This article examines the trends of terrorist organizations on the Asian continent in terms of their ebb and flow, as well as their transformations in organizational behavior, ideology, military capabilities, geographic relocations, targeting levels, and changes in leadership structures within these organizations. The analytical article concludes by observing and analyzing the key basic trends as follows:
First: General Trends of Terrorist Organizations in Asia
Terrorist organizations, whether local, regional, or global, present in Asia, are experiencing both ebb and flow, as outlined below:
Middle East: The trends of ebb and flow of terrorist organizations in the Middle East can be explored through three countries: Syria, Iraq, and Yemen, which are clear cases witnessing changes from time to time. In Syria, the limits of change in the trends of terrorist organizations are apparent through the monitoring of the disappearance and persistence of these organizations and their designations, alongside determining the level of decline and progress in the number of terrorist operations. The impact of most local terrorist organizations has diminished, while global terrorist organizations have either merged or fractured. The number of terrorist operations conducted by ISIS increased during the first half of 2024 compared to the same period in 2023. In contrast, Iraq has seen a significant decline in both local and global terrorist organizations, with a reduction in ISIS operations across the country during the first half of 2024. Yemen, on the other hand, has witnessed relative stability in the map of terrorist organizations in 2024 compared to the previous year, as the three primary terrorist organizations—Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, ISIS’s Wilayat in Yemen, and the Houthi movement—have remained largely unchanged without substantial shifts.
South Asian Countries: South Asian countries are the most indicative of changes in the dynamics of terrorist organizations, particularly regarding their activity and geographic shifts. Afghanistan has experienced a transformation in the trends of active terrorist organizations since the Taliban took control of power, which reflects on Pakistan. In 2024, operations by ISIS-Khorasan increased, and Al-Qaeda’s logistical structure expanded in Afghanistan. The “Balochistan Liberation Army” is also attempting to capitalize on the Taliban’s reality to reinforce its presence in the border region among Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iran. In Pakistan, where several terrorist organizations are present, fluctuations between growth and decline have been noted in 2024, as six local organizations operate within its geographic bounds, including “Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan,” “ISIS Khorasan,” “Pakistan’s Liberation Movement,” and “Pakistani Jihad.” The rate of attacks conducted by the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan has particularly increased in the last two years. With the recent political changes in Bangladesh, trends in terrorist organizations indicate a significant shift that may have future implications, especially after the ban on the Jamaat-e-Islami was lifted following 11 years of enforcement; this could encourage the re-emergence of more radical movements.
Central Asian Countries: The inactivity of terrorist organizations in Central Asia continues, such as the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, the Houthi movement in Tajikistan, the Caliphate Soldiers in Kazakhstan, and the Islamic Movement of Kyrgyzstan. Despite their relative inactivity in terms of operations or attacks in recent years, some have made geographic movements in 2024, such as the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan and the Tajik Houthi movement, which relocated elements to the geographical area between Tajikistan and Afghanistan, particularly in Badakhshan province, to operate under the auspices of the Taliban’s intelligence agency. Another notable observation is the “soft targeting” by ISIS towards Central Asian countries through recruitment via new communication channels; estimates indicate that most ISIS-Khorasan members are from Central Asian republics, with Tajiks representing about 5%. Thus, it can be said that Central Asian countries topped ISIS recruitment in 2024, posing future risks to the region and neighboring countries. For instance, in March 2024, ISIS-Khorasan targeted Russia via Tajik fighters, resulting in approximately 144 fatalities. Iran also witnessed a terrorist operation carried out by ISIS in January 2024 that resulted in 84 deaths and 284 injuries. Later, another operation from the Army of Justice active along the Pakistani border resulted in the deaths of 11 Iranian security personnel.
Southeast Asian Countries: Southeast Asia remained calm regarding terrorist activity in 2024, with the last attack in this region occurring in December 2023 by ISIS in the Philippines. An ISIS cell was detected in Malaysia in June 2024, following another cell’s detection in Singapore in February 2023. Notable is that Philippine forces killed the leader of ISIS in Southeast Asia, Abu Zakariya, in June 2023. Therefore, it can be inferred that ISIS and its local affiliates in Southeast Asia, such as Ansar al-Khilafah and the Maute group in the Philippines, as well as the Muslim Caliphate group and the Mujahideen of Eastern Indonesia, are in a dormant state, perhaps due to ISIS’s intensified focus on East and West Africa as more suitable regions for regaining operational strength in the coming period. The most significant transformation seen in the map of terrorist organizations in Southeast Asia is that the Jamaah Islamiyah, led by Abu Bakar Bashir, which is present in the region, particularly in Indonesia, has dissolved itself and announced its adoption of a peaceful approach since its inception in the early 1980s.
Second: Key Transformations in Terrorist Organizations and Their Implications:
Analyzing the map of terrorist organizations in Asia and their primary trends in terms of growth and decline allows for the identification of four patterns of transformation within these organizations during recent times, as follows:
Shift to Peaceful and Political Activity: The abandonment of violence by terrorist organizations, both behaviorally and ideologically, ranks among the most significant transformations that extremist groups identifying as Islamic may undergo; however, measuring the shift from armed action to peaceful initiatives does not always imply a complete transition from violence to pacifism. There are three potential levels that any transforming organization could embody:
Comprehensive Transformation: This means that the organization’s transition from violence to pacifism entails meeting three conditions: ideological or intellectual transformation, meaning that the organization condemns armed action within its ideological literature; behavioral transformation, involving the organization’s abandonment of weapons; and structural transformation concerning the disintegration of the organization’s branches and its military and organizational infrastructure. When applying these criteria, it appears they apply to only one case: the Jamaah Islamiyah in Southeast Asian countries, which has decided to dissolve itself, reject violence, and lay down its arms.
Pragmatic Transformation: This refers to a shift in the organization and its behavior while the organization maintains its ideological literature; thus, it abandons armed action behaviorally but simultaneously condemns such actions if committed by another organization. This type of transformation applies to the Jamaat-e-Islami in Bangladesh, where the new authority after Sheikh Hasina’s resignation in August 2024 lifted the ban on the party, which announced its participation in the elections scheduled for December 2024; the party itself does not conduct terrorist acts but does not condemn other more radical organizations employing violent means.
Factional Transformation: This involves applying the ideological and behavioral dimensions without implementing the organizational aspect, meaning that a faction of the organization—not the entire organization—ceases armed operations and renounces it without legitimizing it ideologically. An example of this is “Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham” and its separation from Al-Qaeda, where the movement adopted political action, presenting itself as a national Syrian movement focused solely on domestic matters while seeking to establish relations with neighboring countries and international powers, distancing itself from the “global jihadist movement” to achieve some level of approval from Western countries.
Leadership Structure and Internal Cohesion: The connection between members of the organization and its leadership, along with leadership stability, constitutes a critical factor in the geographical expansion of the organization and its operational spread, without overlooking the impact of international confrontations against extremist organizations. Conversely, internal divisions and power struggles lead to factional splits, resulting in the diminishing or disappearance of the original organization and its splinter groups. When applying this to the reality of terrorist organizations in Asia, we find cases affected by changes in leadership or internal divisions. For example, Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan transitioned from decline to growth after the death of Mullah “Fazlullah” and the rise of “Noor Wali Mehsud” in 2018, as it united its internal ranks and integrated several armed factions aligned with its ideas, especially following the Taliban’s ascent to power in Afghanistan, including “Shehryar Mehsud Group,” “Ahrar Group,” “Amjad Farooqi Group,” and “Askar Jangawi Group,” among others.
Hierarchy of Goals and Scope and Level of Targeting: The hierarchy of terrorist organizations’ goals entails arranging their objectives between ideological and logistical, which includes securing funds for survival and gaining space for expansion to apply ideological goals representing, for ISIS, the Islamic caliphate; for Al-Qaeda, fighting crusaders and rulers; and for local organizations, opposing regimes that contradict Sharia. Observing terrorist organizations in Asia reveals a shift in their priorities and targeting. In Syria, some organizations like “Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham” prioritized fighting other terrorist organizations such as ISIS and “Guardians of Religion” over battling the Syrian government, which may stem from pragmatic reasoning and an attempt to alter their image both domestically and internationally. Conversely, ISIS in Syria has become more locally focused by targeting what it perceives as nearby enemies, having carried out about 33 attacks starting in early 2024 against oil tankers belonging to both the Syrian Democratic Forces and the Al-Qatarji forces operating within the National Defense Forces of the Syrian regime, with 24 operations against the SDF and 9 against the Al-Qatarji militia. Additionally, it is noted that jihadist Islamic organizations in Thailand are engaging in purely local targeting, aiming at the government forces in the south, whereas similar organizations in southern Philippines have shifted towards a regional and global identity, leading them into conflict with the authorities after some expressed support for ISIS in 2014 and 2015.
Military and Communication Capabilities: The year 2024 shows a continuation of the shift in terrorist organizations in Asia from using automatic rifles and rocket projectiles to utilizing drones, guided munitions, and ballistic missiles, which represents a qualitative transformation as terrorist organizations are rapidly keeping pace with technological developments and seeking alternatives in methods and tools for executing their terrorist operations.
Finally, the fluctuations in the directions and transformations of terrorist organizations in Asia, regarding their ebb or flow, resemble a pendulum movement that largely depends on the evolving countermeasures by Central and South Asian countries, primarily because these countries—despite normalizing trade relations with the Taliban in Afghanistan, except for Tajikistan—fear the export of the Taliban’s model beyond Afghanistan’s borders. Furthermore, the empowerment of the Jamaat-e-Islami party in Bangladesh, which is affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood and will participate in the elections of December 2024, may indicate a parallel empowerment of extremist and violent groups in Bangladesh and adjacent countries, potentially repeating scenarios experienced in Egypt, Libya, and some North African countries, as well as other Arab nations following the revolutionary phase of 2011.
