The Russian-Ukrainian war has become a prime international crisis impacting the vital interests of many countries around the world, as military operations have shaken the foundations of European security. The resulting economic consequences have led to global inflation, affecting issues related to energy, food, and construction worldwide. Although communications between Russia and Ukraine, as well as between Russia and several European capitals, have not ceased, and signals and messages between Moscow and Washington have continued, none of these interactions have led to a cease-fire or a political settlement of the crisis. The Russians have entrenched themselves in their relative military superiority, while Americans and Europeans have tightly embraced economic sanctions, leaving each party still clinging to its original demands more than two months after the war began.
Ukraine, being the weaker party in this equation, has sought to strengthen its resistance and garner international sympathy, suffering numerous casualties, including civilians, thousands of injuries, and the exodus of three million refugees. The ongoing crisis has not only placed significant pressure on the international system and major power relations but has also impacted the global system and its interactions. The outcome could either lead to a painful labor that might spell doom for humanity if military escalation continues or give birth to new international understandings and agreements that could lay the groundwork for a new international order, achieving some form of global security and peace.
Back to the Declaration of February 4, 2022
The Chinese perspective in this process is extremely important. Despite the rapidly unfolding events and the focus on war and economic clashes, Beijing’s role appears understated in the entire crisis. Nonetheless, reality showcases a different role for China, beginning on February 4, 2022, when a joint Chinese-Russian statement was issued following a meeting between Presidents Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping at the Winter Olympics in Beijing. The statement called for a review of the international system established since the end of the Cold War, which is based on the United States as the sole superpower, from which security, peace, and cooperation on our planet are derived. The document asserted that “democracy” is a universal human value and not a privilege of certain states, and that establishing and defending it is a shared mission for the entire international community. However, “every people has the right to choose paths for achieving democracy,” and “no one but the people themselves has the right to evaluate the level of democracy in their country.” Furthermore, it stated, “Attempts by some countries to impose their own democratic standards on others constitute an affront to democracy and pose a concrete threat to global and regional peace and stability, undermining the international system.”
The call for change emphasized the necessity of cooperation with other countries, particularly the new leading powers, including Russia, which sees itself as more than just the Soviet Union that collapsed, but as a military power commanding respect not only for its vast nuclear arsenal but also for its military capabilities that can be deployed politically, as evidenced in Syria. China, expressing considerable economic power alongside military strength, serves as a crucial partner in the global market, whose global and regional interests in the South China Sea cannot be ignored. The key term in the statement and subsequent declarations was the need for the United States to treat its peers—Russia and China—with respect, rather than lecturing them on democracy and human rights.
Amid the escalation of the crisis and the Russian-Ukrainian war, there were strong doubts about whether China was aware of Russia’s intentions to shift the review of the international system from formal statements to reality by curbing NATO’s expansion into Ukraine, against the backdrop of a comprehensive review of the historical phase post-Cold War when the United States emerged as the sole leader of the international and global order. From the Russian perspective, this transition signified a significant geopolitical loss in world history, creating an undesirable monopoly for Washington in global politics. Although China agrees with the idea of review, it has not collapsed after the Cold War; rather, it has achieved remarkable economic and technological growth and has its unique pathway for globalization, represented in its Belt and Road Initiative, in addition to its role in the World Trade Organization, becoming the largest trading partner of the United States. This marked a fundamental difference between China and Russia regarding their visions for the review, particularly given Chinese behavior post-crisis, suggesting a lack of full awareness concerning Russian intentions, except for a shared concern about NATO’s expansion within Europe.
A Surprising and Complex Chinese Position
The February 4 statement led to initial interpretations of the Russian-Ukrainian crisis that positioned Russia and China on the same side. However, China soon surprised many by supporting Russia’s stance against NATO’s expansion to include Ukraine, regarding this position as natural for a state unwilling to face threats at its borders. Yet, at the same time, it did not want the crisis caused by the Russian troop buildup to escalate into a global crisis at a time when the world required greater cooperation to tackle the COVID-19 pandemic, the energy crisis, and inflation—not more division. The political crisis stemming from the military buildup turned into a military crisis when the buildup reached its peak, leading to Russia invading Ukraine. This moment revealed a divergence between Russia and China, as the latter, as a major global economic power with the world’s largest population, aspires for a stable world governed by cooperation and consensus. In such a viewpoint, it is natural to reject military alliances, including NATO; however, it is extraordinary for NATO’s rejection to become a pretext for invading Ukraine without adequate attempts for negotiation and exploration of avenues for achieving mutual security instead of resorting to weapons.
China’s decision to abstain from voting in the UN Security Council session dedicated to discussing the “Ukrainian crisis” last March shocked many. Yet, it accurately reflected China’s perspective, which Foreign Minister Wang Yi articulated as consistent with Chinese foreign policy principles, chiefly respecting the sovereignty, unity, and territorial integrity of all nations, including Ukraine. Secondly, it emphasized China’s support for a concept of security that is mutual, comprehensive, cooperative, and sustainable, where the security of any nation does not come at the expense of others. This contradicts NATO’s intent to expand further eastward, approaching Russian borders after five rounds of enlargement. On the other hand, China’s position indicates that it is “monitoring developments concerning Ukraine, and the current situation is something China does not wish to witness.” The “issue” contains its humanitarian dimensions, calling on parties to prevent the crisis from spiraling out of control and negotiate a solution, positioning Ukraine ultimately as a bridge for communication between East and West rather than as a frontline between major powers. The balance here is delicate between Ukraine’s sovereign rights and Russia’s security rights, placing all of this within the context of regional security across the entire European continent. China’s stance here is cautious, ensuring that the UN and the Security Council are not mere tools for any party, as the Council’s function is not to incite conflict but to resolve it. Thus, China consistently opposes any deliberate invocation of Chapter VII in the Council’s resolutions aiming to authorize the use of force and sanctions.
China’s voting position in the Security Council, followed by its stance in the General Assembly, placed it in a complicated position concerning Russia, which shares its vision of review, and its global status and economic relations with the West, particularly the US. Since then, China has continuously advocated for a ceasefire and peaceful resolution of the crisis while maintaining open channels with both Beijing and Kyiv. On the other hand, it kept lines open with European powers seeking a diplomatic solution, primarily France and Germany, and importantly with Washington itself. Notably, US-China discussions have unfolded within a global framework, while US-Russian discussions have been largely confined to the current crisis. It is evident that despite apparent disagreements over principal issues raised by Washington regarding the contradiction between “democracy and authoritarianism,” and the right of intervention concerning human rights issues in China and other countries, and China’s stances on Taiwan and the South China Sea, communication channels between Washington and Beijing have remained long and deep. In November, discussions took place between US National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan and high-ranking Chinese diplomat Yang Jiechi, lasting three hours, followed by a virtual meeting between US President Joe Biden and Chinese President Xi Jinping for another three hours—occurring before the Ukrainian crisis, but additional meetings continued into March 2022 in Rome, lasting seven full hours, succeeded by another virtual meeting between the two presidents lasting three more hours. The extended duration of these meetings reflects a commitment from both sides and a long list of issues to address.
Towards an American-Chinese Equation
The overarching theme of these discussions is “efforts to manage competition between the two states and discuss the impacts of Russia’s war against Ukraine on regional (European) and global security.” During these talks, the US position returned to the “Shanghai Declaration,” which established the foundations of US-China relations fifty years ago. President Biden emphasized that the relationship has reached a critical juncture that will shape the world in the twenty-first century. Based on this context, the US does not seek “a new Cold War” with China, nor does it aim to change the regime in China. The US does not view the enhancement of its alliances as targeting China, nor does it support Taiwan’s independence, and Washington does not intend to seek conflict with China. The US side expressed readiness to engage in frank dialogue with China, foster closer cooperation, uphold the one-China policy, and effectively manage and contain differences to ensure the stable development of US-China relations, including maintaining close communication with the Chinese president to steer the direction of US-China ties. The Chinese president, for his part, approached the Ukrainian crisis by referencing the significant new changes in international conditions that pose serious challenges to the themes of security, development, and peace in this era. Given that both the US and China are permanent members of the UN Security Council and the world’s largest economies, they are tasked not only with directing US-China relations correctly but also with “assuming the required international responsibility” and “working towards peace and security in the world.” The Chinese president blamed the previous US administration—Trump’s—for its stance on Taiwan and encouraging independence movements within the region, as well as for failing to translate the US president’s positions on China into reality. Following this, it became possible to discuss confronting the Russian-Ukrainian war from the perspectives of cease-fire, Russian-Ukrainian negotiations, and humanitarian considerations for Ukraine.
Details of this situation have yet to be fully disclosed, and it is likely that the leaders of both countries will leave the specifics to their aides to determine the procedures. However, while it is challenging to assert complete alignment of viewpoints—because, as the saying goes, “the devil is in the details”—Chinese positions open the door to significant matters. Firstly, under the prevailing spirit of cooperation in the discussions, China is likely to exert its influence alongside Russia to push for a ceasefire in Ukraine, as it cannot thwart US economic sanctions, which would thrust it into confrontation with Washington, a scenario through which it may collaborate with the US to limit NATO’s expansion. Secondly, despite existing differences related to NATO’s presence and the US alliances with Australia, Japan, and South Korea, there are enough points of agreement aiming for an end to the Ukrainian conflict. Thirdly, discussions between the two parties suggest they recognize, in an objective sense, that they are the leading powers in the near future; should Russia share this position, it will be hampered by the consequences of the war in terms of its international reputation and diminished economic standing. In conclusion, the Chinese dimension in the Ukrainian war crisis will outline many features of an impending new international system.