On December 3, 2024, South Korea witnessed dramatic events following President Yoon Suk-yeol’s unexpected announcement of martial law. Although the troubled relationship between the legislative and executive branches indicated a potential clash, even the most pessimistic observers did not foresee that the president would seek to overturn the democratic principles that Korea has worked to establish, as the opposition accuses him of doing.
A Shocking Decision and Rapid Turnaround
In a televised address, President Yoon justified his decision to impose martial law by emphasizing the need to protect the country from North Korean communist forces and anti-state elements, aiming to rebuild South Korea and prevent its collapse and ruin. This decision appeared to be an attempt by the president to strengthen his authority, indicating politically inaccurate calculations, especially since the ultimate outcome could significantly jeopardize his political future.
Article 77 of the South Korean Constitution grants the president the ability to declare martial law and implement related measures. However, the same article permits the National Assembly to request the president to revoke martial law through a vote by a majority of its members against the decision. This occurred merely hours after Yoon’s announcement when 190 members of the National Assembly entered the assembly headquarters and unanimously voted against the martial law decision, rendering it unenforceable.
In light of the above, one can analyze the motivations behind the South Korean president’s sudden initiative and the swift retreat from his martial law decision through several factors:
The Troubled Relationship between the Legislative and Executive Branches: President Yoon’s actions suggest that the underlying tension or differences between him and the parliament (National Assembly) escalated to an explosive level due to the fraught relationship over the past two years. This tension intensified after the April 2024 National Assembly elections, which resulted in the opposition parties collectively holding a majority of seats (192 out of 300), while the ruling People Power Party secured 108 seats. This strained relationship restricted President Yoon’s ability to implement his agenda effectively, facing harsh opposition within the National Assembly. This troubled relationship became clear early on, as Yoon chose not to attend the inaugural session of the National Assembly in September 2024, marking the first time a president missed the opening since 1987. The gap widened further after the Democratic Party proposed a budget cut for the upcoming year on November 29, 2024, a decision passed unilaterally within the budget committee, the first of its kind in South Korean history. Additionally, tensions flared amid corruption allegations concerning the president’s wife and senior officials in his government.
Increasing Political Polarization: Recent developments and the announcement of martial law revealed significant divisions and political polarization among key actors in the South Korean political scene. These actions might indicate a policy of retaliation imposed by the opposition, which seeks to obstruct the government’s agenda and oust officials, including President Yoon himself. Since coming to power in May 2022, there have been 22 impeachment attempts led by the opposition against government officials, with ten attempts against the president since June, according to the president. Moreover, Yoon’s speech unveiled political divisions and the opposition’s vengeance, adopting a narrative accusing them of being pro-North Korea and anti-state. This narrative may have aimed to tarnish the opposition’s image and attract public opinion in his favor. Although these attempts did not yield significant results, they reflected a level of mistrust and a desire among political actors to marginalize one another, exposing another negative aspect of the political scene characterized by rising political animosity stemming from personalized politics. This is evident as most former presidents have faced investigations and condemnation once their opponents came to power.
Resistance to Straying from the Democratic Path: President Yoon’s rapid turnaround and retreat from enforcing martial law indicate a desire among Korean institutions, represented by the National Assembly, and public opinion, reflected through citizens and civil society organizations, to thwart any attempts that could be viewed as a coup against the values and democratic path that South Korea has promoted since becoming a democracy in 1987. This journey began with the election of the first president from outside military ranks in 1992. Additionally, South Korea has not declared martial law for nearly 45 years, the last occurrence being after the assassination of President Park Chung-hee, who ruled for about 15 years. Therefore, this recent attempt is perceived as crossing red lines and rules that have shaped the political system over the past decades, serving as a true test of the choice between reverting to authoritarianism or upholding the democratic model. However, current transformations suggest that the democratic experience in South Korea may still be fragile or not fully matured, amidst ongoing political divisions, abuses of power, attempts to demonize the opposition, and existing gender gaps, among other factors that contradict established democratic practices.
Army’s Flexibility and Alignment with Collective Sentiment: The arrangements for imposing martial law placed the army in a prominent position, with General Park An-soo, the chief of staff, leading the martial law operations. He issued several decrees, including banning political activities and gatherings and placing the media under military control, thereby increasing the army’s grip on the scene. The Ministry of Defense had announced a state of readiness for all its units, deploying troops on the streets and surrounding the National Assembly building. The opposition did not discount the possibility of premeditated planning for this move, particularly after the announcement in August 2024 of the appointment of Kim Yong-hyun, the head of the presidential security service, as the new Minister of Defense, a step that raised concerns among the opposition, which had begun discussing a potential martial law imposition in September 2024. However, the military’s response to recent decisions appeared balanced and calm, especially after withdrawing from the scene following the National Assembly’s vote against the martial law, thus adhering to constitutional rules. Consequently, military conduct prevented violent confrontations with the disgruntled public and political forces upset with Yoon’s decision, allowing for peaceful containment of the crisis away from violence and chaos.
General Features of the Upcoming Scene
The actions taken by the South Korean president can be described as a reckless gamble with uncertain outcomes, possibly marking the beginning of the end for him. While the attempt to overturn democracy was absorbed, the overall scene’s outlines remain unclear. A significant political momentum is expected in the coming months, which can be summarized as follows:
Compulsory Path (Resignation or Impeachment): Events may be headed towards a compulsory path that the Korean president did not anticipate. The logical outcome of his failure to maintain control through the martial law imposition will lead either to his resignation or impeachment. However, with the president’s popularity diminishing significantly in recent times, now at only 20% compared to about 53% at the time of his election, the likelihood of him opting for resignation remains doubtful, given his desire to cling to power and avoid political accountability. The second likely avenue pertains to impeaching the president and forcing him out of the scene. The opposition has started drafting a proposal for impeachment, which may be voted on December 7. The process does not seem difficult for the opposition since it requires a two-thirds majority from the 200 assembly members. This indicates that the opposition needs to persuade eight members from the ruling party to support the motion. Theoretically, voting for impeachment seems assured, as reports indicate that 18 members from the ruling party voted in favor of lifting martial law. While it is difficult to confirm support for impeachment among ruling party members, the ruling People Power Party’s stance on the martial law may hint at potential votes in favor of impeachment, as its leader described the martial law as tragic and called for accountability for all accountable individuals. If this happens, South Korea will face its second presidential impeachment since completing the democratic transition, following the parliament’s ousting of President Park Geun-hye in 2017. Yoon may find himself facing a fate similar to Park’s once he is impeached and stripped of immunity, which had seen accusations of bribery and abuse of power, resulting in a 20-year prison sentence for her, later pardoned in December 2021.
Recourse to the Constitutional Court as a Complementary Path: Following passage in the National Assembly, impeachment requires a similar decision from the Constitutional Court, which can either uphold or reject the impeachment. The decision must be approved by at least six out of nine judges. However, this path faces challenges as only six judges currently serve on the court, following the recent retirement of three judges. The court cannot consider impeachment unless seven or more judges are present, indicating that passing the decision in court remains incomplete due to the lack of a quorum. Consequently, the Democratic Party recommended on December 4 adding two judges to the court to overcome any potential hurdles that could affect the decision’s validity or raise doubts about its legitimacy, alongside concerns regarding the court’s potential rejection of the decision given that some judges were appointed by President Yoon. This issue might allow Yoon to remain in power for at least three months after the National Assembly vote, as historical experience indicates that appointing new judges can take two to three months. Furthermore, the Constitutional Court is not obligated to issue a decision within a specific timeframe regarding the impeachment, which might take as long as three months, akin to the experience during Park Geun-hye’s impeachment, where the National Assembly voted in December 2016 before the Constitutional Court approved the decision in March 2017.
Call for Early Elections: If the legal process of the impeachment is completed or if he agrees to resign, the country will move into preparations for early elections, which were initially set to allow President Yoon to remain in office until 2027. In this scenario, Prime Minister Han Duck-soo would manage the country, with elections to be held within 60 days. Expectations indicate that these elections would favor the Democratic Party, with Lee Jae-myung, the party leader, being the most likely candidate, especially since he lost the presidential election in 2022 by a narrow margin. Despite the challenges the People Power Party faces in gaining significant traction in the upcoming early elections following Yoon’s recent actions, this does not negate the potential of the party leader, Han Dong-hoon, in the presidential race, especially as he has maintained a fundamentally oppositional stance against the president’s steps, and his popularity may rise further if he rallies or urges party members in parliament to vote in favor of the impeachment decision.
Finally, President Yoon’s retreat from imposing martial law does not represent the final chapter in the dramatic transformations that South Korea experienced on December 3 and 4; rather, it may mark the beginning of even more dramatic changes, both domestically and internationally. This could potentially alter the political equation in South Korea and shift the relative weights of actors in the scene, raising major questions about the future of democracy in South Korea and the future relationship between the legislative and executive branches.
