The Middle East is currently engulfed in a state of uncertainty regarding the next steps following Iran’s launch of nearly 200 ballistic missiles directly from its territory towards Israel on the evening of October 1, 2024. This action was in retaliation for the assassinations of Hamas’s political bureau chief, Ismail Haniyeh, in Tehran on July 31, and the Secretary-General of Hezbollah, Hassan Nasrallah, along with the Deputy Commander of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard, Abbas Nehrujan, in Beirut on September 27.
A Climate of Anticipation
Just as Israel responded to the initial direct Iranian attack in April, Tel Aviv pledged at the beginning of October to retaliate for what it deemed the “largest missile attack” in Israel’s history. Notably, the United States has shown a strong commitment to responding, with American officials emphasizing the necessity of consequences for the Iranian missile assault. Jake Sullivan, the U.S. National Security Advisor, even refrained from urging Israel to “exercise restraint,” signaling that Washington might be prepared for the first time to risk direct support for a new Israeli offensive against Iranian territory. This marks a significant and unprecedented shift in U.S. policy, particularly within Democratic administrations, regarding the tools used to respond to Tehran. Historically, Democrats have aimed to de-escalate tensions between Israel and Iran.
As the Middle East braces for these developments, numerous indicators suggest that an Israeli response could trigger a qualitatively different phase of direct conflict with Iran. If Tel Aviv follows through on its threats to bomb Iranian infrastructure or vital facilities, such as oil and gas storage sites, there is a real possibility of targeting nuclear reactors in Bushehr, Natanz, and Fordow. This situation suggests that the region may be on the brink of a prolonged war of attrition, especially given Iranian forces’ pledges to target U.S. and Western interests in Yemen, Iraq, and Syria. Thus, the pressing questions remain: What scenarios could unfold in the Middle East in the coming days? Is there any room for diplomacy amid Iranian missiles and Israeli fighter jets?
Possible Scenarios
One of the most complex factors surrounding the calculations of Middle Eastern countries is the “political and military euphoria” of both sides in the conflict. Following the assassination of Hassan Nasrallah and Israel’s military successes since the “Beiger” bombings on September 17, Israel’s confidence—particularly among its intelligence and military agencies—has surged. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu expressed hopes of achieving a historical victory by “silencing opponents” on multiple fronts, including Iran, Iraq, Syria, Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Houthis in Yemen, and Hamas.
Conversely, Iran’s response on October 1, utilizing a large number of ballistic missiles that reached Israeli airspace in just 12 minutes, marked a unique “field euphoria” for Tehran’s forces. This was particularly significant after many believed Iran had abandoned its regional allies due to delays in avenging Haniyeh’s assassination.
In this volatile military environment, characterized by a lack of common ground among the warring parties and the absence of a regional or international entity willing to exert pressure to prevent a slide into political and military chaos, the region stands on the verge of several key scenarios:
Bilateral War Erupts: This scenario posits that significant and widespread attacks would be confined to Iran and Israel only. The nature of the Israeli response to the Iranian missile attack would dictate this. If Tel Aviv carries out its threats of a “hybrid attack,” combining security and military responses by conducting massive sabotage operations alongside strikes on any oil and gas wells, missile launch pads, or Iranian nuclear facilities, Tehran would have no choice but to escalate and launch successive waves of missile strikes against Israel without pause. Under these conditions, the region could experience a war akin to the Iraq-Iran conflict from 1980 to 1988. Both Israel and Iran possess the necessary tools to propel themselves into this scenario. Tehran boasts the largest missile arsenal in the region, with over 17,000 “Sejil” missiles capable of hitting targets 2,500 kilometers away, along with “Khaybar” missiles that reach about 2,000 kilometers. Additionally, Iran has long-range missiles such as “Fateh” and “Imad,” according to the Arms Control Association, a Washington, D.C.-based NGO, which noted that Iran possesses highly accurate solid-fuel missiles capable of reaching distant targets. All this indicates that Iran could enter into a long war with Israel, which has over 600 modern fighter jets like the F-15, F-16, and F-35, all capable of reaching Iranian territory. This scenario may only cease if either side realizes it is fatigued or faces an existential threat, such as the downfall of the Iranian regime or significant Israeli casualties due to ongoing Iranian missile attacks.
Outbreak of a Comprehensive Regional War: This scenario could occur if the United States directly partners with Israel in targeting Iranian territory. In such a case, we would be looking at the emergence of “regional warfare,” creating two opposing alliances: one led by the United States, Israel, and Britain—who have announced their involvement in countering Iranian missiles—and the other composed of Iran and its proxies, particularly the Houthis in Yemen, Hezbollah in Lebanon, and the Popular Mobilization Forces in Iraq. Should war break out according to this scenario, it would likely target American and Western interests not only in the region but also potentially Israeli and Western embassies elsewhere around the world. The recent bombings near the Israeli embassy in Copenhagen in early October serve as an indicator of what could transpire in the event of a comprehensive regional war.
Threat to the Iranian Regime: This scenario suggests that Washington and Tel Aviv might exploit the Iranian missile attack to target leaders of the Iranian regime, similar to the killings of Haniyeh and Nasrallah, while simultaneously bombing vital facilities. This action could encourage Iranians to rebel against their ruling regime from the American and Israeli perspectives. Despite previous failures by Washington to employ this option to topple the Iranian regime, Netanyahu’s direct address to the Iranian people from the United Nations, coupled with the U.S.’s tougher rhetoric following recent Israeli successes and the Iranian assault on Israel, suggests that this scenario cannot be entirely ruled out. Israeli officials have confirmed that key Iranian economic targets are part of Israel’s response, and Netanyahu and the Israeli military have indicated multiple times that their message to the Tehran regime will mirror their actions against Nasrallah.
April 2024 Scenario: In April, Israel retaliated against Iran’s launch of over 330 drones, cruise missiles, and ballistic missiles with a calculated attack near the Bushehr nuclear power station without hitting it, resulting in no Iranian response at that time. However, this scenario is somewhat unlikely under current circumstances for several reasons. First, Iran used approximately 200 ballistic missiles in its October 1 attack, double the number used in April’s assault. Second, the U.S. position is more rigid this time regarding Iran, encouraging Tel Aviv to retaliate; American calculations assume that allowing Tehran to go unanswered may embolden it and its allies to target American interests and forces in the region.
Focus on Lebanon: This scenario assumes that Israel’s response to Iran will be limited, with a return to focusing on southern Lebanon, aiming to bring back approximately 100,000 Israelis who have evacuated their homes since October 8, 2023, and to establish a buffer zone in southern Lebanon to ensure that events similar to those on October 7 do not recur from the north. This can be achieved by weakening Hezbollah’s capabilities. Israel may pursue this goal through one or more phases, beginning with a broad ground war aimed at expelling Hezbollah’s “Radwan Forces” from southern Lebanon. This scenario may take one of the following paths:
Demarcation of Land Borders: This would depend on Israel’s willingness to demarcate land borders with Lebanon, whether before or after a ground incursion, similar to the maritime border demarcation in 2022. This would resolve disputes over 13 land points that have lingered since the Israeli withdrawal from southern Lebanon in May 2000. Under this path, Hezbollah would retreat to the north of the Litani River, with the Lebanese Army replacing it on the border with Israel.
Hochstein Path: This involves the path that U.S. envoy Amos Hochstein attempted, persuading Hezbollah to withdraw eight kilometers north of the Blue Line, thereby reassuring Israel that Hezbollah elements would not infiltrate to abduct Israeli civilians, as occurred on October 7, 2023. It appears that Tel Aviv is seeking more than this in light of the intelligence and military successes it has achieved since September 17.
Buffer Zone to the Litani River: Given Iran and Hezbollah’s rejection of separating the fronts in Lebanon and Gaza, indicators suggest that the Israeli military will continue to act on its threats to push Hezbollah forces back approximately 30 kilometers. This buffer zone would extend from the eastern Bekaa Valley to the mouth of the Litani River in the Mediterranean Sea. This path would require Israel to engage in a potentially protracted ground war with Hezbollah forces, similar to the year-long conflict with Hamas in the Gaza Strip.
In conclusion, the Middle East stands on a precarious precipice, awaiting clarity on the extent of Israel’s response to the Iranian missile attack, a reaction that will delineate a new phase not only for regional security but also potentially lead to profound ramifications for issues and matters beyond the region.
