In analyzing the phenomenon of international competition, American estimates, including a report from the “Council on Foreign Relations” issued in December 2024 titled “No Limits? The China-Russia Relationship and U.S. Foreign Policy,” indicate that the United States will not be able to confront Chinese and Russian influence everywhere and in every issue indefinitely, and it should not attempt to do so. Instead, it must selectively engage in the most important areas and issues.
To achieve this goal, the report suggests that the United States should take several steps, including enhancing “global swing states.” In the competition between Washington, Beijing, and Moscow, there are six “swing states” of particular importance: Brazil, India, Indonesia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, and Turkey. According to the report, they are all “middle powers” with sufficient collective geopolitical weight to support their political preferences and influence the future direction of the international system. Therefore, Washington should prioritize preventing Moscow and Beijing from gaining advantages in these countries and encouraging their governments to choose policies that benefit the existing international system. In practical terms, this means using trade incentives, military participation, foreign aid, and diplomacy to prevent “swing states” from hosting Chinese or Russian military bases, granting access to technological infrastructure or military equipment, or assisting them in evading Western sanctions.
Indonesia’s Surprise and “BRICS”:
Looking at the six “swing states,” we find that three of them (Brazil, India, and South Africa) are founding members of the “BRICS” group, along with Russia and China, while Saudi Arabia was invited to join the group starting from January 2024, although its stance remains ambiguous and participated in the last “BRICS” summit in Kazan, Russia, in October of last year, led by Foreign Minister Prince Faisal bin Farhan. As for Turkey, it has expressed its desire to join the group as one of the 13 countries with the status of “partner.”
On January 6, 2025, the Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the president of the “BRICS” group during the year 2025, issued a statement indicating that Indonesia has officially joined the group as a full member, and that the largest country in Southeast Asia in terms of population “shares with other members the desire to reform global governance institutions and contribute positively to cooperation within the Global South.”
On its part, the Indonesian Ministry of Foreign Affairs welcomed the announcement in a statement on January 7 of last year, describing its joining “BRICS” as cooperation among countries of the Global South, and that group membership is a strategic means to enhance cooperation and partnership with other developing countries. At the beginning of Brazil’s official assumption of the presidency of “BRICS” from Russia, it affirmed that cooperation among countries of the Global South and reform of multilateral institutions would be at the top of the Brazilian presidency’s priorities for the group, alongside the development of payment methods to facilitate trade exchanges among member countries. In light of these statements, U.S. President Donald Trump threatened to impose a 100% tariff if a new currency were created for “BRICS” countries to replace the U.S. dollar.
The announcement by Brazil of Indonesia’s official joining of the “BRICS” group came as somewhat of a surprise; as official representatives of several founding member countries, including Russia, made statements indicating that at this stage, and after the announcement of inviting five countries to join the group starting from January 2024 (the United Arab Emirates, Egypt, Iran, Ethiopia, and Saudi Arabia), in addition to Argentina, which officially apologized for not joining later, it was decided to take a break from further expansion.
Turning Towards China:
After his official inauguration on October 20, 2024, Indonesian President Prabowo Subianto quickly engaged in an active international agenda, starting with a visit to China from November 8 to 10, 2024, during which the countries signed a series of agreements worth approximately $10 billion, focusing on sectors such as infrastructure, agriculture, the green economy, and technology. According to Western analyses, the visit reflected Subianto’s determination to maintain strong relations with Beijing to support the economic goals of his domestic agenda. In this context, China affirmed its support for Subianto’s initiative to provide free meals to the poorest residents of Indonesia, a cornerstone of his social care program. Western analysts noted the joint agreement reached by the countries during the visit on development in areas with overlapping claims in the South China Sea near the Natuna Islands, where China’s “Nine-Dash Line” overlaps with Indonesia’s exclusive economic zone. This agreement was considered a “striking shift” that legitimizes China’s regional claims in the South China Sea and even strengthens them, potentially undermining Indonesian sovereignty.
This issue received further attention in light of the joint statement signed by Subianto and former U.S. President Joe Biden during his visit to the White House, a few days after the former’s visit to Beijing. In this statement, the presidents emphasized the importance of freedom of navigation and respect for the legal jurisdictions of coastal states in accordance with relevant international law provisions.
This shift in Indonesia’s stance towards China, which was viewed by Americans as a stark contradiction in tone between the two visits, left many observers puzzled; prompting Subianto to reaffirm his commitment to protecting Indonesia’s sovereignty. In this context, it is worth noting that “maritime boundaries” represent one of the most important priorities of Indonesia’s foreign policy, and the primary reference for the Indonesian negotiator in this matter is “peaceful settlement” and adherence to rules and principles of international law, particularly the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 1982. Indonesia is still engaged in negotiations on maritime boundary disputes with several of its neighbors (Vietnam, Malaysia, East Timor, the Philippines, Singapore, and China).
Indonesia’s shift towards China can be justified by several considerations primarily related to Trump’s second term, the most prominent of which are as follows:
1- Serious doubts from the Trump administration about alliances and favoring unilateralism over traditional alliances, which may witness a withdrawal from the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF) launched by Biden to enhance industrial relations with regional partners, just as Trump withdrew from Obama’s Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP).
It is noted here that the member countries of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum, which includes Indonesia, have not hidden their increasing concerns about the potential impact of Trump’s presidency on global trade; this was clearly reflected in the joint statement issued from the APEC summit on November 16 of last year in Lima, the capital of Peru, which included 36 points on enhancing cooperation and trade among member countries.
China played a central role in this summit, according to Western estimates, as President Xi Jinping took the initiative in multilateral discussions and engaged in numerous bilateral meetings, including a meeting with Biden. The discussions also included the ten countries of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), at the heart of which is Indonesia, which is preparing to play a pivotal role in global trade flows during the coming decade, with a significant part of its growth rates centered around the ASEAN bloc. International economic estimates indicate that Southeast Asia is expected to greatly benefit from the contraction of trade between the United States and China, driven by ongoing industrial technological competition. The region will also benefit from diversification efforts and risk mitigation undertaken by major international companies that continue to move their production out of China.
2- U.S. budget cuts for the U.S. Agency for International Development, which have already led to the reduction of many development programs in Southeast Asia, including Indonesia.
3- Uncertainty about the future of trade relations with the United States due to the return of Trump’s protectionist policies, including potential tariffs on ASEAN exports, especially the trading powers within it like Indonesia, Vietnam, and Malaysia.
Mutual Benefits:
There is a question about what Indonesia can offer to the “BRICS” group and vice versa? In this context, it can be said that there are mutual benefits for both parties, as follows:
1- Gains for “BRICS”: Indonesia’s joining as a full member of “BRICS” provides several benefits to the group, including the following:
A- The large market: Indonesia is the fourth most populous country in the world, which provides a large market for products and services. The Indonesian economy is among the top ten economies globally in terms of purchasing power (seventh in 2024), and is the driving force for ASEAN economies.
B- Natural resources: Indonesia possesses vast natural resources such as oil, gas, and minerals.
C- Economic cooperation: Indonesia can contribute to enhancing economic cooperation among “BRICS” member countries. It is a member of the G20, and its joining means an increase in the number of G20 member countries in “BRICS” to six, in addition to membership in the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA) and the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP).
2- Benefits for Indonesia: “BRICS” can offer Indonesia the following:
A- Economic Cooperation: The group provides Indonesia with significant opportunities in this regard, especially as the digital innovation sector is rapidly developing in the country. Estimates indicate that it will contribute approximately 133 billion USD by 2025. Indonesia is the largest e-commerce market in the ASEAN region, with total sales projected to approach 133 billion USD by 2025. Additionally, it is the largest e-commerce market in the ASEAN region, with total sales nearing 28 billion USD.
Furthermore, Indonesia has made remarkable strides in the creative economy, which relies on utilizing goods and services that employ creativity and intellectual capital as primary inputs to achieve economic development. This includes sectors such as heritage, arts, crafts, festivals, celebrations, archaeological sites, museums, and exhibitions.
To support this vision, Indonesia established a specialized agency for the creative economy more than a decade ago, specifically in January 2015, with the responsibility of developing, formulating, identifying, and coordinating policies. The goal is to position Indonesia as one of the global economic powers in the creative economy by 2030.
There is no doubt that countries joining or partnering with BRICS can greatly benefit from Indonesia’s experience in this regard.
B- Political support: Indonesia’s joining the group represents a strategic orientation towards non-alignment with any particular major power, and support for the Indonesian vision of structural changes in the international system, which is gradually transitioning from a unipolar system led by the United States to a multipolar system. Like the vast majority of Global South countries, Indonesia hedges its positions, seeking cooperation with major powers in the East and West, but without American dominance over the world. This hedging is imposed upon itself with Trump’s entry into the White House with his isolationist agenda. In this context, the Kazan Declaration issued from the sixteenth “BRICS” summit stated that Western sanctions are a “threat to the global economy, a violation of the UN Charter, and a type of unilateral measures that violate international law and harm the right of peoples and countries to comprehensive development.”
In light of this, the West views the expansion of “BRICS” as a deliberate reassessment of global power relations, and that this development, as expressed in the “Kazan Declaration,” is a challenge to the dominance of Western financial institutions and the expansion of multilateral economic partnerships, especially against the backdrop of trade tensions between the United States and China.
It is natural for China and Russia, the two largest powers in “BRICS,” to seek to deepen their economic and strategic relations within the group’s framework, using the bloc’s expansion as a strategic countermeasure to Western dominance and providing an alternative economic model for countries seeking a degree of strategic independence. There is no doubt that Trump’s stance on the potential currency initiative for “BRICS,” despite its unlikelihood in the near future, reflects broader concerns about China’s growing influence within the group.
A Swinging Approach:
Indonesia follows a multi-directional swinging approach in its foreign policy, similar to India, through a form of active non-alignment. This was clearly embodied in Jakarta’s step to join the “BRICS” group while proceeding with its plans to join the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, allowing it to diversify its strategic partnerships and reduce its dependence on any particular major power.
Amidst the current geopolitical turmoil, Indonesia and other ASEAN countries have no intention of choosing any side, as they wish to remain an open door to the global economy. While Indonesia reorients its strategic positioning, it recognizes that the United States remains the decisive actor in regional security, providing military support and security and defense cooperation. From an economic perspective, the United States remains a major investor and market for ASEAN countries; balancing their strong trade relations with China, whose influence in the region is unlikely to wane, contrary to what the Americans seek. With Trump’s return, Indonesia and other ASEAN countries realize that aligning with Washington may become increasingly costly and difficult. Moreover, Washington’s commitment to long-term regional stability is now in doubt.
