Hafter’s Movements in Southwestern Libya: Local Stakes and Regional Context

This paper attempts to understand the motivations and context behind the retired General Khalifa Hafter’s decision to deploy his military units to southwestern Libya. According to the spokesperson for the “Libyan National Army,” led by Hafter, the goal of this move is to “secure the southern borders and enhance Libya’s national security.”

Fears of a New Confrontation Between East and West

The announcement by the “Libyan National Army” under Khalifa Hafter of sending troops to southwestern Libya has raised concerns about a possible new military confrontation between these forces and those loyal to the Government of National Unity, similar to the conflict of 2020. That conflict ended with a ceasefire agreement following successive military defeats of Hafter’s forces, which were supported by Russia through the Wagner Group, in western Libya. These defeats were due to active Turkish military support for the Tripoli government.

Despite the limited impact of the 2020 confrontation on the military and territorial balance, it pushed the country into a new phase where foreign influence became more evident and no longer embarrassed any of the conflict’s parties.

Although the regions where Hafter’s forces announced they would send reinforcements are already under his control, this sudden move has heightened fears of deepening Libya’s division and quashing any remaining hopes of revitalizing the political settlement process and ending the chaos that has engulfed the country since early 2012.

According to a statement from Hafter’s forces, the military reinforcements will be sent to the cities of Ubari, Brak, al-Shati, Sebha, Murzuq, al-Qatrun, Adre, and Ghat, all located in the western and southwestern parts of the country along the borders with Algeria and Niger.

Hafter’s forces have confirmed that these reinforcements are not directed against any party but are intended to establish and enhance security, combat smuggling, and conduct “desert patrols and tighten control over the border strip with neighboring countries” to secure the borders and address “any threats that may target the nation’s safety and stability.”

However, these reassurances did not dispel the concerns of Tripoli authorities. The Tripoli-based General Staff announced an increased state of alert in response to what it described as “Hafter’s forces moving towards the town of al-Shweirif, located 450 km south of Tripoli.” The High Council of State warned that “suspicious movements of eastern forces led by Hafter towards southwestern areas of the country might lead to a return to armed conflict that threatens the ceasefire agreement.”

In parallel with these statements, the United Nations Mission in Libya called for de-escalation, urging all parties to exercise maximum restraint and avoid any provocative actions that could destabilize the fragile stability in Libya and endanger citizens’ safety.

Local Stakes and Oil Resources

It is legitimate to question Hafter’s motives for sending additional forces to southwestern areas that are already under his control. Observers of Libyan affairs believe that Hafter’s western push aims to control the strategic city of Ghadames, located on the border between Libya, Algeria, and Tunisia, approximately 650 kilometers southwest of Tripoli.

Ghadames lies to the northwest of the southern cities in the Fezzan region mentioned in Hafter’s forces’ statement. The city’s airport provides a vital logistical and operational base for any potential future conflict or campaign to control the capital, Tripoli. According to these analysts, controlling Ghadames would allow Hafter’s forces to transport equipment and personnel smoothly and in large quantities from their main base in Jufra, central Libya, and from their strongholds in Benghazi and Sirte to western Libya.

Ghadames overlooks the “Debdeb” crossing with Algeria (about 20 kilometers away), which has been closed since the outbreak of the Libyan crisis in 2011. It was scheduled to open last year, but objections from Hafter himself, warning that it might lead to renewed military confrontation with Tripoli authorities, prevented it. Additionally, Ghadames is no more than 15 kilometers from the town of “Bourj el Khadra” in the governorate of Tataouine in southern Tunisia.

Since his emergence, Hafter has been geographically isolated from the broader Maghreb region and the African coastal neighbors. This political and diplomatic isolation has hindered him from leveraging his military gains, despite the substantial financial and political support he has received over the past decade from Middle Eastern countries and Russia.

If Hafter were to control Ghadames, it would open a door to security coordination and cooperation, particularly in the field of irregular migration, with two of Libya’s most stable Maghreb neighbors, which are also significant in terms of trade exchanges and form the social and human depth of Libya’s western population. This would make Hafter a crucial partner for the European Union, which has maintained a central focus on Libya in its policies related to combating irregular migration flows across the Mediterranean from the African coast.

In addition to its exceptional geographical location, Ghadames has recently become an oil-producing city. The Hamada oil field, discovered in 2007, is expected to start exports within weeks with an initial production capacity of 8,000 barrels per day. In July 2024, the Libyan Oil Company announced the completion of the pipeline construction that will transport oil from the field to the Mellitah port on the Mediterranean Sea, located 250 kilometers north of Ghadames.

Hafter is also eyeing al-Shweirif, located 400 kilometers south of Tripoli. Controlling this town, which intersects strategic roadways, would enable Hafter’s forces to connect their bases in the east and central regions with their locations in the west via land routes. It would also allow them to control traffic between the Tripoli area and the Fezzan region in the south. Operationally, controlling al-Shweirif would provide Hafter’s forces with a forward base close to the capital and their allies’ positions in the west, especially the Zintan forces.

Looking Towards the Coast: Hafter and the African Neighbors Card

Hafter’s forces have notably linked this movement to what they called the “deteriorating situation in neighboring countries and the rise in smuggling gangs and extremist groups.” Although the statement avoided naming specific countries, the described situation fits some Sahelian countries, including Mali, which has recently seen deadly clashes between the army and Tuareg rebels allied with jihadist groups in the Tinzawatene region.

While Mali does not share a border with Libya, social, tribal, and ethnic links between northern Mali, southern Algeria, and northern Niger, which historically serves as the Tuareg’s space, make the expansion of the conflict in northern Mali plausible. The impact on these countries, particularly Libya, which has significant Tuareg communities in its southern and southwestern regions (the historical Fezzan region), is evident. The events in Libya following the popular uprising against Muammar Gaddafi in 2011 led to the displacement of tens of thousands of Tuaregs to Sahelian countries, particularly Mali.

This displacement has had serious security implications, rekindling the Tuareg rebellion in northern Mali. Additionally, jihadist groups linked to Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb obtained large quantities of weapons amidst the chaos in Libya, enabling them to control all of northern Mali in 2012 and advance southward, nearly capturing the capital, Bamako, were it not for French military intervention.

Wide-scale displacement cannot be ruled out if confrontations intensify in northern Mali, especially since the Malian forces, supported by Russian Wagner militias, took control of Kidal in November 2023, leading to a displacement movement towards Algeria and Niger.

Hafter might be concerned that potential displacement waves from northern Mali and Niger could foster increased political and possibly organized military presence of the Tuareg in southern Libya, which, after years of chaos and lack of central authority, has become akin to northern Mali.

Personal Motivations or Regional Agenda?

Hafter’s sudden interest in southwestern Libyan regions adjacent to the Sahel and his declaration of intent to control them and conduct “desert patrols” raises questions about the reasons behind this shift in Hafter’s military strategy, which had previously been confined to northern Libya, especially the western regions along the long Libyan coast where the capital Tripoli is located. Hafter’s military efforts over the past eight years have focused on trying to control Tripoli without success.

In light of this, it is reasonable to question whether Hafter’s move is driven by personal motives or is part of a broader strategy extending beyond Libyan territory into the Sahel region, which represents a vital geographical and strategic depth for Libya.

Two key aspects shared by Libya and most Sahelian countries must be highlighted:

1. The prevailing chaos in these African countries for over two decades, which extended to Libya in 2011.
2. The growing Russian military presence in the region. Libya was a gateway for this presence, with Hafter being one of its key figures. The first documented military presence of the Wagner Group in the Sahel and North Africa dates back to 2018 when the British newspaper “The Sun” revealed that the Russian company, which has since evolved into the “African Division,” had established military bases in Tobruk and Benghazi.

In the subsequent years, Wagner’s presence in the Sahel has increased, providing security and military services to the ruling regimes in three Sahelian countries: Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso. It also serves the Central African Republic government and has close ties with the Rapid Support Forces in Sudan, providing them with weapons and equipment from Libya.

Hafter’s mention of “desert patrols” is particularly noteworthy, especially given that the targeted region is adjacent to the Niger border, where the new military rulers, after seizing power in summer 2023, ended cooperation agreements with French and American forces and replaced them with Wagner Group elements currently using Niamey’s airport

as their base.

Libya and Hafter at the Heart of a New Russian Strategy

A group of Western and Russian investigative journalists called “All Eyes on Wagner” revealed that Russia fundamentally adjusted its strategy of influence in Africa following the death of Wagner’s founder, Yevgeny Prigozhin, in summer 2023. The company, which was at the forefront of this strategy, was incorporated into Russian military intelligence and became part of the Russian Ministry of Defense. In light of the Russian-Ukrainian war and the rift with the West, Russia abandoned its “covert advance” strategy and adopted an overt strategy of influence in Africa, according to these investigative journalists.

Libya is at the heart of this new strategy aimed at strengthening Kremlin influence on the continent by linking areas of influence with a logistical supply line extending from Tobruk to Central Africa, passing through Niger, Mali, Burkina Faso, and possibly Chad soon.

Tobruk port is a key pivot in this new Russian strategic structure. The “All Eyes on Wagner” group revealed that two Russian cargo ships arrived at this port on April 8, 2024, from the Syrian port of Tartus, carrying large quantities of weapons and equipment. These journalists confirm that the activity recorded at Tobruk port is primarily related to the transportation of equipment and weapons rather than personnel, indicating that the operation is primarily logistical.

It seems that Russia has temporarily abandoned its efforts to secure a maritime outlet on Africa’s Atlantic coast to enhance its presence and influence in the Sahel, opting instead for Tobruk port. This aligns with Hafter’s southwestern movement towards Niger, and it appears that Hafter will be a significant player in the new Russian strategy, which extends beyond the influence battle in Africa to address the repercussions of the Russian war on Ukraine, especially Western financial sanctions on Moscow.

The Wagner Group’s control of Libya and the Sahel, in collaboration with its allies, would enable Moscow to circumvent Western sanctions and make it an indispensable partner for the European Union in addressing irregular migration flows from the Sahel through Libyan territory to the Mediterranean.

Hafter’s situation represents a unique exception in Russia’s African strategy. Since the arrival of Wagner, the spearhead of this strategy, its mode of operation has been consistent: providing security and military services to fragile regimes struggling to consolidate authority and ensure stability in their countries, in return for economic privileges, often in the form of licenses for mineral exploitation, particularly gold and oil.

However, Hafter’s case in Libya indicates the emergence of African military entities that may serve the new Russian strategy. Incorporating Wagner into Russian military intelligence and renaming it the “African Division” gives Russia greater maneuverability and alleviates the stigma of using “mercenaries” in building and expanding international relations. Nevertheless, it places Russia in a position of significant diplomatic and political responsibility concerning the behavior of this division and potential abuses and violations, with Wagner’s record in this regard being far from spotless.

Hafter, with his organized and equipped army, political backing (Libyan House of Representatives), and regional allies, appears capable of taking on the role that Wagner previously played, with even better advantages. This includes handling the “dirty work” while the Kremlin reaps political, diplomatic, and strategic benefits and gains significant economic advantages from Libya’s rich oil resources and its strategic location on the Mediterranean. In case of any issues or violations with significant diplomatic or political repercussions, the Kremlin would be entirely free of responsibility, as Hafter’s forces are ultimately Libyan and not subject to international law as they are not recognized regular forces.

The rapid engagement of the new head of the “African Division,” Andrei Afryanov, with Hafter less than a month after taking office reflects this Russian interest in him within the new strategy. A statement released after the meeting indicated that both sides agreed to continue cooperation to “secure resources.”

The close ties that Wagner has established with the leader of the Rapid Support Forces in Sudan, Mohamed Hamdan Hamidti, and its support in terms of weapons and equipment amid the outbreak of civil war in Sudan, highlight Moscow’s interest in emerging or flourishing parallel armies in the context of the chaos affecting several African countries, especially in the resource-rich and strategically significant Sahel region. However, Russia’s need for a maritime outlet to connect its areas of influence in the continent via maritime transport routes compelled Moscow to enhance its relations with the Sudanese army to obtain a license to establish a naval base in Port Sudan.

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