India’s Stance on the Al-Aqsa Flood and the Israeli Aggression on Gaza
Introduction:
Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, Indian politicians believed that the best way to strengthen ties with the United States was through Israel. As a result, India quickly established diplomatic relations with Israel, and the relationship between the two countries developed in all fields, particularly in security and military areas. This shift essentially relegated the Palestinian cause to a marginal issue on India’s list of concerns. However, this relationship has shown aspects that drew considerable attention in the Arab world with the onset of the “Al-Aqsa Flood” operation, which this paper will attempt to shed some light on.
1. Features of India’s Stance on the Al-Aqsa Flood:
From the early hours of the Al-Aqsa Flood on October 7, 2023, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi tweeted, condemning the Palestinian side harshly and aligning with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s rhetoric, without even consulting the Ministry of External Affairs, as was later revealed. The ministry issued a less severe statement the following day. This was followed by a series of actions consistent with the policies of the ruling right-wing Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP). Notably, authorities in major Indian states, especially Uttar Pradesh, imposed restrictions, including arrests, on protesters sympathetic to Palestinians facing genocide in Gaza. This pattern was repeated in various Indian states, including the capital, Delhi, suggesting that this policy is an official stance adopted by Indian authorities. In contrast, Hindu right-wing extremists were allowed to express their support for Israel’s genocidal war, accusing those who sympathize with Palestine of being jihadists and unpatriotic, despite the fact that support for Palestinians was prevalent on social media.
In the media, despite the cautious stance of official authorities, particularly the Ministry of External Affairs, and their inclination towards non-decisive positions, mainstream media generally adopted a professional tone, showing some sympathy for the Palestinians.
2. Unrestricted Cooperation:
It is noteworthy that India’s stance on its partnership with Israel has not been negatively affected, despite all the crimes against humanity committed by Israel against the Palestinians. In fact, this partnership, especially in military manufacturing, has had a real impact on Israel’s criminal war. Some of the drones used by Israeli forces were co-produced by the Indian company Adani. Additionally, certain types of ammunition found in the field were sourced from India, as was the case when Spanish authorities intercepted an Indian ship attempting to circumvent a blockade imposed by the Houthis in the Red Sea. It is known that India has declared military cooperation with Israel and previously participated in the Israeli Blue Star maneuvers.
Of course, India’s cooperation with Israel is not limited to the military and security fields but is also strong in the economic field. While Thailand withdrew its workers from the Israeli agricultural sector following October 7, 2023, causing significant harm to the Israeli economy and creating a need for replacement, India stepped in to fill the gap by sending 100,000 Indian workers, who are currently being deployed in what can only be described as a dangerous environment.
3. Double Standards:
Regarding India’s performance in international organizations, it has been consistent with the position of most countries in the world, adhering to the so-called “two-state solution,” but notably omitting the phrase indicating that East Jerusalem is the capital of the Palestinian state—a significant retreat in India’s stance. However, at the bilateral level, India seeks to continuously develop its relations with Israel in all fields, justifying this as a gesture of gratitude to Israel, which was the only “country” to supply India with weapons during the Kargil conflict with Pakistan, and a desire not to anger the U.S. administration by adopting policies contrary to the U.S. stance on Ukraine and Palestine. Notably, part of the Arab position, particularly that of the UAE and Saudi Arabia, aligns with India’s stance.
4. Impact of the Recent General Elections on the Indian Government’s Position on the Palestinian Cause:
The decline in the ruling party’s performance in the general elections held in May 2024 did not affect its stance on the Palestinian cause. This can be explained by the lack of any significant change in the factors that have governed this position from the outset, the most important of which is India’s desire to strengthen its relationship with the United States, particularly concerning its regional role in countering China within the Quad group, enhancing its economic performance by attracting foreign capital, the ideological alignment between the ruling party and the Zionist movement, and most importantly, the Arab rush to normalize relations with Israel and establish ties with it. India no longer feels any Arab pressure compelling it to reconsider its policies regarding its relations with Israel; instead, it finds itself in a favorable environment that shares the same stance.
Conclusion:
Indian policy has focused on strengthening ties with the occupying state at all levels while maintaining formal and limited relations with the Palestinian National Authority, approaching the Palestinian issue through the gateway of the Palestine Liberation Organization. Unlike Russia and China, which have established relations with Hamas and hosted Palestinian delegations under the pretext of reconciliation, India has deliberately blurred the line between Palestinian resistance and terrorism in its press, even though India has not classified any Palestinian movements as terrorist organizations. There is no doubt that a ceasefire according to terms and conditions acceptable to Israel, which India sees as potentially eliminating the “Palestinian headache,” would align with the current Indian government’s policy. It does not seem that India has any objections to any solution approved by the United States and the Arab countries, allowing India to continue its partnership with Israel, the United States, and the supportive Arab countries without moral or ethical dilemmas that might be imposed by the belief of some Indian elites in India’s historical stance against colonialism and its role in supporting the Palestinian cause. As for the possibility of India following the example of Russia and China by establishing official relations with Palestinian resistance movements, this seems unlikely, as India has approached the Arab world through those Arab states that hold a negative stance toward Palestinian resistance movements. Additionally, India may not want to upset the Americans and the Arab rulers who are normalizing relations with Israel simultaneously.
