Although the initial reactions from Iran, both at the official and media levels, before and after the American presidential elections on November 5, 2024, suggest that there is not much difference between the new American president “Donald Trump” and vice president “Kamala Harris” regarding Iran, this does not negate the fact that the announcement of “Trump’s” victory has raised concerns among political circles and decision-making spheres in Iran. Given the “legacy of differences and hostilities” that existed between Iran and the “Trump” administration during his first term (2017-2021), it implies that Iran will cautiously monitor potential changes in American policy towards it when “Trump” assumes office on January 20, 2025, and the implications for its interests amidst the developments unfolding in the Middle East over the upcoming year.
Numerous Concerns
Iran’s government spokesperson “Fatemeh Mohajerani” was the first to comment on president “Donald Trump’s” victory in the American presidential elections. Her comments were broad and did not hint at a clear stance from Iran regarding the new realities imposed by the election results. Mohajerani stated, “The livelihoods of Iranians will not be affected by the results of the American presidential elections,” adding, “The American elections do not really concern us, and it does not matter who will be the president of the United States… Our policy is stable and does not change based on individuals. We have previously laid the necessary plans, and there will be no change in people’s living conditions.”
However, this does not negate that the announcement of “Trump’s” victory provoked varied reactions within Iranian political and media circles, giving rise to several implications, the most notable of which include:
Concerns over the return of the “maximum pressure” policy: Most factions within Iran agree that the return of president “Donald Trump” to the White House means a revival of the “maximum pressure” policy that he previously adopted during his first term. This was evident in the efforts made by his administration to “zero out” Iranian oil exports after reinstating American sanctions on August 7, 2018, following the withdrawal from the nuclear agreement on May 8, 2018.
Although Iran has not seen a significant change in the policy adopted by the current American administration under “Joe Biden,” especially with the failure of indirect negotiations held between the two sides, involving other parties such as the European Union, it does not negate that the current administration has taken relatively “de-escalation” steps towards Iran, such as overlooking Iranian oil smuggling, to the extent that Iranian oil exports reached 1.7 million barrels per day, which is approximately 65% of Iranian oil exports prior to the re-imposition of American sanctions.
Anticipation of a repeat of the assassination of “Qassem Soleimani”: President “Donald Trump” was the one who issued the order to assassinate the former commander of the Quds Force of the Revolutionary Guard, “Qassem Soleimani,” on January 3, 2020, after he left Baghdad Airport accompanied by the deputy secretary general of the Popular Mobilization Forces, “Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis.” This decision had previously been avoided by former American presidents “George Bush” and “Barack Obama,” according to several reports during that time, out of caution regarding potential Iranian responses, a consideration that “Trump” did not account for when making this decision, the ramifications of which Iran continues to suffer from, even though it quickly moved to fill the vacuum created by Soleimani’s assassination by appointing “Ismail Qaani” to his position.
In this scenario, amidst the escalating regional tensions currently, which have prompted affiliated militias to attack American bases and interests in the region, it is possible that “Trump” might once again adopt this approach by targeting Iranian military leaders perceived to be involved in guiding these attacks. “Ismail Qaani,” the commander of the Quds Force, may also be a potential target for Israel in the coming phase, especially if the intensity of direct military confrontations with Iran escalates, particularly after Iran has started issuing direct threats that it will respond militarily to attacks previously launched by Israel against Iran on October 26, 2024.
Fear of encouraging Tel Aviv to continue its military strategy: Iran does not exclude that one of the initial and early consequences of “Trump’s” victory in the American presidential elections could be Israel’s push to continue its current military strategy, which centers on dismantling the military infrastructure of Iranian-affiliated militias in the surrounding countries and regions, whether in Lebanon, Syria, or Gaza. Tehran is among the capitals that believed that Israeli Prime Minister “Benjamin Netanyahu’s” refusal to reach a ceasefire in Gaza or a settlement to end the war in Lebanon indicated that he was awaiting “Trump’s” victory in the American elections, which could provide additional American support at both the political and military levels.
Here, Iran is concerned that this could lead “Netanyahu” to continue his military plans, potentially escalating to direct and extensive military confrontations with Iran, particularly since he has recently shown a notable focus on launching a new campaign against Iran’s nuclear program, promoting the “existential threats” posed by this program to Israel’s security.
The possibility of a new phase of openness between Israel and Arab countries: Various factions in Tehran do not rule out that “Trump’s” return to the White House could lead to the beginning of a new phase of normalization agreements between Israel and some Arab countries, which Iran still views as primarily being targeted, as it believes these agreements seek to form a regional coalition against its regional and nuclear ambitions.
In Tehran’s view, “Trump” may exert strong pressures on Israel and the Arab states likely to sign those agreements, especially with Saudi Arabia, while simultaneously providing various incentives to both parties to enhance the likelihood of reaching those deals. They believe that these commitments might be engaged early on as soon as a decision is reached for a ceasefire in Gaza or a settlement to end the war in Lebanon, a scenario that they deem inconsistent with their current interests.
A Policy of Waiting
In light of this, it can be concluded that, given its current concerns over the directions that the new American president “Donald Trump” might adopt, Iran has no option but to adopt a policy of “wait and see,” until President “Trump” stabilizes his new administration and defines the priorities of the foreign policy he will pursue. Afterward, Iran will begin to determine its own priorities, with expectations that decision-making circles in Tehran will start crafting potential scenarios for managing relations with “Trump,” with the ultimate goal of preventing the deterioration of potential escalations between the two sides to a red line characterized by direct engagement in war, whether with Israel or the United States.
