How has Germany’s policy towards Russia changed?

Unlike the norm, Germany’s incoming Chancellor quickly proclaimed his stance on the relationship with the United States. In a television show, Friedrich Merz remarked that he never imagined he would need to say something like that on air, but following Trump’s recent statements criticizing the European Union and attacking Ukraine before peace talks with Russia, and hinting at the end of America’s traditional commitment to European security, it seems that this new American administration does not care about Europe’s fate.

Friedrich Merz, known for his strong support of transatlantic relations, asserted that his top priority is to gradually enhance Europe’s power, leading to strategic independence from the United States. Merz aims to firmly restore Germany’s role in the European and international political arena, in a country where 79% of the population believes that Russia represents the greatest threat to peace, while the war in Ukraine is a significant concern for them, all amid a decline in trust towards the American ally. Only 39% of Germans believe that the alliance with the United States is still stable.

Eastern Policy

Since the Cold War, the eastern policy (Ostpolitik) has been central to West Germany’s approach toward the Soviet Union for decades. The Social Democratic Party adopted this course after coming to power (1969-1982), driven by internal transformations, including student protests, the rise of a post-war generation as a voting force rejecting the conservative approach dominated by Adenauer, opposition to American intervention in Vietnam, and resentment toward the silence of the previous generation regarding the Third Reich’s history.

German Chancellor Willy Brandt utilized this turn to reshape German foreign policy, realizing that betting on a sudden collapse of socialist regimes was a naive proposition. Brandt hoped to establish a relationship of trust with the East, similar to what his Christian Democratic predecessor, Chancellor Konrad Adenauer, had with the West. Brandt’s policy relied on acknowledging the status quo, within a pragmatic framework that guided him alongside Minister Egon Bahr, the architect of the détente policy, who summarized its essence with his famous phrase: “Acknowledging the current situation in order to change it in the future.” Egon Bahr drew upon John F. Kennedy’s vision that “the development of trade with Eastern bloc countries should occur without endangering our security.” The central idea was that enhancing economic relations would create social interconnectedness and that improving living standards in the Soviet Union and East Germany could mitigate the stance of the ruling regimes and reduce ideological polarization, hoping that this might lead to a rapprochement that could culminate in the reunification of Germany. Eastern policy played a role in the West’s strategy to ease tensions between the socialist and capitalist blocs.

Practically, West Germany concluded a series of “eastern treaties” with Warsaw Pact countries, including agreements to enhance communications and facilitate crossings. In August 1970, the Moscow Treaty solidified this direction, as both parties agreed to renounce the use of force and recognize the European borders established after World War II. In December of the same year, the Warsaw Treaty reinforced this approach by officially recognizing the Oder-Neisse Line as Poland’s western border, effectively ending the border dispute left by post-war territorial changes. This recognition was a turning point that contributed to alleviating historical tensions between the two countries. In December 1972, the Basic Treaty was signed between West Germany and East Germany, with each side recognizing the sovereignty of the other; this opened the door to expanding diplomatic, economic, and cultural exchanges between the two states and helped establish the détente policy as a strategic option to contain the German-German conflict within the context of the Cold War.

This orientation did not receive significant support from the German economic circles. The percentage of companies interested in expanding trade relations with the Soviet Union was limited, and German-Soviet trade in the 1970s was compensatory, as German exports were tied to Soviet imports economically and technologically. For instance, under the 1970 agreement, West Germany supplied the Soviet Union with large-diameter pipes, which were later used to export natural gas. While West Germany’s reliance on Moscow was not critically important economically at the time, it was sufficient to establish a long-term relationship between the two sides.

Germany soon found itself at the heart of Cold War tensions; in 1981, the Soviet Union exerted pressure on the communist government in Poland to suppress the Solidarity movement, a Polish trade union that called for broad social reforms. The United States responded by imposing economic sanctions on Moscow; however, Chancellor Helmut Schmidt—Brandt’s successor from the Social Democratic Party—rejected this confrontational approach and instead continued his policy of promoting eastern policy, pushing for the implementation of the gas pipeline agreement between West Germany and the Soviet Union, aimed at transporting natural gas from Siberia to Europe. This decision displeased the United States, revealing how the eastern policy deepened the gap between West Germany and its closest allies.

Upon Helmut Kohl’s assumption of power, he sought to mend relations with the United States, as his strong support for NATO and his agreement to deploy American missiles in Western Europe were pivotal in restoring trust between the two countries. However, Kohl did not seek to detach the economic ties that West Germany had established with the Soviet Union; he recognized—the same as most West Germans—the importance of maintaining a channel for dialogue with Moscow, especially regarding the future of East Germany.

More broadly, the détente approach contributed to stabilizing the relationship between West Germany and the Soviet Union, and it was seen as a key factor in achieving the peaceful reunification of Germany in 1990. While it is difficult to determine the extent of this policy’s impact on ending the Cold War, it strengthened West Germany’s pragmatic approach, paving the way to accommodate geopolitical changes in the following decades. The legacy of eastern policy can be summarized in three main points:

1. Enhancement of West Germany’s International Status: West Germany’s engagement with East bloc countries expanded its diplomatic influence, enabling it to play a more effective role in the international arena. This shift also helped reshape German identity post-war, moving away from the legacy of hardline nationalism.
2. Contributing to European Detente: Eastern policy alleviated tensions between East and West, exemplified by the Helsinki Accords of 1975, which emphasized respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. This agreement is viewed as a precursor to the movements for change in Eastern Europe, which later contributed to the collapse of communist regimes.
3. Domestic Controversy and Conservative Concerns: Despite its successes, eastern policy faced sharp criticism within West Germany; conservatives argued that recognizing East Germany and the post-war borders would reinforce the country’s division and dilute claims to lost territories. This debate highlighted the tension between national identity and pragmatic diplomacy, a discussion that remained present in German politics for decades.

German Approaches to Partnership with Russia

With the end of the Cold War, the fall of the Berlin Wall, and the dissolution of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s, there was a prevailing belief in Germany and the West that Russia would trend towards democracy, and optimism even suggested the possibility of its joining NATO. Former U.S. Secretary of State James Baker promoted this optimism, believing it would bolster the democratic transition in Russia and prevent a return to the previous authoritarian approach. However, these hopes quickly faded, and frustration began to creep into Western perceptions throughout the 1990s, as signs of faltering democratic progress in Russia grew and the likelihood of a return to authoritarianism increased. The failure of the democratic transition was not solely the Russians’ fault; Western partners did not make sufficient efforts to effectively integrate Russia into European institutions and failed to reshape a new European security system that included Russia outside of NATO.

This approach, whether intended or not, fostered feelings of subjugation and humiliation among Russians, increasing their aversion towards the West. Furthermore, the West’s exaggerated assessment of the strength of the democratic wave following the collapse of the Soviet Union, combined with erroneous assumptions about the trajectory of developments in Russia, led to an underestimation of the Russian imperial legacy and the strength of deeply entrenched power structures, which proved to be more resilient than anticipated.

At first, Moscow viewed the eastward expansion of the European Union positively, particularly with the potential for partnership agreements between Russia and the EU. However, it later rejected European partnership agreements with Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia, even though it initially sought similar agreements. Regarding NATO, Russia opposed its eastward expansion from the start, and although attempts were made to contain these concerns through agreements in 1997 and 2002, Moscow was not satisfied, seeking an equal role within the alliance. Additionally, NATO and EU members were not prepared to grant Russia a sphere of influence in the post-Soviet space, given their commitment to the principles of sovereignty and the right to self-determination for smaller states, thus rejecting a return to the “balance of power” politics that prevailed in the 19th and 20th centuries.

The EU attempted to enhance cooperation with Russia, but without sacrificing the interests of smaller states in Eastern and Southeastern Europe. Any neglect of these countries would rekindle feelings of distrust and fears of redrawing borders reminiscent of the Yalta Agreement.

The eastern expansion of the EU and NATO created a new European reality, where Berlin no longer needed to seek Moscow’s approval when dealing with countries like Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary, as the former Warsaw Pact countries had become part of the EU and NATO, thereby securing a seat at the decision-making table regarding policies towards Russia.

This radical change led to a contraction of the eastern policy, evolving into a new German policy towards Russia (Rysslandpolitik). The new policy seemed to offer a suitable framework for integrating Russia into a broader Europe. It also helped German companies expand their influence in Russia, but despite the formal similarities between the two approaches, considering it a direct extension of the eastern policy is misleading, as the entire international context has changed.

Despite Berlin’s intention to deeply integrate Russia into European institutions, this effort went beyond its membership in the Council of Europe and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, extending towards broader prospects. Moscow was dissatisfied, and Putin’s speech before the German Bundestag in 2001 clearly reflected this frustration when he sarcastically questioned whether this partnership was real. Putin openly criticized the West, particularly concerning Russia’s marginalization within the European security structure, and denied it an influential role in NATO. As European integration advanced and NATO expanded, Putin’s rhetoric became more straightforward and assertive towards the West.

This approach reached its peak during Chancellor Gerhard Schröder’s tenure; Germany, under Schröder, chose to ignore this escalation and preferred to focus on “modernization partnership” and “change through trade” with Russia, aiming for a constructive partnership. For instance, the German-Russian advisory meetings (2001-2005) were institutionalized. In 2005, the two countries signed an agreement to build the “Nord Stream” gas pipeline, connecting Russia and Germany directly across the Baltic Sea, which enhanced economic cooperation between the two parties. Schröder dismissed the increasing political tensions raised by objections from Eastern European countries and particularly emphasized “historical reconciliation,” showing a particular understanding of “Russia’s fears of encirclement,” and criticized the EU for rejecting Russia’s proposal to create a free trade area extending from Vladivostok to Lisbon. Over time, Schröder’s relationship with Putin evolved into a close one, making it unsurprising for Schröder to describe Putin as a “genuine democrat.” Later, Schröder joined the boards of Russian energy companies, and analysts argue that Schröder’s policy encouraged Putin to adopt a more aggressive approach, as he realized that Germany would prioritize economic interests above all else. The Federal Republic of Germany could less be described as anything other than “Russia’s lawyer in Europe.”

Merkel’s Gamble

During Angela Merkel’s tenure (2005-2021), she initially adopted the traditional German approach towards Russia established by Helmut Kohl and solidified by Gerhard Schröder, which relied on economic integration and diplomatic rapprochement as tools to contain Russia. In her early years, Merkel ignored the rise of authoritarianism within Russia and Putin’s turn towards a revisionist foreign policy towards Europe, continuing the partnership policy that began losing its foundations as Putin entrenching an authoritarian regime and focusing on geopolitical interests.

The Obama administration adopted a “reset” policy towards Russia, which encouraged German Chancellor Angela Merkel to strengthen her relations with Moscow, then headed by Dmitry Medvedev. In this context, Merkel framed the EU’s agenda towards Russia, adopting the “partnership for modernization” approach, based on traditional German political assumptions that enhancing economic interaction with Russia could transform it into a more democratic and reliable player. In 2010, this model became an official EU policy with the launch of the “EU-Russia Partnership for Modernization,” alongside the signing of 22 bilateral agreements between member states and Moscow.

Merkel intensified her efforts to integrate Russia into European frameworks, signing the Meseberg Memorandum with Medvedev, which proposed establishing a joint political and security committee between the EU and Russia, granting Moscow greater influence over European security decisions—a privilege not enjoyed by the U.S. or NATO. The settlement of the Transnistria conflict (the breakaway region in Moldova supported by Russia) was seen as a practical test for this new cooperation mechanism.

However, the Meseberg Memorandum encountered several obstacles and failed to achieve its objectives, as Russia made no concessions to resolve the conflict, instead appointing the far-right nationalist Dmitry Rogozin as its envoy to Transnistria and head of the Moldovan-Russian economic commission, signaling Moscow’s lack of interest in any real progress. The Meseberg initiative highlighted the limitations of the German approach, as Berlin faced criticism for “cutting deals” bilaterally with Russia amid hesitance from EU member states to shoulder responsibility. Rather than enhancing EU-Russia relations, the initiative led to disappointment on both sides, further eroding mutual trust and demonstrating the limitations of German influence within European policy.

Over time, Merkel started adopting a more cautious stance towards Moscow, criticizing Putin’s human rights record and opposing granting him broader influence within European institutions. However, these criticisms were not accompanied by decisive actions to contain Russian influence; Merkel continued to support the “Nord Stream 2” project, making Germany more reliant on Russian energy. This decision represented not only a continuation of traditional German economic policy but also revealed a fundamental conflict between Berlin’s economic interests and its national security.

In this context, it can be argued that German policy did not undergo a fundamental transformation during the first decade of Merkel’s rule; German politicians remained attached to their old perceptions of the relationship with Russia, while the economic elite sought to protect their investments and commercial interests, even as signs of Russian escalation became evident. As a result of this orientation, Germany became more susceptible to Russian coercion as it continued to collaborate with a kleptocratic regime that gained access to its critical infrastructure through mega energy projects led by Gazprom and its subsidiaries.

Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014 brought about changes in German policy, but it was not enough to sever ties with the previous approach. Merkel supported the imposition of sanctions on Moscow, but instead of adopting a stricter strategy to curb Russian influence, she kept communication channels open with the Kremlin, supported by then-Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier, former chief of staff to Schröder.

Merkel’s fundamental bet rested on the assumption that ongoing dialogue would prevent misunderstandings that could lead to open military escalation; for this reason, Germany remained hesitant between intensifying sanctions and maintaining its trade and energy relations with Russia. This became a fundamental factor in the continuity of German caution, making Putin bolder, but more importantly, public opinion in Germany leaned toward playing the role of a mediator between Russia and the West instead of engaging directly with Moscow. This public stance reinforced Merkel’s hesitance, as she sought to maintain a diplomatic balance, even if it meant not taking firmer actions.

The annexation of Crimea served as an early warning of the failure of German policy towards Russia; it revealed the inherent flaws in Germany’s approach to Russia, failing to deter Russian expansionist ambitions, and the Minsk agreements underscored the limitations of diplomacy with a revisionist expansionist power that does not respect political settlements. This crisis imposed a daunting challenge on Germany: how to balance economic pragmatism, diplomatic mediation, and geopolitical realism?

Germany’s tepid response in 2014 fortified Putin’s conviction that Berlin would not take deterrent measures, and its continued reliance on Russian energy undermined its leverage; thus, Berlin failed to recognize that the Russian strategy was long term, as the annexation of Crimea was not an isolated event but part of a broader Russian approach to destabilizing Europe. Nevertheless, Germany persisted in betting on dialogue and economic measures as tools to contain Russia, ignoring the signals coming from Moscow.

Lessons Learned: Failures of German Policy toward Russia

The Illusion of Transformation and the Myth of Economic Interdependence: Germany assumed that economic cooperation would lead to a democratic transformation in Russia, drawing inspiration from the eastern policy experience. This approach overlooked that Putin was not seeking reform; rather, he aimed to fortify his authority, using the economy as a tool of influence. Energy projects like Nord Stream became a means of coercion instead of a guarantee of stability, with Russian revenues being used to fund military interventions in Georgia (2008), Crimea (2014), and Ukraine (2022).

Historical Blind Spots: The “Russia first” approach dominated German thinking, leading to the disregard of the security concerns of Eastern European countries like Poland, the Baltic states, and Ukraine. Berlin focused its historical responsibility for World War II solely on Russia, ignoring that Ukraine and Belarus also bore the brunt of Nazi occupation. This led to a leniency toward Moscow, including the rejection of Ukraine’s NATO accession plan in 2008, which encouraged Russia to escalate.

Culture of Appeasement and Diplomatic Illusions: Germany tethered its policy toward Russia to dialogue and economic integration, believing that concessions would encourage cooperation. However, the opposite occurred, as the appeasement policy exacerbated Putin’s expansionist appetite. Even after the Crimea annexation, Berlin continued to seek dialogue, even as Russia no longer considered itself part of the European system but rather a power seeking to undermine it.

Influence of Economic Interests in Shaping Policy: Economic lobbying groups, such as the Eastern Committee of the German Economy, imposed the preservation of close relations with Moscow, citing Germany’s need for Russian gas and markets. Entities like “Petersburg Dialogue” also played a role in promoting a strategic partnership with Russia, even after its aggression escalated. The influence of these interests extended to the German political elite, who prioritized trade over national security.

Ignoring the Geopolitical and Security Dimension: Berlin favored economic interests over security considerations, disregarding warnings about Putin’s expansionist policies. After the annexation of Crimea in 2014, it imposed limited sanctions without any effective deterrence. This blunder worsened with the continued support for “Nord Stream 2,” which reduced Ukraine’s role as an energy transit state, making it more susceptible to Russian coercion.

Failure to Prepare for the Ukraine War: Despite allies’ warnings, Germany adopted no deterrence strategy before the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 and refused to provide arms to Kyiv even after the war broke out, weakening its defenses. Berlin took too long to adjust its stance, revealing its lack of readiness to contend with such a significant threat.

A Moment of Transformation (Zeitenwende)

Germans were shocked as they witnessed Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. They felt it was an assault on the very idea of Germany itself.

On February 27, 2022—three days after the Russian invasion—Chancellor Olaf Scholz announced a historic turning point before the German Bundestag, pledging to make radical, historic changes in Germany’s and Europe’s history. He committed to establishing a €100 billion defense fund to modernize the German army, promising to increase defense spending to 2% of GDP, providing military aid to Ukraine, thus overcoming decades of hesitation in exporting lethal weapons, and finally ending dependence on Russian energy by investing in liquefied natural gas and renewable energy.

In that moment, Scholz reshaped the discussion about Germany’s role in Europe and the world, departing from the old German principle of not arming parties in international conflicts, and simultaneously challenging all preconceived notions regarding Russia.

However, despite the decisive nature of this announcement, implementing reforms faced significant obstacles. Germany’s “new foreign policy” remains the subject of intense debate. Obstacles emerged when Germany confronted itself, as bureaucratic hurdles, political divisions, and a reluctance to take risks made the necessary changes a process fraught with hesitation and, crucially, lacking a coherent strategy for dealing with the ramifications of change.

Berlin resisted sending heavy weapons to Ukraine, citing fears of escalation with Russia, while Poland and the Baltic states provided direct military assistance. Germany initially sent only 5,000 helmets, leading to widespread criticism. Later, under American and European pressure, Germany began providing advanced weapons, such as Gepard anti-aircraft tanks, IRIS-T air defense systems, and PzH 2000 self-propelled howitzers. In 2023, it agreed to send “Leopard 2” tanks, but only after dragging its feet and facing NATO pressure. Although Germany has become one of Ukraine’s largest weapon suppliers, its delays have harmed its credibility as a reliable security ally.

The most dramatic change was the swift abandonment of Russian energy; Germany succeeded in leading Europe to reduce energy supplies from Russia. Berlin halted the “Nord Stream 2” project and quickly began constructing LNG facilities, increasing gas imports from Norway, the U.S., and Qatar, while restarting coal plants to alleviate the energy crisis. However, this shift came at a cost, leading to rising prices and harming German industry; this sparked public discontent, which far-right populist parties (AfD) exploited to call for a resumption of economic relations with Russia.

The End of the Transatlantic Alliance Era

The meeting between Trump and Zelensky in the Oval Office revealed fundamental shifts in the foundations of transatlantic relations that had lasted nearly eight decades. What was once a steadfast alliance based on shared values and interests has become conditional and subject to calculations of power and changing political interests. More dangerously, these transformations reflect not just fluctuations in Trump’s policies but indicate a diminished significance of Europe in the strategies of great powers, both in Washington and Moscow, under Trump’s adoption of a hardline view of this change.

In light of these profound changes, the issue extends beyond merely reshaping the balance of international power; it involves redefining the values and concepts that govern the international system. The real challenge lies not in these transformations themselves but in the ability of international actors to absorb the effective trends amid the noise generated by the changing landscape. In this context, Germany finds itself at a crucial crossroads; it must abandon its strategic hesitancy and adopt a more independent and effective foreign policy.

Germany still defines itself more by its past than by its readiness for the future. Post-World War II German identity played a pivotal role in shaping its foreign policy, grounded in principles of peace, multilateral diplomacy, and European integration. However, new challenges—whether rising extreme right movements domestically, shifts in the international system, or the ramifications of the war in Ukraine—require Germany to rethink its identity, demanding that it:

1. Transition from a “civil power” mentality to a “geopolitical power”: Germany can no longer rely solely on diplomatic economic measures but must play a more effective role in European security.
2. Broaden its understanding of historical responsibility: Beyond focusing exclusively on its relationship with Russia, it must include moral obligations towards Eastern Europe, especially Ukraine, which has suffered from Russian aggression.
3. Redefine its relationship with military power: Move from being a country that avoids military interventions to a state ready to defend the European order, including enhancing defense spending and actively participating in NATO.
4. Achieve a balance between the German identity as a peaceful power and its need for strategic deterrence: Avoid falling into the trap of nationalist sentiments while remaining cautious of appeasement policies towards expansionist powers like Russia.

Necessary Strategic Transformations

As America’s commitment to European security wanes and the trend of political Trumpism in Washington rises, Germany needs to develop its defensive capabilities away from excessive reliance on the United States. This requires restructuring its arms policies, investing in advanced military technology beyond traditional NATO commitments, and solidifying its role as a European security leader capable of fulfilling its responsibilities in facing growing threats.

Regarding its policy towards Russia, embracing a clear and firm approach based on effective deterrence rather than the failed appeasement policy has become essential. Berlin should enhance its military presence in Eastern Europe, provide sustainable military support to Ukraine, finally eliminate reliance on Russian energy, and diversify energy sources to ensure its national security. Its relationship with Moscow should be based on an active containment strategy that prevents any uncalibrated rapprochement that might repeat past mistakes.

In its relationship with the United States, Berlin must proceed cautiously regarding the ongoing transformations with a realistic vision that considers the probabilities of a reduced U.S. role in European security. This requires strengthening defense alliances within Europe and engaging in strategic partnerships in the Indo-Pacific region, particularly with Japan and Australia, to balance new trends in the international system. Germany should also reassess its relations with China in a balanced manner to safeguard its economic interests without compromising its national security or geopolitical standing.

Chancellor Olaf Scholz’s declaration of a “turning point” in German policy should not remain mere political rhetoric; rather, new Chancellor Friedrich Merz must translate this into a coherent practical strategy. This necessitates:

1. Reassessing security and economic priorities away from a purely commercial mindset.
2. Accelerating the reform of the German army, ensuring its readiness to operate within more complex security contexts.
3. Reducing cumbersome bureaucratic barriers that hinder rapid implementation of reforms.
4. Adopting proactive diplomacy that combines soft power with military capability to ensure Europe’s stability in the face of rising geopolitical challenges.

Today, Germany faces a momentous test; it can no longer evade its responsibilities as a pivotal European power, and it must abandon hesitancy in confronting global crises. The coming years will be crucial in determining whether Berlin can reframe its foreign policy in line with the fundamental shifts in the international system or remain captive to outdated calculations that have proven unsuccessful.