In light of growing global fears of a nuclear war that could have catastrophic consequences for the world, especially amidst the Russian-Ukrainian war and President Vladimir Putin’s commitment to the potential use of nuclear weapons, the U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee held a hearing on September 20, 2022, to explain American nuclear policy, focusing on the nuclear threats to U.S. national security. The hearing was titled “U.S. Nuclear Strategy and Policy.” It included testimonies from Madeline Cridon, a research professor at the Elliott School of International Affairs at George Washington University, Rose Gottemoeller, a lecturer at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies and the Center for International Security and Cooperation at Stanford University, as well as Eric Edelman, a senior adviser at the Center for Budget and Strategic Assessments and president of the U.S. Institute of Peace, and Franklin Miller, director of the Scowcroft Group.
Growing Concerns
Madeline Cridon began her remarks by discussing her academic background, focusing on several key issues, including:
The chaotic nature of the international system: Cridon argued that the world is characterized by chaos and uncertainty, pointing out that President Putin’s attack on Ukraine is “unjustified.” She added that the COVID-19 pandemic, along with the Russian-Ukrainian war, has raised doubts about the extent to which global supply chains can be relied upon, indicating how these factors have driven the U.S. to experience inflation rates not seen since the 1980s.
Concerns about Russian nuclear intentions: Cridon expressed her worries regarding Moscow’s evasion of its obligations under the New START treaty with the United States, particularly its recent decision to suspend inspections, along with its attempts over the past fifteen years to modernize its nuclear arsenal and launch the long-range Sarmat intercontinental ballistic missile. She also referred to upgrades in its electronic weapons and anti-space weapons, noting that the depletion of Russia’s conventional capabilities during the Ukrainian war might drive it towards nuclear capabilities, destabilizing international order in the future.
Long-term Chinese threat: Cridon observed that, while Russia poses a nuclear threat to the United States in the near term, China is working to develop its nuclear arsenal, with forecasts suggesting it could possess between 1,000 to 1,500 nuclear weapons by 2030, aiming to be a world-class military power by 2049. This positions China as the primary long-term threat to the U.S.
Concerns over North Korean capabilities: Cridon also discussed North Korea’s ongoing efforts to develop its nuclear weapons as a means of protecting its regime in Pyongyang from perceived threats, as well as its role in pushing the world to accept its status as a nuclear-armed state. She mentioned North Korea’s newly enacted nuclear policy law, which heightens the risks surrounding the U.S. amid the Russian-Ukrainian war.
Importance of investing in U.S. nuclear capabilities: Cridon concluded by emphasizing the need to invest in U.S. nuclear capabilities and strengthen infrastructure for uranium and lithium production projects while maintaining funding for these initiatives, alongside efforts to sign beneficial international agreements and stabilize global regulations.
Arms Race
Rose Gottemoeller highlighted several key points during the hearing:
Concern over Russian nuclear modernization: Gottemoeller stressed the significance of the New START treaty between the U.S. and Russia, noting it obligates Moscow to specific modernization limits that assist Washington in predicting the size and status of Russian strategic nuclear forces, contributing to the stability of the international system. However, she expressed fears regarding ongoing Russian nuclear modernization, which has enabled Moscow to produce missiles and warheads, allowing it to update its nuclear triad comprising strategic bombers, intercontinental ballistic missiles, and submarine-launched ballistic missiles. She expressed concern that Washington has yet to catch up with Moscow’s advancements in its nuclear arsenal, affirming the importance of the New START treaty, warning that if it were terminated, Moscow could outpace Washington in the nuclear domain.
Growing Chinese nuclear capabilities: Gottemoeller noted that China’s emergence as a nuclear player is worrying; despite its initial restraint and maintenance of a small nuclear stockpile, Beijing is beginning to incorporate strategic attack submarines and long-range bombers into its arsenal, signaling a desire to match U.S. and Russian nuclear capabilities. She pointed out that there are 300 intercontinental ballistic missile silos dug into the desert north and west of Beijing, raising concerns about China’s intentions, especially as it does not share information about its modernization program, keeping its aims ambiguous.
Modernization of the U.S. nuclear arsenal: Gottemoeller emphasized the necessity of continuing to modernize the U.S. nuclear arsenal through maintaining stable funding. She praised recent decisive actions regarding enhancing production capacity for both missiles and nuclear warhead silos, viewing this as essential for safeguarding the U.S. from potential nuclear aggression during any period of heightened global tensions. She reassured attendees that the number of Chinese warheads will remain substantially lower than that of the U.S. arsenal until 2030, even if China were to quintuple its stockpile over the next ten years. Moreover, the strength of the U.S. nuclear arsenal acts as a deterrent against serious Russian nuclear threats.
Flexible approach with U.S. adversaries: Gottemoeller underscored the importance of keeping negotiations open with Russia as it serves U.S. national security interests, along with the need to seek renewal of the New START treaty when it expires in February 2026 or to achieve a new agreement. Concurrently, the U.S. must continue its race to update its nuclear arsenal to mitigate risks amid ongoing Russian threats in Ukraine. Gottemoeller stressed the importance of understanding the motivations behind China’s push for nuclear modernization, particularly as Beijing aims to become a leader in artificial intelligence by 2030, which could significantly enhance its nuclear arsenal funding.
Nuclear Deterrence
Eric Edelman and Franklin Miller provided a joint testimony, addressing various thoughts summarized as follows:
Era of new triadic nuclear competition: The witnesses referred to the strong competition the U.S. will face against both the People’s Republic of China and Russia; while Washington has traditionally focused on Russia and its nuclear stockpile, Beijing has emerged, aggressively seeking to enhance its nuclear capabilities and continuing sophisticated intercontinental ballistic missile tests that are expected to increase in capability and range. Additionally, China is working on developing weapons more likely to be used in conventional wars as a deterrent, which can be used to deter Washington if it intervenes to aid Taiwan. However, at the nuclear level, Moscow remains the only true immediate threat to the U.S. given its current arsenal and projected production in the coming years—all critical factors to consider in any negotiations concerning the renewal of the New START treaty to ensure “strategic stability.”
Concerns over North Korean nuclear activities: The witnesses expressed concerns regarding North Korea’s new law indicating the potential for an automatic retaliatory strike, even if leader Kim Jong-un is killed or incapacitated; despite its small nuclear arsenal, North Korea has developed intercontinental and short-range ballistic missiles and is capable of producing about six nuclear warheads annually. This poses a challenge that U.S. policymakers must factor in.
Doubt about the efficacy of the Iran nuclear deal: The witnesses expressed skepticism about reviving the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action with Iran, noting that even if it was reinstated, it would lapse in a few short years, with all restrictions on Iranian enrichment capacity ending by 2030, implying that Tehran would emerge as a nuclear power on its way to full capability.
Increasing dilemmas of nuclear deterrence for nations: The witnesses added that technological advancements, particularly in artificial intelligence, hypersonic weapon capabilities, and cyber intrusions, will hinder national nuclear deterrent capabilities and may push countries to adopt risky options, making it challenging to trust computers to decide whether to launch a nuclear war. They noted the possibility of an alliance between Moscow and Beijing conducting a joint attack against the U.S., placing the latter in a substantial crisis necessitating preparation for confronting two adversaries simultaneously.
In conclusion, the witnesses affirmed the need to reassure NATO allies and those in Asia that the U.S. will be their nuclear guarantee and will defend them against any aggression. This will require Washington to expedite modernization of its nuclear triad to maintain sufficient strength to deter its enemies while continuing to monitor the global nuclear race to avoid any imbalances and ensure the capacity to respond to any attack, whether singular or in concert by both Russia and China.
