongols. Baybars’ efforts were limited to sporadic attacks and skirmishes, transitioning to organized campaigns separated by peace or truce, which were quickly followed by new military actions, as seen in the acts of erasing the last Crusader strongholds in Akka, Tyre, and Sidon by the end of the 13th century. Following the crusades, the Mamluk state shifted its focus back to peaceful interactions with the Christian world, employing military responses as reactions to peaceful movements with the Christian world as the latter, after the failure of economic blockades against Egypt, resorted to overt warfare against Egyptian and Levantine ports and ships.

The European understanding of this period emphasized the need to strike at the commerce interests of Egypt, which was the primary source of the Mamluk state’s strength after Egypt monopolized the secure, stable trade route far removed from Mongolian threats from the east and west. The Mamluks acted in the context of peaceful relations from a position of strength and maneuvering, not weakness and submission, which served to support their political and military interests in confronting enemies from both East and West.

These pacific moves by the Mamluks did not prevent them from engaging in clashes with the House of War, particularly evident in the 14th century with the invasions of Cyprus and Rhodes.

Utilizing the combat tool was linked to the perceptive understanding of al-Ashraf Barsbay regarding the value of trade for Egypt’s wealth as the center of Islamic power, thus he zealously supported it by all available political and military means, starting from bolstering influence in Yemen and Hijaz against the Crusaders to these military campaigns against Cyprus and Rhodes to secure trade against piracy, necessitating the elimination of remaining Crusader strongholds in the region, especially Cyprus and Rhodes, where their leaders were compelled to fight Muslims and defend all Christian powers against the perceived danger represented by them.

While the overriding characteristic of utilizing the combat tool responded to movements from the House of War, the Mamluk state additionally experienced the use of military tools in conquests, albeit limited in the Mamluk time. This was indicative of the Mamluk state’s actions during the reign of al-Nasir Muhammad, considered one of the greatest periods in Mamluk history, where his policies varied between conquest and defense, witnessed particularly in his multiple military campaigns against the Nubian Kingdom achieving the establishment of the first Muslim king over that land.

The inquiry now stands: why did both the Abbasid and Mamluk states tend towards such a pattern in employing military tools against the House of War? In this regard, it can be relied upon four clusters of factors related to the nature of the extension of the Islamic state during the two periods, internal factors, and the nature of rival threats faced by the Islamic side. In the first Abbasid era, the Umayyad state had reached its maximum geographical extent, with the Taurus Mountains serving as the natural border beyond which Muslims could not advance, while in front of the Byzantines in the east and the Beriberian Mountains forming a boundary to their expansion into Europe against the Franks in the West. The Mamluk state arose in the aftermath of the Crusades, during which they had to counter the Crusader expansion beyond Islamic territories, demonstrating that their approach in employing the military was guided by the realities of weakness, not opportunism, in a long-standing conflict against non-Islamic powers.

In summary, surrounding conditions impose jihad tools and determine their methodologies, demonstrating the Islamic experience that jihad, in the sense of combat for conquest and annexation, was not the only method during periods of strength and influence. Although Abbasids and Mamluks thrived in power and influence, they also mobilized to protect, spread, and support Islam through other peaceful, commercial, and cultural means.

This highlights the lack of credibility in the question concerning the nature of the relationship between Muslims and non-Muslims: was it combat or peace? Was fighting a tool of strength while peace was a tool of weakness in Muslim history? Consequently, the validity of the perspective that dismisses idealistic glances of limited visions of the evolution stages of Islamic history becomes evident, as a holistic vision offers the true interpretation of the Islamic experience and its growth — a growth and expansion not merely limited to great conquests but also encompassing ongoing cultural expansion beyond the era of major conquests.

On another front, we find a style of utilizing military tools for offense clear in the Umayyad behavior in Al-Andalus and the Ottoman behavior during their height. The Umayyad state in Al-Andalus adopted an active policy of opening and expansion against the international and non-Islamic entities present in this part of the world: the Holy Roman Empire and feudal lords of coastal European cities. Although the Umayyad state in Al-Andalus followed a policy similar to that of its pre-existing Umayyad state, the conquests initiated by the Umayyad state in Al-Andalus cannot be compared to the magnitude or continuity of the major conquests during the Umayyad Caliphate. The division of the Islamic world into rival powers weakened the capability of the Umayyad state in Al-Andalus, as it lacked the Islamic cooperation present in the East to achieve the successes realized when unified.

The Ottoman Empire, during its peak, showcased its use of military tools in conquests, as evidenced by Ottoman military campaigns in Europe, successfully capturing various non-Islamic territories. Thus, the Ottoman state fortified its northwestern borders and expanded its influence towards the heart of Europe, carving its position as a significant player in the Mediterranean basin. While the Ottomans initially refrained from taking direct steps to reinforce their influence in the Red Sea due to pressure from their war against Europe and the Safavids—only achieving nominal compliance from the Mamluks in Yemen—they were compelled to act based on the deteriorating circumstances during this period, focusing their broad strategy on consolidating control over these regions and eliminating Mamluk rule. The incursion of the Portuguese threat stood as a compelling factor behind the Ottoman annexation of Yemen to secure its southern borders and block the Portuguese from the Red Sea tides. Moreover, the Ottomans employed their military to combat the Portuguese in the Indian Ocean and the Arabian Gulf, striving to eliminate Portuguese maritime presence in those spaces.

With regard to the Islamic state’s utilization of alliances as a tool in international interactions under its influential positions in the international system, it strove, under the multipolar framework, consistently with Kaplan’s principles, to form coalitions that would prevent system poles from achieving dominance. It even employed these alliances to establish balances that would hinder the gains that one power may enjoy, even necessitating collaboration with non-Islamic players to limit the behavior of one central Islamic power in the international system.

In this context, the adversarial policies characterizing the relationship between the Abbasid state and the Umayyad state in Al-Andalus gave rise to composite alliances, as this period witnessed alliances formed between the Abbasid state and the Franks against the Umayyads in Al-Andalus. An illustrative instance of this military alliance occurred during the reign of Al-Mansur, where the interests of the Abbasid Caliph and the Frankish Emperor aligned to topple the Umayyad rule in Al-Andalus, with Muslims agreeing to surrender Frankish territories in return for a massive army advancing from the north, while the Abbasid army advanced from the south, effectively encircling Islamic Spain between Muslim and Christian pincers.

The central Islamic states’ reliance on alliances to achieve equilibrium in their interactions with major non-Islamic forces is also evident in the behavior of the Mamluk and Ottoman states. Under the Mamluk rule, leaders such as Qutuz, Baybars, and Qalawun effectively utilized a series of alliances with their two primary challengers: the Mongols and the Christian forces simultaneously. This was to minimize the negative effects of the first threat (Persian Mongols) and to eliminate the remaining Crusader presence.

Following the patterns of alliances that the Mamluk state formed, we find a pattern of Muslim-Mongol alliances in the face of a Crusader-Mongol coalition, Christian Byzantine or Frankish alliances against the same Mongol-Crusader coalition, and a Mamluk alliance with Venice aimed at bolstering the Mamluk navy in opposition to the Portuguese.

The Ottoman experience in employing alliances in its external interactions serves as a clear example of how to utilize this tool to achieve goals that necessitate a balance of power within the system. Here, we can distinguish between two patterns of employing these alliances: there are alliances between the Ottoman state and secondary powers in the system to confront a central force in the international system, as exemplified by the Ottomans’ alliance with a faction contending for the Hungarian throne against central European powers pursuing the same. The second pattern of alliances entered into by the Ottoman state was with a central power against another central force in the international system, highlighted by the Ottoman-French alliance against Emperor Charles V.

It’s worth noting, in the framework of analyzing the Ottoman state’s utilization of alliances, that the effectiveness of these partnerships depended on the strength of the Ottoman state, which is evident in three manifestations: the strength of the Ottoman state prompted European forces like France and England to ally with it against other centers in the international system, as these powers perceived the Ottoman state as the only military force capable of maintaining balance against Spain. The degree of strength exhibited by the Ottoman state also dictated its objectives for such alliances; while its aim during the state’s powerful phases was to facilitate Ottoman expansion, it later shifted to defending the very existence of the Ottoman presence in Europe as it began losing vital elements of strength. Lastly, the significance of the alliances the Ottoman state entered into concerning the balance in the international system varied with the evolution of the Ottoman state. While initially a player shaping European balances during its peak, it eventually became an entity subjected to these balances during its decline, managing to preserve its empire’s existence—despite its weakness during its last two centuries—through a complex game of alliances and counter-alliances with non-Islamic major powers, a strategical move that prolonged its existence rather than designated its power.

The question now is: what is the significance of the Umayyad, Abbasid, and Mamluk states in the context of war and alliances in their interactions within the multipolar system? The successful external approach of the Abbasid state in its early period enabled it to maintain its status as a leading power in the international system as the largest commercial entity in the ancient world; it succeeded in consolidating Islam in areas it engaged with, as long as the Abbasid state was powerful, imposing a non-peaceful coexistence policy from a position of strength. The Umayyads in Al-Andalus succeeded in establishing it as the largest political and military power on the Iberian Peninsula; though they were limited in capabilities due to the turmoil with the Caliphal center. The Mamluks, during their period of strength, succeeded in dismantling the Crusaders’ hold and mitigating the Mongol threat, thereby serving jihad objectives and defending Islam through strategies fitting someone playing a central role in the international system. The Ottoman state, through the utilization of war and alliances, expanded the Islamic opening across several regions of Europe, Asia, and Africa.

In conclusion, two final observations regarding behavioral patterns need to be noted alongside evaluations informed by the concepts of jihad and non-allegiance to non-Muslims.

On one hand, we see that some Islamic centers (the Abbasids, Mamluks, and Ottomans), despite their strength and central role in various stages, found that religious jihad was not merely reflected in the exclusive use of military tools as a sole method for managing external dealings, but utilizing other tools also proved fruitful in supporting Islamic power and disseminating Islam and establishing Islamic civilizational foundations, in addition to defending what already existed. This matter was dynamic and often related to periods of weakness, lack of unity among the other party, or at least not surpassing the Islamic power in strength. The state of Islamic strength did not impose a condition of continuous combat but revealed patterns for using economic commercial interactions to back and support Islamic strength, even while also highlighting how the power dynamics could affect this engagement – but under different circumstances, such as the weakening of the Islamic party and its fragmentation versus the strength and gathering of the Islamic party’s opposition sources of weakness.

On the other hand, Islamic alliances with non-Islamic elements against other non-Islamic powers had positive ramifications as long as the Islamic party was in a position of strength against a non-Islamic target. The reverse ramifications emerge when analyzing the reactions within the Islamic framework where Islamic alliances with non-Islamic groups against an Islamic input yield deleterious effects in total against the interests of the ummah.

Thus, while some Islamic entities from the Umayyad to the Ottoman period played a central role within the international system’s framework, the inquiry must now address the factors contributing to the flourishing and decline of these powers. Do these differ from those affecting the central powers discussed broadly in Arabic literature?

Secondly: Islamic History and Factors Affecting the Prosperity and Decline of International Powers: Between Ideological and Material Factors A review of Islamic history reveals that the rise and decline of major states is determined by several key factors: ideology, internal stability, military capabilities, position within the global economic structure, the nature of relationships within the Islamic sub-system, the strength or weakness of rivals, external intervention in Islamic parties’ internal affairs, and wars as turning points in state histories. These factors can be divided into four groups based on their impact on either the rise or decline of states: self-referential capabilities of the Islamic party, dynamics within the Islamic sub-system, capacities and behaviors of non-Islamic parties, and the interplay between the Islamic party’s actions and the capabilities of non-Islamic entities. While the first group of factors may contribute to the rise of the Islamic party in certain periods, they may lead to its decline in others; a review shows that the Islamic forces’ benefit from the second and third groups of factors was often limited and primarily led to the decline of Islamic powers.

Below is a presentation of these four groups within the context of Islamic experience and comparative analysis with Western perspectives. While the latter often focuses on material factors surrounding rises and falls, this analysis will illuminate the particularity of Islamic experience in terms of the role ideology has played at several levels: the level of state strength (first group), indicating its function and foreign policy underpinnings, meaning its relationship to jihad as a driver of Islamic policies; and secondly, the role of these ideological factors in framing inter-state relationships within the Islamic landscape and engagements with non-Islamic states (second and fourth groups).

However, the issue of foundational evaluation regarding the legitimacy of interaction patterns within these various groups persists without resolution. As previously noted in Chapter Two of Part One, carrying out such a task requires specific indicators that reflect the coherence or waning influence of ideological factors in these interactions (such as religious decrees concerning jihad against non-believers or waging war against a fellow Muslim, or decrees regarding the behavior of authority amid domestic dissent). Models of such decrees exist throughout history at various junctures, with the aim of this part of the project being to assist in understanding and determining the primary turning points therein, as this subject requires distinct methodologies which might fall beyond the potential scope and aims of this project. Nonetheless, the efforts made towards establishing rules for external relations, whether at peace or war (part of foundational work), alongside historical analyses and their results provide a basic foundation for researchers interested in evaluating real historical contexts within theoretical normative frameworks of Islamic perspective. Moreover, it is significant to extend these reflections towards present realities and their complex interactions.

Factors Related to the Islamic Party’s Self-Capabilities This group includes three factors: ideology, internal stability, and military capabilities.

A) Ideological Factor This factor exerts influence on several levels: the level of belief, enthusiasm, and cohesion among the populace representing the state’s strength, alongside mobilization and motivation factors; the level of defining the state’s role and driving its policies; the level of internal harmony grounded in values of justice, equality, and freedom.

A review of history demonstrates that the principle of jihad served as the foundational tenet guiding the policies and organizations of Islamic centers. Jihad and the defense of Islam incited both individual and community initiative and provided the main determinants for the function of the state while driving its Islamic policies. Thus, these states succeeded in preserving and spreading Islam during periods of prosperity and strength. However, the abandonment of ideology as a principal driving force steering state behavior, reflected in the skepticism of leadership and military, shifted the primary motive for external mobilization towards the pursuit of material gains resulting from territorial expansion, manifested in internal conflicts over power. This condition significantly contributed to the decline of the Umayyad, Abbasid, Mamluk, and Ottoman states. Moreover, the ascendency of secular and nationalist tendencies remained fundamental causes behind the collapse of the Ottoman Empire in the early twentieth century, as there was no longer any common bond uniting leadership and the public towards shared external objectives, prompting personal interests, characterized by material dimensions, to overshadow priorities and contradict strategies guiding Islamic state engagement.

Consequently, it can be concluded that the levels of impact of ideological factors in both phases of strength and weakness do not separate from the linked material factors; thus, in declining ideological influence, material regress occurred. This decline did not only restrict self-capacities of the state (military power, economic strength, and internal cohesion) but also extended to relationships among Islamic powers and their relations with others, necessitating that ideological influences, in strength or decay, shape not just power relations at the Islamic sub-system level but also relations with non-Islamic counterparts.

B) Internal Front: Defeat from Within Before Outside The stability of the internal front is a critical factor determining the Islamic party’s strength in interactions with non-Islamic powers. While the cohesion of the internal front of the Islamic state represented strength in some historical periods, a review illustrates that major Islamic states often became embroiled in internal strife during critical periods in their international dealings. These conflicts profoundly affected their capability to interact effectively with other international actors and address threats posed by the international environment, significantly weakening their ability to tackle these dangers.

For instance, the decline of the Umayyad state was closely linked to its internal challenges; policies adopted by certain Umayyad caliphs (such as regional or ethnic biases) bred substantial feelings of resentment among citizens towards the regime, ultimately resulting in internal strife that led to the fragmentation of state cohesion just as their conquests peaked. Consequently, the authority became preoccupied with internal issues, neglecting external challenges.

This internal strife not only weakened the Islamic centers’ roles as principal powers in the international system but also affected those secondary Islamic parties that arose alongside these dominant centers. The repercussions of discontent during Yazid ibn Muawiya’s rule remain highly relevant; the civil unrest lasting twelve years interrupted conquests across all fronts, particularly against Byzantine territories due to the Umayyad leadership being embroiled in internal struggles to consolidate power, leading them from an offensive to a defensive posture.

The partitioning of religious and political divisions within the Fatimid state ultimately caused its fragmentation. In the Maghreb, its influence started to wane at the hands of the Zubari who rebelled against it in pursuit of independence, initiating a round of local conflicts that spread chaos while neglecting the danger encroaching from the north posed by the Normans, with Italian influence extending to the cities of Pisa and Genoa.

C) Military Capabilities The nature of these military capacities significantly influenced the rise and decline of major Islamic states. On one hand, military strength constitutes one of the crucial factors facilitating the emergence of major Islamic states within the structure of the international system. The military capability of these Islamic states was tied to the loyalty of its forces to the caliph and its ability to build terrestrial and naval forces to counter threats posed by opponents, bolstering military strength in regions serving as either launching points for conquests or frontiers.

For example, having a loyal and powerful military was significant in Muawiyah ibn Abi Sufyan’s victory over the Byzantine forces, as he ensured the primary composition of this army remained loyal to him. The early Abbasid caliphs also prioritized military allegiance in their forces.

In Al-Andalus, Muslims adopted a dynamic military structure to reconcile conflicts arising from ethnic identities between Arabs and Berbers and between Qaysis and Yemenis. Also, the Islamic experience emphasizes investing in and training both land and naval forces to concurrently fortify military assets in places representing key jumping-off points for expansion or defensive fronts.

Additionally, the Umayyad state under Muawiyah emphasized developing a robust naval power given that the pivotal international actor it contended with—the Byzantine state—relied heavily on naval strength for its military clout.

As military capabilities historically flourished, the decline of states evidenced through their failure to adapt to modern military developments became apparent with the Mamluks, who, despite possessing a distinguished martial quality in land warfare, remained significantly weaker at sea, inhibited by resource shortages necessary for fleet construction such as wood and metal, which they had to import for preparatory military activities or direct confrontation with the Portuguese.

This illuminates the critical importance of a balanced military approach; simply relying on a robust land force inadequate in the face of monumental naval challenges during times of maritime threats.

Officially, the Ottoman experience delineates a new strategy through which military strength propelled the state’s prosperity, with the Ottomans implementing a Janissary system, whereby children were enslaved from Christian lands and raised in military and Islamic institutions. Some historians view this army structure as the first permanent military force in history, ensuring that the Ottoman unit remained cohesive and loyal solely to the Sultan, their sole parent being the state. This army’s growth turned it into a vital factor in extending Ottoman authority and influence, even though it later contributed to the state’s decline amid its weakening position against Europe in subsequent centuries due to neglecting vestiges of modern warfare and military organization in the face of burgeoning European powers.

A review of the patterns highlighted by military capabilities contributing to the decline of great states illustrates five themes: addressing ethnic diversity within the military, the soldiers’ attitudes toward warfare, the role of the state in providing armies, the navy’s significance in external confrontations, and the obsolescence of military equipment.

For instance, the Abbasid state witnessed a shift in army composition as increased reliance on foreign Khurasanian soldiers replaced local Syrian and Iraqi troops, lifted the Persian element to a pivotal role in the Abbasid army, leading to pronounced ethnic rivalries within the military that negatively impacted the state’s strength and coherence.

The soldiers’ stances towards warfare proved detrimental to military unity; for instance, during the Umayyad period, the preoccupation of troops with material gains led to defeats, such as the Battle of the Great Martyrs—a historical fallout with profound implications for the Islamic party’s future in international interactions.

Such patterns reveal detrimental consequences of ideological retreat not only in military engagement but also in policies and economics.

The decline in the state’s role in military provisioning is the third pattern in reviewing the historical Islamic experience concerning military efficacy. Instances during the Abbasid state reflect a downward shift in the central authority’s engagement with military assembly; the regional governors of frontiers began to seize this responsibility.

The notable absence of a regular army influenced their initiative and deterrence capacity, inviting external aggressors to exploit vulnerabilities due to the declining central role.

Additionally, the lack of a robust naval presence directly undermined the advantages Islamic states had in fortifying their territorial interests; the Umayyad navy, exemplified during the second siege of Constantinople, faced a critical setback, leading to a perceptible decline in the Umayyad’s offense policy for expansion. Although an active naval force was fortified prior to their attempts to besiege Constantinople, the loss of their fleet represented pivotal barriers in counteracting the Byzantine dominance, shifting their perception of conquest policies.

Similarly, the Mamluks faced vulnerabilities at sea, ensnared between two maritime powers—Portuguese to the South and Ottomans to the North—ultimately contributing to their own downfall.

To conclude, the Islamic historical experience denotes that military strength can result in states’ decline if the state fails to adapt to modern military advancements against rivals poised with increasing capabilities—evidenced through the Mamluke and Ottoman histories, where reliance on traditional cavalry and swords fell short against contemporary military organizing principles adopted by both European powers and Ottomans during the zenith of their power.

2) Factors Relating to Interactions within the Islamic Sub-system Muawiyah ibn Abi Sufyan successfully united the Islamic ummah, establishing a powerful state that marked a crucial juncture in international relations, defined by its bifurcation between the Umayyad and Byzantine Empires. The hallmark of the Umayyad period was the singular Islamic actor –the Umayyad state– amidst a lack of Islamic sub-systems that initiated interactive relations with non-Islamic powers. However, the Abbasid era immediately witnessed the emergence, detachment, and independence of several echelons, specifically with the arrival of the Islamic state in the Maghreb, followed by independent entities arising in the East with the infant state of Al-Zahir, alongside several Islamic powers indicating short-lived or de-facto independence from the Umayyad’s established influence.

In tracking the interactions amongst Islamic entities from the Umayyad to the Ottoman Renaissance, it is apparent that four key results arise:

  • Collaborative interactions between Islamic parties often yielded beneficial outcomes, bolstering their positions against non-Islamic actors, thereby contributing to the consolidation of central Islamic strength at play. For instance, the establishment of the Tahirid state during the early Abbasid era benefited from their amicable relations with the Abbasid state, yielding no notable threats to the Abbasid had the latter been preoccupied with settling conflicts. Consequently, the stabilization of the eastern precinct simmered, reinforcing the Abassids’ authority.

The Mamluk alliance with the Muslim Mongols further exemplifies this, as the Golden Horde believed its safety tapered upon enlisting assistance from Egypt, instrumental to Mamluk policy vis-a-vis balance against the Franks’ alliance with Persian Mongols. The palpable intersection between Berka Khan and Qutuz and later Baibars, signified their mutual interests extending into spheres of tropes aimed at nullifying Europe’s repeated crusading endeavors.

  • Conversely, Islamic entities occasionally faltered in providing support to fellow Islamic states, thereby inhibiting the effectiveness of Islamic powers within the international arena, instead enabling non-Islamic contingencies to exploit this distrust for significant gains at the expense of Islamic parties’ objectives.

This absence of support stemmed from diverse factors; including internal schisms within the Caliphate, rivalries between Islamic factions, and relations with non-Islamic entities, compounded by the limitations of Islamic military capacity. The Hamdanids proved incapable of sustaining their positions against Byzantine resilience without the backing of their centered power during segments of their deterioration under the Buwayhid’s yoke, demonstrating that factions often needed an integrated front for stability.

  • The disputes between Islamic factions manifested in two primary patterns: forming alliances with non-Islamic forces against a segment perceived as rival or outright military confrontations among these Islamic factions. Notables included the Ottoman-British Coalition deployed against Muhammad Ali of Egypt, resulting in overarching implications of Islamic inter-factional tussles culminating in the fall of ascendant Islamic forces, ultimately at the center’s expense.
  • The persistent conflicts between Islamic powers continuously compromised the Islamic presence in directing international interactions at set intervals, leading to gradual marginal retreats from power over time.

The latter aspect reveals unmistakable patterns of conflict between Islamic factions. Historical records illustrate that while the Abbasid caliphate was cognizant of the beneficial role played by the Tulunids against the Byzantine threat, the ruling body successively sought their eradication—a methodology that ultimately culminated in the military successes of Abbasid campaigns.

Enemies endured escalating tensions across the 15th and 16th centuries engendering wars between the Ottomans and Mamluks and substantial military engagements with the Safavids as these states vied for preeminence in the Islamic domain.

In succinct terms, the collective efforts leading to intra-Islamic conflict inherently contributed to diminishment in the last remaining significant powers commanding respect within the international system, further leading to profound fragmentation and erosion of the last vestigial forms of a political Islamic unity.

Long after the systemic pivotal roles shifted among Islamic entities navigating through earlier conflicts to presently emerge into a state of pervasive fragmentation and disunity, Islamic civilizations continued to exhibit resilience, persistence, and nuanced endeavors for revival and renewal throughout epochs, notwithstanding external pressures towards dominance.

All in all, even as the dominant Islamic entities transitioned from the Umayyad through the Ottoman durations marked within notable international frameworks, assessing contributing elements to their rise and decline holds discourse on shared factors alike in contrast with alternate central powers navigating systemic paradigms in both historic and contemporary contexts.

References

  • Islam in International Relations: Politics and Paradigms, Editors: Nassef Manabilang Adiong, Raffaele Mauriello, Deina Abdelkader.
  • Islam and International Relations: Contributions to Theory and Practice, Editors: Nassef Manabilang Adiong, Deina Abdelkader, Raffaele Mauriello.
  • International Relations in Islamic History: A Comparative Civilization Perspective, Author: Nadia Mahmoud Mustafa.
  • Towards an Islamic Theory of International Relations: New Directions for Methodology and Thought, Author: AbdulHamid AbuSulayman.
  • nternational Relations and Islam: Diverse Perspectives, Editor: Nassef Manabilang Adiong.
  • Islam and International Relations, Author: Mustapha Kamal Pasha.
  • Islamic Society and International Relations, Author: Muhammad Al-Sadiq Afifi.
  • International Relations in Islamic Jurisprudence, Author: Aref Khalil Abu Awwad.
  • Islam and International Relations in Peace and War, Author: Mahmoud Shaltout.
  • Islamic Organization of International Relations, Author: Muhammad Nasr Muhammad.
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