As much as the war in Ethiopia’s Tigray region represented the peak of Eritrean-Ethiopian coordination and rapprochement, the understandings that concluded the war marked the beginning of a new chapter in the relationship between the two long-standing rivals, characterized by a latent tension over numerous contentious issues.
This tension has taken an upward turn in recent months, with several indicators confirming both sides’ readiness for a potential round of conflict. Many sources have reported a movement of armored military mobilizations on both sides of the border, along with the Eritrean government announcing a general mobilization campaign. General Tsadkan Gebretensae warned in an article that the outbreak of another comprehensive war between the two countries “is not just a possibility, but an inevitable event unless immediate preventive measures are taken.”
This paper aims to analyze the underlying motivations behind the Ethiopian-Eritrean tension since the signing of the Pretoria agreement in November 2022. It will also address the indicators that have recently emerged indicating escalation and the likelihood of military engagement, concluding with an explanation of the catastrophic consequences that would follow the outbreak of war between the two nations, and suggesting a solution not only to overcome the current crisis but also to address the root causes of the ongoing tension between Asmara and Addis Ababa.
Factors Behind Eritrean-Ethiopian Tension
When discussing the drivers of the current tension between Eritrea and Ethiopia, they can be divided into three interconnected circles: one related to the internal conditions of both countries, another revealing its connection to regional dimensions and conflicts, and the last linking Ethiopian ambitions to return to the Red Sea through the Eritrean gateway within an international context that appears to herald significant changes.
Internal Factors:
Ethiopian Ambitions to Reach the Red Sea: The Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed’s intention for his country to acquire a sovereign maritime outlet is one of the key drivers of the current crisis between Eritrea and Ethiopia. In a speech he delivered in October 2023, Ahmed presented several arguments supporting this claim, including historical and practical factors linked to the economic, demographic, and security vulnerabilities stemming from Ethiopia’s status as a landlocked country with a population of nearly 120 million.
This rhetoric has sounded alarm bells in Asmara, considering various factors related to the historical context of the relationship between the two countries. Ethiopia fully annexed Eritrea in 1952, and access to the sea was one of its primary objectives in controlling Eritrea, ultimately leading to the outbreak of the Eritrean revolution, which successfully fought for thirty years to achieve national freedom. Since then, some Ethiopian nationalist currents view this as a historical mistake that must be corrected.
A second worrisome factor for Asmara is that although Ahmed downplayed the use of force to obtain the port in his famous speech and in a statement made to parliament in November 2023, he cautioned that this issue could lead to conflict if peaceful avenues failed.
The third noteworthy aspect is that all Ethiopian statements indicate a desire for a Red Sea outlet. Even after signing the memorandum of understanding with the separatist Somaliland region, Ethiopian rhetoric remained focused on the Red Sea, which is a concerning indicator for Asmara, feeling that the port of Assab is the target of this discourse.
The Pretoria Agreement and Its Implications: After two years of bloody battles, the Ethiopian government and the Tigray People’s Liberation Front engaged in negotiations that led to the signing of the Pretoria Agreement to cease hostilities between both parties in November 2023. This represented a promising step towards establishing peace and stability in Ethiopia.
Although Asmara denied seeking to undermine the Pretoria agreement, it maintained a negative stance towards this agreement, which some described as a “stab in the back.” Eritrea was not included in this agreement’s framework despite being a major partner to Addis Ababa in the war against Tigray, and its army sustained significant human losses, while Asmara faced international pressures and sanctions due to its involvement in the war.
Asmara’s negative position on this agreement stems from multiple motivations, including its provisions allowing Tigray to remain a political force in the country, whereas Eritrean leadership felt that this political entity should be entirely dismantled.
Conflict in the Amhara Region: The signing of the Pretoria Agreement did not only dismantle the Eritrean-Ethiopian alliance but also dealt a fatal blow to the alliance between Abiy Ahmed and the Amhara nationalist militias, which were key partners in the war against the Tigray People’s Liberation Front. These militias believe they were excluded from negotiations and that they were not consulted about the terms of the ceasefire agreement before its approval.
The issue of the disputed territories between Amhara and Tigray is prominent in this context, as the absolute refusal to cede control over these territories was one reason that the Amhara nationalists demanded separate representation in Pretoria negotiations. Given that the agreement’s provisions for addressing issues concerning the disputed territories align with the Ethiopian constitution, which implies their subordination to Tigray, it was seen as a “red line” by members of the Ethiopian parliament from the Amhara National Movement. Any arrangement failing to acknowledge this would lead to a state of perpetual instability in the region.
Crisis in the Tigray Region: Following the signing of the Pretoria Agreement, disagreements quickly arose among senior Tigray leaders, which later crystallized into two factions: one includes the temporary transitional administration in Tigray led by Getachew Reda, while the other forms a wing of the Tigray People’s Liberation Front led by Debretsion Gebremichael, who recently asserted control over the regional capital, Mekelle, imposing his authority and allies over vast areas in the region.
In this context, Eritrea has been accused by various Ethiopian parties of harboring Debretsion’s faction and contributing to the escalation of this conflict, which both Debretsion’s faction and Asmara have denied. Yet, supporters of this accusation argue that both sides share a negative stance towards the Pretoria Agreement and a desire to overthrow Abiy Ahmed.
Eritrean Military Presence in Ethiopia: Eritrean forces entered Tigray to support the Ethiopian federal government against the Tigray People’s Liberation Front, controlling parts of the region beyond the Eritrean territories occupied by Ethiopia as per the Algiers Agreement, which Ethiopia has stalled in implementing.
Upon the war’s conclusion, the Pretoria Agreement stipulated the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Tigray. Since then, the presence of the Eritrean army in parts of the region has become a contentious issue between Eritrea and Ethiopia, with the temporary Tigray administration reiterating its condemnation of Eritrean forces’ presence and calling on the federal government to ensure their withdrawal, while Eritrea denies this, claiming its forces are spread “within its sovereign territory.”
Conclusion Despite the drums of war echoing in both Eritrea and Ethiopia, a direct and extensive military confrontation between the two seems unlikely. Ethiopia, engulfed in internal crises, does not appear capable of bearing the security and economic burdens of such a choice. In contrast, Eritrea, given its current circumstances and its defensive rather than offensive rhetoric, does not seem inclined to initiate this war.
Therefore, the current cycle of tension may signal a pattern that Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed uses, employing a brinkmanship policy that threatens mutual fall into the abyss of armed conflict, prompting external parties to develop and expedite initiatives to ensure Addis Ababa achieves its objectives.
In light of the looming threat of conflict, the situation calls for urgent international and regional mediation efforts aimed at addressing the root causes of the ongoing tension, including border delineation according to the Algiers Agreement, discussions about Ethiopian ambitions to access international waters without threatening Eritrean sovereignty, and fostering international support for building economic partnerships between the two countries.
The resolution of these issues, while challenging and requiring regional and international cooperation, is paramount to avoiding a devastating conflict that would alter regional maps at a significant human and economic cost.
References
1-General Tsadkan G. Bayru, Tigray cannot be the battleground for Ethiopia and Eritrea, African Report, 10 March 2025, (Accessed: 15 March 2025), https://n9.cl/eg9nz
2- Abdelkader Mohamed Ali, Ethiopia’s Red Sea Port Claim: Motives, Backgrounds, and Repercussions, Al Jazeera Center for Studies, December 26, 2023, (accessed March 12, 2025), https://n9.cl/tyc87
3- Abdelkader Mohamed Ali, a movement in the Horn of Africa. Is the birth of an anti-Ethiopian coalition written?, Al Jazeera, January 13, 2024 (accessed March 15, 2025), https://n9.cl/78kl8
4-Michael Woldemariam, Taking Ethiopia-Eritrea Tensions Seriously, United States Institute of Peace, 15 December 2023, (Accessed: 12 March 2025), https://n9.cl/98b0f
5- For more details on this agreement, see: Abdelkader Mohamed Ali: Cessation of Hostilities Agreement in Ethiopia: Gains, Gaps and Future Scenarios, Al Jazeera Center for Studies, November 27, 2022, (accessed March 12, 2025), https://n9.cl/syupzr
7. Mohamed Saleh Omar, Ethiopia and Eritrea. From the Coalition Trench to the Rivalry Square, Al Jazeera, March 7, 2025 (accessed March 12, 2025), https://n9.cl/zqt1z2
8- Abdelkader Mohamed Ali, Agreement on Cessation of Hostilities in Ethiopia, op. cit.
9- Michael Woldemariam, Taking Ethiopia-Eritrea Tensions Seriously, ibid.
10- Abdelkader Mohamed Ali, From Alliance to Conflict: The Dynamics of the Amhara-Abiy Ahmed, Al Jazeera Center for Studies, 8 May 2024 (accessed 12 March 2025), https://n9.cl/8wofi
11- Ibid.
12. See, for example:
Mulatu teshome Wirtu, To avoid another conflict in the Horn of Africa, now is the time to act, Aljazeera, 17 February 2025, (Seen: 13 March 2025), https://n9.cl/bj6ikl
13- General Tsadkan G. Bayru, Tigray cannot be the battleground for Ethiopia and Eritrea, African Report, 10 March 2025, (Accessed: 15 March 2025), https://n9.cl/eg9nz
14- UMD Media, News Report: TPLF Faction Denies Alleged Secret Ties with Eritrea, 26 February2025, (Accessed: 15 March 2025), https://n9.cl/mew63e
16- General Tsadkan G. Bayru, Tigray cannot be the battleground for Ethiopia and Eritrea, Ibid.
17. The conflict has its roots in the Ethiopian-Eritrean war (1998-2000), which ended with the Algiers Agreement. The agreement granted areas including the disputed city of Badme to Eritrea, but Ethiopia initially refused to carry out the ruling, leading to protracted tensions. However, in 2018, Ethiopia’s prime minister, Abiy Ahmed, launched a peace process, promising to respect the agreement. This improved relations between the two countries, but the border was not demarcated in accordance with the Algiers Agreement until the Tigray war, which later changed all alliances.
18- Al Jazeera, African Union warns of grave situation in Ethiopia’s Tigray region, March 14, 2025 (accessed March 15, 2025), https://n9.cl/p1xar
20- It is remarkable that the Ethiopian Prime Minister linked the Renaissance Dam to the Red Sea, where Ahmed stressed that “the Red Sea and the Nile River are the basis for Ethiopia’s development or annihilation,” and that he is ready to “negotiate the benefit of the Red Sea as we negotiated the Renaissance Dam.”
Office of the prime Minister- Ethiopia, (18.11-18.30)
21- Abdul Qadir Muhammad Ali, with the decline of its international isolation. Is Eritrea on the cusp of political reform?, Al Jazeera, 19 May 2024 (accessed 15 March 2025), https://n9.cl/wfkx3
22- Ibid.
23- Aljazeera, Somalia, Eritrea and Egypt pledge to bolster security ties, 10 October 2024, (Accessed: 13 March 2025), https://n9.cl/ti525
24- Institute for the Study of War, Africa File, October 17, 2024: Egypt-Eritrea-Somalia Summit; Challenges with Tigray Peace Process, 17 October 2024, (Accessed: 13 March 2025), https://n9.cl/nsep9
25. It is notable here that the Ambassador of Ethiopia to Belgium, Luxembourg and the European Union, Groom Abbay, stated that “powerful countries believe that Ethiopia has the right to own a seaport”.
Radio IRENA, Ethiopia’s ambassador to the European Union, says the existence of Ethiopia’s port on the Red Sea is a matter of his country’s existence, October 4, 2023 (accessed: December 16, 2023), https://cutt.us/dPpnP
26- Aron Hagos, Brigade N’Hamedu: From Diaspora to Asmara, Martin Plaut, 5 February 2025, (Accessed: 14 March 2025), https://n9.cl/428qn
27- Ministry of Information of Eritrea, Ethiopian Airlines resumes flight to Asmara, Shabiat, 18 July 2018, (Accessed: 15 March 2025), https://n9.cl/lyjac
28- Addis Standard, Ethiopian Airlines ‘seeking clarification’ after Eritrea suspends flights effective Sept, 24 July 2024, (Accessed: 15 March 2025), https://n9.cl/g0y24q
29- Mulatu Teshome Wirtu, To avoid another conflict in the Horn of Africa, now is the time to act, Aljazeera,17 February 2025, (Accessed: 15 March 2025), https://n9.cl/bj6ikl
30- Ibid.
32- Ibid.
33- Aze.media, Azerbaijan issues note to Eritrea over detention of three ships, 8 January 2025, (Accessed: 15 March 2025), https://n9.cl/2orcqv
34- Mahmoud Abubakar, “Azeri arms ships spark ‘hidden crisis’ between Eritrea and Ethiopia,” Independent Arabic, February 11, 2025 (accessed March 15, 2025), https://n9.cl/1apmp
35- Lanfranchi, Guido and Dessalegen Gedebo, Amanuel, A dangerous frenemy: Averting a showdown between Eritrea and Ethiopia, Netherlands Institute of International Relations, March 2025, p 6.
36- Ibid.
37- Ibid.
38- Ibid.
39- Ibid.
40. Eritrean Foreign Minister Osman Saleh’s visit to the kingdom on 9 March 2025 is likely part of Riyadh’s diplomatic efforts between Eritrea and Ethiopia. See:
Ministry of Information of Eritrea, Minister Osman Saleh Delivers Message of President Isaias, Shabiat, 9 March 2025, (Accessed: 15 March 2025), https://n9.cl/v7aml
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