Features of Increasing Defense Cooperation Between Russia and Indonesia

Recent reports have highlighted Russia’s request to allow its aircraft to be stationed at an airbase in far eastern Indonesia. This reflects Russia’s efforts over the past years to shift its focus toward Asia, expanding beyond its partnerships with China and North Korea to boost its economic weight and influence in the region, especially as the Kremlin realizes that Europe will not be a partner to Russia in any capacity. Addressing the American and European challenge necessitates enhancing partnerships deeply within Asia. Therefore, Russia has worked to strengthen its security and military presence in the Indo-Pacific region and increase partnerships with middle powers in Southeast Asia.

Notable Indicators

Since the election of “Prabowo Subianto” as President of Indonesia in October 2024, Moscow and Jakarta have sought to deepen their bilateral relations in various economic, educational, and military fields. The most significant indicators of the partnership between the two sides can be summarized as follows:

Joint Military Exercises: Indonesia and Russia conducted their first joint naval exercises just one month after the new Indonesian president assumed office. In November 2024, Indonesia and Russia embarked on their inaugural joint naval maneuver in the Java Sea. It was officially announced that these bilateral exercises aimed to support Indonesia’s foreign policy agenda prioritizing non-alignment in the face of global power conflicts. The exercises were divided into two phases, conducted over five days near the Indonesian city of Surabaya, east of the capital Jakarta.

Visits by High-Level Russian Officials to Indonesia: “Sergei Shoigu,” the Secretary of the Russian Security Council and one of Vladimir Putin’s closest allies, visited Indonesia and Malaysia in February 2025, despite Moscow’s focus on the battlefield in Ukraine. This high-profile visit indicates that Moscow’s intentions toward Jakarta may extend beyond merely building strong military ties with Indonesia to include acquiring military privileges that also serve Russia’s major interests globally, particularly in Europe. Additionally, Russian Deputy Prime Minister “Denis Manturov” visited Indonesia on April 14 and 15, 2025, coinciding with reports of Moscow’s request for Indonesia to host an airbase on its territory.

Creating New Demand for Russian Weapons in Indonesia: Russia has been seeking to sell defense technology and fighter jets to Indonesia, considering it a potentially lucrative market for Russian arms. Russia has generally aimed to deepen its military partnerships with ASEAN countries as a whole, participating in joint military exercises and showcasing numerous military programs to leaders of these countries to make its military offerings more popular among nations in this region, which is engaged in a new arms race.

Establishing a Permanent Russian Military Presence in Indonesia: A report by Jane’s, published on April 16, 2025, stated that Moscow sought to establish a base for its long-range aircraft in Indonesia. The report indicated that the Russian request included an attempt to gain Jakarta’s approval for its aircraft to be stationed at the “Manoaha” airbase in far eastern Indonesia, located in Papua province. This base is about 1,300 kilometers away from the Australian city of Darwin.

Key Motivators

Several factors are enhancing the rapprochement between Russia and Indonesia, which can be discussed as follows:

Moscow’s Urge to Assert Its International Presence and Influence: Numerous newspapers, especially “Deutsche Welle” and “Radio Free Asia,” have reported that Russia’s move to establish a base for its long-range aircraft in Indonesia can be viewed as a tactical strike aimed at provoking concern, fear, and uncertainty among the United States and its allies in the region. This maneuver underscores that Moscow is no longer content with symbolic gestures—such as sending a submarine to an Asian port—to demonstrate its continued global presence and influence and its capacity to break its international isolation. Instead, it aims to create a permanent military presence in Asia, thereby multiplying the threats faced by Washington’s allies in the region.

Indonesian Leadership’s Interest in Potential Economic Opportunities by Cooperating with Moscow: Indonesia seeks to establish closer economic relations with Russia, particularly eager to attract Russian investments in strategic sectors such as energy and mining, as well as in the Indonesian sovereign wealth fund. The good relations with Moscow also seem to be part of the strategy of the new Indonesian president, aimed at making Indonesia an active middle power, albeit non-aligned. Furthermore, relations with Moscow allow Indonesia to achieve a degree of balance in its relationships with China and the United States amid intensifying competition between the great powers.

Lack of Negative Public Sentiment in Indonesia Toward Russia: Indonesians, like many people in the Global South, do not hold the same negative perception of Moscow that prevails in the West. For example, a survey conducted by the “Pew” Research Center in mid-2023 indicated that 70% of Australians surveyed viewed Russia “very negatively,” compared to just 6% of Indonesians.

Russia’s Non-opposition to Indonesia’s Accession to the BRICS Group: In January 2025, Indonesia officially joined the BRICS group as the first Southeast Asian nation, a bloc of Global South countries viewed by many as challenging Western dominance over the global economic system. While some Indonesian analysts reject the suggestion that Jakarta’s accession to the bloc constitutes alignment with China and Russia, stepping away from the Western economic system, they affirm that President “Prabowo’s” interest in joining this group indicates his desire for Indonesia to be a more active diplomatic player in an international system, especially given his country’s significant impact from the ongoing trade war between China and the United States.

Indonesian Elites’ Interest in Russian Culture: Some Russian political elites have important ties to Russia. For instance, the Indonesian Minister of Culture, and Deputy Chairman of the “Gerindra” party led by the current Indonesian president, “Fadlizon,” is known for his admiration of Russia. He holds a degree in Russian literature from the University of Indonesia. Before the presidential elections of 2019, which “Subianto” lost, “Zon” stated that Indonesia needed a strong leader like “Vladimir Putin.” He remarked, “If you want Indonesia to rise and succeed, it needs a leader like Vladimir Putin, who embodies courage, intelligence, wisdom, and astuteness.”

Potential Implications

The rapprochement between Russia and Indonesia entails several potential major implications, outlined as follows:

Increased Australian Concerns Regarding Russo-Indonesian Approaches: Australia is among the countries most affected and concerned by this partnership, especially given its unique security and military partnership with Indonesia. Australia always seeks to ensure Jakarta maintains a policy of appeasement, neutrality, and non-involvement with any major international party in the Indo-Pacific conflict. Australia issued an official statement commenting on the news of Russia’s attempt to establish a military base in Indonesia, with Australian Defense Minister “Richard Marles” questioning the validity of the information in the Jane’s report. He justified this by saying that his Indonesian counterpart assured him that no Russian aircraft would be allowed to be stationed in Indonesia. For his part, Australian Prime Minister “Anthony Albanese” stated that he seeks answers from his counterparts in Indonesia regarding the report.

Increased Debate Regarding Indonesia’s External Balance Policy: Although Russia’s recent moves in Indonesia have raised concerns among several analysts and specialists in the Indo-Pacific region, many analysts point out that Indonesia’s traditional foreign policy approach, focusing on sovereignty and non-alignment, makes any agreement to establish military bases nearly impossible. Just as the firm stance of non-alignment and sensitivity toward sovereignty sometimes complicates Jakarta’s defense relations with Australia, the same mentality acts as a significant deterrent to slowing Jakarta’s cooperation with other international players from China and Russia.

Possibility of Australia Expanding Cooperation with Indonesia: It is estimated that such a Russian move toward rapprochement with Indonesia would serve as a wake-up call for the current Australian government, prompting it to avoid complacency and exert greater effort to confront the challenges posed by Moscow in Southeast Asia. The stability that has characterized relations between Australia and Indonesia may have made Canberra somewhat lax. Prime Minister “Anthony Albanese” and opposition leader “Peter Dutton” have expressed their appreciation for the relationship with Indonesia; however, each has, in their own way, missed opportunities to invest in this relationship. “Albanese” failed to attend “Prabowo’s” inauguration in October 2025, marking a departure from a long-standing tradition upheld by successive Australian Prime Ministers, and he has not visited Indonesia since then. Similarly, “Dutton” declared that he would make his first foreign visit to Washington instead of Jakarta.

Further Complications in U.S.-Indonesian Relations: While the Trump administration seeks an agreement with Russia to end the Ukraine war, Russia’s desire to establish a presence in the Indo-Pacific through Indonesia will likely not be well-received, particularly as it complicates the security landscape in the region with multiple actors involved. In this context, Trump’s tariff policies against various countries, including Indonesia, may facilitate further rapprochement between Jakarta and Moscow.

China Monitoring the Outcome of the Indonesia-Russia Rapprochement: The Ukraine war has contributed to strengthening relations between Russia and China, with Beijing seemingly supporting the Russian perspective on the war, particularly regarding attributing blame to Western policies for igniting this conflict. However, the accelerated pace of Russian presence in the Indo-Pacific and near China may raise some concerns in Beijing, especially given the current unclear trajectory of U.S.-Russian talks and what demands Washington may have from Russia.

In conclusion, all these factors suggest that in light of the fierce competition for influence among great powers in the Indo-Pacific region, these countries will seek to draw neutral states into their camp and gain more military and political concessions in exchange for supporting their bilateral partnerships with these countries. This could ultimately represent either an opportunity or another challenge that needs to be addressed in a highly sensitive and changing political environment.