IGAD’s Role in Conflict Resolution: From Regional Security Structures to the Sudan Crisis
The Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) was established on November 25, 1996,1 succeeding the Intergovernmental Authority on Development and Combating Desertification (IGADD) established in 1986. As the name suggests, both the first and the second, it is an organization that began as an environmental organization to combat desertification caused by the drought that hit the region between 1985 and 1986, and has expanded to include development in its comprehensive sense. With the increasing conflicts witnessed on the continent and the East African region in particular, which includes the countries of the Horn of Africa, which is one of the regions that witness the most political and security tensions and turmoil, both internally and externally, we mean the collapse of the state in Somalia after the fall of Siad Barre in 1991, the border dispute between Ethiopia and Eritrea (1998-2000) , and the conflict between Sudan and South Sudan (2012) , among others. Therefore, in the early 1990s, thinking began to expand IGAD’s missions to include peace issues, considering that development is not achieved in a politically and security-unstable environment.
The Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) was established on November 25, 1996, succeeding the Intergovernmental Authority on Development and Combating Desertification (IGADD) established in 1986. As the name suggests, both the first and the second, it is an organization that began as an environmental organization to combat desertification caused by the drought that hit the region between 1985 and 1986, and has expanded to include development in its comprehensive sense. With the increasing conflicts witnessed on the continent and the East African region in particular, which includes the countries of the Horn of Africa, which is one of the regions that witness the most political and security tensions and turmoil, both internally and externally, we mean the collapse of the state in Somalia after the fall of Siad Barre in 1991, the border dispute between Ethiopia and Eritrea (1998-2000) , and the conflict between Sudan and South Sudan (2012) , among others. Therefore, in the early 1990s, thinking began to expand IGAD’s missions to include peace issues, considering that development is not achieved in a politically and security-unstable environment.
In this paper, we will discuss IGAD’s security structures and their role in resolving conflicts in the region, with a focus on the recent armed conflict that erupted in Sudan in April 2023.
IGAD security structures
Like the sub-economic organizations in Africa, and because of their geostrategic position in the east of the continent and in the heart of the Horn of Africa, IGAD has shown interest in security aspects as a prerequisite for the development process, and this objective was evident in the 1996 Convention, where Article 18/A stipulates the importance of achieving peace and security, and taking collective action to confront security threats. The Department of Peace and Security has therefore been established under the secretariat of the Commission, which has 3 programmes relating to the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts, political affairs and humanitarian affairs, and coordinates with two other mechanisms in Addis Ababa, the first relating to the strengthening of capacities to counter terrorism and the second to the secretariat of the Early Warning and Conflict Response Mechanism.
Therefore, the Eighth IGAD Summit, held in Khartoum in November 2000 (Article 3/2) , decided to establish an early warning and conflict response mechanism, whose task would be to preserve, resolve and manage conflicts, with the IGAD secretariat preparing the details at the next meeting of the Summit.
Indeed, its security protocol was also adopted in Khartoum in 2002, which represented a paradigm shift in the work of the Authority, from a mere forum for economic coordination to a regional actor in the field of security and peace, and was supported by the decisions of the IGAD summit after reviewing its structure in 2010.
In this context, it can be said that the most prominent institutions concerned with peace and development issues, which are mentioned in articles 9-12 of the 1996 Convention, are the Assembly: the Council of Heads of State and Government, the Council of Ministers: Ministers for Foreign Affairs, the Council of Ambassadors: Permanent Representatives, and the Secretariat: which includes 4 departments, one of which is concerned with peace and security.
As for the security structures of IGAD, they are as follows:
1) The Early Warning Mechanism, established in 2002, relies on monitoring and analyzing community data to anticipate conflicts and respond quickly as they occur.
2) The Committee of the Elders, which includes former political or diplomatic figures, intervenes in informal ways to facilitate mediation processes.
3) The Peace and Security Department of the IGAD Secretariat, one of the four divisions operating under the IGAD Commission, is responsible for peace and security-related tasks. However, it should be noted that the powers of the IGAD secretariat in general, including this section, are limited in light of the centralization of decisions in the body through the Conference of Heads of State and Government.
4) The Mediation Support Unit, which is administratively subordinate to the Department of Peace and Security, was established in 2012 to provide the necessary support to the efforts of the Commission’s mediators, provide them with all the information they need to prevent conflicts through preventive diplomacy and mediation, and strengthen the capacities of Member States in the field of conflict prevention, peacebuilding and mediation. This requires working with a broad network of organizations and experts to respond effectively to conflict situations as they arise and to reduce their recurrence, yet they have not been involved in mediation efforts in Southern Sudan or the Tigray region.
In June 2022, IGAD launched the Peace and Security Section Strategy 2025, which includes priority areas of intervention in the strategy: early warning of conflicts, preventive diplomacy, mediation, promotion of good governance, democracy, human rights, rule of law, post-conflict reconstruction and development, peacebuilding, gender equality, and women’s empowerment for peace.
It is perhaps important to note in this regard that the IGAD Convention did not include any explicit measures or procedures related to the peacekeeping operation and its enforcement, or the imposition of peace, which reflected negatively on its role in the conflict settlement process, and its limitation, for the most part, to early warning and mediation It is also due, in part to the unwillingness of the member states to commit to sending these forces.
Assessment of the role of IGAD in the resolution of pre-conflict conflicts in Sudan
The region in which the IGAD countries are located has witnessed many internal conflicts and internecine wars that have posed a challenge to it that require intervention to resolve them, including the continuation of fighting and civil war in Somalia since 1991 and its repercussions on the IGAD countries, especially Djibouti, Ethiopia and Kenya, the tension between Eritrea and Yemen over some islands in the Red Sea (1997-1998) , the war between Eritrea and Ethiopia over the Badme border triangle (1998-2000) , the conflict in northern Uganda, the conflict in Darfur (2003) , and the border tension between Djibouti and Eritrea over the Bab al-Mandeb mountain and island of Demira (2008 and 2017) , the ongoing war between North and South Sudan (2012) , and the crisis in Ethiopia’s Tigray region (November 2020) .
Despite all these tensions, IGAD has been excluded from intervening in many crises, conflicts and wars, whether internal or internal, and its intervention has been limited to mediation efforts and linked to the parties to the conflict or to the positions of member states. Therefore, it is not surprising that this role has been negatively or positively affected by the parties to the conflict on the one hand, and the position of the IGAD countries on the other.
1) IGAD’s Limited Successes in Cases of Intervention
IGAD played a functional role in mediating between the Sudanese government and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement, leading to the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in Nairobi in 2005, which ended Sudan’s second civil war and paved the way for South Sudan’s independence referendum in 2011. However, it should be noted that the Commission served as a mechanism for the United States that designed the idea of a settlement based on a six-year transitional period, in which the Sudan would be united, but with different systems in the north and south, with a referendum on the right to self-determination.
Once again, with the outbreak of unrest in South Sudan just two years after its independence, IGAD led a mediation effort that led to peace agreements, with the support of the Early Warning Mechanism and the participation of the Committee of the Elders, which resulted in the signing of the Conflict Resolution Agreement in 2015. After the collapse of the agreement, IGAD launched the High-Level Recovery Forum, which led to the signing of another agreement in 2018.
After the overthrow of al-Bashir’s rule in Sudan in 2019, IGAD, in cooperation with the United Nations and the African Union, played a role in signing the political and constitutional declaration and forming a transitional government in Sudan on August 21, 2019. Perhaps one of the reasons for this success is due to Ethiopia, as the head of the Commission at the time, which also acted in a predominantly unilateral manner, including sending a special envoy to Sudan, which seems to have been motivated by the calming of border disputes over al-Fashqa and its desire to attract Sudan to it regarding the Renaissance Dam negotiations.
After the Sudanese army ousted Hamdok’s government in October 2021, IGAD, through a tripartite mechanism that includes it, along with the United Nations and the African Union, worked to finalize a framework agreement to revive the transitional period.
2) Exclusion from intervention in some conflicts and crises
In contrast to these specific successes, IGAD has been excluded or marginalized in many crises and conflicts, including:
a) Marginalizing it on the crisis of the Renaissance Dam negotiations between Egypt, Sudan and Ethiopia, in light of Addis Ababa’s desire for the negotiations to be tripartite only, or within a limited African framework through the African Union.
b) Marginalization from dealing with the crisis in the Tigray region in November 2020, and despite the keenness of Sudan, which was the head of the organization at the time, on the need to settle the crisis within the framework of IGAD, this was met with Ethiopia’s rejection of the idea of intervention, considering that the crisis is an internal affair and its desire to resolve it according to its own vision.
c) Marginalization in the settlement of the border dispute between Sudan and Ethiopia over al-Fashqa and others, despite Sudan’s readiness to accept the mediation of IGAD, but the matter was once again met with the Ethiopian refusal, which wished to settle the dispute only in a bilateral framework.
This marginalization is due in part to the desire of some countries to settle conflicts through them only, and away from IGAD’s intervention, as is the case with the peace agreement signed by Ethiopia with Eritrea in July 2018, where there was no participation from regional organizations such as the African Union or IGAD(10) , in exchange for the participation of Saudi Arabia and the UAE in the mediation process.
3) Challenges faced by IGAD before 2023
It can be said that there are several challenges that faced IGAD and contributed to neutralizing its efforts in the conflict resolution process:
a) Political disparities and conflicting interests among member states, which affect the effectiveness of IGAD in making unified decisions, as some countries, such as Ethiopia, seek to dominate it or neutralize its role in some conflicts, such as what happened in Addis Ababa’s intervention in Somalia unilaterally (2006) to confront Islamic courts, the Tigray crisis (2020) , the Sudanese-Ethiopian tension (2022) , and the Renaissance Dam crisis between Egypt, Sudan and Ethiopia since 2015, while other countries are interested in specific files related to their strategic interests, such as the South file Sudan and Uganda’s support for President Salva Kiir in the face of his vice president, Riek Machar, after the outbreak of the civil war in 2013, and even its intervention with troops to support him at the expense of IGAD’s mediation efforts, which was opposed by Ethiopia, Sudan and Eritrea(11) , which negatively affected IGAD’s efforts to resolve the conflict in South Sudan. Moreover, Sudan, Ethiopia, and Kenya have sent a special envoy to South Sudan without coordination with IGAD, which we will see later in the civil war in Sudan and the unilateral movements of Kenya and Ethiopia in particular.
b) International intervention in the affairs of IGAD, after it accepted the accession of several countries as observers, such as Italy, France, Britain, Germany, Japan, Canada, as well as the United States, which has become very influential within the IGAD, managing many of its affairs, and even controlling its agenda and prioritization, as we will observe in the recent conflict in Sudan, and its unilateralism with Saudi Arabia in managing the Jeddah Peace Platform.
c) Increased regional (Egypt, Saudi Arabia, UAE) and international (Britain, France, and the United States) rivalry, and dual membership in more than one sub-organization in the region, which leads to the dispersion of IGAD’s efforts and the difficulty of taking unified positions on conflict resolution. Competing outsiders can drive a wedge between member states and each other, creating competition and thwarting the formulation of common regional approaches. Some member States are also members of other regional economic groupings, such as the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) and the East African Community (EAC), which sometimes poses challenges to formulating unified responses and directly undermines the impact of IGAD, including its key role in brokering peace agreements.
IGAD’s intervention in conflicts, such as Somalia or South Sudan, was limited to mediation efforts only, while the idea of sending peacekeeping forces was absent, and this is due in part to the unwillingness of member states to give the body the authority to intervene in its internal affairs, and what this may entail in the imposition of sanctions and military intervention, which made IGAD’s role limited in maintaining and imposing peacekeeping, and providing humanitarian aid, especially in light of the lack of political will on the part of states to intervene, as well as the absence of funding. This happened in Somalia in 2006, where the group failed to send its own troops despite receiving approval from the African Union and the United Nations. It also failed to send troops to South Sudan to monitor the 2014 ceasefire.
On the other hand, IGAD may prefer to cooperate with the African Union and the United Nations in the field of UN or continental peacekeeping operations, and its countries prefer to participate individually in these forces, even if the conflict is within one of their own countries, as some member states (Ethiopia, Uganda, Kenya, and Djibouti) contributed the largest percentage to the forces of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), the United Nations-African Union Joint Forces in Darfur (UNAMID), Abyei (UNICEF), and South Sudan (UNMISS). The Verification and Monitoring Mission in the Sudan (2003) , as well as the Monitoring and Verification Mission in South Sudan since 2014. IGAD agencies have also become more proactive in peace operations and initiatives, such as South Sudan, Somalia and the Sudan.
c) The absence of practical measures related to the concept of collective security, which means that an attack on a member state is considered an attack on other states, and it also permits intervention if internal security threats in one state affect others. However, the 1996 Convention did not elaborate on these procedures: when and how? It also did not specify a protocol of its own, as the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) did in the 1978 and 1981 protocols. The result has been the failure of IGAD to intervene militarily to settle internal conflicts, despite serious human rights violations (Darfur in the Sudan and Tigray in Ethiopia).
h) Preference for the individual intervention of some of the States of the Commission in the conflicts of other States, despite the fact that this is contrary to Article 6/b of the 1996 Convention on Non-Intervention. So, we found many unilateral interventions, such as Ethiopia’s intervention in Somalia (2006) , Kenya’s intervention in Somalia (2011) , and Uganda’s intervention in South Sudan (2013) .
Weak funding, as IGAD relies heavily on financial support from international partners, which affects the sustainability of its programs in the settlement processes, and its limitation to early warning and intervention through the mediation mechanism.
d) The absence or weakness of good governance related to democracy and the peaceful transfer of power, and its impact on security instability. According to the Commission’s 2023 CEWARN report, there are a range of challenges it faces, including: weak political governance, commitment to democracy and the rule of law, lack of transparency and accountability, and persistence of racial and ethnic divisions.
Weak governance refers to a failure to achieve good governance characterized by competitive, free and orderly and peaceful elections, leading to an orderly and peaceful transfer of power, and democratic, transparent, and accountable political decision-making processes involving all sectors of society. Although all IGAD member states have constitutions that support democracy and governance, the region is characterized by persistent and recurrent conflicts, resulting from governance disputes, with the results of most of the general elections held in the region (Somalia, Djibouti, Kenya, Uganda) being challenged on the grounds of fraud. A number of Member States are experiencing cycles of violence and instability linked to the electoral process and the rotation of power.
In this regard, IGAD does not contain any mandatory provisions on the observation of elections and the process of peaceful transfer of power, but also lacks measures to reject unconstitutional changes in systems of government and military coups. This may explain why it did not take any measures against the coup that Sudan was subjected to in 2021 and the overthrow of Hamdok’s government.
IGAD efforts in resolving the conflict in the Sudan
It can be said that IGAD dealt early with the recent conflict in Sudan, which erupted on April 15, 2023, between the head of the Sovereignty Council and commander of the armed forces, Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, and his deputy, the commander of the Rapid Support Forces, Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo Hemedti. Immediately the following day, the Commission held a virtual extraordinary summit No. 40, adopted a final communiqué urging civilian parties to participate in the cessation of hostilities, commissioning a high-level delegation led by South Sudan’s President Salva Kiir Mayardit and the membership of the presidents of Kenya and Djibouti, to mediate between the parties,19 and reporting to the next summit on 12 June in Djibouti.
Djibouti summit comes after two important interventions to settle the conflict
The Jeddah talks, sponsored by Saudi Arabia and the United States in May 2023, focused on the humanitarian aspect and the entry of aid, but failed to reach a ceasefire agreement between al-Burhan and Hemedti, and the announcement of its freeze, and the US move towards imposing sanctions on both sides of the conflict on June 1.
The Peace and Security Council of the African Union met on May 27, 2023, and developed a roadmap that stipulated an immediate cessation of hostilities in order to reach a comprehensive ceasefire, effectively address the humanitarian situation, protect civilians and civilian infrastructure, respect international humanitarian law, recognize the role of neighboring member states because the war has already affected them, initiate a comprehensive political process to settle the war, and unify international efforts.
On 12 June, Djibouti hosted the 14th IGAD Regular Summit, which also developed a roadmap for conflict resolution that includes the following:
1) Expand mediation efforts by including Ethiopia as the fourth member of the high-level delegation of the Commission for the Peace Process in Sudan, along with Djibouti, Kenya and South Sudan, with Kenyan President William Ruto chairing the Committee instead of the President of South Sudan, and working in close coordination with the African Union Commission.
2) The Quartet will arrange a direct meeting between Al-Burhan and Hemedti in one of the capitals of regional countries within 10 days.
3) Obtain a commitment from the leadership of the Sudanese Armed Forces and the Rapid Support Forces to establish a humanitarian corridor within two weeks.
4) Initiating a comprehensive political process towards a political settlement of the conflict in Sudan within three weeks.
Although this plan does not contradict the African plan, and is consistent with it, Sudan criticized the decision to form a Quartet committee instead of the tripartite plan, as well as Kenya’s presidency of it, as it is biased in favor of the Rapid Support Forces, as it considered that the Tripartite Mediation Committee headed by South Sudan is still in force, claiming that the summit did not take a decision on the formation of the new committee, which requires consensus among the member states, which did not happen.22
Sudanese reservations about Kenya’s presidency of the Quartet were based on the existence of a close relationship between Hemedti and Ruto, after it was rumored that Hemedti supported the Kenyan president’s election campaign in August 2022, as well as what Kenyan media reported about the existence of a commercial partnership between them in the gold trade, in light of Ruto’s ownership of a company that works in gold mining inside Sudan, and that this relationship was done through former Sudanese Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok, who also has a relationship with the Kenyan president during Hamdok’s days in the field of International organizations.
It may have been this relationship that prompted the Kenyan president to receive Hemedti after the outbreak of the war, provide him with diplomatic cover, and facilitate logistical support for the RSF fighters and her negotiating delegation through Kenyan passports. Later, after the outbreak of the war, Hemedti’s family transferred a large part of its money from the UAE to Kenyan banks, where they owned a number of residential buildings and businesses.
Despite these Sudanese reservations, the Quartet continued its work, hosting its first summit in Addis Ababa on July 10, and issued a final statement urging the Sudanese parties to immediately cease violence and sign an unconditional and indefinite ceasefire, through a cessation of hostilities agreement, supported by an effective implementation and monitoring mechanism. He also called on Sudan’s neighbouring countries to intensify their efforts to deliver humanitarian aid, and to take the necessary measures to mitigate and remove any logistical obstacles to its delivery, including visa and customs requirements. He also requested, and most importantly, a summit meeting of the East African Standby Force ready to intervene (24) to consider the possibility of deploying its forces to protect civilians and ensure humanitarian access.
However, these efforts once again collided with Sudanese reservations, as the government, represented by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, rejected in a statement issued the day after the Nairobi negotiations, Kenya’s chairmanship of the Quartet, which it considered biased towards the Rapid Support Committee, and the government of Sudan sees no justification for transferring the chairmanship of the committee from South Sudan, as decided by the IGAD emergency summit on April 16, 2023(26) .
Khartoum also rejected the proposal to send peacekeeping forces, as a violation of national sovereignty.
Jeddah again hosted a second round of talks in October, with representatives from the African Union and IGAD, but it was suspended on December 3 due to the failure of ceasefire efforts.
Just six days later, IGAD held its 41st Extraordinary Emergency Summit in Djibouti, on December 9, 2023, and its most important items were:
a) Accelerating efforts to organize a comprehensive civil dialogue, led by Sudanese, and led by IGAD and the African Union, to build a national consensus towards the formation of a civilian-led transition. Perhaps this angered al-Burhan, who had reservations about the interference of civilian forces in the settlement process, and that such intervention should be carried out only through the Sovereignty Council and the armed forces.
b) Establish an IGAD framework, consisting of eminent diplomatic and political interlocutors, nominated by the heads of government of IGAD countries, to carry out mediation efforts in Sudan. This new, broader framework is an alternative to the Quartet, which Khartoum has reserved and questioned its legitimacy.
c) Instruct the IGAD Secretary to submit a candidate(s) as soon as possible to the Council of Ministers for appointment as the Commission’s Special Envoy to Sudan, who will coordinate and lead the Commission’s mediation efforts in Sudan.
c) Establish a unified mediation to coordinate the various national, regional, continental and international efforts and processes, under the auspices of IGAD and the African Union.
Despite the reservations expressed by the Sudanese Foreign Ministry about the outcomes of this summit, it agreed to hold a bilateral meeting between al-Burhan and Hemedti on December 28, under the supervision of the expanded committee, on the condition of a ceasefire and the exit of the Rapid Support Forces from the capital, Khartoum. Hemedti pre-empted this meeting by starting a tour of a number of countries in the region, only one day before the scheduled date of the meeting, including Uganda, Kenya, Ethiopia, and Djibouti, which angered Al-Burhan, who did not participate in the meeting.
In a move that was considered provocative by Khartoum, and about two weeks before the third Entebbe summit, the Addis Ababa Declaration was signed on January 2, 2024, between the Coordination of Democratic Civil Forces (Taqaddum), headed by Hamdok, and the commanders of the Rapid Support Forces, with the aim of stopping hostilities, providing humanitarian aid, and protecting civilians.
The IGAD Coordination called on the IGAD to ensure the participation of civilians in the talks between military leaders, stressing the importance of involving civilian forces in all stages of the political process, which also infuriated Sudan, considering that this is an individual action by Addis Ababa, and these civilian forces are affiliated with Hemedti.31 This may explain Ethiopia’s absence from the next IGAD summit.
For the third time, IGAD is holding its 32nd Extraordinary Summit on Sudan, in Entebbe, Uganda, on 18 January 2024,32 with the participation of Hemedti and the absence of al-Burhan, where it expressed its concern over the continuation of the war and the deteriorating humanitarian situation, and renewed its call for an immediate and unconditional ceasefire, a cessation of hostilities, to end the war, and a commitment to dialogue and negotiation.
The Commission also expressed its constant readiness to provide its good offices to facilitate a comprehensive peace process to end the conflict, in close cooperation with all Sudanese parties concerned, the African Union, and regional and international actors, in addition to directing the IGAD Secretariat, in coordination with the African Union Commission, to review the Roadmap for the Resolution of the Conflict in Sudan, which was adopted at the 41st Summit in June 2023, and set specific dates for it within a month. She recalled the commitment of the parties to the conflict to hold a face-to-face meeting within 14 days, in accordance with the last IGAD Extraordinary Summit in December 2023. It also stressed that the member states of the IGAD will use all means and capabilities to ensure the peaceful resolution of the conflict in Sudan, and directed the secretariat to provide an update to the IGAD Summit.
Just a month after the summit, the relationship between Khartoum and Nairobi witnessed a new tension in February 2025, after Kenya hosted a meeting that included the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), a number of civilian political forces, and allied military groups to make arrangements for the declaration of a “parallel government” and the signing of the Sudan Constituent Charter, which the Sudanese government considered a blatant hostility on the part of Kenya and a threat to Sudan’s national security.
In an attempt to avoid a clash with al-Burhan, IGAD decided on March 26, 2024, to appoint South Sudanese lawyer Lawrence Korbandi as its special envoy to Sudan, in the hope that al-Burhan would respond and return to the commission again(34) . Al-Burhan has shown a conditional response to this, as he stipulated the reinstatement of Sudan’s suspended membership in the African Union since the October 2021 coup, in order to deal with the proposals pushed by the IGAD mediation supported by the African Union.
Following the successive drone attacks on Port Sudan since 4 May 2025, which targeted critical infrastructure and civilian areas, the IGAD Secretariat issued a statement condemning these attacks, describing them as a serious threat to civilian lives, and warning that they could exacerbate the already dire humanitarian and political situation, noting that Port Sudan is the country’s vital logistical and humanitarian hub, and that targeting it exacerbates human suffering and impedes the delivery of urgently needed aid.36
Evaluation of IGAD’s efforts in the conflict resolution process in the Sudan
From the previous presentation, it can be said that the settlement efforts have not achieved their goals as of this writing, for several reasons:
1) The multiplicity of mediation platforms and the conflict of agendas
Settlement efforts have seen what is known as the multi-track mode, which aims to combine various peace initiatives to maximize the positives and minimize the negatives. This began in the second round of the Jeddah negotiations in October 2023, after the inclusion of IGAD and the African Union, to benefit from their expertise in conflict resolution, and in line with the unification of the initiatives put forward by the African Union, as well as in the expansion of the AU’s negotiating umbrella, and the same for IGAD, and its development of a roadmap based on the African Union map, which is based on the formation of an expanded mechanism that includes actors at several levels.
However, despite this pattern, the initiatives have not been synchronized, giving the warring parties the ability to “choose from mechanisms.” For example, Sudan’s Foreign Ministry rejected UN intervention by declaring UN Representative Volker Perthes persona non grata, marginalizing the UN as a whole from the mediation process, rejecting the African Union’s mediation on the grounds that Sudan’s membership was still suspended, and then refusing to engage with the Kenyan-led IGAD mechanism, accusing it of planning to “invade” Sudan using the East African Permanent Force (EFAT). On the other hand, only three days later, Khartoum welcomed the Egyptian initiative to hold a regional summit of Sudan’s neighboring countries, in light of the close relations between Al-Burhan and Cairo.
2) Lack of realism in settlement initiatives
The IGAD Roadmap released on June 12, 2023, announced that the Kenyan-led Quartet would organize a meeting between Bashir and Hemedti within 10 days, ensure agreement on a humanitarian corridor within two weeks, and begin a comprehensive political process in Kenya within three weeks. But these dates were quickly forgotten.
Moreover, in the first two months after the start of the war, there seemed to be competition between regional organizations, with both the African Union and IGAD announcing roadmaps, and some regional leaders attempting to play a leadership role (Ethiopia, Kenya), without having any apparent influence on the warring parties. In addition, there are many individual initiatives and peace talks led by several countries, both from the region and neighboring countries, most of which have failed due to the existence of special agendas and interests of mediators, not to mention that the parties to the conflict may be inclined to the mediator who supports them; the Sudanese army’s acceptance of the initiative of the neighboring countries led by Egypt, in contrast to Hemedti’s inclination towards Kenyan and Ethiopian initiatives and movements.39
3) Lack of political will among Member States
One of the most prominent challenges faced by IGAD in its interventions related to Sudan was the lack of real political will among member states, many of them, such as Kenya and Ethiopia, were unwilling to support the deployment of peacekeeping forces in Sudan, due to their unwillingness to interfere in internal affairs, especially in light of the divergent political positions within IGAD itself. This disparity has made the commission vulnerable to criticism over the inability of members to come up with a single policy towards Sudan. The ability of IGAD and others to play an active role in conflict resolution depends on three conditions: political will, the legal basis for intervention (legality), and the actual ability to intervene. Unfortunately, these conditions are lacking in the IGAD, whether in the Sudanese file or elsewhere.
4) Political reservations of the parties to the conflict in Sudan
Despite IGAD’s attempts to mediate, there were significant political reservations from the Sudanese government towards the deployment of regional peacekeepers, as the government rejected this intervention as a violation of its sovereignty, and stressed that its armed forces are capable of controlling the internal situation without the need for external interventions. The army also rejects interventions that include the presence of regional peacekeepers, especially if they are under the supervision of IGAD, which it considers biased in favor of the RSF.
5) Lack of permanent institutional structures for conflict resolution
In the conflict in Sudan and elsewhere, IGAD suffers from a lack of institutional structures capable of carrying out a peacekeeping operation. Although it operates as an organization to promote regional cooperation, it has limited institutional structures in the area of peacekeeping operations and humanitarian interventions, as its role has been limited to political mediation in Sudan’s issues, without a special unit for military operations or peacekeeping, similar to the ECOMOG forces of ECOWAS, which intervened in the conflicts in Liberia, Sierra Leone and Ivory Coast during the 1990s.
This lack explains why IGAD proposed the intervention of forces in the eastern region of the continent, or requested intervention from the African Union or the United Nations, which made IGAD unable to implement concrete steps in the deployment of peacekeeping forces. While there have been attempts to train peace forces in some member countries such as Kenya and Uganda, these efforts have not been sufficient to enhance the effectiveness of IGAD interventions.
In addition, IGAD lacks the effective collective security measures (military, political, economic and diplomatic) that should be taken against parties to the conflict, as IGAD lacks any legal clause in the 1996 Convention on the imposition of economic, military and diplomatic sanctions on any member State that commits acts that endanger regional peace and security.
This may explain the limited role of the African Union in many of the old (Darfur, South Sudan, Somalia) and modern (Tigray, Sudan) conflicts, and raises another issue related to the importance of having an institutional entity entrusted with dealing with peace and security issues in the region, such as the African Union Peace and Security Council or even the ECOWAS Mediation and Security Council, especially since the East African forces are directly subordinate to the African Union, and regional organizations in the region such as SADC, KWISSA, East Africa, and IGAD do not have authority .
6) Weak international support
In the recent conflict in Sudan and before that, IGAD faced challenges in obtaining effective international support, as the international community was divided over support for both sides in Sudan. Western countries, such as the United States and the European Union, have had different positions regarding the provision of political and humanitarian aid, compared to some other countries that feel that IGAD’s intervention in Sudan could complicate the regional situation in the Middle East and Africa, resulting in a lack of international support required to pressure the Sudanese parties to reach a peaceful solution.
The future of IGAD in the settlement of conflicts in the region
It can be seen from the previous presentation that the role of IGAD in the conflict settlement process is still limited, and is mostly limited to mediation and early warning efforts, despite the seriousness of internal and internal conflicts among member states. Therefore, in order to improve their role in conflict resolution, Member States must first have the political will to resolve conflicts in their common best interest, not in accordance with their own narrow interests.
IGAD should also consider restructuring its mechanisms. This process requires:
a) Launching a protocol on governance and good governance, which condemns access to power in an unconstitutional way (coups).
b) The formation of a Peace and Security Council with real powers in the field of maintaining regional stability.
c) The formation of special forces ready to intervene in conflicts, similar to the East African Forces or the “ECOMOGE” in West Africa.
d) Forming a specialized mediation center that can help develop more integrated methods of conflict resolution. The Centre must include trained teams that understand the security, economic and social challenges facing each conflict.
IGAD needs to strengthen its cooperation with the United Nations and the African Union in order to coordinate efforts on the ground and ensure the provision of material and humanitarian support.
IGAD Scenarios in Conflict Resolution in East Africa
There are many scenarios that may face IGAD in the future, ranging from the hope of enhanced cooperation and the capacity to intervene effectively, to the persistence of structural challenges and political divisions.
Each scenario depends on many overlapping factors, including the political will of member states, cooperation with international organizations, and the ability to respond quickly to regional crises. Therefore, it can be said that we are facing three scenarios in this regard:
Scenario 1: Increasing the effectiveness of IGAD in the successful resolution of conflicts, as a result of unifying efforts among the OIC member states, collective action through their respective institutions, and the creation of a legitimate mechanism for intervention, in addition to accelerated cooperation with international organizations such as the African Union and the United Nations. However, this scenario faces some challenges that can be overcome, including continued disparity among member states and limited financial resources.
The second scenario: IGAD’s failure to settle conflicts due to internal divisions on the one hand, and the escalation of conflicts on the other, lack of international support, and limited military capacity. This scenario may threaten the existence of the Commission or marginalize it significantly, so that it becomes a tool in the hands of the major countries, which it uses wherever it wants to achieve narrow goals that do not serve all member states.
The third scenario is that the situation remains as it is, and it seems that it is the most likely scenario so far, as despite the passage of two years since the outbreak of the last war in Sudan, no measures have been taken to stop or deal with it, which has been repeated in previous conflicts, and is likely to be repeated in other future conflicts as well.
References
Scholarly & Institutional Papers
- “The Role of Regional Multi-Actor Mediators: The Case of IGAD in the Ethiopia–Tigray Conflict”
Irit Back, Journal of the Middle East and Africa (2024)
Analyzes IGAD’s hesitant mediation when a major member (Ethiopia) was the conflict party, offering lessons on its institutional limitations.
(tandfonline.com) - “IGAD as an International Organization, Its Institutional Development and Shortcomings”
Journal of African Law (Cambridge)
Examines IGAD’s legal framework, CEWARN inception, and broader institutional dynamics.
(Cambridge University Press & Assessment) - “IGAD’s Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism (CEWARN)” (Official IGAD overview)
Detailed description of CEWARN’s design, implementation, and regional early-warning strategies.
(IGAD) - “High expectations: Civil society participation in conflict early warning and response systems of the AU, ECOWAS and IGAD”
Critically reviews IGAD’s CEWARN structure, highlighting its shortcomings in civic inclusion and operationalization.
(tandfonline.com) - “Inter-governmental Authority on Development on the Ground: Comparing Interventions in Sudan and Somalia”
Explores IGAD’s practical mediation efforts in both countries, pre-2000s.
(tandfonline.com) - “IGAD, Sudan, and South Sudan: Achievements and setbacks of regional mediation”
Offers a balanced evaluation of IGAD’s mediation outcomes, including scholarship on its limitations.
(tandfonline.com) - “An investigation into the role of the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) in the resolution of the Sudan conflict”
Gladys Manyi Ashu (2006)
Academic thesis focusing on the Machakos Protocol and IGAD’s mediation strengths and strategies in Sudan.
(DSpace Repository) - “Role of IGAD in Conflict Resolution: A Case Study of the Civil War in Sudan/South Sudan”
Kennedy Kariuki (2014 Master’s thesis)
Evaluates IGAD’s involvement in the Comprehensive Peace Agreement and regional peacebuilding.
(Erepo) - “Beyond Elite Bargains: The Legacy and Future of IGAD’s Mediation in South Sudan”
IPI Global Observatory, July 2025
Discusses IGAD’s hybrid mediation in South Sudan, balancing regional norms and international frameworks.
(IPI Global Observatory)
Primary & Media Reports
- AP News: “Sudan suspends ties with east African bloc for inviting paramilitary leader to summit”
Highlights political tensions arising from IGAD’s 2024 mediation efforts and perceived partiality.
(AP News) - Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies: “The Failure of the Jeddah and IGAD Mediation Efforts for Sudan”
Analysis of coordination failures among mediation initiatives, calling for more unified approaches.
(Arab Center Washington DC)
