Under the title “Back to the Crime Scene,” prominently featured on the front page of the Iranian newspaper Javan, the publication affiliated with the Revolutionary Guard commented on the victory of Republican candidate and former U.S. President Donald Trump in the American presidential elections, which took place on November 6, 2024. This victory raised concerns and anticipation within Iran, despite claims from some quarters that it is “irrelevant.”
Trump’s anticipated second presidential term occurs against a different internal, regional, and international backdrop for Iran compared to his first term (2017-2021). While current factors complicate the chances of de-escalation between the two sides, suggesting a continuation of the conflict (the boxing ring in Persian literature), they also open the door for the possibility of a major deal covering various contentious issues between them (the chess game), although this remains contingent on the still heated conditions in the region.
Diverse Positions:
Trump’s victory elicited varied reactions within Iran, which can be highlighted as follows:
Disguising Impact: In the first Iranian response to Trump’s victory, the spokesperson for the Iranian government, Fatemeh Mohajeri, stated that “the livelihood of Iranians is not affected by the results of the American elections,” adding, “Our policies are fixed and do not change based on individuals.” Furthermore, the Supreme Leader of Iran, Ali Khamenei, in his first appearance on November 7, 2024, during a meeting with members of the Assembly of Experts, avoided commenting on the American elections and Trump’s victory, an act not lacking in significance, especially compared to his previous vehement declarations against Trump, which included direct threats to assassinate him in retaliation for the killing of former Quds Force commander Qasem Soleimani in early January 2020.
Tehran aims to avoid exacerbating relations with Washington ahead of the anticipated presidency of elected Trump, hoping that his victory will not prompt a more hardline approach towards Iran, particularly in light of emerging preliminary appointments in the new American administration, featuring figures perceived in Tehran as “hawks and lunatics,” including Marco Rubio, chosen to be Secretary of State, and Brian Hook, nominated to be the American envoy for Iran, both known for their hardline stances towards Iran.
Sending Signals for De-escalation: In a departure from previous trends, Iranian officials acknowledged that Trump’s election reflects the choice of the American people through democratic means, expressing the popular will of Americans. This was articulated by Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesman Ismail Baghaei. This stance contrasts sharply with previous Iranian views regarding American elections, which Khamenei had described as “the most rigged in the world” when commenting on the 2020 election results that led to Joe Biden’s victory.
Furthermore, Iranian President Masoud Bezhakian affirmed, in his remarks on Trump’s victory, that “there is no escape from dealing with the United States patiently,” and Iranian Presidential Assistant Mohammad Javad Zarif labeled Trump’s victory as an “opportunity” for Washington to reassess its policies towards Tehran, urging Trump to alter the maximum pressure strategy pursued during his first term, which, he argued, had only resulted in significant escalation in Iran’s nuclear program. Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi echoed this sentiment multiple times.
These messages from Iran reflect the direction that Bezhakian’s government aims to pursue regarding the United States, based on “managing differences” with Washington and seeking to understand each other regarding contentious issues, with the aim of lifting the burdens of sanctions, which Bezhakian declared his top priority since his election campaign.
Denying Involvement in Assassination Attempts against Trump: Iranian officials renewed their denial of any link to attempts to plan the assassination of Donald Trump, with Araghchi calling such accusations “third-rate comedy.” The Foreign Ministry spokesperson called it “an attempt to lay mines in relations between Tehran and Washington.” These statements came in response to a federal court ruling in Manhattan on November 8, 2024, that charged a member of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard in connection with an intermediary in planning Trump’s assassination either before or after the elections, linked to prior foiled attempts by American police to assassinate Trump, the latest of which was on October 14, 2024.
This is also connected to Tehran’s efforts to alleviate tensions that may arise during the anticipated presidential term of elected Trump. This includes attempts related to cybersecurity allegedly orchestrated by Iranians to influence the results of the American elections, all of which will impact the approach Trump will take towards Tehran, especially given his known inclination towards personal vendettas.
Showing Readiness for Military Confrontation: Some Iranian circles fear that Trump’s return may multiply the pressures on them and lead to greater isolation, potentially resulting in direct military strikes either from the U.S. itself or through allowing Israel to take on this mission unabated.
For example, on November 6, 2024, the Deputy Commander of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard, Ali Fadavi, stated that he did not rule out any U.S. or Israeli preemptive strikes to deter Iran from responding to the recent Israeli attack on October 26, 2024. Also, the former head of the Revolutionary Guard intelligence service, Hossein Taeb, called for continued military escalation with Israel until the end to demonstrate Iran’s power and capabilities against what he referred to as “hostile forces.”
This context aligns with reports of Tehran launching the “Khoramshahr 4” ballistic missile on November 10, 2024, from the missile base in Semnan Province, which some Israeli sources indicated was targeted in the recent Israeli strikes against Iran—a challenge from Tehran indicating that its missile program had not been hindered by recent Israeli attacks, counter to claims from some sources, and that it is continuing to develop advanced missiles, given that Iran had used these in attacks on Israel in April and October.
Potential Effects:
Trump’s victory in securing a new presidential term is likely to result in several repercussions linked to Iran’s behavior, which can be summarized as follows:
Postponing Response to Israel: Prior to the announcement of the American election results, Iranian calls for counteraction against Israel due to its attacks on Iranian targets on October 26, 2024, had intensified. These attacks reportedly included air defense systems and sites for manufacturing crucial ballistic missile components, as well as a nuclear research center, prompting Khamenei to instruct Iranian officials to prepare a response to the Israeli assaults, despite his initial reluctance when the attacks occurred. This implies that Tehran was beginning to assess the extent of the damages resulting from Israeli strikes, initially unclear.
However, these demands faded in the days following Trump’s victory due to fears in Tehran that any potential retaliation against Israel could provide a strong pretext for the incoming Trump administration to unleash Israel, which would leverage this potential response to target what the current U.S. administration under Biden has deemed “red lines,” specifically concerning Iran’s nuclear and oil facilities.
Some evaluations suggest that the briefing by Iranian air defense leaders before the Islamic Consultative Assembly’s (Iranian Parliament) National Security Committee on November 11, 2024, in which they confirmed that the recent Israeli strike on Iran “did not achieve its objectives,” may serve as a message allowing Tehran to evade its commitment to a “mandatory” response to Israel.
This does not mean that Iran will abandon its response to Israel, especially considering the legitimate reasons that may compel Iran to act, including the need to maintain the balance of deterrence with Israel to escalate the cost of any future attack against Iran, in addition to the fact that the Israeli strikes targeted locations in Tehran, marking the first time the capital has been attacked since the eight-year war with Iraq, alongside the death of four military personnel and one civilian as a result of these strikes. However, Trump’s victory will likely lead Iran to deliberate its response carefully and rationally, potentially rationalizing the response to its minimum or even leveraging it as a bargaining chip with the United States regarding other nuclear and regional issues.
Manipulating the Nuclear Card: Trump’s return to the White House casts a heavy shadow over Iran’s nuclear program. On one hand, Tehran is concerned that the incoming American administration may assist Israel in targeting Iran’s nuclear program, as Israel has made this option available following the exchanges of attacks between it and Iran in April and October 2024. This option can only be pursued with clear support from the United States on technical, military, and political levels. Trump’s stance on this was evident when he stated regarding the Israeli attacks on Iran on October 26, “Strike the nuclear program first, worry about the rest later.”
On the other hand, Tehran seeks to leverage Trump’s leniency towards the possibility of reaching an agreement with Iran, which he has expressed multiple times, contingent upon American terms that include preventing Iran from attaining nuclear weapons and potentially include conditions related to its missile program or regional role.
Despite Iranian statements prior to the American elections regarding a possible shift in “nuclear doctrine” towards acquiring nuclear weapons, following Khamenei’s fatwa against it, Iran demonstrated flexibility regarding international oversight of its nuclear program by inviting International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Director General Rafael Grossi to visit Tehran on November 12, 2024, a visit that had been postponed for months. This invitation also comes at a time when Iran’s nuclear program has reached advanced levels; the IAEA’s recent report issued in August 2024 indicated that Iran is only two kilograms short of producing four nuclear bombs if it decides to pursue that course.
This visit grants Tehran some time to maneuver with its nuclear card and claim that it does not oppose reaching understandings with the agency regarding outstanding issues, similar to the partial agreement reached in March 2023 to avoid additional pressures. Moreover, the nuclear agreement is nearing what is termed the “end day” on October 18, 2025, compelling Iran to seek a new agreement, or it risks reinstitution of international sanctions if Europeans activate the “snapback mechanism,” or even face military actions targeting its program, a prospect that Araghchi warned against in his remarks on November 14, 2024, expressing Iran’s willingness to negotiate based on “national interest” and “without pressure or intimidation.”
Pressuring Proxies for Acceptance of De-escalation: Tehran recognizes that one of Trump’s main objectives during his previous presidency was to curtail Iranian influence in the region. However, recent developments following the “Al-Aqsa Flood” operation on October 7, 2023, may give this strategy notable momentum during his upcoming presidency. Trump stated in one of his meetings that he would end the war in Ukraine in 24 hours, while asserting that he would urge Israel to halt hostilities in Gaza and Lebanon, which implies that the matter will remain at Israel’s discretion to assess the situation to ensure its security, with unlimited support from the anticipated American administration.
Consequently, Iran is likely to pressure Hezbollah in Lebanon and Hamas in Palestine to accept de-escalation and ceasefire, hoping to prevent loss of the remaining capabilities of these groups entirely due to the severe strikes they have recently faced from Israel. Tehran has shown responsiveness towards this, manifesting in the Iranian president’s remarks suggesting that a ceasefire could impact their response to the Israeli assault, indicating Tehran’s readiness to partially relinquish its retaliation against Israel if an opportunity arises for a ceasefire in Gaza and Lebanon, alongside showing flexibility regarding the implementation of UN Resolution 1701 to end the war in Lebanon.
In this context, the visit of Iranian leader’s advisor Ali Larijani to Lebanon coincided with indications of a preliminary approval from Hezbollah regarding the American proposal for a ceasefire in Lebanon.
Continuing to Improve Relations with Regional Countries: Notably, Bezhakian’s comments on Trump’s victory indicated that this win meant nothing for Iran, prioritizing strengthening relations with “our neighbors and Islamic nations,” implying that Tehran is committed to improving ties with regional countries. This approach began with the previous Iranian government under Ebrahim Raisi, signing an agreement to restore relations with Saudi Arabia on March 10, 2023, followed by pact after pact to foster reconciliation with regional states.
In this context, Iranian First Vice President Mohammad Nasr Aref participated in the Arab-Islamic summit in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, on November 11, 2024, meeting Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman and affirming commitment to furthering relations between the two sides. Additionally, military cooperation between the two countries is growing, evidenced by the visit of Saudi Chief of Staff General Fayyad Al-Ruwaili to Tehran on November 10, 2024, to meet his Iranian counterpart Major General Mohammad Baqeri to explore the development of bilateral relations in military and defense fields. This came shortly after both sides, alongside other countries, conducted military maneuvers in the Arabian Sea, underscoring Tehran’s determination to deepen cooperation with regional states, especially considering Iran’s efforts to restore ties with neighboring countries.
Tehran’s objective from this approach is twofold: first, to attempt to lessen the political and economic blockade imposed on it due to sanctions, and second, to thwart opportunities for the United States and Israel to exploit the differences between Iran and its neighbors to exert more pressure on Tehran.
Competition between Hardliners and Reformists: Trump’s victory in the U.S. presidential elections has intensified competition between hardline and reformist factions in Iran. While some reformist and moderate groups expressed optimism about Trump’s win, viewing it as an “opportunity,” as articulated by reformist leader and former minister in President Mohammad Khatami’s era, Mohammad Ali Abtahi, others cautioned against not seizing this opportunity. This sentiment was echoed by the Iranian newspaper “Setareh Sobh,” which ran a front-page headline saying “Accept Reality… Trump Has Come,” urging decision-makers in Tehran to send an urgent message to the United States assuring that Iran does not seek to acquire a nuclear bomb and desires to improve relations with Washington. Conversely, hardline elements strongly criticized this stance, as evidenced by “Kayhan,” a newspaper close to Supreme Leader Khamenei, which denounced what it terms “pretenders to reform,” who are allegedly instilling fear among Iranians following Trump’s victory. Some conservative figures responded with “death to Trump,” including well-known members of the steadfast front, alongside declarations from others asserting that Iran’s interests are unaffected by who is in power in the U.S.
This competition recalls the dynamics preceding the signing of the nuclear agreement between Iran and the P5+1 in 2015, where reformists and moderates exemplified by former president Hassan Rouhani and his foreign minister Javad Zarif pushed for the deal and western opening, contrasting with another faction of conservatives opposing this course, who found their validation in Trump’s withdrawal from the nuclear agreement in 2018. They launched a fierce attack on reformists and moderates, transforming the reformists’ greatest victory (the nuclear deal signing) into a significant defeat that became evident in subsequent parliamentary (2020) and presidential (2021) elections, where hardline factions triumphed, and reformists faced significant setbacks leading up to Bezhakian’s win.
In conclusion, it can be said that the coming period will be critical for Iran to monitor the formation of the new administration under incoming President Trump and to assess how its approach differs from that of the previous administration. Considerable indicators suggest the possibility of understanding between the two countries, including the presence of a reformist government in Iran aiming for rapprochement with Washington, along with Trump’s assurances that he intends not to attack Iran or change its regime; rather, he wishes to prevent it from acquiring nuclear weapons while controlling its regional behavior—a scenario that could materialize within a deal encompassing these issues. However, the continued escalation of tensions in the region amid the ongoing conflict in Gaza and Lebanon makes any discussion of an American-Iranian understanding difficult to attain, at least in the short term. Nevertheless, this does not rule out the resumption of indirect negotiations that had previously taken place between the two parties, which had recently halted—an outcome not rejected by the American “businessman” mentality represented by Trump nor by the Iranian “bazaar trader” mentality, which has negotiated even with the Iraqis during the eight-year war.
