Since 2015, the Russian military presence in Syria marked a pivotal turning point in Moscow’s strategies to position itself as a major influential power in the Mediterranean. Through its military intervention in Syria, Russia was able to rescue Bashar al-Assad’s regime from collapse, which allowed it to establish a strategic foothold in the Mediterranean via the Tartus and Hmeimim bases. However, following the fall of the Assad regime on December 8, 2024, this Russian military presence now faces unprecedented challenges that could threaten its influence in the region as a whole. This shift forces Russia to reassess its strategies in the Mediterranean amid recent changes.
Challenges to Continuity
The fall of the Syrian regime poses a significant challenge to the continuation of the Russian military presence in Syria for the following reasons:
Loss of Local Ally: The Assad regime served as the backbone of the Russian presence in Syria, giving Moscow legitimacy to use its military bases in Tartus and Hmeimim. With the regime’s collapse, Russia lost this essential support, casting doubts on its military continued presence. Reports indicate that Russia is seeking to establish communication with the new authorities to ensure the continuation of its bases, but this effort faces major challenges given the change in power dynamics and political stances, especially since Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov declared on December 7, 2024, that fighters of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham are terrorists and that Russia will only support legitimate Syrian forces.
Pressures from the War in Ukraine: Russia is suffering significant resource drain due to its engagement in the war in Ukraine, which directly affects its ability to support its military presence in Syria. Reports suggest that the number of Russian fighter jets at Hmeimim base has decreased to only 22 by mid-2024, with a similar decline in the number of helicopters to 15. Additionally, the Western sanctions imposed on the Russian economy have increased the difficulty of covering logistical operational costs for maritime and aerial transport to Syria. These financial and military challenges make it hard for Moscow to maintain the level of presence established in previous years.
Increased Security Threats and Ground Challenges in Syria: With the rising influence of armed groups in Syria, Russian bases have become increasingly vulnerable. For example, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham forces have advanced toward Russian bases in Tartus and Hmeimim, heightening the security fragility for Russian troops. Hmeimim base has recorded dozens of drone attacks since 2018, indicating weak security measures against ongoing threats. Complicating matters further, reports have indicated that Russian ships stationed at the Tartus port left before the regime’s fall due to fears of direct attacks.
Impact of Political Changes in Syria: With new authorities emerging in Syria after the fall of the Assad regime, Russia faces uncertainty regarding the future of its military presence. Statements from Russian diplomats have suggested that these authorities may not be committed to previously signed contracts, specifically the 2017 agreement defining the Russian presence in Tartus for 49 years, putting Russian military bases at risk of closure or renegotiation. According to sources close to the developments, Moscow has attempted to propose new arrangements to ensure the survival of its bases; however, these proposals have not received a clear response from the newly governing bodies, complicating the future of this presence, which seems likely to be secured only for a short duration.
Potential Increase in External Pressures to End Russian Presence in Syria: Turkey’s support for former Syrian opposition forces presents a significant challenge for Russia, especially as these forces are poised to govern a new Syria. Additionally, Western countries have criticized Moscow under the pretext of committing humanitarian violations during its bombardments of opposition areas in Syria, and it is not unlikely that some Western countries will exploit the opportunity of Assad’s fall to advocate for Russia’s complete withdrawal from Syria, further complicating Moscow’s aim for a long-term presence there.
Moscow’s Options
Russia will seek to rearrange its military influence in Syria and the Mediterranean through various options, notably:
Renegotiating to Secure Military Bases: Following the fall of the Assad regime, Russia aims to negotiate with the new controlling forces to ensure the continued use of its military bases in Syria, especially Tartus and Hmeimim. Reports have indicated that some opposition leaders have expressed willingness to provide guarantees not to target Russian bases. According to Russian sources, the Kremlin has begun establishing communication channels with local actors to rearrange its presence in the region, with Dmitry Peskov stating that Moscow is negotiating with parties capable of protecting Russian interests and ensuring the security of military bases.
Seeking Regional Alternatives in the Mediterranean: With the increasing challenges related to maintaining its military bases in Syria after the fall of the Assad regime, Russia is looking for alternative locations to accommodate its naval and aerial operations in the Mediterranean. One potential option is the Port of Port Sudan in Sudan, where Moscow previously reached an agreement with Sudanese authorities to establish a naval base. Although this base is located in the Red Sea and not part of the Mediterranean, it provides a strategic outlet that could be utilized to support Russia’s operations in the region. However, the volatile political situation in Sudan and ongoing internal conflicts pose significant obstacles to this option. Another alternative could be the Port of Tobruk in Libya, where Russia enjoys strong relations with the Libyan National Army leader, Khalifa Haftar. Tobruk is a sensible choice due to its strategic location in the eastern Mediterranean, allowing Russia relative ease in supporting its operations in the region. Nevertheless, the fragile political environment in Libya and associated security risks from the ongoing conflict make this option fraught with danger. Algeria emerges as a potential option, as it has previously allowed Russian ships to stop at its ports for refueling and supplies. However, Algeria adopts a relatively neutral foreign policy, making it difficult for it to grant Russia a permanent military base. Moreover, Algeria’s ports are located in the western Mediterranean, diminishing their effectiveness as a strategic alternative to Tartus and Hmeimim.
Reducing Military Presence and Adopting a Temporary Presence Strategy: Developments indicate that Russia may have to reduce its military presence in Syria, limiting itself to a symbolic presence at the remaining bases. This trend relies on transitioning its operations to temporary naval patrols in international waters using ships equipped with long-range missiles like Kalibr and Tsirkon, ensuring continued deterrence without the need for an expensive permanent presence. This option demonstrates Russia’s ability to retain military influence while reducing economic costs.
Strengthening Alliances with Regional Allies: Russia can rearrange its regional alliances to compensate for the loss of influence in Syria. In this context, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov emphasized on December 7, 2024, the importance of enhancing cooperation with Iran and Turkey to ensure constructive dialogue within Syria. Turkey may also play a pivotal role as a mediator between Moscow and opposition factions, reflecting the importance of regional coordination to achieve stability and secure Russian interests.
Expanding Influence through Non-Military Tools: In addition to military options, Russia might resort to utilizing political and economic tools to enhance its influence. Reports suggest that Moscow is seeking to secure a role in Syria’s reconstruction as a means of bolstering its non-military influence. Russia could also utilize economic support and humanitarian aid as tools for political pressure and building new relationships with the controlling powers in Syria and the region to counter the expansion of Western influence in Syria.
Complete Withdrawal from Syria: If the financial and political costs of continuing in Syria become excessively high, Russia may be compelled to withdraw fully. Reports have indicated that some Russian ships have left Tartus, and Russian military operations in Syria have been significantly reduced. Some analysts have mentioned that Russia’s focus on Ukraine might push it to abandon its positions in Syria and concentrate on other, more strategically significant areas. While a complete withdrawal represents a significant loss of Russian influence, it remains a plausible option under current circumstances.
Potential Consequences
The recent events in Syria could have potential ramifications for the Russian military presence in the Mediterranean, including:
Loss of a Strategic Anchor Point: The fall of the Assad regime will deal a significant blow to the Russian military presence in the Mediterranean, as the Tartus and Hmeimim bases constituted vital anchor points. The Tartus base is the only one outside Russia and is an important logistical center for supporting Russian naval operations in the Mediterranean and the African coast, while Hmeimim provides air cover and support. With the regime’s collapse, these bases are now threatened, weakening Russia’s capability to execute operations in the region.
Diminished Naval Deterrence Capability: Russian bases in Syria have enabled Moscow to deploy ships equipped with long-range missiles in the Mediterranean, providing advanced deterrence capabilities against its opponents, particularly NATO. With Assad’s fall, Russia’s ability to execute these strategic operations will shrink.
Increased Dependence on Distant Ports: With the loss of access to the Tartus base in Syria, Russia will face a considerable challenge in redirecting its naval operations to distant ports in the Baltic Sea or Northern Fleet bases. It should be noted that distant Russian ports, such as Sevastopol in the Black Sea or Kronstadt in the Baltic Sea, will have to bear the burden of maintaining ships and conducting logistics, which will slow down and increase the cost of Russian naval operations in the Mediterranean. Additionally, the closure of Turkish straits to Russian warships under the Montreux Convention presents an additional obstacle; crossing from the Black Sea to the Mediterranean requires complex diplomatic arrangements with Turkey. Furthermore, these distant ports will be geographically removed from primary operational zones in the Mediterranean, meaning ships will need to spend longer periods in transit. Moreover, the heavy reliance of the Russian Navy on aging Soviet-era vessels will necessitate intensive periodic maintenance, and the loss of maintenance facilities in Tartus means these ships may have to shorten their deployment periods in the Mediterranean, thereby weakening Russia’s capacity to maintain a permanent and effective naval presence in the region.
Complicating Logistic Transport Processes: Syrian bases were part of the Russian military supply line known as the Syrian hub, which connected the Black Sea to the Mediterranean through Tartus. With the loss of local support, Russia faces significant logistical challenges in securing the transport of equipment and supplies to its forces deployed in the Mediterranean, especially with Turkish straits closed to Russian warships since 2022 under the Montreux Convention.
Weakened Regional Influence: The fall of Assad will reduce Russia’s ability to use Syria as a launch pad to expand its influence in the Eastern Mediterranean and North Africa. For example, Tartus was utilized as a support base for Russian presence in Libya and the African Sahel region. Reports indicate that Russia will now face difficulty executing its long-range naval operations in the Mediterranean and the Middle East, weakening its ability to challenge NATO’s influence in the region.
Threatened Loss of Geopolitical Gains: Russian bases in Syria represented a symbol of Moscow’s return to the international stage as a major player in the Middle East. With the regime’s fall, Russia risks losing these geopolitical gains. Observers have noted that the absence of a permanent naval base in the Mediterranean will reduce Russia’s capability to maintain its presence in the region, thereby enhancing NATO’s influence and that of other countries like Turkey and Israel.
In conclusion, the fall of the Assad regime will undermine Russia’s ability to utilize its military bases in Tartus and Hmeimim in the short term, potentially leading to a complete loss of these bases in the medium to long term. Furthermore, Moscow’s attempts to rely on distant ports to manage and organize its military presence in the Mediterranean will likely be costly financially and affect the speed of its operations. It can also be said that Moscow’s endeavors to find alternative bases in the Mediterranean to compensate for its lost anchor point in Syria will not constitute a sustainable solution, as the proposed alternatives are located in countries suffering from security instability (like Libya and Sudan).
