Factors Influencing Tensions Between North and South Korea

In late October 2024, the Korean Peninsula experienced some instability due to verbal skirmishes and mutual threats between North and South Korea. Since the onset of the Korean War in 1950, a form of psychological warfare between the two Koreas has emerged, relying on propaganda leaflets exchanged between the sides, each striving to promote itself while undermining the other. This tactic continued after the war ended, initially employed by South Korea and subsequently adopted by civil society organizations in the South to raise awareness among the Northern populace about democracy, along with some technological products, food, and medicines unavailable in North Korea. In recent months, developments regarding this psychological warfare intensified after South Korea’s cancellation in May 2024 of a law ratified in 2020 that prohibited South Korean citizens from sending balloons to the North in a cooperative context between former President Moon Jae-in and North Korean leader Kim Jong-un. The psychological warfare between the two Koreas is a central issue in analyzing the Korean conflict, and the rise or fall of this tactic serves as an indicator of the underlying intensity of tensions between them. Therefore, it is necessary to probe the dimensions of this recent escalation, noting that the balloons are merely a surface representation of deeper tensions occurring in the region.

The concept of unification is a crucial element in understanding the foreign policies of both Koreas. Both nations view unification as an inevitable goal that must be achieved, though the means to this end fluctuate over time. During periods of tension, parties may deny their desire for unification or believe that military strength is the route toward it. Conversely, during times of peace, both sides often regard cooperation as a starting point for unification. This dynamic reflects the general push and pull between North and South Korea.

In this context, and particularly in the recent past, the Korean conflict has taken a new turn, albeit not directly, but as an inseparable aspect of the broader conflict between the North and South and, by extension, the United States. North Korea has extended its scope beyond mere skirmishes on the Korean peninsula to the Ukrainian battlefield in support of Russia. This notion of expanding outreach beyond its borders marks a new turning point in this conflict that warrants analysis.

Korean Foreign Policy: The Return of Tensions

Since the end of the Korean War in the early 1950s, there has been no serious effort to build peaceful relations between the two Koreas despite the signing of a ceasefire agreement in July 1953. Consequently, although relations between the North and South have oscillated between conflict and calm, a sense of hostility has dominated the overall climate of Korean relations for the past seventy years. It can be concluded that the conflict has not transcended Cold War politics, which pivot around influencing the northern and southern actors by larger powers. Even if one doesn’t consider it as influence, Korean interactions orbit around major powers, given that the conflict remains entrenched in this phase.

Furthermore, it is pertinent to discuss North Korea’s reactions to shifts in Southern policy. Kim Jong-un did not revert to his aggressive posturing until the presidency of Yoon Suk-yeol in South Korea, whose more confrontational approach diverged significantly from that of his predecessor, Moon. From 2017 to 2022, during Moon’s tenure, the two Koreas were in a period of peace and containment fostered by South Korea’s “Sunshine Policy,” aimed at increasing communication and cooperation between the two.

Since Yoon Suk-yeol assumed the presidency of South Korea in 2022, the deterioration of inter-Korean relations has been notable. Unlike Moon Jae-in, Yoon has pursued a more confrontational strategy toward the North. While Moon relied on agreements with the North, resulting in some level of containment of the Northern threat, Yoon, as a populist leader, is acutely aware of the growing tensions within the South Korean political scene. The rise of nationalist and conservative sentiments domestically has led to criticism of Moon’s foreign policy toward the North, focusing instead on preserving South Korea’s national security. Additionally, the South Korean public’s shift in opinion toward prioritizing self-reliance in security, including the consideration of nuclear capabilities, has gained traction, especially after the Ukrainian War demonstrated that American protection may not be a complete deterrent against all forms of aggression. From a security perspective, Yoon understands that South Korea is caught between several nuclear powers, namely North Korea and China. The growing interest in a South Korean nuclear bomb contrasts with South Korea’s commitments under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, leaving it with little choice but to strengthen its alliance with the U.S. and its allies rather than pursue a nuclear project. This strategy has compelled Yoon to adopt a more aggressive stance towards North Korea, identifying the North as the primary foe, while also seeking closer relations with Japan, marking Yoon as the first president to visit Japan since 2010 following a period of strained relations.

It is evident that the nature of inter-Korean relations shifts in direction and intensity, heavily influenced by the South Korean president’s orientation. The transition from Moon to Yoon has altered South Korea’s foreign policy from a focus on containing North Korea through peaceful relations without emphasizing ties with the U.S. and Japan, to a confrontational approach toward the North while prioritizing alliances with the West. Consequently, this escalation between North and South Korea has expanded the conflict—in significant part indirectly—beyond the Korean Peninsula.

It was also natural for North Korea’s policy shift to align with that of the South. In the latter half of 2022, North Korea began ramping up its missile tests, crossing maritime boundaries with the South for the first time, alongside numerous threats and displays of force on the Korean Peninsula. South Korea responded to these threats and skirmishes through military activities, either independently or in conjunction with the U.S.

A critical turning point occurred in 2023 when North Korea decided to withdraw from the military agreement between the two Koreas signed in 2018. This decision came as the South threatened partial withdrawal due to the North’s violation of the no-fly zone stipulated in the agreement following the launch of a satellite in late 2023. North Korea completed its withdrawal in January 2023. In June 2024, South Korea fully withdrew from the agreement after North Korea sent balloons to the South carrying human and industrial waste. Throughout that year, inter-Korean relations continued to escalate, reaching a peak as North Korea expanded its conflict zones beyond the Korean Peninsula.

Pressure and Moving Beyond the Region

The current situation suggests that North Korea is under pressure both externally and internally. The primary issue appears to be the financial sanctions imposed on it by the UN, initiated in 2006 following its first nuclear test, which expanded from 2006 to 2017 to prohibit North Korea’s imports of various agricultural goods, petroleum, weapons, and more. Alongside these, numerous individual sanctions from the U.S. and the EU have placed the North Korean populace in a dire humanitarian position and imposed significant political challenges for its leadership. Kim Jong-un cannot afford to overlook military expenditures, believing that military strength is the only way to sustain his regime and maintain the state’s existence in the region. However, statistics indicate that approximately 60% of North Koreans live in extreme poverty, unable to meet their fundamental needs for food, clothing, and shelter.

Thus, Kim must consider options beyond his borders to resolve the crisis and strike a balance between the importance of maintaining a military industrial complex, confronting South Korea and the West, and meeting the needs of his people. These three elements are crucial determinants of North Korea’s foreign policy and are reflected in its increasing collaboration with Russia across military, economic, and political fronts—a partnership rooted in the 1950s that persisted throughout the Cold War and has been inherited by Putin’s Russia since he took leadership in 2000.

Since the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020, Russian-North Korean relations had been notably stagnant due to border closures. However, in June 2024, Russia and North Korea signed a comprehensive strategic partnership, although support and collaboration had been ongoing prior to that, particularly since the beginning of the war in Ukraine. Politically, North Korea has supported Russia in the UN General Assembly every time a resolution was passed against Russia, whether condemning its aggression or recognizing the territories annexed by Russia. Furthermore, North Korea was among the few countries that recognized the new republics of Donetsk and Luhansk. Conversely, Russia has supported North Korea in the UN Security Council through various measures, the most significant being the use of its veto to dismantle the sanctions regime by failing to renew the mandate of the expert team responsible for sanction monitoring last July. Both nations are attempting to lift some constraints from each other or provide support in various forms.

Militarily and strategically, North Korea has been one of the earliest supporters of Russia since the start of the Ukrainian war, sending military equipment to the Russian front to confront Ukrainian forces. Cooperation has grown throughout the conflict, with the latest development involving North Korea sending approximately 3,000 troops to Russia and planning to send an additional 10,000, marking North Korea’s most significant military intervention outside its territory. In return, Russia has started sending food supplies to North Korea, aiding in addressing its food crisis, thus allowing a closer examination of the policies of each actor in these conflicts.

Dismantling the Present and Future Scenarios

There are several intertwined lines of thought that must be differentiated. Firstly, the shift in North Korea’s foreign policy coincided with the vacuum created by the changes in South Korea’s foreign policy toward the North. Consequently, the decision-making environment in North Korea has become increasingly precarious, striving to balance new tensions in the region while needing to maintain existing military capabilities—fundamental requires to ensure the loyalty of the populace. The costs of upkeeping this military force adversely impact the provision of essential services to the population, coupled with the natural food crisis in North Korea. Therefore, North Korea must find a way to extricate itself from this internal political quagmire.

Secondly, Moon’s policy in South Korea relied on rapprochement with North Korea while simultaneously maintaining some distance from close relations with the U.S. and the West. As a result, this approach limited Western intervention in North Korean affairs. However, with the shift in strategy and the animosity North Korea harbors toward the West—especially with tightening economic and trade sanctions exacerbating North Korea’s economic conditions—a pivot was ripe for either of its primary foreign allies, namely China or Russia.

Thirdly, why Russia and not China? From China’s perspective, it is unlikely that China will cooperate with North Korea as extensively as North Korea requires at this time, to avoid affecting its already tense relations with the U.S. This has manifested in China’s stance toward the situation. On the other hand, the timing of North Korea’s policy shift aligned closely with the onset of the Russian-Ukrainian war in early 2022, creating room for maneuverability between North Korea and Russia. North Korea benefits from exporting its military production to Russia, assisting it in the war, while simultaneously seeking to benefit from Russian food production to alleviate its food crisis. Such an opportunity would not have been available to North Korea within the external framework of China. North Korea has utilized the Ukrainian war as leverage for maneuvering. Furthermore, the historical alliance between Russia and North Korea has been capitalized upon since 2022.

Finally, the scene surrounding the Ukrainian conflict becomes increasingly complex, particularly with Ukraine’s advances against Russia, prompting Russia to seek to leverage existing partnerships and attempt to counter the West indirectly. It is likely that the Russian-North Korean alliance will strengthen, raising questions about China’s stance regarding the Russia-North Korea rapprochement, as well as the positions of South Korea and the West, along with the points where the two allies occasionally diverge, and how far North Korea will benefit from this cooperation.

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