On October 31, 2024, North Korea launched the latest and most powerful intercontinental ballistic missile in its arsenal, the Hwasong-19, which has a range of over 7,000 kilometers. This missile is an upgraded version of the Hwasong-18. International reports indicated that it achieved the longest flight in the history of North Korean missile tests, covering a threat level that could extend beyond the eastern U.S. mainland into deeper American territory.
This test represents a significant event in the context of a peak of highly complex interactions expected to increasingly complicate at an accelerated pace, amid a rising arms race between the two Koreas, coupled with the nuclear armament stance, particularly with the internal pressure in South Korea for nuclear independence from the American umbrella. In Seoul, there are even scenarios developed for a potential nuclear war between the two neighboring Koreas.
The main assessment that the South Korean military intelligence focuses on—presented in a closed parliamentary briefing a day before the North Korean missile test—is that North Korea’s next step will be to conduct its seventh nuclear test, especially as preparations for this have almost been completed at the testing site in Punggye-ri, a town in the northeast of the country. Reports suggest that the detonation might take place in tunnel number three designated for such tests.
A Frenzied Arms Race:
Currently, the repercussions of the recent missile test conducted by Pyongyang are at the forefront. However, it is noteworthy that South Korea showcased a new missile, the Hyunmoo-5, earlier in the same month, which is not less distinguished than its northern counterpart, the Hwasong-19. Seoul limited its presentation of the missile to the commemoration of the founding day of the national army without conducting a test. This has created an aura of uncertainty surrounding its new missile. The proximity in timing between the presentations of these two missiles signals an unprecedented missile arms race, justified by both sides as a need to build defense capabilities and readiness for deterrence.
U.S. defense analyses, based on image assessments of the Hyunmoo-5 missile and markings on the launch and storage vehicles, suggest that the missile aligns with South Korea’s current “three-axis” strategy designed to counter the increasing threat posed by North Korea’s nuclear and missile capabilities. This strategy comprises three plans known as (kill chain, air and missile defense, and massive punishment and retaliation), and Seoul has announced the establishment of a strategic leadership to oversee its three-pronged system and coordinate precise strike capabilities across all domains.
Conversely, the Hwasong-19 test reveals a missile that stands unparalleled in North Korea’s missile arsenal. The launch platform appears distinct from previous models, suggesting limited error margins and therefore higher accuracy in targeting. Moreover, the estimated weight of the warhead is significantly greater than previous versions within the same missile family.
Polar Alliance Strategy:
The two Korean rivals have exchanged accusations of expanding alliances that contribute to mutual escalation and polarization between the sides. Official data from Pyongyang indicates that this new test follows the expansion of Seoul’s alliances with the United States and Japan, as the three countries conducted naval maneuvers in April and May 2024. North Korea perceives these exercises, led by the U.S.-led alliance, as threats, as the naval exercises initiated from South Korean territorial waters, specifically Jeju Island, involved significant weaponry, including the USS Roosevelt aircraft carrier and a nuclear submarine, alongside destroyers making their debut deployment.
In light of these exercises and a meeting of the U.S. and South Korean defense and foreign ministers, North Korean Foreign Minister Choe Son-hui accused both countries on November 1 of plotting a nuclear attack against her country during a meeting with her Russian counterpart, Sergey Lavrov, in Moscow, a day after the missile test.
On the eve of the Hwasong-19 launch, tensions escalated between both sides in the United Nations Security Council where the U.S. Deputy Ambassador, Robert Hood, stated that Pyongyang sent thousands of troops to the Russian Kursk region, a claim that was flatly denied by Russia’s UN Ambassador, Vasily Nebenzya, calling the American reports “blatant lies.” In this context, U.S. reports suggest that Russia might share its missile expertise with North Korea in exchange for North Korean support in the war against Ukraine. In response, reports from the Korean Central News Agency reaffirmed Pyongyang’s commitment to sole ownership of the missile test.
In the same vein, North Korea’s stance intensified against the backdrop of a 2+2 meeting between Seoul and Washington, coinciding with the North Korean test. This committee, which consists of the foreign and defense ministries of both countries, saw a report from the Korean Central News Agency citing officials as saying that “North Korea has no choice but to continue efforts to enhance its self-defense capabilities,” accusing Washington and Seoul of pushing the Korean Peninsula toward war scenarios, following a second statement on the same day where the foreign minister indicated plans for a nuclear war.
Seoul’s Assessments of the Effectiveness of the U.S. Approach:
Last year, the United States issued the 2023 declaration regarding its policy towards North Korea as part of the U.S. national security strategy. This declaration included five main principles: (1) South Korea will reaffirm its commitment to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. (2) Washington is committed to making every effort to consult with Seoul before using nuclear weapons on the Korean Peninsula. (3) The two countries will establish a high-level nuclear advisory group. (4) The United States will visibly deploy strategic assets. (5) The two nations will enhance military exercises and maneuvers while integrating South Korean capabilities into U.S. strategic planning.
Following the North Korean missile test, the U.S. swiftly conducted an aerial exercise with South Korea and Japan, involving the B1B nuclear bomber along with strategic fighters from both Seoul and Tokyo.
However, South Korea’s assessments of the joint exercise agenda reflect renewed doubts about the effectiveness of U.S. deterrent behavior towards North Korea. Many South Korean evaluations agree that American deterrence, akin to NATO’s approach, might yield counterproductive effects, perhaps making North Korea more rigid in its defense policies.
Interestingly, there are U.S. assessments echoing this sentiment, as several defense analysts with regional expertise indicate that incorporating South Korea’s protective policy into the U.S. national security strategy, under the title of “integrated deterrence policy,” and the structural framework it established through the formation of a nuclear consultation committee, are merely tactical policies and do not reflect an overarching American power strategy to ultimately deter Pyongyang.
Returning to unofficial assessments in Seoul, they suggest serious options being considered in the corridors of the joint (2+2) meetings, including giving South Korea a free hand in nuclear armament to build a deterrent balance against its northern counterpart, or redeploying U.S. tactical nuclear weapons in South Korea. These assessments are also supported by public opinion surveys indicating a rise in popular support for an independent nuclear arsenal, with a South Korean Unification Institute survey this year showing 66% public support for South Korea developing its nuclear weapons, a six-point increase from a previous survey conducted in 2023. Analysts in Seoul often repeat the question: What if a nuclear war breaks out between the Koreas? How would the response unfold in such a scenario?
Nevertheless, the most likely option at this time leans toward the redeployment of U.S. tactical nuclear weapons, a notion hinted at by South Korean news agency Yonhap, which reported that U.S. preparations are underway to deploy “strategic assets”—typically referring to conventional and nuclear capabilities—in response to North Korean missile tests. As an urgent measure, the U.S. State Department announced new regulations on 15 materials used in rocket solid fuel combustion structures to restrict North Korea’s access to them.
The Japanese Position:
Japan swiftly condemned the North Korean missile test and appears to have been informed at least a day in advance before the test, due to information exchanges with South Korea and the United States. Based on reports from Tokyo, South Korean military intelligence detected preparations for another missile launch by North Korea on October 30.
Undoubtedly, Japan perceives the North Korean missile threat. While short-range nuclear missiles pose a direct threat to South Korea, long-range and intercontinental missiles represent a threat to Japan and the U.S. mainland, as the intercontinental missiles North Korea has tested have previously flown over Japanese airspace, as occurred in 2017 with the Hwasong-12 test.
From Tokyo’s perspective, the new Hwasong-19 missile is characterized by its capability to reach space at record speeds before returning to the atmosphere, being launched at a high angle, which implies a steep, nearly vertical descent that avoids maximum proximity to neighboring territories. The first official statement from Japanese Defense Minister Gen Nakatani confirmed that the missile fell outside Japan’s economic waters, about 200 miles west of the island of Okushiri in Hokkaido, causing no damages while recognizing the standard achieved by the missile test.
In light of this, three main considerations can be noted regarding Japan’s stance on these missile tests. First, Japan will primarily continue to strengthen its alliance with the United States and South Korea, acknowledging that this alliance also sends messages to China amid ongoing maritime disputes. The second consideration concerns efforts to enhance the American nuclear protection umbrella. The third relates to increasing military spending, evident in the historic defense budget approved for 2024, amounting to 7.95 trillion yen (approximately 55.9 billion USD), reflecting a 16.5% increase over 2023, with plans for a continued annual increase that could reach 62.5 billion USD by 2027, making the aggregated five-year defense budget 302 billion USD—setting a historic benchmark for Japan.
What’s Next?
It can be said that Pyongyang has achieved a technical leap in its missile program, evidenced by the brief time between two tests of the Hwasong-19 within a year, and positive indications of significant improvements in capabilities. However, other obscure signs—or, in other words, questions raised by some specialized technical assessments—relate to the massive size of the missile, which might render it impractical for wartime use.
With this tremendous North Korean development and Pyongyang’s possession of between 50 and 80 nuclear warheads, or possibly more based on varied estimates, and considering former President Donald Trump’s victory in the U.S. presidential election, South Korea may now focus on the next nuclear test, a possibility also hinted at by Japanese reports. This is particularly pertinent as both countries link it to the presence of North Korean troops supporting Russia in its war in Ukraine, suggesting that North Korea’s engagement in such a conflict will have implications for its nuclear program in one way or another.
This possibility is also associated with what some perceive as a contradiction between the official statements and leaks from the capitals of the three-nation alliance (Washington, Seoul, Tokyo), which imply that the sequential direction is toward increased strategic coordination. However, behind the scenes and at the unofficial level, there are widespread criticisms of relying on the American nuclear umbrella as the primary option, with various assessments in Japan and South Korea indicating an erosion of that umbrella, necessitating more effective deterrence measures, while not ignoring the importance of the American umbrella until viable alternatives exist.
Undoubtedly, proposing alternatives to the American nuclear umbrella carries risks. Although possessing nuclear programs, a wide base of reactors, knowledge, and expertise, the more dangerous consideration is the potential timeline for arriving at a state of nuclear equilibrium, which would not solely impact North Korea, as China might also view this as directed towards it—leading Washington to anticipate South Korean and Japanese actions of this kind, given that it would overturn all balances in East Asia.
Finally, the potential return of former President Donald Trump to the White House could lead South Korea and Japan to adopt two different types of responses, moving towards greater self-reliance that may even include the possibility of acquiring nuclear weapons to deter the anticipated North Korean threat. However, they will simultaneously await political signals from the White House and the Pentagon regarding North Korea at the beginning of Trump’s new term, considering the potential shifts happening among allies on one hand, and Trump’s approach toward North Korea, China, and Russia on the other. For instance, during Biden’s administration, North Korea conducted 115 missile launches—double the number during Trump’s first term (2016-2020)—considering that as of today, the situation for North Korea is significantly different compared to 2018 in terms of missile and nuclear capabilities, alongside the dangerous shifts in the regional security environment in East and Northeast Asia amidst an ongoing war in Ukraine and regional conflicts in the Middle East.
