How Does the African Legion Enhance Russia’s Influence on the Dark Continent?
Russia is working to preserve the legacy of the Wagner Group’s achievements and its penetration into many African countries, especially following the success of previous military coups in the Sahel region and the arrival of military elites friendly to Moscow. This provides Russia with strategic advantages such as gaining military bases and intelligence stations to support its influence and diverse interests there.
In contrast to these opportunities and gains, there is an expected increase in friction between Russia and many Western powers, especially France, which has lost a significant portion of its traditional positions and influence in the Sahel region. In response, Paris is considering counter-pressure on the Ukrainian front by sending French troops there, in addition to potential friction with the United States, as seen with the current situation at the 101st Military Base in Niger.
Extensive Restructuring:
After the death of Wagner Group leader Yevgeny Prigozhin in August 2023, following a rebellion against the Kremlin, the group underwent restructuring with the formation of the new African Legion. This legion is military in nature and operates directly under the Russian Ministry of Defense, under the supervision of Deputy Defense Minister Yunus-Bek Yevkurov. The legion’s forces are distributed across five African countries: Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, the Central African Republic, and Libya—the main headquarters of the legion. The choice of Libya is primarily geopolitical, as it facilitates logistical supply lines to Russian deployment areas in Africa. Former Wagner fighters form the backbone of the African Legion, holding leadership positions and enjoying advantages and priority during recruitment.
In January 2024, 100 soldiers were deployed to Burkina Faso to protect interim President Ibrahim Traoré from assassination attempts, with an additional 200 troops expected to join. Legion forces arrived in Niger on April 12, 2024. On April 17, 2024, the Wagner-affiliated channel “Rosich” on Telegram posted several images and videos showing a shipment of vehicles and weapons belonging to the African Legion, delivered by the vessels Ivan Green and Alexander Otrakovsky to the port of Tobruk in Libya.
Diverse Objectives:
The formation of the new African Legion aims to expand Russia’s influence in Africa and achieve various objectives, which can be outlined as follows:
Selective Recruitment and Employment: Prior to the formation of the African Legion, there was a broad recruitment campaign conducted mainly through social media networks such as VKontakte and various Telegram channels linked to the Russian military or private military companies. The recruitment campaign focused significantly on specialists, with announcements seeking a wide range of military professionals including artillery experts, drone operators, electronic warfare specialists, assault troops, experienced tank operators, and radar station operators. Recruitment offers include a six-month contract, a salary of 240,000 rubles (over $3,330), and life insurance. The Kremlin reduced its initial mobilization target of 40,000 soldiers by half following the integration of Wagner Group operations in August 2023, to only 20,000 by the end of 2023.
Securing Russian Interests and Countering Western Presence in Africa: The African Legion aims to oppose Western presence and acquire as many resources and assets as possible in Africa. For instance, international estimates suggest that Moscow has acquired a large number of gold mines in Mali and the Central African Republic through Wagner Group in recent years, and these assets will now be transferred to the African Legion. The Legion’s forces have already started securing control over gold mines, such as the Intahaka mine in northern Mali, which was secured in cooperation with the army in February 2024. There are also reports linking military attacks with Russian support on the city of Kidal to the potential presence of large uranium reserves in the northeastern region. In October 2023, representatives from the Russian nuclear company Rosatom met with officials in Mali to discuss the development of nuclear infrastructure and energy in the country, as well as providing support for local research facilities and training staff.
Providing Security Services and Training to African Governments: Russian President Vladimir Putin presents himself through the African Legion as a security ally and protector of regimes in Sahel countries, specifically the Sahel Alliance (Mali, Niger, Burkina Faso), the Central African Republic, and Libya. These countries need security assistance amid the withdrawal of counter-terrorism forces, reduced Western and French military support, and unprecedented security pressures resulting from political instability, increased terrorism activity, and escalating armed conflicts and civil wars in the region.
Avoiding a Repeat of Wagner Rebellion: The transition from Wagner Group’s relative independence to direct Kremlin oversight of the African Legion, coupled with having a more disciplined military tool through legalized activity, aims to prevent internal rebellion by Wagner’s leader’s son, Pavel Prigozhin, who initially controlled thousands of Wagner mercenaries after his father’s death. It is unclear to what extent he remains involved with a smaller group of fighters still loyal to his father’s memory, with reports suggesting he may be responsible for some forces in the Central African Republic and Mali. Therefore, it is conceivable that there is a new agreement between the Kremlin or Russian military intelligence with Pavel to avoid repeating his father’s actions while ensuring he does not fully control the group.
Whitewashing Russian Security Operations in Africa: International reports have frequently mentioned, whether accurately or not, Wagner’s involvement in committing significant abuses in Mali and the Central African Republic, including killings, attacks on civilians, looting, and mass executions. According to French reports, the Russian group, alongside the Malian army, was involved in the killing of many civilians during the “Moura” massacre in central Mali in March 2021. The new Russian legion attempts to improve Moscow’s reputation and present a new image of its role in Africa.
Opportunities and Limitations:
There are several broad repercussions and reflections on the presence of the African Legion, which can be summarized as follows:
Facilitating Logistical Network Connections for Russian Forces: The presence of the African Legion in Niger will help bridge the air gap between its positions in North Africa and Sub-Saharan Africa. The Legion’s capture of the American base in Agadez would place the Russian base within 1,100 miles or less of Russian-controlled air bases in Libya, such as the al-Jufra base, which serves as a stopping point before heading south to African countries, and slightly more than the same distance from key Russian bases in Mali’s capital to the west and the Central African Republic’s capital to the southeast.
Threatening NATO Security from the South: Russian Deputy Defense Minister Yunus-Bek Yevkurov visited Libya in December 2023 to advance the African Legion’s agenda and discuss using the coastal city of Tobruk in eastern Libya as a base for Russian naval vessels. Former Italian Armed Forces Chief Vincenzo Camporini stated in February 2024 that Russia could also deploy nuclear submarines there, similar to how the former Soviet Union sent missiles to Cuba in 1962. This scenario could undermine the security architecture of the Mediterranean region, and Moscow might use the ports of Sirte and Ras Lanuf as a naval base to expand its influence in the area.
Moscow’s Leverage Over European Security: Increased Russian influence and military presence in Niger would give Moscow more tools to threaten Europe. Russia’s acquisition of uranium deposits in Niger in exchange for military support would increase its share in the nuclear energy market, as Niger is the world’s seventh-largest uranium producer. Moscow might also use its positions in northern Niger to exploit migrant smuggling routes through the desert, potentially increasing illegal migration to Europe. European Border and Coast Guard Agency and many European officials have warned that Russia might be trying to incite larger refugee flows from Africa to destabilize Europe, influence elections, and undermine military support for Ukraine. The agency noted that 380,000 migrants attempted to cross into Europe from Libya in 2023, the highest number of illegal migrants since 2016. Although Russia may not be able to control all these operations, European reports attempt to attribute almost all threats in Africa to Moscow.
Friction Between the African Legion and AFRICOM: Friction between Russian and American forces in Niger is likely. Recent field reports indicate that African Legion forces have entered areas controlled by American forces in Niger. Although there has been no direct interaction or clash between the Russian and American forces, and both use separate areas within the 101st Air Base adjacent to Diori Hamani International Airport in Niamey, this step places American and Russian forces in close proximity. The likely scenario could involve either the displacement of one of the forces from the base or, in the worst-case scenario, both remaining as neighbors.
Russia Exploiting Regional Tensions: Algeria and Morocco are competing to access the Sahel region by offering various development initiatives in trade and cross-border infrastructure. Morocco is attempting to exploit Algeria’s diminished influence in the region following recent tensions with Mali and the collapse of the Algiers peace agreement in northern Mali. Consequently, Moscow might seek to improve its relations with the Sahel Alliance by leveraging its good relations with Algeria to serve its vital interests through Algerian ports, reaching the Russian military base in the Central African Republic.
A New Phase:
The overall outcome suggests that the presence of the African Legion represents a public revelation of Russia’s plans after a period of unofficial Wagner activity. This shift signifies a new phase in Russia’s security strategy in Africa, moving the focus of Russian operations from the Central African Republic to the Sahel region and Libya.
However, the African Legion faces a strategic dilemma in repurposing Wagner’s operations to achieve its own agenda without undermining its effectiveness and spread, which complicates matters further. This is especially true given that cooperation with the Libyan army, for example, remains at odds with efforts to maintain relations with the Libyan government in Tripoli, specifically concerning Russian companies operating in oil and energy sectors.
The African Legion may achieve some breakthrough through its presence in several
Sahel countries, but this does not necessarily mean it will decisively win the battle for stability and presence there against American forces. The situation remains highly fluid, and Washington is not likely to give up easily without securing suitable alternatives or striking a deal that does not remove it significantly from the field.
