How does violence on the Syrian coast affect the future of the Alawite sect?

Recent acts of violence in Syrian coastal cities have revealed an escalation of sectarian risks, leading to further political and social polarization. The security apparatus loyal to the new Syrian administration has been involved in mass killings targeting individuals based on their sectarian affiliation. Militants have also threatened to massacre residents of some Alawite villages due to their sectarian affiliation. On March 11, 2025, the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights documented the killing of entire families, including women and children. Sectarian violence on the Syrian coast is deepening the country’s political and demographic crisis, leading to the erosion of the Alawites’ political and demographic presence, especially in the absence of any indicators that reassure the Alawite minority or provide radical solutions to sectarian tensions.

Increasing Concerns

The concerns of the Alawite sect have increased following the fall of the Assad regime on December 8, 2024, and reached their peak in the current time after mass killings of sect members in Latakia, which can be presented as follows:

1- Institutionalizing sectarianism in the approach of the new administration: According to the behavior of the new Syrian administration in dealing with incidents of violence in coastal cities, which resulted in the killing of hundreds of civilian residents from the Alawite sect, the behavior of the security apparatus under the new administration has not changed towards the sectarian aspect in combat performance. With the understanding of the security elements under the rule of Al-Sharaa that the coastal cities have an Alawite majority, they have made sure to carry sectarian banners and slogans in a way that appears more intense than the previous battles they fought after the fall of the Assad regime, which poses an expected danger to increase the intensity of possible sectarian operations if the insistence on neutralizing or at least marginalizing the Alawite sect continues.

2- Intensifying systematic violence operations on the Syrian coast: Concerns have increased among the Alawite sect on the Syrian coast due to the mass killings carried out by the Syrian forces and reserve forces, which include elements from Central Asian countries such as Uzbekistan. These operations, described by the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights as “systematic genocide,” resulted in the killing of about 1,000 Alawite civilians.

Operations of looting and robbing Alawite houses were also recorded, where they were burned. On March 11, 2025, the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Volker Türk, confirmed that many of these operations were summary executions carried out on a sectarian basis in the provinces of Tartus, Latakia, and Hama, by unknown armed men and armed elements allegedly supporting the security forces.

3- Western flexibility in dealing with the “Al-Sharaa” administration: International and Western parties have condemned the killings witnessed on the Syrian coast and called for an end to the cycle of violence, as U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio, in a statement issued on March 10, 2025, called on the Syrian transitional authorities to hold those responsible for the crimes accountable, while the European Union called for ensuring independent investigations to reveal the full circumstances of these crimes and condemn their perpetrators. The international positions that came without punitive measures or at least a threat of them reveal Western flexibility in dealing with the transitional administration led by Al-Sharaa, and giving it time to dispel the ambiguity regarding the nature of the attack on the Syrian coast.

4- Weakness of “Al-Sharaa” measures aimed at uncovering the truth: Despite the announcement by the transitional president, Ahmed Al-Sharaa, on March 9, 2025, of forming an independent committee to address the clashes on the coast, this committee has been widely criticized due to the long period allocated for uncovering the truth, in addition to doubts about the committee’s integrity as its members are affiliated with the new administration.

5- Fear of Turkish interventions supporting the transitional administration: It is clear that the concerns of the Alawite sect are increasing after the Turkish president’s announcement on March 10, 2025, that his country “will continue to provide all possible forms of support” to Syria, days after the violent confrontations on the Syrian coast. In the view of the Alawite sect, Turkish interventions may result in increased pressure on the Alawite component, whether through excluding their presence in political life or through supporting the security operations of the new Syrian administration against its local enemies. The continuation of Turkey’s policy in this approach means further erosion of the Alawite component’s influence in Syria.

Possible Paths

The acts of violence against the Alawite minority in Syria indicate that there are possible paths regarding the future presence of the Alawite component in Syria in the coming period, and the most prominent of these are as follows:

1- Mass displacement of Alawites to neighboring countries, especially Lebanon: It is likely that the systematic violence in Syrian coastal cities will push large sectors of the Alawite sect, which constitutes about 10% of Syrians, to mass displacement to neighboring countries, especially Lebanon, where the Lebanese-Syrian border has witnessed the influx of hundreds of Alawite refugees fleeing sectarian killings, not to mention the confirmation by Lebanese authorities on March 11, 2025, that more than 350 Syrian families belonging to the Alawite sect have crossed into Lebanon in the past few days.

2- Changing the demographic composition of Syrian coastal cities: The forced displacement of Alawites under the sectarian violence practiced by the security apparatus under the new Syrian administration and the foreign fighters loyal to it coincides with increasing concerns about a possible demographic change in the coastal cities, especially Latakia and Tartus, considering these areas the most accommodating for the Alawite sect in Syria. In light of this, and in the context of the legacy of hostility towards the Alawite sect, which the new administration considers an extension of the Assad regime, it is likely that the new administration will adopt demographic policies in the coming period targeting a change in the population composition of the coastal cities, with the aim of dismantling the social fabric and weakening the national identity of the Alawites, changing the population composition of areas where Alawites are concentrated, and ensuring their transformation into areas of political and security influence for the new authority.

3- Alawite alliances with armed entities opposing the government: With the continuation of identity-based killings on the Syrian coast, where the Alawite majority is concentrated, the latter may turn to building local alliances with forces opposing the new Syrian administration, including some Kurdish parties that reject the recent agreement signed on March 10, 2025, between the Syrian Democratic Forces “SDF” and the Al-Sharaa government. It is also likely that the sect will expand its alliances with armed organizations in the region, especially Iraqi factions that have fundamentally rejected the submission and recognition of the new reality that emerged in Syria following the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime.

This is revealed by the statement of the Secretary-General of Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq, Qais al-Khazali, on March 8, 2025, expressing his deep concern about the escalation of violence in Syria, and his confirmation in his statements that “the executions targeting members of the Alawite sect cause deep panic and require urgent action from the international community to protect them.” In light of this, the expansion of the Alawite component’s relationship with local and regional armed entities seems likely, as it represents a last resort for protecting the minority, and at the same time indicates the reverse repercussions of the violence that Alawites are currently facing.

4- Alawite tendency to forge alliances with Iran, Russia, and Israel: It is likely that Alawite political forces will seek to explore new alliances in the coming period to protect themselves from the risks of the violence they are facing. In this context, the prospects for returning to alliances with the sect’s traditional supporters, especially Iran and Russia, may increase, as their interests and military presence in the Eastern Mediterranean region have been damaged after the fall of the Assad regime. From here, Russia’s condemnation of the violence on the coast can be understood, as well as the statement by the Iranian Foreign Ministry on March 11, 2025, which described the incidents of violence on the Syrian coast as “regrettable,” and added that “attacks on minorities, including Alawites, Christians, and Druze, represent a wound to human feelings and the international conscience.”

At the same time, it is expected that the Alawite sect will seek to strengthen its relations with Israel, especially in light of the latter’s attempts to institutionalize the sectarian project within the Syrian interior. The Alawites may seek to exploit this direction to neutralize the violence practiced by the new authority against them. From here, it is possible to interpret what the Israeli media has published in recent weeks regarding the sending of a number of Alawite leaders in Syria a message to Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, in which they request “to be saved from the Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham regime.”

Serious Risks

In conclusion, it can be said that the escalation of the sectarian tone in Syrian coastal cities has greatly affected the situation of the Alawite sect, increasing its immersion in its internal concerns after the fall of the Assad regime. This situation has opened the door to questions about the future of the Alawite sect in Syria, as some international data have shown the complete displacement of Alawite families from the Syrian coast, in addition to revealing a demographic transformation process in the region targeting the dismantling of the social structure of the Alawites, which portends serious risks to the future of the sect within the Syrian interior.