About 26 days after Iran’s extensive ballistic missile attack on three Israeli military bases on October 1, 2024, the Israeli response was “engineered” between Tel Aviv and Washington to avoid leading to a wide-scale regional war, thereby preserving everyone’s face—from Iran and Israel to maintaining the Democrats’ chances in the upcoming U.S. presidential elections scheduled for November 5.
The Israeli response, carried out in the early hours of October 26, was limited to targeting 20 Iranian military sites. This included air defense bases, particularly those housing four Russian-made “S-300” systems, and the destruction of solid fuel rocket mixer production lines. This “engineering” of the Israeli response allowed Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to speak of the “painful and precise” strikes as successes, reaffirming his commitment to extreme right ministers to punish Tehran for the largest attack Israel has suffered in its history, which involved around 200 Iranian ballistic missiles on October 1. Furthermore, this “engineering” allowed Tehran to promote a narrative claiming its losses were minimal, with no more than four soldiers killed at the targeted bases, praising its air defenses, despite Israel’s assertion that it had destroyed these defenses in the first wave of three attack waves.
This method of the Israeli attack aligned with the interests of the current U.S. administration and Democratic presidential candidate Kamala Harris, for whom a broad war in the Middle East is not beneficial, especially with elections approaching in just a few days. Additionally, Washington implicitly bragged about successfully persuading Tel Aviv not to target Iran’s nuclear facilities or oil wells.
Questions arise such as: What factors compelled Israel to adopt this “limited” response? Will Iran retaliate against the Israeli attack, as Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi suggested? What new equations and calculations have emerged as a result of this Israeli attack? Can these equations redefine the Middle East? These questions can be answered through the following ten trends.
Limited Capabilities Compared to Objectives:
Before the Israeli attack on Iran, estimates suggested that Tel Aviv might resort to destroying Iran’s four famous nuclear reactors in Bushehr, Natanz, Arak, and Fordow. However, in the end, Israel did not target these nuclear facilities for several primary reasons, including:
Lack of Necessary Capabilities: Israel does not possess the U.S. bombs weighing over 32,000 pounds, the only type capable of destroying underground nuclear reactors deep in the Iranian desert. This differs from the approximately 2,000-pound bombs previously used by Israel to assassinate Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah and his successor, Hashem Safieddine. According to the American site Axios, the U.S. refused to provide Israel with the 32,000-pound bombs to prevent an attack on Iranian nuclear sites. Additionally, Tel Aviv lacks strategic bombers like the B-52 Stratofortress, capable of flying long distances, which Washington used to bomb Houthi targets in Yemen due to their attacks on ships in the Red Sea.
Geographical Distance: Israel acknowledged that geographical factors played a significant role in favor of Iran, as the “F-35” aircraft carried light loads due to the over 1,800-kilometer distance between Israel and Iran. As the distances increased, aircraft reduced their ammunition load to accommodate additional fuel tanks. According to the Israeli military’s statement, approximately 100 aircraft, particularly “F-35s,” were used, and these planes did not penetrate Iranian territory but rather attacked from Iran’s western border. This may explain why most targets attacked by Israel were in western and southwestern Iran, avoiding central, eastern, or northeastern areas. The Arak, Natanz, and Fordow reactors are located in the desert’s interior, dispersed across Iranian territory covering 1.6 million square kilometers, making penetration risky for Israeli aircraft during both the attack and the return journey.
Avoiding Negative Consequences: Israel could not target the Bushehr reactor, which is very close to Gulf states, as this could harm not only Gulf countries but also more than 30,000 American soldiers who might be affected by nuclear fallout from Bushehr. Tel Aviv also sought to avoid provoking Tehran to change its nuclear doctrine from its current peaceful program—per U.S. intelligence assessments—to surpassing the nuclear threshold and increasing uranium enrichment from 60% to the 90% necessary for producing an atomic bomb.
Not Targeting Oil Facilities:
Israel refrained from targeting oil facilities, especially oil fields, storage tanks in Abadan, and refineries near the Arabian Gulf, following advice from the United States, according to several American newspapers, including The Washington Post, for several reasons:
- Fear of Skyrocketing Oil Prices: High oil prices would adversely affect fuel prices in the United States just days before the American elections, harming Harris’s position.
- Iran’s Pre-Attack Announcement: Iran had published a list of targets prior to the Israeli attack, including Israeli gas fields in the eastern Mediterranean. Based on Israeli calculations, Tel Aviv was certain that Tehran could absorb any strike against its oil facilities because these installations are spread over wide areas, while Israeli oil and gas facilities are densely concentrated in a narrow space of no more than 120 kilometers.
American “Red Lines”:
For the first time, Israel adhered to U.S. “red lines” since October 7, 2023, as President Joe Biden publicly stated multiple times that Washington does not support strikes against Iranian nuclear reactors or oil facilities. Tel Aviv likely aimed not to embarrass the White House, which asserted that it advised Israel not to expand its targets to avoid dragging the region into a widespread regional war detrimental to Harris’s prospects, an outcome feared by the Democrats, who wanted to avoid repeating what is known as the “Bernie Sanders scenario” in 2016 when the Democratic base favored the progressive senator’s nomination, but the Democratic Party establishment stood behind Hillary Clinton, resulting in Sanders’s supporters not turning out for the election and Trump winning.
The expansion of war in the Middle East could also amplify dissatisfaction among supporters of the party’s liberal wing, led by Sanders and Elizabeth Warren, adversely affecting the Democrats’ chances in the November 2024 elections.
Neutralizing Air Defense:
The Israeli response specifically targeted four Russian-made “S-300” air defense systems acquired by Iran in 2016, according to The Wall Street Journal. An Israeli drone had previously targeted the command and control center of these systems on April 19, when Tel Aviv struck the city of Isfahan in retaliation for the initial Iranian attack on Israel on April 13. If the Israeli narrative is accurate regarding the destruction of these air defense systems, it would make it easier for Israel to penetrate Iranian air defenses thereafter.
Neutrality of Regional Countries:
The unity and strong stance of Arab nations were evident in their refusal to allow the use of their airspace by either party in the current conflict, particularly those countries along the flight paths of Israeli aircraft heading towards Iran. These countries maintained a position of strict neutrality, aligning only with peace and stability, and rejecting the expansion of the conflict when they declared that they would not allow their territories or skies to be used to target any party. This neutrality was evident in the Iraqi government’s announcement on October 28 of its formal protest to the United Nations Secretary-General and the UN Security Council regarding Israel’s use of Iraqi airspace in its attack on Iran. This sent a clear message to both Tehran and Tel Aviv that the countries in the region do not wish to broaden the scope of the war or enter a maze of regional conflicts whose consequences are unknown.
Messages to Russia:
Iranian Foreign Minister Araghchi’s accusation of U.S. involvement in the attack on Iran through reconnaissance of Israeli aircraft in its airspace was not made lightly. According to numerous American media outlets, Tehran was preparing to supply thousands of ballistic missiles to Russia to assist Moscow in its war against Kyiv; thus, destroying the production lines for solid fuel rocket mixers would not only impact Iran’s missile capabilities but also prevent it from pursuing any deal to support Russia with these missiles.
Additionally, the Israeli aircraft targeted drone storage facilities, sending another message to Russia, which had already received thousands of drones from Iran, according to American officials, including National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan. All of this possibly explains the leaks to certain media outlets suggesting that Russia supplied Iran with intelligence about Israeli and American movements shortly before the Israeli response.
Weakening Tehran’s Allies:
Targeting the production lines for ballistic missiles and drones could disrupt Iran’s supply of these weapons to the Houthis in Yemen, Hezbollah in Lebanon, and Hamas in Gaza, as well as weaken Iranian supply lines of these weapons to its allies in Iraq and Syria. The coming weeks will reveal the extent of the damage that could affect Iran’s ability to supply its regional allies and proxies.
A Window for Diplomacy:
Iran’s two attacks on Israel on April 13 and October 1, 2024, and Israel’s response have demonstrated to all, including Tehran and its allies, as well as Tel Aviv and its ally Washington, that it may be time to halt the current war. This period represents a “real window for diplomacy” to stop the fighting in Gaza through proposals for “short ceasefires,” which are currently being discussed in Cairo and Doha, and to initiate Israeli discussions about ending the war in southern Lebanon, especially with all Lebanese parties agreeing to implement Resolution 1701 without amendments or deletions.
Lack of Iranian Retaliation:
The Iranian narrative regarding the Israeli attack reflects intentions of non-retaliation. All Iranian statements describe the Israeli attack as limited and having been thwarted by air defense systems; this may be a setup for Iran’s non-response, especially since the attack avoided targeting prominent figures, nuclear facilities, or Iranian oil fields.
A New Approach for the Day After:
The retaliatory strikes between Tel Aviv and Tehran have revealed the fragility of regional security, which calls for exploring a new approach to prevent future conflicts in the area, as the old equations in the Middle East have proven to be far off and incapable of achieving safety and security for the countries and peoples in the region.
