The attack by the Islamic State (ISIS) on a military base of local forces in Puntland state on December 31 last year raised local and regional concerns about the group’s capacity for confrontation, resilience, and expansion in a geographically isolated area in the Bari region (the largest region in Somalia). The attack, executed by a group of fighters consisting of 12 individuals of Arab, African, and Asian nationalities, was described as “qualitative.” It is considered the most violent attack by the organization, leading to the deaths of approximately 20 local forces and partial destruction of the military base in the Tarjiliy area of the Iskushuban district, from which military operations against ISIS were launched after a decade since its emergence.
This attack has rekindled potential fears regarding the growing influence of ISIS and its control over vital areas in Puntland, paving the way for access to maritime outlets in the region, which threatens international navigation and could leave geopolitical implications in the region should its influence grow and expand to other areas in Puntland, Somaliland, and Ethiopia.
The following report examines the background of ISIS’s emergence and the reasons for its field rise since 2015, alongside exploring the motivations and underlying causes of the campaign Puntland is undertaking against this organization. Additionally, it will track international efforts, especially American ones, to contribute to the efforts to eradicate ISIS and their agendas, while identifying potential future scenarios for dismantling the fate of ISIS in northeastern Somalia.
ISIS in Somalia: Emergence and Sudden Rise
The ISIS (Somalia branch) was established by the former leader of the Al-Shabaab group affiliated with Al-Qaeda, Abdul Qadir Mu’min, in October 2015, declaring allegiance to ISIS with a few fighters from the movement numbering no more than 30 armed men. This step represented the nucleus for the formation of a new armed jihadist organization in Somalia. This announcement was the first of its kind, as media circles speculated at the beginning of 2016 that the movement intended to pledge allegiance to ISIS, similar to what Boko Haram had done in Nigeria; however, the organization’s leadership appeared determined to remain under Al-Qaeda’s umbrella, which it had pledged loyalty to in 2012.
Several factors facilitated the establishment of this organization in Puntland:
“Difficult” Geography: The leader of ISIS, Abdul Qadir Mu’min, chose the Bari region in Puntland as the nucleus and headquarters for establishing the organization. On October 26, 2016, the organization briefly seized the coastal town of Qandala, located about 75 kilometers east of Bosaso (the commercial capital of Puntland), declaring it the headquarters for the ISIS branch in Somalia, before being expelled by regional forces in December of the same year. The organization then moved to the Ali Maskad Mountains, a geographical area that is difficult to breach on land and overlooks the Red Sea, allowing the group to establish military training centers and administrative headquarters to attract foreign fighters.
Clan Dynamics: In Somalia, clans play an active role in the power dynamics. The political system of the federal states built on clan power-sharing has produced a model that has marginalized some clans, prompting them to challenge this system when opportunities arise. This is one reason for the appearance of ISIS in Puntland; the leader of the organization, Abdul Qadir Mu’min, belongs to the Ali Suleiman clan centered in the Bari region, alongside other clans (Dheere) that feel dissatisfied with the clan-based foundation that forms the backbone of Puntland, giving the organization a space to hide, maneuver, and thus expand.
Disagreements Between Puntland and the Federal Government: This factor is one of the most prominent reasons for the spread and rise of ISIS, exploiting the lack of coordination between Somali security agencies and Puntland due to recurring disputes over power-sharing, which can paralyze the state’s capabilities and weaken its military operations to eliminate this organization in the future.
The rise of ISIS in Somalia can be observed through the following axes:
Military Rise: Initially, the number of ISIS members in Somalia, which formed its core, did not exceed 30 fighters. By 2016, this number rose to between 100 and 200 fighters. This number continued to fluctuate until 2019, ranging from 100 to 300 fighters. By 2024, the number jumped to around 700 fighters, and local security research centers estimate that the organization’s militants range from 800 to 1,500 fighters.
Significant Financial Revenues: The organization struggled to find local funding sources in Somalia but managed to impose levies and collect taxes from traders under threat, carrying out bomb attacks and armed assaults against those who refused to pay. This created widespread fear among traders in Puntland, leading to a sharp increase in ISIS revenues—from approximately $70,000 per month in 2018 to $2.5 million in 2021, and surpassing $2 million in the first half of 2022. According to a report by a United Nations monitoring group in February 2023, the ISIS coordination office for Africa, based in Somalia, was sending $25,000 monthly in cryptocurrency to the Islamic State – Khorasan Province in Afghanistan.
From Local to Global Jihad: According to security sources, the ISIS branch in Somalia has started attracting fighters and senior leaders from other branches, including the Emir of the organization, Abu Hafs al-Qurashi. Security sources indicated that local leader Abdul Qadir Mu’min is likely to become the potential Emir of the organization, which could pose a future threat extending beyond Somalia to most of East Africa, even though it has chosen a different path than that of the organization in Syria and Iraq; it is biding its time as it gathers revenues and builds its military strength, according to a report from International Crisis Groups.
The War on ISIS in Somalia: Local Motivations and Regional Calculations
First: The Impact of Local Military Strikes on ISIS
Puntland launched a large-scale military campaign, the first of its kind in ten years, to uproot ISIS in the Bari region, dubbed “Operation Lightning,” which received significant public support to curb the organization’s momentum. The military campaign against ISIS continues, entering its fourth month and has made significant advances, liberating dozens of towns from ISIS’s grip, including military and administrative headquarters and homes belonging to the organization’s leaders, alongside neutralizing more than 60 fighters from ISIS, most of whom are of African and Asian nationalities. This reflects that foreigners form the majority of the organization compared to a small number of locals, which also explains that the factor of forced or voluntary recruitment has not been convincing or feasible locally.
At the end of February 2025, the President of Puntland launched the third phase to continue military operations against ISIS, which has lost many of its fighters and vast areas, exceeding 60 locations in the Ali Maskad mountain range. General Yusuf Yulah stated to local media that local forces faced militants from 32 different nationalities belonging to ISIS, announcing significant victories after eliminating around 300 fighters from various nationalities, including Morocco, Syria, Saudi Arabia, Ethiopia, Sudan, and Mali, with no Somali fighters from the organization reported among the casualties in recent confrontations. Local forces are gradually approaching the organization’s main stronghold to eradicate it completely.
Several reasons underpin Puntland’s security campaign against ISIS:
Containing the Threat of ISIS in Puntland: As its influence has grown, becoming the nucleus of the organization in the coastal areas and desert, having access to maritime outlets lacking security oversight, a report from International Crisis Groups highlighted the danger of rising ISIS presence in Puntland. This prompted local leadership to seriously consider confronting the organization and limiting its expanding influence.
Fears Threatening International Navigation in the Red Sea: The organization controls vital areas from which it could threaten regional and international navigation due to their proximity to strategic corridors and their proximity to Yemen, potentially allying with the Houthis. They also control areas rich in gold and precious minerals, having begun trading and successfully mined gold, sending it to global markets.
Unifying the Domestic Front in Puntland Against Terrorist Organizations: This policy is a key hope for the current President of Puntland, Said Abdullah Deni, aiming to enhance his popularity among the community and shift attention from internal political conflicts to combating Somali ISIS, an effort that would likely gain public support in Puntland and attract local clans to rally behind him on political and security issues.
For its part, the federal government viewed Puntland’s campaign against ISIS as a step that enhances efforts to eradicate terrorist organizations, with this initiative having received encouragement from the government in Mogadishu despite ongoing political disputes between the two sides. In this context, the Somali President, Hassan Sheikh Mahmood, emphasized the importance of supporting Puntland’s efforts through the formation of a support committee for its war against this organization, indicating that his government would stand by Puntland to confront ISIS, which threatens the security and safety of global shipping lanes off the coast of Somalia. He urged the people of Puntland to come together, stating that supporting local forces is a duty, through the unity of all segments of society at home and abroad to eradicate this organization.
Second: American Agendas and the Impact of Airstrikes on ISIS
On the international level, the U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) has been carrying out a series of heavy airstrikes against the organization since February, following directives from U.S. President Donald Trump, aimed at weakening the organization’s capabilities and supporting local forces’ security operations. American motivations to prevent the escalation of ISIS’s threat in a region of strategic importance in Somalia’s territorial waters can be summarized as follows:
Trimming ISIS’s Claws: By preemptively addressing potential risks of a radical ideological organization emerging in northeastern Somalia that could replicate the Houthi group in Yemen, which could be bolstered by the proposed convergence of interests between Somalia’s ISIS and its counterpart in Yemen. This poses real security concerns threatening Western and U.S. interests in the region, despite the recent American attacks on both ISIS and the Houthis.
Reinforcing American Strategy in the Region: This explains the return of intense U.S. airstrikes in Somalia, particularly targeting ISIS. Previously, the targeting was limited to the organization’s leadership and was not random, but the recent airstrikes against ISIS have placed the organization in a genuine predicament, disrupting its movements during local security operations in Puntland. Within two months, the U.S. executed seven heavy airstrikes at an average of about one strike per week, reflecting U.S. interest in protecting its interests in the region, particularly its bases in Somalia, Djibouti, and Kenya.
Countering Chinese and Russian Influence: The Horn of Africa is undoubtedly one of the most strategically attractive areas of international interest in the continent, placing Washington in a challenging battle against China, Russia, and Iran to maintain its presence and protect its influence in the region. However, the decline of U.S. support to regional countries, once facilitated by the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), could provide a green light for China to step in and support these nations. Additionally, Somalia’s offer to the U.S. for two bases (the Balidogle airbase and the Berbera base) and two strategic ports (Bosaso and Berbera) could undoubtedly entice Washington to protect its interests and coordinate more closely with the Somali government to address separatist movements and growing security threats, ramping up attacks against both ISIS and Al-Shabaab.
Winners and Losers in the Declared War on ISIS
Without a doubt, the security operation initiated by Puntland President Said Abdullah Deni has yielded positive results, proving the role of local forces in combating armed organizations with extremist tendencies. Those forces continue to advance gradually towards a decisive end to the organization militarily, expanding their targeting and the thickets in which ISIS spreads daily, causing the organization to retreat, caught between the hammer of local forces and the anvil of American airstrikes. This currently gives the upper hand to a group that seems to have not previously engaged in real battles on the ground since its inception in 2015 due to its current military and operational retreat.
In terms of profit and loss, there are influential parties involved in the security operations against ISIS and others lurking to ensure their participation in the ultimate declaration of the organization’s eradication, which can be detailed as follows:
First: Winners
Puntland (Politically and Militarily): Puntland and its President, Said Abdullah Deni, are the primary winners in dismantling ISIS cells in Somalia. If efforts to weaken the group militarily are successful, this benefits the people of Puntland, especially in Bosaso, where traders were paying large sums to the group out of fear of extortion and assassinations targeting dozens of traders by its affiliates. The end of this organization at the hands of the President will enable him to leverage this victory politically when running for the presidential elections in 2026 or enhance his local and political stature within the state, potentially uniting the internal front in Puntland in his ongoing political struggle with the Mogadishu government.
Federal Government: On the other hand, the federal government stands as an observer of the operations being conducted by Puntland, although it expressed support for this initiative, welcomed by Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mahmood, viewing it as a fundamental step in combating armed groups that pose threats to the Somali republic. He believes the political conflict with the state may be overcome, but the security predicament and threats posed by armed groups are a primary risk threatening state-building and must be addressed, whether in coordination with the federal government or independently. Therefore, eliminating ISIS is a significant gain for the Somali government, providing it with more options and opportunities to confront Al-Shabaab, which remains active in the south and central areas of the nation. Notably, Puntland authorities rejected Mogadishu’s involvement in current security operations due to political disagreements and preferred to confront the organization alone.
Al-Shabaab: The armed movement, which still maintains its presence in some regions of Puntland, particularly in the Ali Mado Mountains in the Bari region of northeastern Somalia, sees a valuable opportunity for expansion if its main ideological enemy is eliminated. Since ISIS posed a considerable threat to its existence, drawing strength from local clan dynamics in Puntland, it achieved military victories against Al-Shabaab, successfully expelling it from several areas in the Ali Maskad mountains. The exit of ISIS from these strategic areas could provide a functioning chance for Al-Shabaab to expand and proliferate in Puntland.
Second: Losers
ISIS in Somalia: The organization currently fears that it may experience a repetition of the scenario of its defeat in Mosul in 2017 now in Puntland, having lost most of its strongholds and major locations in the Ali Maskad mountains. There are reports of many of its fighters fleeing abroad, with many of them being of Asian and other African nationalities, hindering the possibility of a rapid recovery and emulating the Al-Qaeda model in adapting to the environment and resuming offensive activity like Al-Shabaab in the south. Therefore, the loss of these strategic locations threatens its presence and expansion in West and Central Africa, considering that northeastern Somalia was its gateway to the heart of Africa, potentially paralyzing its future presence on the continent.
Smuggling Gangs of Arms and People: The organization’s ties with smuggling gangs (both arms and migrants) have been central to its spread in northeastern Somalia. Thus, striking the organization from within undermines its support system and uncovers more details and ambiguities regarding the entities cooperating with it and providing it with power. Indeed, Somali waters have become an attractive environment for pirates on one side and smuggling gangs on the other since the Israeli offensive on Gaza at the end of 2023.
Influential Regional Powers: Local suspicions about the presence of regional countries and armed groups with a direct influence in feeding terrorism and extremism in Somalia have been growing since 2000. These suspicions became apparent after the discovery of foreign passports belonging to foreign fighters, some of which were recent and carried data from Arab and African countries. The loss of ISIS could deal a military blow to the influential powers that provide a backyard for this organization, as Somali and Puntland authorities have hesitated to disclose these countries and groups, increasing suspicions about those powers’ roles in undermining efforts to pull Somalia from the dark tunnel it has occupied for decades.
Fates and Future of ISIS in Somalia
Three scenarios define the future of ISIS in Somalia over the next decade, during which its strength and military influence have intensified, enabling it to shape a significant part of the organization’s trajectory in Africa. Those scenarios are as follows:
Scenario One: Continuation of Military Operations Against ISIS: This scenario is expected due to ongoing security operations, and it may not cease against the organization, prolonging this battle due to limited military and logistical support for local forces in Puntland. There might be emerging concerns that the organization practices a game of human and logistical attrition against Puntland management, preparing to resume violent activities and surprise local forces with fierce confrontations similar to those seen at the onset of the fighting in January. Certainly, the continuation of encounters with the organization will witness periods of ebb and flow due to the nature of the fighting and the challenging geographical conditions in the Ali Maskad mountains of northeastern Somalia.
Scenario Two: Weakening ISIS: This scenario is the most likely if local forces can further tighten their grip without politicizing security operations against this organization, which distinguishes the current security operation against it and is the secret to local forces’ superiority. However, if the operations stop, this may lead to merely weakening the organization without an inevitable end for it ultimately.
Scenario Three: Eradication of ISIS: Local authorities hope to combat the organization until it is eradicated and will not stop their security campaign until achieving this complete victory, yet this scenario is considered the least probable in the upcoming stages of operations that have entered their fourth consecutive month without local forces being able to eliminate it entirely. This will revert the battles to a scenario of maintaining the status quo when despair finally reaches its peak and depletes the state’s human and financial resources.
References
Scores dead as Islamic State attacks military base in Somalia, VOAsomali, February 11, 2025, (Accessed: March 20, 2025), http://bit.ly/4jlcKxa
2) Abdelkader Momen: He lived in Sweden during the 1990s and early 2000s, then moved to the United Kingdom, and when he returned to Somalia, he joined Al-Shabaab and became a prominent figure in the jihadist videos. He defected from the movement in 2015, after a storm of defections in the movement after the departure of its spiritual leader and de facto founder, Ahmed Abdi Godni, in a US airstrike, in late 2014, after which Momen established with a group of militants not exceeding 30 members of the branch of the organization in northeastern Somalia, and announced the pledge of allegiance to Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi.
3)- The Islamic State in Somalia: Responding to an Evolving Threat, Crisis Group, 12 September 2024, (Accessed: Mrach 20, 2025), https://bit.ly/42xYwn3
4)- ISIS faction raises black flag over Somali port town, CBSNEWS, October 27, 2016, (Accessed: March 25, 2025), https://bit.ly/4lCf8BV
5)- Islamic State in Somalia: the terrorist group’s origins, theconversation, March 20, 2025, (Accessed: 28 March 2025), https://bit.ly/3RBJxlN
Does the ISIS presence in Somalia reflect further international concern and threat, Shaf Center for Future Studies, September 29, 2024, (date of entry: March 30, 2025), https://bit.ly/3XMxp53
7) Ibid.
8)- Global Terrorism Index 2025 Report 2025, institute for economic and peace, (Accessed: 30 March 2025), http://bit.ly/43DfotJ
9)- Somali security forces kill more than 60 ISIS fighters, Anadoul, 11 February 2025, (Accessed: 30 March 2025), https://bit.ly/3DXX0RZ
10) Somalia. Local forces in Puntland control new ISIS positions, New Arab, March 2, 2025 (entry date: March 30, 2025), https://bit.ly/4lbo1BY
11) Al-Shafi’i Abtun, the war on ISIS in Somalia… Backgrounds and Results, Al-Arabi Al-Jadeed, Issues, February 3, 2025, (Admission: March 30, 2025), https://bit.ly/4clrB8F
Fahad Yassin, former Somali intelligence chief, The Importance of the War on ISIS in Somalia, Platform X, February 8, 2025 (access: April 2, 2025), https://bit.ly/4jjq991
13) See the speech of the Somali President, Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, at the opening of the new session of the Somali Parliament, http://bit.ly/4jscIE2
14)- U.S. Forces Strike ISIS-Somalia, AFRICOM, Feb 16, 2025, (Accessed: 2 April 2025), https://bit.ly/43DXNBT
15) Trump and the American strikes in Somalia .. Why now?, Egyptian Observatory, February 2, 2025 (Admission: April 3, 2025), https://bit.ly/4jiA66x
16)- US aid freeze paralyzes NGOs working to help millions of displaced people in Somalia, AP, February 12, 2025, (Accessed: 3 April, 2025), https://bit.ly/3XS4Gf7
17)- Somalia offers US exclusive control of air bases, ports, REUTRES, March 28, 2025, (Accessed: 3April, 2025), https://bit.ly/3GeaXM0
18)- Al-Shabaab Versus the Islamic State in Somalia Province, JSTOR, March 2023, (Accessed: 3April, 2025), http://bit.ly/3GbsK6x
19) Sumaya Sheikh Mahmoud, Puntland: War on the Islamic State and Future Scenarios, Al-Jazeera Center for Studies, March 23, 2025 (Entry: April 8, 2025), https://bit.ly/4i6PP7I
20)- Puntland claims it clicked ISIS treatment sites, business links in Somaliland, Hiiranonline, March 3, 2025, (Accessed: 8April, 2025), https://bit.ly/42eCVAd
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