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Factors for the Decline of “Jihadist Terrorism” Threats in the United States

The incident of the ramming that occurred in the American city of New Orleans at the beginning of 2025, carried out by an American citizen from the state of Texas, and resulted in the death of 14 people, led to a reevaluation of the reality of the phenomenon of “jihadist terrorism” in the United States, its scope of impact, and its spread, especially since Washington, since declaring the war on terrorism in the aftermath of the events of September 11, 2001, through confronting the Islamic State organization “ISIS” in the Middle East, has witnessed some terrorist attacks resulting from the inspiration of ISIS and Al-Qaeda organizations to individuals to carry out “lone wolf” attacks. However, longer-term trends indicate that terrorism has not reappeared in the United States.

In this context, a study by researcher Alexander Palmer and others titled “Jihadist Terrorism in the United States: What the Data Tells Us” for the Center for Strategic and International Studies in January 2025 analyzed the extent of the influential capacity or effective presence of the terrorism threat within the American interior. It concluded that this threat does not require a review of internal security policies or the allocation of more resources, but rather only requires external efforts to support international counter-terrorism efforts.

Low Levels of Terrorism:

The United States has witnessed around 740 terrorist attacks and plots since January 1, 1994, until January 1, 2025, of which 140 attacks and plots were characterized by jihadist terrorist acts. The analysis of these numbers leads to the following:

  1. “Jihadist Terrorism” between Rise and Fall: “Jihadist terrorism” in the United States has seen two main rises since the events of September 11; the first occurred at the beginning of the tenure of former President Barack Obama, and the second between the declaration of ISIS’s caliphate in 2014 and the fall of its last regional strongholds in 2019. Most of the jihadist attacks and plots targeted civilians in general, despite the fact that these two periods of increased jihadist activity also witnessed a large number of attacks and plots against military, governmental, and law enforcement targets.

In addition, recorded jihadist attacks and plots against targets within the United States have significantly decreased since the defeat of ISIS in 2019. While the period between 2013 and 2019 saw the execution of 27 attacks and the disruption of 46 jihadist plots, at an average of about 10 attacks or plots per year, since the beginning of 2020 until January 2025, only 8 jihadist terrorist attacks and 10 failed plots have been recorded, at an average of about 3 attacks or plots per year.

  1. Less Impactful Attacks: The numbers also indicate a decline in the level of terrorist violence in the United States since the defeat of “ISIS,” attributed to the decline in the organization’s ability to inspire and export violence as Washington’s capabilities to dismantle and strike the logistical structure of these organizations have grown. Even in terms of damage, the attacks have become less deadly. In the period between 2013 and 2017, terrorists in the United States killed on average (about 3) people per attack, compared to an average not exceeding (about 0.4) since the end of 2017.

The sustainability of terrorist attacks during the period from 2013 to 2017 is attributed to ISIS’s ability to inspire and influence people abroad, in terms of the mere targets of jihadist groups, including punishing their enemies.

  1. International Terrorist Organizations as the Main Source: International terrorist organizations such as ISIS and Al-Qaeda constitute the primary source of jihadist terrorism in the United States. Despite the fact that the terrorist attacks carried out by international terrorist groups have not been more impactful than those witnessed by the United States since September 11, these groups have been successful in facilitating and supporting terrorist attacks with widespread resonance in Europe.
  2. Dominance of Targeting Civilians in the Terrorist Target Bank: Civilian targets were the most targeted, especially since jihadist ideology enables the targeting of civilians on a wide scale, in light of the promotion of fatwas related to the fact that non-Muslim civilians are legitimate targets, and even Muslim civilians can be killed as collateral damage. Some jihadist Salafists have expanded the forms of takfir to the extent that permission is given to target Muslim civilians who are considered to be highly non-compliant with Islamic traditions.

However, military targets of terrorism emerged in two years, namely 2010, where 6 attacks and plots to target the army occurred, and 2015 with 7 operations, through targeting military facilities in Northern Virginia, including the Pentagon, the U.S. Coast Guard recruitment office, and the National Museum of the Marine Corps. Despite the absence of casualties, there was material damage exceeding $100,000, and these incidents were carried out by “lone wolves.” However, in 2015, the targeting came from supporters of ISIS in Iraq and Syria by creating a list containing 100 U.S. military service members, including all their personal information.

  1. Jihadist Violence by American Citizens: The analysis of the aforementioned data indicates that the majority of terrorist acts that occurred in the United States were carried out by American citizens. Since the events of September 11, 2001, American jihadists have been 80% citizens or residents in the United States, and more than 40% of them were U.S.-born citizens. While there is a small percentage indicating efforts by foreign citizens to carry out terrorist acts as in the events of September 11 itself, or the attempt by Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula to bomb Northwest Airlines Flight 253, which had 289 people on board, in addition to another incident revealed in a shooting at the Pensacola Naval Air Station.

Factors Limiting Terrorism:

The decline in the number of terrorist attacks and plots against the United States, particularly following the defeat of the Islamic State organization since 2019, can be attributed to several factors, some of which are related to security policies and others outside of this framework, as follows:

Absence of Jihadist Incentives: Despite the occurrence of several global variables, whether related to the context of the international system or jihadist organizations, they have not been able to become a field that incites jihadists in America to carry out terrorist operations. Although prominent and impactful geopolitical events such as the victory of the Taliban movement in Afghanistan and the Israeli war on the Gaza Strip were able to mobilize sympathizers with jihadists in the United States, this did not lead to an increase in jihadist attacks and plots, and the idea of the rise of Al-Qaeda and ISIS organizations in Africa did not inspire or incite American jihadists.

Lack of Support and American Pressure: The decline in terrorist attacks within the American interior can be explained by increased military pressure on ISIS, as this was a reason for cutting off supplies and support from potential jihadist terrorists in the United States. Even the “virtual facilitator” model adopted by ISIS to incite and support terrorist plans in Washington diminished after the organization lost its last major territories in the Middle East. In the period from 2013 to 2019, there were 13 attacks or plots based on the idea of virtual communication with a member of a terrorist organization located outside the United States, with the aim of initiating a terrorist act on American soil, but since the fall of ISIS, virtual communication strategies have only included 3 attacks or plots, attributed to the pressures exerted by Washington to combat terrorism, represented in tracking online communications or targeting the strongholds and training centers of these organizations.

Decreased Radicalization Rates among the Muslim Community: The decline in levels of “jihadist terrorism” within the American interior can also be explained by the decrease in levels of radicalization among the Muslim community in the United States and their increasing regular cooperation with law enforcement authorities. Many of the plots that were thwarted by the Federal Bureau of Investigation were discovered within the framework of some cooperation from the Muslim community with law enforcement authorities and their notification of suspicious activity.

Dynamics and Effectiveness of Counter-Terrorism Institutions: In parallel with the aforementioned factors, there has been intense activity from local counter-terrorism institutions in the United States over the past twenty years, which has likely led to a reduction in terrorist plots and achieved a degree of deterrence for a large number of elements affiliated with jihadist organizations.

Absence of Links between the United States and International Jihadists: Most of the jihadist plots in the United States do not involve any direct connection to international terrorist organizations. Among the 129 attacks and plots (about 18%) recorded over the past twenty years, only 23 attacks and plots involved known contact between the plotters and a member of an international terrorist organization. Among these plots and attacks, 11 of them involved Al-Qaeda, and 9 of them involved ISIS, with most of the plots and attacks carried out by ISIS occurring at the peak of its control and rise within Arab countries. In this context, Al-Qaeda and its agents have continued to provide training to plotters and attackers in a more traditional manner, whether it be training on bomb-making or training on flying to hijack airplanes.

In contrast, ISIS adopted the “virtual facilitation” approach to support its virtual followers instead of training them abroad. The plot that was thwarted in 2024 to carry out an attack on election day in the city of Oklahoma was the latest of these plots. The U.S. Department of Justice accused the alleged plotter of communicating online with a member of ISIS, possibly in the Islamic State of Khorasan Province.

In conclusion, the study reached a series of conclusions, the first being that the threat of “jihadist terrorism” does not warrant additional special attention from local law enforcement agencies or policymakers beyond the already high levels currently being dealt with. Despite the fact that the recent attack in the American city of New Orleans is one of the most severe incidents, it does not indicate that it is part of the return of jihadists to prominence in the United States.

The study also indicates that the current American methods of monitoring and disrupting terrorists abroad require the provision of continuous and sustainable support from policymakers, especially since the plots executed by foreign terrorists still pose a threat that deserves ongoing attention, as the tactics followed by the United States to combat terrorism can greatly enhance the disruption of various plots, whether those related to foreign terrorists or those that exist internally. Finally, the results generally indicate that “jihadist terrorism” in the United States does not pose a danger and does not require special action to confront it, and the matter is limited to intensifying American activity externally to undermine and confront international terrorist organizations such as ISIS and Al-Qaeda.

Source:

Alexander Palmer, Skyeler Jackson, and Daniel Byman, Jihadist Terrorism in the United States: What the Data Tell Us, CSIS BRIEFS, Center for Strategic & International Studies, Washington, 21 January 2025.

Mohamed SAKHRI

I’m Mohamed Sakhri, the founder of World Policy Hub. I hold a Bachelor’s degree in Political Science and International Relations and a Master’s in International Security Studies. My academic journey has given me a strong foundation in political theory, global affairs, and strategic studies, allowing me to analyze the complex challenges that confront nations and political institutions today.

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