Does the Biggest Threat to Erdogan End with the Death of the Great Preacher?

On the occasion of the 101st anniversary of the founding of the Turkish Republic by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, the Turkish regime has eliminated its most significant contemporary threat following the announcement of the death of Fethullah Gülen, the founder of the Gülen movement, on October 21, in Pennsylvania, USA. The Justice and Development Party (AKP) government has not concealed its relief at the death of a man whose relationship with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has raised questions and speculation for over five decades.

Despite Erdoğan’s reliance on religious movements to manage the affairs of his country, particularly Sufi movements, the Gülen movement represented a unique challenge for the Turkish regime. Gülen transformed from a close ally of the Turkish president to an enemy; his movement was classified as a terrorist organization following accusations of plotting the bloody coup in July. Thus, Gülen’s death raises fundamental questions about its ramifications on Turkish policies, both domestically and internationally, and its effects on the fate of the movement and its successor, as well as its interactions with the new realities that will emerge in the post-Gülen era.

Historical Roots of the Gülen Movement

Fethullah Gülen, born in 1941, was an imam from the Erzurum province in eastern Turkey. He became a significant political player in Turkey thanks to his patient and methodical development of the Gülen movement (Hizmet) from the 1960s until the first decade of the 21st century. Today, he is regarded as the leading figure of a movement that enjoys the loyalty of millions, often referred to as the Gülen Movement, while in Turkey, it is known as the Fethullah Gülen Terrorist Organization (FETO).

This organization was officially established in the 1970s, stemming from traditional Islamic Sufi groups that promoted the concept of integrating Islam with liberal values, as well as democracy and interfaith dialogue. The movement gained a foothold in Turkish politics through a global network of schools, research centers, and media outlets, which provided fertile ground for the cadres of the AKP during its early years in power. The movement exerted significant influence over the media, commercial institutions, and state agencies and was very active abroad, managing schools in various locations around the world, becoming a crucial component of Turkey’s soft power for decades.

As a cleric, Gülen was sent to the coastal city of Izmir in the 1960s, where he began to expand his base. During this period, he established and funded a network of students who would become the core of the movement, transforming from a religious figure in western Turkey to the founder of an expansive movement managing schools, charitable institutions, and media organizations. Gülen, known among his followers as “the Great Preacher,” continued to build a solid base of supporters, forming his sect and its core cadre. By the 1990s, members trained in movement institutions began to find positions within state institutions, creating one of the most significant challenges in contemporary Turkish political history.

Despite close monitoring by the Turkish military, Gülen established schools in Turkish-speaking countries, the Balkans, and Africa, especially following the collapse of the Soviet Union. His schools graduated thousands of students every year, and the movement also managed to control companies across various sectors, including food, health, education, and media, thanks to the annual donations from its followers.

As the decade drew to a close, Turkish law enforcement agencies prepared a report revealing the movement’s influence within state institutions, leading to an investigation by the prosecutor, who accused Gülen of attempting to establish a theocratic state. These investigations resulted in Gülen leaving Turkey for the United States in March 1999, and he never returned until his death.

Fethullah Gülen’s Journey from Ally to Enemy

It didn’t take long for Erdoğan’s rise to power in 2003 to provide the Gülen movement with an opportunity to bring its political influence to the forefront. The new prime minister lacked influence within state institutions, and Gülen needed Erdoğan to help expand the movement’s reach, or as Gülen himself stated in one of his speeches, “to infiltrate the veins of the state.”

As a result, the AKP government engaged in an open war with its close ally, particularly after the infamous “Ergenekon Case,” which suggested the existence of a shadowy group of secular military officers, journalists, and politicians conspiring to take control of the state, leading to a division between Gülen and then-Prime Minister Erdoğan.

For decades, the Turkish regime viewed the Gülen movement as operating a “parallel state” and believed that movement supporters within the military were behind the bloody coup attempt on July 15, 2016. While the precise details of the conspiracy remain unclear, both government supporters and opposition figures in Turkey agreed that the Gülen movement was behind the coup, which resulted in the deaths of around 300 people, as rebel military officers bombed the Turkish parliament. Gülen’s movement was added to the list of Turkey’s top terrorist organizations and labeled a terrorist organization.

By the end of 2016, the Turkish regime launched widespread purges against institutions affiliated with the Gülen movement. Universities, media outlets, and associations were shut down, and over 42,000 military, police, and judicial personnel were arrested or dismissed. More than 23,400 employees in the education sector were suspended, hundreds of teachers, doctors, and lawyers had their licenses revoked, and thousands of Gülen movement members were imprisoned.

To escape these severe repercussions, tens of thousands of Turkish citizens fled to exile in Europe, especially Germany, fearing accusations of belonging to the movement and involvement in the coup attempt, as 80,000 sought asylum since 2016. Following this, Erdoğan called on the United States to extradite Gülen, but it did not respond, and Washington’s refusal became a significant source of tension between the two countries. As a result, the pressure exerted by the Turkish government significantly diminished the movement’s influence in domestic politics, potentially leading to its demise. By the end of 2024, more than 700,000 members of the Gülen movement and its supporters had been prosecuted. Due to the Turkish government’s purging policy, thousands of state employees lost their jobs, especially in the judiciary, military, police, and education sectors, indicating that the movement now has limited human and financial resources, and is leaderless.

Implications of Gülen’s Death on the Future of the AKP Government

Gülen’s death is likely to lead to a series of profound political and social consequences within the Turkish regime, the most notable of which are as follows:

1. Weakened Justification for Internal Crises: Gülen’s death, as the central figure of the Gülen movement, may weaken Erdoğan’s ability to confront internal criticisms and pressures, especially regarding the economic crisis and the state of human rights in the country, as Gülen’s movement has often been used as a pretext for these crises.
2. Neutralization of Ankara’s Pressure on European Countries: In the near future, the prominence and activity of the Gülen movement in European countries, particularly Germany and Austria, are expected to decline. Additionally, some elements of the Gülen movement may seek alternative havens due to potential internal upheavals that may affect funding for movement groups in Europe, thereby reducing Ankara’s arguments for pressuring European governments to pursue the movement and its members.
3. Erosion of Momentum Surrounding the Memory of the 2016 Coup: What was once a significant tool for Erdoğan’s domestic policies, the 2016 coup attempt, justified by various motivations including reaffirming the strength of the ruling regime, reinforcing his mental image to bolster local influence, and tightening control over the country’s security structures, may see that momentum erode following Gülen’s death.
4. Mobilizing Public Support for the Gülen Movement: Gülen’s death could rekindle the movement’s momentum in Turkish streets and create significant sympathy for his followers post-mortem. Notably, the movement still retains a positive reputation among various social sectors and religious classes in Turkey, especially through its substantial charitable role via businesses, medical clinics, educational institutions, and social services offered at nominal prices.

The Fate of the Gülen Movement After Gülen

It is challenging for a sect-like organization to cultivate the same level of loyalty among its followers after the death of its founder. The movement was built upon Gülen’s personage, and his departure may signify the official end of the organization; however, this will not prevent the movement— even in its weakest moments— from continuing to provoke issues internationally, given its effective global network, especially in the United States. The following points highlight this:

Succession Issue: The Gülen movement may face significant challenges and internal conflicts concerning the transition to new leadership after Gülen’s death, particularly regarding the movement’s leadership structures in Europe and the United States. This conflict is fueled by recent internal disputes within the movement, which reached unprecedented levels following Gülen’s declining health, resulting in various factions vying for leadership, including the Mustafa Özcan group and the Barbaros Koçakurt group, which are responsible for the movement’s external activities.

Increased Splintering: Following Gülen’s death, groups may break away from the Gülen movement due to internal divisions and the potential cessation of financial support in some countries, prompting these groups to join alternative advocacy entities or consider returning to Turkey to surrender to security forces and acknowledge the role of the movement in the 2016 coup to benefit from the “remorse law” introduced by the AKP after the coup, allowing those involved or supportive of the coup to confess their charges in exchange for lighter sentences.

Declining Global Influence of the Movement: All indicators point to a decrease in the geographical presence of the Gülen movement, particularly in regions that were previously centers of its activity, such as Central Asia, Africa, Europe, and America. Early conflicts among movement leaders over Gülen’s estimated billion-dollar assets exacerbate this decline.

Shift to a Decentralized Movement: The Gülen movement was highly centralized during Gülen’s leadership, marked by his significant influence across a broad range of countries. Consequently, his death and increasing internal turmoil may fuel the expansion of decentralized management in the future, with each group in each country operating as an independent organization.

New Ideological Framework: Some elements of the movement may alter their orientations or choose to operate independently in their respective countries, distancing themselves from Gülen’s ideas and principles. This shift is encouraged by the violent crises affecting the organizational framework of the movement following its founder’s death.

Conclusion

In summary, the death of Fethullah Gülen, the founder of the Gülen movement, will fundamentally impose new dynamics internally regarding Erdoğan’s use of the movement to navigate some of the challenges he faces, especially since he categorizes Gülen and his followers as terrorists and holds them responsible for the deterioration of certain political and security situations in the country.

Externally, Gülen’s death may lead to an improvement in Turkish-American relations. Ankara’s battle with the Gülen movement had international dimensions; when the dispute began, Turkey sought to convince its partners to take stringent measures against the movement, labeling it a terrorist organization and demanding they curb its funding sources and extradite its members, and it insisted on seizing the movement’s overseas assets. Additionally, it insisted on the extradition of Gülen, which Washington refused, publicly accusing it of indirect involvement in the coup. Now, with Gülen’s death, the primary case of symbolic importance in the bilateral relations between the two countries has fallen off the agenda.